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Scientific Progress and Accomplishments: 
This project addresses the problem of how to produce reliable software 
that is also flexible and cost effective for the DoD distributed 
software domain. Current and future DoD software systems fall into two 
categories: information systems and warfighter systems. Both kinds of 
systems can be distributed, heterogeneous and network-based, consisting 
of a set of components running on different platforms and working 
together via multiple communication links and protocols. 
We focused on "wrap and glue" technology based on a domain specific 
distributed prototype model. Glue and wrappers consists of software 
that bridges the interoperability gap between individual COTS/GOTS 
components. The key to making the proposed approach reliable, flexible, 
and cost-effective is the automatic generation of glue and wrappers 
based on a designer's specification. The proposed "wrap and glue" 
approach allows system designers to concentrate on the difficult 
interoperability problems and defines solutions in terms of deeper and 
more difficult interoperability issues, while freeing designers from 
implementation details. The objective of our research is to develop an 
integrated set of formal models and methods for system engineering 
automation. These results will. enable building decision support tools 
for concurrent engineering. Our research addresses complex modular 
systems with embedded control software and real-time requirements. 
Our long-term goals are to construct an integrated set of software 
tools that can improve software quality and flexibility by automating a 
significant part of the process, and providing substantial decision 
support for the aspects that cannot be automated. The resulting 
development environment should be adaptable to enable (1) maintaining 
integrated support in the presence of business process improvement, (2) 
incorporation of future improvements in engineering automation methods, 
and (3) specialization to particular problem domains. 
Specific tasks accomplished in FYOO include (1) the design of an 
interface wrapper model that allows developers to treat distributed 
objects as local objects, ( 2 )  the development of a tool to generate 
Java interface wrappers from a specification written in the high-level 
Prototype System Description Language (PSDL), (3) the design of a 
distributed heterogeneous environment to automate the process of 
integration distributed systems, (4) a case study involving the 
development of a "wrapper and glue" solution for integrating/extending 
COTS/GOTS/legacy components of the Naval Integrated Tactical 
Environmental System I (NITES I), ( 5 )  the design of high-level net 
models for fault detection in multistage interconnected networks, (6) 
tools for assertion checking, dynamic analysis and testing of programs, 
(7) application of machine learning algorithms in software development, 
and (8) reliability modeling for safety critical software. 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper suggests an approach to the development of 
software testing and debugging automation tools based on 
precise program behavior models. The program behavior 
model is defined as a set of events (event trace) with two basic 
binary relations over events -- precedence and inclusion, and 
represents the temporal relationship between actions. A 
language for the computations over event traces is developed 
that provides a basis for assertion checking, debugging 
queries, execution profiles, and performance measurements. 
The approach is nondestructive, since assertion texts are 
separated from the target program source code and can be 
maintained independently. Assertions can capture the 
dynamic properties of a particular target program and can 
formalize the general knowledge of typical bugs and 
debugging strategies. An event grammar provides a sound 
basis for assertion language implementation via target 
program automatic instrumentation. 
An implementation architecture and preliminary 
experiments with a prototype assertion checker for the C 
programming language are discussed. 
Keywords 
software testing and debugging automation. 
Program behavior models, events, event grammars, 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Program testing and debugging is still a human activity 
performed largely without any adequate tools, and consum- 
ing more than 50% of the total program development time 
and effort [9] .  Testing and debugging are mostly concerned 
with the program run-time behavior, and developing a pre- 
cise model of program behavior becomes the first step 
towards any dynamic analysis automation. In building such 
a model several considerations were taken in account. The 
first assumption we make is that the model is discrete, i.e. 
comprises a finite number of well-separated elements. For 
this reason the notion of event as an elementary unit of 
action is an appropriate basis for building the whole model. 
The event is an abstraction for any detectable action per- 
formed during the program execution, such as a statement 
execution, expression evaluation, procedure call, sending 
and receiving a message, etc. 
Actions (or events) are evolving in time and the program 
behavior represents the temporal relationship between 
actions. This implies the necessity to introduce an ordering 
relation for events. Semantics of parallel programming 
languages and even some sequential languages (such as C) do 
not require the total ordering of actions, so partial event 
ordering is the most adequate method for this purpose [21]. 
Actions performed during the program execution are at 
different levels of granularity, some of them include other 
actions, e.g. a subroutine call event contains statement exe- 
cution events. This consideration brings to our model inclu- 
sion relation. Under this relationship, events can be 
hierarchical objects and it becomes possible to consider pro- 
gram behavior at appropriate levels of granularity. 
Finally, the program execution can be modeled as a set of 
events (event trace) with two basic relations: partial ordering 
and inclusion. In order to specify meaningful program 
behavior properties we have to enrich events with some 
a t t r ibu tes .  
An event may have a type and some other attributes, such 
as event duration, program source code related to the event, 
program state associated with the event (i.e. program variable 
values at the beginning and at the end of the event), etc. This 
program behavior model may be regarded as a “lightweight” 
semantics of the programming language. 
The next problem to be addressed after the program 
behavior model is set up is the formalism for specifying 
properties of the program behavior. This could be done in 
many different ways, e.g., by adopting some kind of logic 
calculi (predicate logic, temporal logic). Such a direction 
leads to tools for static program verification, or in more 
pragmatic incarnations to an approach called model checking 
r121. 
Since our goal is dynamic program analysis that requires 
different types of assertion checking, debugging queries, 
program execution profiles, and so on, we developed the 
8 
concept of a computation over the event trace. It seems that 
this concept is general enough to cover all the above 
mentioned needs in the unifying framework, and provides 
sufficient flexibility. This approach implies the design of a 
special programming language for computations over the 
event traces. We suggest a particular language called 
FORMAN ([3], [17]) based on a functional paradigm and the 
use of event patterns and aggregate operations over events. 
The papers [2], [3], [I71 are based on our assertion checker 
prototype for a subset of the PASCAL language. This paper 
describes the first experience with an assertion checker for the 
C programming language. The implementation of the C 
assertion checker is based on source code automatic 
instrumentation and supports almost complete C language 
(the most serious constraint is the requirement that the target 
program is contained in a single compilation unit). To adjust 
to the specifics of the C target language the FORMAN 
language has been modified, in particular, the scope construct 
(WITHIN function-name) and explicit type cast have been 
added (see examples in Sec. 4). 
Patterns describe the structure of events with context 
conditions. Program paths can be described by path 
expressions over events. All this makes it possible to write 
assertions not only about variable values at program points 
but also about data flow and control flow in the target 
program. Assertions can also be used as conditions in rules 
which describe debugging actions. For example, an error 
message is a typical action for a debugger or consistency 
checker. Thus, it is also possible to specify debugging 
s t ra teg ies .  
The notions of  event and event type are powerful 
abstractions which make it possible to write assertions 
independent of a particular target program. Such generic 
assertions can be collected in standard libraries which 
represent general knowledge about typical bugs and 
debugging strategies and could be designed and distributed as 
special software tools. 
Possible applications of a language for computations over 
a program event trace include program testing and debugging, 
performance measurement and modeling, program profiling, 
program animation, program maintenance and program 
documentation [ 5 ] .  Even the traditional debugging method 
based on scattering print statements across the source code 
may be easily implemented as an appropriate computation on 
the event trace (see example in Sec 4). The advantage is that 
the print statements are kept in a separate file and the source 
code of the target program will be instrumented automatically 
just before execution. A study of applying FORMAN to 
parallel programming is presented in [4]. 
2 EVENTS 
FORMAN is based on a semantic model of target program 
behavior in which the program execution is represented by a 
set of events. An event occurs when some action is performed 
during the program execution process. For instance, a 
function is called, a statement is executed, or some expression 
is evaluated. A particular action may be performed many 
times, but every execution of an action is denoted by a unique 
event. 
Every event defines a time interval which has a beginning 
and an end. For atomic events, the beginning and end points 
of the time interval will be the same. All events used for 
assertion checking and other computations over event traces 
must be detectable by some implementation (e.g. by an 
appropriate target program instrumentation.) Attributes 
attached to events bring additional information about event 
context, such as current variable and expression values. 
In order to give some rationale for our notion of an event, 
let us consider a well-known idea such as a counter. Usually 
the history of a variable X when used as a counter looks like: 
x := 0; 1.. 
Loop ... 
x : = x +  1; ... 
endloop; ... 
In order to determine whether the actual behavior of the 
counter X matches the pattern described by the program 
fragment above we have to consider the following events. Let 
Initialize-X denotes the event of assigning 0 to the variable 
X, Augment-X denotes the event of incrementing X, and 
Assign-X denotes the event of assigning any value to the 
variable X. The event Assign-X is a composite one; it 
contains either Initialize-X or Augment-X events. One could 
determine if X behaves as a counter when a program segment 
S is executed in the following way. First, the sequence A of 
all events of the type Assign-X from the event trace of 
program segment S has to be extracted preserving the 
ordering between events. Second, A has to be matched with 
the pattern: 
Initialize-X (Augment-X) * 
where ’*’ denotes repetition zero or more times. If the 
actual sequence of events does not match this pattern we can 
report an error. Therefore, assertion checking can be 
represented as a kind of computation over a target program 
event trace. 
The program state (current values of variables) can be 
considered at the beginning or at the end of an appropriate 
event. This provides the opportunity to write assertions about 
program variable values at different points in the program 
execution history. 
Program profiling usually is based on counting the number 
of events of some type, e.g. the number of statement 
executions or procedure calls. Performance measurements 
may be based on attaching the duration attribute to such 
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events and summarizing durations of selected events. 
3 PROGRAM BEHAVIOR MODEL 
FORMAN is intended to be used to specify behavior of 
programs written in some high-level programming language 
which is called the target language. The model of target 
program behavior is formally defined as a set of events (event 
trace) with two basic relations, which may or may not hold 
between two arbitrary events. The events may be sequentially 
ordered (PRECEDES), or one of them might be included in 
another composite event (IN). For each pair of events in the 
event trace no more than one of these relations can be 
established. 
In order to define the behavior model for a particular target 
language, types of events are introduced. Each event belongs 
to one or more of predefined event types, which are induced 
by target language abstract syntax (e.g. execute-statement, 
send-message, receive-message) or by target language 
semantics (e.g., rendezvous, wait, put-message-in-queue). 
The target program execution model is defined by an event 
grammar. The event may be a compound object, in which 
case the grammar describes how the event is split into other 
event sequences or sets. The event grammar is a set of axioms 
that describe possible patterns of basic relations between 
events of different types in the program execution history; it 
is not intended to be used for parsing an actual event trace. 
The rule A : : B C establishes that if an event a of the 
type A occurs in the trace of a program, it is necessary that 
events b and c of types B and C also exist, such that the 
relations b I N  a, c IN a, b PRECEDES c hold. 
For the C language assertion checker prototype we have 
defined the following simple event grammar. 
(Axiom 1) execute-program:: 
( ex-stmt I eval-expr )* 
(Axiom 2) ex-stmt:: 
( ex-stmt 1 eval-expr )* 
(Axiom 3) eval-expr:: func-call 1 
eval-expr+ destination? 
{ eval-expr } + 
(Axiom 4) func-call:: 
{ eval-expr }* ex-stmt* 
Axiom 1 states that the program execution event contains 
(the IN relation) a set of zero or more ordered (w.r.t. relation 
PRECEDES) events of the types execute-statement or 
eva lua te-express ion .  
Axiom 2 states the same fact about the execute-statement 
event. For example, the event of executing a composite 
statement such as if-then-else will contain an event 
eval-expr for condition evaluation and a sequence of zero 
or more events for the corresponding THEN or ELSE branch 
execution. If a statement has a label’attached, the label 
traversal itself is considered as an empty statement execution 
event .  
Axiom 3 describes the possible structure of an expression 
evaluation event: it may contain a function call event or may 
be an ordered sequence of other expression evaluation events 
(e.g. for a ‘comma” expression). The assignment expression 
evaluation contains the event destination which is 
distinguished because it is of a special importance for 
assertion checking. In our model we have avoided any 
assumptions about the ordering of argument evaluation for 
binary operations, such as ‘+’ or ‘*’, since the C language 
semantics leaves this undefined [ 181. The metaexpression 
{ eval-expr } + denotes a set of one or more events of the 
type eval-expr without any ordering relationship. 
Axiom 4 describes the structure of a function call event 
which starts with a set (may be empty) of unordered events 
for actual parameter evaluation followed by the function body 
execution events. 
The order of event occurrences reflects the semantics of 
the target language. When performing an assignment 
statement, first the right-hand part is evaluated and after this 
the destination event occurs (which denotes the assignment 
event itself). The event grammar makes FORMAN suitable 
for automatic source code instrumentation to detect all 
necessary events. 
An event has attributes, such as the source text fragment 
from the corresponding target program, current values of 
target program variables and expressions at the beginning and 
at the end of event, the duration of the event, a previous path 
(i.e. set of events preceding the event in the target program 
execution history), etc. 
FORMAN supplies a means for writing assertions about 
events and event sequences and sets. These include 
quantifiers and other aggregate operations over events, e.g., 
sequence, bag and set constructors, boolean operations and 
operations of the target language to write assertions about 
target program variables. 
Events can be described by patterns which capture the 
structure of event and context conditions. Program paths can 
be described by regular path expressions over events. 
4 EXAMPLES OF DEBUGGING RULES 
In general, a debugging rule performs some actions that 
may include computations over the target program event 
trace. The aim is to generate informative messages and to 
provide the user with some values obtained from the trace in 
order to detect and localize bugs. Rules can provide dialog to 
the user as well. An assertion is a boolean expression that may 
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contain quantifiers and sequencing constraints over events. 
Assertions can be used as conditions in the rules 
describing actions that can be performed if an assertion is 
satisfied or violated. A debugging rule has the form: 
assertion SAY (expression sequence) 
ONFAIL SAY (expression sequence) 
The presence of metavariables in the assertion makes it 
possible to use FORMAN as a debugger’s query language. 
The evaluation of an assertion is interrupted when it becomes 
clear that the final value will be False (or True), and the 
current values of metavariables can be used to generate 
readable and informative messages. 
We will use as an example of a C program the Simple 
Tokenizer program described in [25]. This program reads a 
text file until the special symbol ‘.’ (dot) is read, recognizes 
small integers, identifiers, and some predefined key words, 
skips spaces and PASCAL-like comments, prints the input 
text with line numbers attached before each line, splits the 
output into pages with a page header on the top of each page 
(including page number), and reports each token recognized. 
Unrecognized symbols are printed as ERROR tokens. The 
source code contains 542 lines of code (including some of our 
updates and comments). The following list of function 
prototypes used in the Simple Tokenizer gives some idea of 
the architecture. 
void init-scanner(char *name); 
void initgage-header (char *name) ; 
BOOLEAN get-source-line(); 
void get-char ( ) ; 
void skip-blanks ( ) ; 
void skip-comment ( )  ; 
void get-token ( 1  ; 
void get-word ( 1  ; 
BOOLEAN is-reserved-word(); 
void get-number ( )  ; 
void get-special ( ) ; 
void open-source-file(char *name); 
void close-source-file(); 
void print-line (char line [I ) ; 
void print-token ( ) ; 
void printgage-header0; 
void quit-scanner(); 
The input text file for Simple Tokenizer used for running 
the following examples contained 150 lines of text with a 
total of 454 tokens. The corresponding output contained 13 
pages with maximum of 50 lines per page (including the input 
lines and messages about tokens recognized, each on a 
separate line of output). 
Example of a debugging query. 
In order to obtain the history of a global variable 
page-number the following computation over the event 
trace can be performed. The WITHIN construct indicates the 
scope of the trace computations defined by this rule. The rule 
condition is TRUE, and as a side effect the entire history of 
variable page-number is shown. The [ . . . ] list 
constructor defines a loop over the entire program event trace 
(execute-program event). All events matching the 
pattern func-call 1s printf (i.e. events of the type 
func-call and function name ‘printf‘) executed within the 
body of printjage-header function are selected from 
the trace and the function VALUE is applied to them. The 
metavariable C holds the event func-call under 
consideration. The resulting sequence consists of variable 
page-number values at the end of each event captured by 
metavar iab le  C du r ing  t he  p rog ram execut ion.  
WITHIN printgage-header 
TRUE 
SAY ( ‘The history of page-number variable 
[ C: func-call IS ‘printf’ 
values is: ’ 
FROM executegrogram 
APPLY VALUE (int) (AT C page-number) 1 ) ; 
END 
When executed on our prototype the following output is 
The history of page-number variable values 
This debugging rule provides a slice of the program 
execution history containing the trace of particular variable 
values. The matter of interest may be, for instance, to check 
whether the values in the variable history are arranged in 
ascending order. 
produced: 
i s : 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3  
Example of an assertion checking. 
Let us write and check the assertion: “There exists an input 
line with length exceeding some maximum, say IO.” The 
program snippet containing the function get-source-line 
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looks like: 
BOOLEAN get-source-line ( )  
{char 
print-buffer [MAX-SOURCE-LINE-LENGTH+9] ; 
if ( (fgets (source-buffer, 
MAX-SOURCE-LINE-LENGTH, 
source-file) ) !=  NULL) { 
++line-number; 
Get-Line : 
sprintf (print-buffer, "%4d %d: % s " ,  
line-number,level,source-buffer) ; 
print-line (print-buffer) ; 
return (TRUE) ; 
1 else return (FALSE) ; 
Traversal of a label is an event of the type exes tmt , and 
we can check  t he  va lue  o f  a C express ion  
strlen(source-buffer) z 1 0  afterthis event. 
WITHIN get-source-line 
EXISTS L: ex-stmt IS 'Get-Line:' 
FROM executegrogram 
VALUE(int) (AT L strlen(source-buffer) >lo) 
SAY('Too long input line detected at stmt' ) 
SAY (L) 
SAY( 'It is 
VALUE (int) (AT L strlen (source-buffer) )
'characters long') 
ONFAIL SAY ( ' No long input lines detected' ) ; 
We check  whe the r  the  express ion  
strlen(source-buffer) > 1 0  isnotequaltoOforal1 
events L. When the assertion is satisfied for the first time, the 
assertion evaluation terminates and the current value of the 
metavariable L can be used for message output. In order to 
make error messages more informative, the value of a 
metavariable when printed by the SAY clause is shown in the 
form: 
event-type:> event-source-text 
source-line-number within function-name 
Time= event-begin-time . .  event-end-time 
Event  begin  a n d  end  t imes  in  th i s  p ro to type  
When executed on our prototype this assertion checking 
implementation are simply values of the step counter. 
yields the following output. 
Too long input line detected at stmt 
ex-stmt : > 'Get-Line: ' source line 460 
within function get-source-line 
Time= 95 . .  96 
It is 20 characters long 
Example of a run time statistics gathering. 
It is hard to measure real execution time of a heavily 
instrumented target program, although the simulated time 
measurement may be performed given that events may have 
some duration attributes predefined. In order to obtain the 
actual number of function calls executed, number of function 
get-source-line calls, and number of tokens 
recognized by the Simple Tokenizer, the following query can 
be performed: 
TRUE 
SAY('Tota1 function calls' 
CARD[ ALL func-call 
FROM executegrogram]) 
SAY('Tota1 function get-source-line calls' 
CARD [ func-call IS get-source-line 
FROM executegrogram]) 
SAY('Tota1 tokens recognized' 
CARD [ ALL func-call IS get-token 
FROM executegrogram] 
' ,  among them ' 
CARD [ ALL F: func-call & 
SOURCE-TEXT (F) == 'get-token' 
AND VALUE (int) (AT F token == ERROR) 
FROM executegrogram] 
'ERROR tokens detected' ) ;  
The CARD operator returns the number of items selected 
by the aggregate operation, i.e. the number of events 
matching the pattern in the aggregate operation body. The 
ALL option in the aggregate operation indicates that all nested 
events of the type f unc call should be taken into account. 
The pattern in the third aggregate operation provides an 
example of a complex event pattern with a context condition 
attached. The scope of this trace computation is the entire 
program trace. After execution on our prototype the 
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following output is obtained. 
Total function calls 6802 
Total function get-source-line calls 150 
Total tokens recognized 454, among them 37 
ERROR tokens detected 
Example of path expression checking. 
Regular expressions over event patterns may describe 
sequences of events extracted from the event trace. The 
following assertion checks whether function get-token and 
print-token calls appear in a certain order. Sequence of events 
satisfying the pattern X:fhc-call& SOURCE-TEXT(X) = 
‘get-token’ OR SOURCE-TEXT(X)==‘print-token’ is 
selected from the entire event trace and matched against the 
path expression (func-call IS ‘get-token’ func-call IS 
‘print-token’) f. A message is produced with information 
about the pattern matching results. 
[ X: func-call & SOURCE-TEXT(X)== 
‘get-token‘ OR 
SOURCE-TEXT (X) = = 
’print-token’ FROM executegrogram 1 
SATISFIES(func-call IS ‘get-token‘ 
func-call IS ‘print-token‘ ) + 
SAY(’function calls follow the pattern 
(get-token print-token) + ’ )  
ONFAIL SAY ( ‘pattern 
(get-token print-token) + 
is violated‘); 
Example of instrumenting the target source code with 
print statements. 
Suppose we want to insert in the target source code print 
statements to print at run time the value of input strings with 
length exceeding 10 and corresponding line numbers. Values 
o f  in te res t  a r e  ava i lab le  in g loba l  var iab les  
source-buf f er and line-number, respectively. The 
following debugging rule performs this function. 
WITHIN get-source-line 
FOREACH L1: ex-stmt IS ‘Get-Line:’ 
FROM executegrogram 
VALUE ( int ) 
( AT L1 strlen(source-buffer) >lo? 
printf (“long line! ! !\n%s\n”,source-buffer) :1) 
AND 
VALUE ( int ) 
( AT L1 
printf (”line-number=%d\n”, line-number) ) ; 
END 
Formally this rule will cause an assertion checking, which 
will be successful since the C expression involved yields a 
non-zero value (representing Boolean TRUE); as a side effect 
the print statements are executed at run time. This debugging 
rule has two aspects  worthy of not ice.  First ,  the 
instrumentation code is separated from the target code; it will 
be inserted automatically just before the execution and can be 
maintained in a separate file. There may be several different 
print instrumentations defined for the same target program; 
keeping them in separate files provides a great flexibility in 
arranging a custom set ofprint statements to be inserted at run 
time. Second, the instrumentation is attached to a particular 
event in the trace matching the pattern ex-stmt I S  
’ Get-Line : ‘ , i.e. traversal of the label Get-Line :, 
therefore it does not depend on possible target code 
modifications as long as the label is not changed. 
Debugging rules can be considered as a way of formalizing 
reasoning about the target program execution -- humans often 
use similar patterns for reasoning when debugging programs. 
For example, if the index expression of an array element is 
out of range, the debugger can try a rule for eval-index events 
that invokes another rule about a wrong value of the event 
eval-expression, which in turn will cause investigation of 
histories of all variables included in the expression. 
5 BRIEF IMPLEMENTATION SURVEY 
The architecture of the computations over the event traces 
for the C programming language is based on the automatic 
instrumentation of the target program source code in such a 
way that some computations over the trace are performed at 
run time and the rest of information is saved in the trace file 
for postmortem processing. The instrumentation does not 
change the semantics of the target program. The trace file is 
read by the FORMAN interpreter to complete the 
computations over the trace and to generate messages. A 
special attempt in this prototype was made to optimize the 
trace generation, in particular to filter events in order to 
reduce the size the trace. 
The front end of the assertion checker was adapted and 
modified from Shawn’s Flisakowski parser and abstract 
syntax tree builder for the complete C programming language 
(gcc version) [14]. The instrumentation module was designed 
by Ana Erendira Flores-Mendoza as her Master’s project in 
the NMSU CS Department [ 151. The total size of the software 
used for the prototype amounts to more then 20KLOC of C1 
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lex/yacc/Rigal [ 11 code. 
Since an event in our model has a duration and may 
contain another events, it is represented on the trace by two 
records, one for the beginning of event and one for the end. 
The semantics of the C language do not specify the order of 
subexpression execution; to address this issue and to ensure 
proper nesting of event eval-expr beginning and end records 
on the trace the instrumented code maintains some auxiliary 
stack for expression evaluation. A similar stack mechanism is 
added to the instrumented code to maintain proper nesting of 
ex-stmt and func-call events when performing return, goto, 
and break statements. These specifics of our target program 
behavior model led as to the decision to implement the 
instrumentation module from the scratch rather than to use 
some generic instrumentation tools like [33]. The basic 
building block for expression E instrumentation is comma- 
expression (el ,  temp = E, e2, temp), where e l  stands for 
p ro logue  i n s t rumen ta t i on ,  e2  s t ands  fo r  epi log 
instrumentation, and temp variable holds the result of the 
original expression E evaluation. 
Only events necessary for the given FORMAN program 
are involved in the computations over the trace and put on the 
trace. For the Simple Tokenizer program discussed above, 
using the input file with 150 lines and 454 tokens and the 
entire set of debugging rules described in the previous section 
the total number of events generated by the target program 
according to the event grammar is 105,808, although only 
7253 of them (less then 7%) are put on the trace. Even in its 
current state with many potential optimizations not yet 
implemented, the prototype demonstrates the feasibility of 
trace computations for “typical” student programs like the 
Simple Tokenizer. Our experiments with other C programs 
show that storing several tens of thousands of events on the 
trace is sufficient for a large number of “typical” C programs 
run with a set of debugging rules and assertions similar to the 
examples in Sec. 4. It should be noted that typically the size 
of input data used for testing and debugging purposes is 
relatively small. 
6 RELATEDWORK 
What follows is a very brief survey of basic ideas known 
in Debugging Automation to provide the background for the 
approach advocated in this paper. 
Event Notion 
The Event Based Behavioral Abstraction (EBBA) method 
suggested in [7] characterizes the behavior of the entire 
program in terms of both primitive and composite events. 
Context conditions involving event attribute values can be 
used to distinguish events. EBBA defines two higher-level 
means for modeling system behavior -- clustering and 
filtering. Clustering is used to express behavior as composite 
events, i.e. aggregates of previously defined events. Filtering 
serves to eliminate from consideration events which are not 
relevant to the model being investigated. Both event 
recognition and filtering can be performed at run-time. 
An event-based debugger for the C programming language 
called Dalek [27] provides a means for describing user- 
defined events which typically are points within a program 
execution trace. A target program has to be instrumented in 
order to collect values of event attributes. Composite events 
can be recognized at run-time as collections of primitive 
events .  
FORMAN has a more comprehensive modeling approach 
than EBBA or Dalek, based on the event grammar. A 
language for expressing computations over execution 
histories is provided, which is missing in EBBA and Dalek. 
The event grammar makes FORMAN suitable for automatic 
source code instrumentation to detect all necessary events. 
FORMAN supports the design of universal assertions and 
debugging rules that could be used for debugging of arbitrary 
target programs. This generality is missing in the EBBA and 
Dalek approaches. The event in FORMAN is a time interval, 
in contrast with the event notion in previous approaches 
where events are considered pointwise time moments. 
The COCA debugger [13] for the C language uses the 
GDB debugger for tracing and PROLOG for debugging 
queries execution. It provides a certain event grammar for C 
traces and event patterns based on attributes for event search. 
The query language is designed around special primitives 
built into the PROLOG query evaluator. We assume that 
FORMAN is more suitable for trace computations as it has 
been designed for this specific purpose. 
Path Expressions 
Data and control flow descriptions of the target program 
are essential for testing and debugging purposes. It is useful 
to give such a description in an explicit and precise form. The 
path expression technique introduced for specifying parallel 
programs in [ 111 is one such formalism. Trace specifications 
also are used in [26] for software specification. This 
technique has been used in several projects as a background 
for high-level debugging tools, (e.g. in [lo]), where path rules 
are suggested as a kind of debugger commands. FORMAN 
provides a flexible language means for trace specification 
including event patterns and regular expressions over them. 
Assertion Languages 
Assertion (or annotation) languages provide yet another 
approach to debugging automation. The approaches currently 
in use are mostly based on boolean expressions attached to 
selected points of the target program, like the assert macro in 
C [IS]. The ANNA [23] annotation language for the Ada 
target language supports assertions on variable and type 
declarations. In the TSL [22], [29] annotation language for 
Ada the notion of event is introduced in order to describe the 
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behavior of Tasks. Patterns can be written which involve 
parameter values of Task entry calls. Assertions are written in 
Ada itself, using a number of special pre-defined predicates. 
Assertion-checking is dynamic at run-time, and does not need 
post-mortem analysis. The RAPIDE project [24] provides an 
event-based assertion language for software architecture 
de sc r ip t i on .  
In [6] events are introduced to describe process 
communication, termination, and connection and detachment 
of process to channels. A language of Behavior Expressions 
(BE) is provided to write assertions about sequences of 
process interactions. BE is  able to describe allowed 
sequences of events as well as some predicates defined on the 
values of the variables of processes. Event types are process 
communication and interactions such as send, receive, 
terminate, connect, detach. Evaluation of assertions is done at 
run-time. No composite events are provided. 
Another experimental debugging tool is based on trace 
analysis with respect to assertions in temporal interval logic. 
This work is presented in [20] where four types of events are 
introduced: assignment to variables, reaching a label, 
interprocess communication and process instantiation or 
termination. Composite events cannot be defined. Different 
varieties of temporal logic languages are used for program 
s t a t i c  ana ly s i s  ca l led  Model  Checking  [12].  
In [30] a practical approach to programming with 
assertions for the C language is advocated, and it is 
demonstrated that even local assertions associated with 
particular points within the program may be extremely useful 
for program debugging. 
The DUEL [ 191 debugging language introduces 
expressions for C aggregate data exploration, for both 
assertions and queries. 
The FORMAN language for computations over traces 
provides a flexible means for writing both local and global 
assertions, including those about temporal relations between 
events. 
Algorithmic Debugging 
The original algorithmic program debugging method was 
introduced in [32] for the Prolog language. In [31] and [16] 
this paradigm is applied to a subset of PASCAL. The 
debugger executes the program and builds a trace execution 
tree at the procedure level while saving some useful trace 
information such as procedure names and inputloutput 
parameter values. The algorithmic debugger traverses the 
execution tree and interacts with the user by asking about the 
intended behavior of each procedure. The user has the 
possibility to answer “yes” or “no” about the intended 
behavior of the procedure. The search finally ends and a bug 
is localized within a procedure p when one of the following 
holds: procedure p contains no procedure calls, or all 
procedure calls performed from the body of procedure p 
fulfill the user’s expectations. 
Algorithmic debugging can be considered as an example 
of debugging strategy, based on some assertion language (in 
this case assertions about results of a procedure call). The 
notion of computation over execution trace introduced in 
FORMAN may be a convenient basis for describing such 
debugging strategies. 
7 CONCLUSIONS 
In brief, our approach can be explained as “computations 
over a target program event trace based on a precise program 
behavior model”. According to [8] and [28], approximately 
40-50% of all bugs detected during the program testing are 
logic, structural, and functionality bugs, i.e., bugs which 
could be detected by appropriate assertion checking similar to 
that demonstrated above. 
We expect the advantages of our approach to be the 
fo l lowing:  
The notion of an event grammar provides a general 
basis for program behavior models. In contrast with pre- 
vious approaches, the event is not a point in the trace but 
an interval with a beginning and an end. 
Event grammar provides a coordinate system to refer to 
any interesting event in the execution history. Event 
attributes provide complete access to each target pro- 
gram’s execution state. Assertions about particular exe- 
cution states as well as assertions about sets of different 
execution states may be checked. 
The IN relation yields a hierarchy of events, so the 
assertions can be defined at an appropriate level of granu- 
larity. 
A language for computations over event traces pro- 
vides a uniform framework for assertion checking, pro- 
files, debugging queries, and performance measurements. 
The fact that assertions and other computations over the 
target program event trace can be separated from the 
text of the target program allows accumulation of for- 
malized knowledge about particular programs and makes 
it easy to control the number of assertions to be checked. 
The first experiments with our C assertion checker 
prototype prove that: 
instrum’entation of the C source code may be an appropri- 
ate technique for automatic testing and debugging tool 
design, 
event filtering can reduce the size of the stored event 
trace to 520% of the total trace, 
the size of the stored event trace could be kept within 
reasonable limits (several tens of thousands of events) for 
realistic C programs. 
The future work will be dedicated to further optimizations 
of trace computation and event filtering, and to the design of 
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an appropriate user interface. 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper suggests an approach to the development of 
software testing and debugging automation tools based on 
precise program behavior models. The program behavior 
model is defined as a set of events (event trace) with two basic 
binary relations over events -- precedence and inclusion, and 
represents the temporal relationship between actions. A 
language for the computations over event traces is developed 
that provides a basis for assertion checking, debugging 
queries, execution profiles, and performance measurements. 
The approach is nondestructive, since assertion texts are 
separated from the target program source code and can be 
maintained independently. An event grammar provides a 
sound basis for assertion language implementation via target 
program automatic instrumentation. Preliminary experiments 
with a prototype assertion checker for the C programming 
language are discussed. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Program testing and debugging is still a human activity 
performed largely without any adequate tools, and consum- 
ing more than 50% of the total program development time 
and effort [8]. Testing and debugging are mostly concerned 
with the program run-time behavior, and developing a pre- 
cise model of program behavior becomes the first step 
towards any dynamic analysis automation. In building such a 
model several considerations were taken in account. The first 
assumption we make is that the model is discrete, i.e. com- 
prises a finite number of well-separated elements. For this 
reason the notion of event as an elementary unit of action is 
an appropriate basis for building the whole model. The event 
is an abstraction for any detectable action performed during 
the program execution, such as a statement execution, 
expression evaluation, procedure call, sending and receiving 
a message, etc. 
Actions (or events) are evolving in time and the program 
behavior represents the temporal relationship between 
actions. This implies the necessity to introduce an ordering 
relation for events. Semantics of parallel programming 
languages and even some sequential languages (such as C) do 
not require the total ordering of actions, so partial event 
ordering is the most adequate for this purpose [ 191. 
Actions performed during the program execution are at 
different levels of granularity, some of them include other 
actions, e.g. a subroutine call event contains statement exe- 
cution events. This consideration brings to our model inclu- 
sion relation. Under this relationship, events can be 
hierarchical objects and it becomes possible to consider pro- 
gram behavior at appropriate levels of granularity. 
An event may have a type and some other attributes, such 
as event duration, program source code related to the event, 
program state associated with the event (i.e. program variable 
values at the beginning and at the end of the event), etc. This 
program behavior model may be regarded as a “lightweight” 
semantics of the programming language. 
The next problem to be addressed after the program 
behavior model is set up is the formalism for specifying 
properties of the program behavior. This could be done in 
many different ways, e.g., by adopting some kind of logic 
calculi (predicate logic, temporal logic). Such a direction 
leads to tools for static program verification, such as an 
approach called model checking [ll]. 
Since our goal is dynamic program analysis that requires 
different types of assertion checking, debugging queries, 
program execution profiles, and so on, we developed the 
concept of a computation over the event trace. It seems that 
this concept is general enough to cover all the above 
mentioned needs in the unifying framework, and provides 
sufficient flexibility. This approach implies the design of a 
special programming language for computations over the 
event traces. We suggest a particular language called 
FORMAN ([2], [16]) based on a functional paradigm and the 
use of event patterns and aggregate operations over events. 
The papers [I], [2], [16] are based on our assertion checker 
prototype for a subset of the PASCAL language. This paper 
describes the first experience with an assertion checker for the 
C programming language. The implementation of the C 
assertion checker is based on source code automatic 
instrumentation. To adjust to the specifics of the C target 
language the FORMAN language has been modified, in 
particular, the scope construct (WITHIN function-name) and 
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explicit type cast have been added (see examples in Sec. 4). 
Patterns describe the structure of events with context 
conditions. Program paths can be described by path 
expressions over events. All this makes it possible to write 
assertions not only about variable values at program points 
but also about data flow and control flow in the target 
program. 
Possible applications of a language for computations over 
a program event trace include program testing and debugging, 
performance measurement and modeling, program profiling, 
program animation, program maintenance and program 
documentation [4]. Even the traditional debugging method 
based on scattering print statements across the source code 
may be easily implemented as an appropriate computation on 
the event trace (see example in Sec 4). The advantage is that 
the print statements are kept in a separate file and the source 
code of the target program will be instrumented automatically 
just before execution. A study of applying FORMAN to 
parallel programming is presented in [3]. 
2 EVENTS 
FORMAN is based on a semantic model of target program 
behavior in which the program execution is represented by a 
set of events. An event occurs when some action is performed 
during the program execution process. For instance, a 
function is called, a statement is executed, or some expression 
is evaluated. A particular action may be performed many 
times, but every execution of an action is denoted by a unique 
event. 
Every event defines a time interval which has a beginning 
and an end. For atomic events, the beginning and end points 
of the time interval will be the same. All events used for 
assertion checking and other computations over event traces 
must be detectable by some implementation (e.g. by an 
appropriate target program instrumentation.) Attributes 
attached to events bring additional information about event 
context, such as current variable and expression values. 
In order to give some rationale for our notion of an event, 
let us consider a well-known idea such as a counter. Usually 
the history of a variable X when used as a counter looks like: 
x := 0; . . .  
LOOP . . . 
x := x + 1; . . .  
endloop; . . .  
In order to determine whether the actual behavior of the 
counter X matches the pattern described by the program 
fragment above we have to consider the following events. Let 
Initialize-X denotes the event of assigning 0 to the variable 
X, Augment-X denotes the event of incrementing X, and 
Assign-X denotes the event of assigning any value to the 
variable X. The event Assign-X is a composite one; it 
contains either Initialize-X or Augment-X events. One could 
determine if X behaves as a counter when a program segment 
S is executed in the following way. First, the sequence A of 
all events of the type Assign-X from the event trace of 
program segment S has to be extracted preserving the 
ordering between events. Second, A has to be matched with 
the pattern: 
Initialize-X (Augment-X)* 
where ' * '  denotes repetition zero or 
more times. If the actual sequence of 
events does not match this pattern we can 
report an error. Therefore, assertion 
checking can be represented as a kind of 
computation over a target program event 
trace. 
The program state (current values of variables) can be 
considered at the beginning or at the end of an appropriate 
event. This provides the opportunity to write assertions about 
program variable values at different points in the program 
execution history. 
3 PROGRAM BEHAVIOR MODEL 
FORMAN is intended to be used to specify behavior of 
programs written in some high-level programming language 
which is called the target laneguage. The model of target 
program behavior is formally defined as a set of events (event 
trace) with two basic relations, which may or may not hold 
between two arbitrary events. The events may be sequentially 
ordered (PRECEDES), or one of them might be included in 
another composite event (IN). For each pair of events in the 
event trace no more than one of these relations can be 
established. 
In order to define the behavior model for a particular target 
language, types of events are introduced. Each event belongs 
to one or more of predefined event types, which are induced 
by target language abstract syntax (e.g. execute-statement, 
send-message, receive-message) or by target language 
semantics (e.g., rendezvous, wait, put-message-in-queue). 
The target program execution model is defined by an event 
grammar. The event may be a compound object, in which 
case the grammar describes how the event is split into other 
event sequences or sets. The event grammar is a set of axioms 
that describe possible patterns of basic relations between 
events of different types in the program execution history; it 
is not intended to be used for parsing an actual event trace. 
The rule A : : B C establishes that if an event a of the 
type A occurs in the trace of a program, it is necessary that 
events b and c of types B and C also exist, such that the 
relations b IN a, c IN a, b PRECEDES c hold. 
For the C language assertion checker prototype we have 
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defined the following simple event grammar. 
(Axiom 1) executegrogram: : 
( ex-stmt I eval-expr ) *  
(Axiom 2 )  ex-stmt: : 
( ex-stmt I eval-expr ) *  
(Axiom 3) eval-expr:: func-call 1 
eval-expr+ destination? 1 
{ eval-expr } + 
(Axiom 4) func-call: : 
{ eval-expr } *  ex-stmt* 
Axiom 1 states that the program execution event contains 
(the IN relation) a set of zero or more ordered (w.r.t. relation 
PRECEDES) events of the types execute-statement or 
evaluate-expression. 
Axiom 2 states the same fact about the execute-statement 
event. For example, the event of executing a composite 
statement such as if-then-else will contain an event 
eval-expr for condition evaluation and a sequence of zero 
or more events for the corresponding THEN or ELSE branch 
execution. If a statement has a label attached, the label 
traversal itself is considered as an empty statement execution 
event. 
Axiom 3 describes the possible structure of an expression 
evaluation event: it may contain a function call event or may 
be an ordered sequence of other expression evaluation events 
(e.g. for a ‘comma” expression). The assignment expression 
evaluation contains the event destination which is 
distinguished because it is of a special importance for 
assertion checking. In our implementation we have avoided 
any assumptions about the ordering of argument evaluation 
for binary operations, such as ‘+’ or ‘*’, since the C language 
semantics leaves this undefined [17]. The grammar rule 
{ eval-expr} + denotes a set of one or more events of the 
type eval-expr without any ordering relationship. 
Axiom 4 describes the structure of a function call event 
which starts with a set (may be empty) of unordered events 
for actual parameter evaluation followed by the function body 
execution events. 
The order of event occurrences reflects the semantics of 
the target language. When performing an assignment 
statement, first the right-hand part is evaluated and after this 
the destination event occurs (which denotes the assignment 
event itself). The event grammar makes FORMAN suitable 
for automatic source code instrumentation to detect all 
necessary events. 
An event has attributes, such as the source text fragment 
from the corresponding target program, current values of 
target program variables and expressions at the beginning and 
at the end of event, the duration of the event, a previous path 
(i.e. set of events preceding the event in the target program 
execution history), etc. 
FORMAN supplies a means for writing assertions about 
events and event sequences and sets. These include 
quantifiers and other aggregate operations over events, e.g., 
sequence, bag and set constructors, boolean operations and 
operations of the target language to write assertions about 
target program variables. 
Events can be described by patterns which capture the 
structure of event and context conditions. Program paths can 
be described by regular path expressions over events. 
4 EXAMPLES OF DEBUGGING RULES 
In general, a debugging rule performs some actions that 
may include computations over the target program event 
trace. The aim is to generate informative messages and to 
provide the user with some values obtained from the trace in 
order to detect and localize bugs. An assertion is a boolean 
expression that may contain quantifiers and sequencing 
constraints over events. 
Assertions can be used as conditions in the rules 
describing actions that can be performed if an assertion is 
satisfied or violated. A debugging rule has the form: 
assertion SAY (expression sequence) 
ONFAIL SAY (expression sequence) 
We will use as an example of a C program the Simple 
Tokenizer program described in [23]. This program reads a 
text file until the special symbol ‘.’ (dot) is read, recognizes 
small integers, identifiers, and some predefined key words, 
skips spaces and PASCAL-like comments, prints the input 
text with line numbers attached before each line, splits the 
output into pages with a page header on the top of each page 
(including page number), and reports each token recognized. 
Unrecognized symbols are printed as ERROR tokens. The 
source code contains 542 lines of code (including some of our 
updates and comments). The input file used for running the 
following examples contained 150 lines of text with a total of 
454 tokens. The corresponding output contained 13 pages 
with maximum of 50 lines per page (including the input lines 
and messages about tokens recognized, each on a separate 
line of output). 
Example of a debugging query. 
In order to obtain the history of a global variable 
page-number the following computation over the event 
trace can be performed. The WITHIN construct indicates the 
scope of the trace computations defined by this rule. The rule 
condition is TRUE, and as a side effect the entire history of 
variable page-number is shown. The [ . . . 1 list 
constructor defines a loop over the entire program event trace 
(executejrogram event). All events matching the 
pattern func-call IS printf executed within the 
body of printgage-header function are selected from 
the trace and the function VALUE is applied to them. The 
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metavariable C holds the event func-call under 
consideration. The resulting sequence consists of variable 
page-number values at the end of each event captured by 
metavariable C during the program execution. 
WfiHIN printgage-header 
TRUE 
SAY( ‘The history of page-number 
[ C: func-call IS printf 
variable values is: ‘ 
FROM executegrogram 
APPLY VALUE (int) (AT C pagepumber) 1 ) ; 
END 
When executed on our prototype the following output is 
The history of page-number variable values 
This debugging rule provides a slice of the program 
execution history containing the trace of particular variable 
values. The matter of interest may be, for instance, to check 
whether the values in the variable history are arranged in 
ascending order. 
Example of an assertion checking. 
Let us write and check the assertion: “There exists an input 
line with length exceeding some maximum, say 10.” The 
program snippet containing the function 
get-source-line looks like: 
BOOLEAN get-source-line() 
{char print-buffer[MAX-SOUEXE-LINE-LENGTH +9 3 ;  
produced: 
is: 1 2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0  11 1 2  13 
if ( (fgets (source-buffer, 
MAX-SOURCE-LINE-LENGTH, 
source-file) ) != NULL) { 
++line-number; 
Get-Line : 
sprintf (print-buffer, ”%4d %d: % s ” ,  
linepumber,level,source-buffer) ; 
print-line(print-buffer); 
return (TRUE) ; 
I 
else return (FALSE) ; 1 
Traversal of a label is an event of the type ex-s tmt , and 
we can check the value of a C expression 
strlen(source-buffer) 5 10 afterthis event. 
WITHIN get-source-line 
EXISTS L: ex-stmt IS ’Get-Line:‘ 
FROM executegrogram 
VALUE (int) (AT L strlen (source-buffer) >lo) 
SAY(’Too long input line detected at stmt’ 1 
SAY (L) 
SAY( ‘It is ’ 
VALUE(int) (AT L strlen(source-buffer)) 
’characters long‘) 
ONFAIL SAY ( ‘ No long input lines detected‘ ) ; 
We check whether the expression 
strlen(source-buffer) > 1 0  isnotequaltoOforal1 
events L. When the assertion is satisfied for the first time, the 
assertion evaluation terminates and the current value of the 
metavariable L can be used for message output. In order to 
make error messages more informative, the value of a 





Time= event-begin-time . .  event-end-time 
Event begin and end times in this prototype 
When executed on our prototype this assertion checking 
Too long input line detected at stmt 
ex-stmt :> ‘Get-Line:‘ source line 460 
Time= 95 . .  96 
It is 2 0  characters long 
implementation are simply values of the step counter. 
yields the following output. 
within function get-source-line 
Example of a run time statistics gathering. 
It is hard to measure real execution time of a heavily 
instrumented target program, although the simulated time 
measurement may be performed given that events may have 
some duration attributes predefined. In order to obtain the 
actual number of finction calls executed, number of function 
get-source-line calls, and number of tokens 
recognized by the Simple Tokenizer, the following query can 




SAY('Tota1 function calls' 
CARD[ ALL func-call 
FROM executegrogram]) 
SAY('Tota1 function get-source-line calls' 
CARD [ func-call IS get-source-line 
FROM executeqrogram]) 
SAY('Tota1 tokens recognized' 
CARD [ ALL func-call IS get-token 
FROM executegrogram] 
' ,  among them ' 
CARD [ ALL F: func-call & 
SOURCE - TEXT (F) == 'get-token' 
AND VALUE (int) (AT F token == ERROR) 
FROM executegrogram] 
'ERROR tokens detected' ) ;  
by the aggregate operation, i.e. the number of events 
matching the pattern in the aggregate operation body. The 
ALL option in the aggregate operation indicates that all nested 
events of the type f unc-call should be taken into account. 
The pattern in the third aggregate operation provides an 
example of a complex event pattern with a context condition 
attached. The scope of this trace computation is the entire 
program trace. After execution on our prototype the 
following output is obtained. 
The CARD operator returns the number of items selected 
Total function calls 6802  
Total function get-source-line calls 150 
Total tokens recognized 454 , among them 3 7  
ERROR tokens detected 
Example of path expression checking. 
Regular expressions over event patterns may describe 
sequences of events extracted from the event trace. The 
following assertion checks whether function get-token 
and print-token calls appear in a certain order. Sequence 
of events satisfying the pattern X : func-call& 
SOURCE-TEXT (X) -- 'get-token' OR 
SOURCE-TEXT ( X )  == 'print-token' is selected from 
the entire event trace and matched against the path expression 
(func-call I S  'get-token' func-call IS 
'print-token' ) + .  A message is produced with 
information about the pattern matching results. 
[ X: func-call & SOURCE-TEXT(X)== 
'get-token' OR 
SOURCE-TEXT ( X )  == 
'print-token' FROM execute_program ] 
SATISFIES(func-call IS 'get-token' 
func-call IS 'print-token' ) + 
SAY('functi0n calls follow the pattern 
(get-token print-token) + ' 
ONFAIL SAY( 'pattern 
(get-token print-token) + 
is violated' 1 ; 
Example of instrumenting the target source code with 
print statements. Suppose we want to insert in the target 
source code print statements to print at run time the value of 
input strings with length exceeding 10 and corresponding line 
numbers. Values of interest are available in global variables 
source-buf f er and line-number, respectively. The 
following debugging rule performs this function. 
WITHIN get-source-line 
FOREACH L1: ex-stmt IS 'Get-Line:' 
FROM executegrogram 
VALUE ( int ) 
( AT L1 strlen(source-buffer) >lo? 
printf ("long line! ! !\n%s\n",source-buffer) :1) 
AND 
VALUE ( int ) 
( AT L1 
printf ("line-number=%d\n", line-number) ) ; 
END 
Formally this rule will cause an assertion checking, which 
will be successful since the C expression involved yields a 
non-zero value (representing Boolean TRUE); as a side effect 
the print statements are executed at run time. This debugging 
rule has two aspects worthy of notice. First, the 
instrumentation code is separated from the target code; it will 
be inserted automatically just before the execution and can be 
maintained in a separate file. There may be several different 
print instrumentations defined for the same target program; 
keeping them in separate files provides a great flexibility in 
arranging a custom set of print statements to be inserted at run 
time. Second, the instrumentation is attached to a particular 
event in the trace matching the pattern ex-stmt I S  
' Get-Line : ' , i.e. traversal of the label Get-Line : , 
therefore it does not depend on possible target code 
modifications as long as the label is not changed. 
5 BRIEF IMPLEMENTATION SURVEY 
The architecture of the computations over the event traces 
for the C programming language is based on the automatic 
instrumentation of the target program source code in such a 
way that some computations over the trace are performed at 
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run time and the rest of information is saved in the trace file 
for postmortem processing. The instrumentation does not 
change the semantics of the target program. The trace file is 
read by the FORMAN interpreter to complete the 
computations over the trace and to generate messages. A 
special attempt in this prototype was made to optimize the 
trace generation, in particular to filter events in order to 
reduce the size the trace. 
The front end of the assertion checker was adapted and 
modified from Shawn’s Flisakowski parser and abstract 
syntax tree builder for the complete C programming language 
(gcc version) [ 131. The instrumentation module was designed 
by Ana Erendira Flores-Mendoza as her Master’s project in 
theNMSU CS Department [14]. The total size ofthe software 
used for the prototype amounts to more then 20KLOC of C/ 
ledyacc code. 
Since an event in our model has a duration and may 
contain another events, it is represented on the trace by two 
records, one for the beginning of event and one for the end. 
The semantics of the C language do not specify the order of 
subexpression execution; to address this issue and to ensure 
proper nesting of event eval-expr beginning and end 
records on the trace the instrumented code maintains some 
auxiliary stack for expression evaluation. A similar stack 
mechanism is added to the instrumented code to maintain 
proper nesting of ex-stmt and func-call events when 
performing return, goto, and break statements. These 
specifics of our target program behavior model led as to the 
decision to implement the instrumentation module from the 
scratch rather than to use some generic instrumentation tools 
like [3 I]. 
Only events necessary for the given FORMAN program 
are involved in the computations over the trace and put on the 
trace. For the Simple Tokenizer example discussed above, 
using the input file with 150 lines and 454 tokens and the 
entire set of debugging rules described in the previous section 
the total number of events generated by the target program 
according to the event grammar is 105,808, although only 
7253 of them (less then 7%) are put on the trace. Even in its 
current state with many potential optimizations not yet 
implemented, the prototype demonstrates the feasibility of 
trace computations for “typical” student programs like the 
Simple Tokenizer. Our experiments show that storing several 
tens of thousands of events on the trace is sufficient for 
“typical” C programs run with a set of debugging rules and 
assertions similar to the examples in Sec. 4. It should be noted 
that typically the size of input data used for testing and 
debugging purposes is relatively small. 
6 RELATEDWORK 
What follows is a very brief survey of basic ideas known 
in Debugging Automation to provide the background for the 
approach advocated in this paper. 
Event Notion 
The Event Based Behavioral Abstraction (EBBA) method 
suggested in [ 6 ]  characterizes the behavior of the entire 
program in terns of both primitive and composite events. 
Context conditions involving event attribute values can be 
used to distinguish events. EBBA defines two higher-level 
means for modeling system behavior -- clustering and 
filtering. Clustering is used to express behavior as composite 
events, i.e. aggregates of previously defined events. Filtering 
serves to eliminate from consideration events which are not 
relevant to the model being investigated. Both event 
recognition and filtering can be performed at run-time. 
An event-based debugger for the C programming language 
called Dalek [25] provides a means for describing user- 
defined events which typically are points within a program 
execution trace. A target program has to be instrumented in 
order to collect values of event attributes. Composite events 
can be recognized at run-time as collections of primitive 
events. 
FORMAN has a more comprehensive modelling approach 
than EBBA or Dalek, based on the event grammar. A 
language for expressing computations over execution 
histories is provided, which is missing in EBBA and Dalek. 
The event grammar makes FORMAN suitable for automatic 
source code instrumentation to detect all necessary events. 
FORMAN supports the design of universal assertions and 
debugging rules that could be used for debugging of arbitrary 
target programs. This generality is missing in the EBBA and 
Dalek approaches. The event in FORMAN is a time interval, 
in contrast with the event notion in previous approaches 
where events are considered pointwise time moments. 
The COCA debugger [I21 for the C language uses the 
GDB debugger for tracing and PROLOG for debugging 
queries execution. It provides a certain event grammar for C 
traces and event patterns based on attributes for event search. 
The query language is designed around special primitives 
built into the PROLOG query evaluator. We assume that 
FORMAN is more suitable for trace computations as it has 
been designed for this specific purpose. 
Path Expressions 
Data and control flow descriptions of the target program 
are essential for testing and debugging purposes. It is useful 
to give such a description in an explicit and precise form. The 
path expression technique introduced for specifying parallel 
programs in [ 101 is one such formalism. Trace specifications 
also are used in [24] for software specification. This 
technique has been used in several projects as a background 
for high-level debugging tools, (e.g. in [9]), where path rules 
are suggested as a kind of debugger commands. FORMAN 
provides a flexible language means for trace specification 
. 
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including event patterns and regular expressions over them. 
Assertion Languages 
Assertion (or annotation) languages provide yet another 
approach to debugging automation. The approaches currently 
in use are mostly based on boolean expressions attached to 
selected points of the target program, like the assert macro in 
C [17]. The ANNA [21] annotation language for the Ada 
target language supports assertions on variable and type 
declarations. In the TSL [20], [27] annotation language for 
Ada the notion of event is introduced in order to describe the 
behavior of Tasks. Patterns can be written which involve 
parameter values of Task entry calls. Assertions are written in 
Ada itself, using a number of special pre-defined predicates. 
Assertion-checking is dynamic at run-time, and does not need 
post-mortem analysis. The RAPIDE project [22] provides an 
event-based assertion language for software architecture 
description. 
In [ 5 ]  events are introduced to describe process 
communication, termination, and connection and detachment 
of process to channels. A language of Behavior Expressions 
(BE) is provided to write assertions about sequences of 
process interactions. BE is able to describe allowed 
sequences of events as well as some predicates defined on the 
values of the variables of processes. Event types are process 
communication and interactions such as send, receive, 
terminate, connect, detach. Evaluation of assertions is done at 
run-time. No composite events are provided. 
Another experimental debugging tool is based on trace 
analysis with respect to assertions in temporal interval logic. 
This work is presented in [ 181 where four types of events are 
introduced: assignment to variables, reaching a label, 
interprocess communication and process instantiation or 
termination. Composite events cannot be defined. Different 
varieties of temporal logic languages are used for program 
static analysis called Model Checking [l I]. 
In [28] a practical approach to programming with 
assertions for the C language is advocated, and it is 
demonstrated that even local assertions associated with 
particular points within the program may be extremely useful 
for program debugging. 
The FORMAN language for computations over traces 
provides a flexible means for writing both local and global 
assertions, including those about temporal relations between 
events. 
Algorithmic Debugging 
The original algorithmic program debugging method was 
introduced in [30] for the Prolog language. In [29] and [15] 
this paradigm is applied to a subset of PASCAL. The 
debugger executes the program and builds a trace execution 
tree at the procedure level while saving some useful trace 
information such as procedure names and inputloutput 
parameter values. The algorithmic debugger traverses the 
execution tree and interacts with the user by asking about the 
intended behavior of each procedure. The user has the 
possibility to answer “yes” or “no” about the intended 
behavior of the procedure. The search finally ends and a bug 
is localized within a procedure p when one of the following 
holds: procedure p contains no procedure calls, or all 
procedure calls performed from the body of procedure p 
fulfill the user’s expectations. 
Algorithmic debugging can be considered as an example 
of debugging strategy, based on some assertion language (in 
this case assertions about results of a procedure call). The 
notion of computation over execution trace introduced in 
FORMAN may be a convenient basis for describing such 
debugging strategies. 
7 CONCLUSIONS 
In brief, our approach can be explained as “computations 
over a target program event trace based on a precise program 
behavior model”. According to [7] and [26], approximately 
40-50% of all bugs detected during the program testing are 
logic, structural, and functionality bugs, i s . ,  bugs which 
could be detected by appropriate assertion checking similar 
to that demonstrated above. 
The first experiments with our C assertion checker 
instrumentation of the C source code may be an appropn- 
ate technique for automatic testing and debugging tool 
design, 
event filtering can reduce the size of the stored event 
trace to 520% of the total trace, 
the size of the stored event trace could be kept within 
reasonable limits (several tens of thousands of events) for 
realistic C programs. 
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1 Introduction 
We suggest an approach to the development of software testing and debugging automation tools based on precise 
program behavior models. The program behavior model is defined as a set of events (event trace) with two basic 
binary relations over events -- precedence and inclusion, and represents the temporal relationship between actions. A 
language for the computations over event traces is developed that provides a basis for assertion checking, debugging 
queries, execution profiles, and performance measurements. 
The approach is nondestructive, since assertion texts are separated from the target program source code and can be 
maintained independently. Assertions can capture both the dynamic properties of a particular target program and can 
formalize the general knowledge of typical bugs and debugging strategies. An event grammar provides a sound basis 
for assertion language implementation via target program automatic instrumentation. Event grammars may be 
designed for sequential as well as for parallel programs. The approach suggested can be adjusted to a variety of pro- 
gramming languages. We illustrate these ideas on examples for the Occam and C programming languages. 
Dynamic program analysis is one of the least understood activities in software development. A major problem is 
still the inability to express the mismatch between the expected and the observed behavior of the program on the level 
of abstraction maintained by the user [9 ] .  In other words, a flexible and expressive specification formalism is needed 
to describe properties of the software system’s implementation. Program testing and debugging is still a human activ- 
ity performed largely without any adequate tools and consuming more than 50% of the total program development 
time and effort [ 8 ] .  Debugging concurrent programs is even more difficult because of parallel activities, non-deter- 
minism and time-dependent behavior. 
One way to improve the situation is to partially automate the debugging process. Precise model ofprogram behav- 
ior becomes the first step towards debugging automation. It appears that traditional methods of programming lan- 
guage semantics definition don’t address this aspect. In building such a model several considerations were taken in 
account. The first assumption we make is that the model is discrete, i.e. comprises a finite number of well-separated 
elements. This assumption is typical for Computer Science methods used for static and dynamic analysis of programs. 
For this reason the notion of event as an elementary unit of action is an appropriate basis for building the whole 
model. The event is an abstraction for any detectable action performed during the program execution, such as a state- 
ment execution, expression evaluation, procedure call, sending and receiving a message, etc. 
Actions (or events) are evolving in time and the program behavior represents the temporal relationship between 
actions. This implies the necessity to introduce an ordering relation for events. Semantics of parallel programming 
languages and even some sequential languages (such as C )  don’t require the total ordering of actions, sopartial event 
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ordering is the most adequate method for this purpose [l 11. 
Actions performed during the program execution are at different levels of granularity, some of them include other 
actions, e.g. a subroutine call event contains statement execution events. This consideration brings to our model inclu- 
sion relation. Under this relationship events can be hierarchical objects and it becomes possible to consider program 
behavior at appropriate levels of granularity. 
Finally, the program execution can be modeled as a set of events (event trace) with two basic relations: partial 
ordering and inclusion. The event trace actually is a model of program’s behavior temporal aspect. In order to specify 
meaningful program behavior properties we have to enrich events with some attributes. An event may have a type and 
some other attributes, such as event duration, program source code related to the event, program state associated with 
the event (i.e. program variable values at the beginning and at the end of event), etc. 
The next problem to be addressed after the program behavior model is set up is the formalism specifying properties 
of the program behavior. Since our goal is debugging automation, i.e. a kind of program dynamic analysis that 
requires different types of assertion checking, debugging queries, program execution profiles, and so on, we came up 
with the concept of a computation over the event trace. It seems that this concept is general enough to cover all the 
above mentioned needs in the unifying framework, and provides sufficient flexibility. This approach implies the 
design of a special programming language for computations over the event traces. We suggest a particular language 
called FORMAN [l], [3], [lo] based on functional paradigm and the use of event patterns and aggregate operations 
over events. 
Patterns describe the structure of events with context conditions. Program paths can be described by path expres- 
sions over events. All this makes it possible to write assertions not only about variable values at program points but 
also about data and control flows in the target program. Assertions can also be used as conditions in rules which 
describe debugging actions. For example, an error message is a typical action for a debugger or consistency checker. 
Thus, it is also possible to specify debugging strategies. 
The notions of event and event type are powerful abstractions which make it possible to write assertions indepen- 
dent of any target program. Such generic assertions can be collected in standard libraries which represent the general 
knowledge about typical bugs and debugging strategies and could be designed and distributed as special software 
tools. 
FORMAN is a general language to describe computations over program event trace that can be considered as an 
example of a special programming paradigm. Possible application areas include program testing and debugging, per- 
formance measurement and modeling, program profiling, program animation, program maintenance and program 
documentation [5]. A study of FORMAN application for parallel programming is presented in [4] 
2 Events, Event Traces, and the Language for Computations Over Event Traces 
FORMAN is based on a semantic model of target program behavior in which the program execution is represented 
by a set of events. An event occurs when some action is performed during the program execution process. For 
instance, a message is sent or received, a statement is executed, or some expression is evaluated. A particular action 
may be performed many times, but every execution of an action is denoted by a unique event. 
Every event defines a time interval which has a beginning and an end. For atomic events, the beginning and end 
points of the time interval will be the same. All events used for assertion checking and other computations over event 
traces must be detectable by some implementation (e.g. by an appropriate target program instrumentation.) Attributes 
attached to events bring additional information about event context, such as current variable and expression values. 
The model of target program behavior is formally defined through a set of general axioms about two basic rela- 
tions, which may or may not hold between two arbitrary events: they may be sequentially ordered (PRECEDES), or 
one of them might be included in another composite event (IN). For each pair of events in the event trace no more 
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than one of these relations can be established. 
There are several general axioms that should be satisfied by any events a, b, c in the event trace of any target pro- 
gram. 
1) Mutual exclusion of relations. 
a PRECEDES b => not (a I N  b) and not (b I N  a )  
a I N  b => not (a  PRECEDES b) and not (b PRECEDES a )  
2) Noncommutativity. 
a PRECEDES b => n o t (  b PRECEDES a )  
a I N  b => n o t (  b I N  a )  
3) Transitivity. 
(a PRECEDES b and ( b PRECEDES c => ( a PRECEDES c) 
(a I N  b ) and ( b I N  c ) => ( a I N  c )  
Irreflexivity for PRECEDES and I N  follows from 2). Note that PRECEDES and IN are irreflexive partial order- 
ings. 
4) Distributivity 
(a I N  b) and (b PRECEDES c) => (a  PRECEDES c) 
(a PRECEDES b) and (c I N  b) => (a  PRECEDES c) 
(FOR ALL a I N  b (FOR ALL c I N  d (a  PRECEDES c) ) )  => (b PRECEDES d) 
In order to define the behavior model for some target language, types of events are introduced. Each event belongs 
to one or more of predefined event types, which are induced by target language abstract syntax (e.g. execute-state- 
ment, send-message, receive-message) or by target language semantics (rendezvous, wait, put-message-in-queue). 
The target program execution model is defined by an event grammar. The event may be a compound object and the 
grammar describes how the event is split into other event sequences or sets. For example, the event execute-assign- 
ment-statement contains a sequence of events evaluate-right-hand-part and execute-destination. The evaluate-right- 
hand-part, in turn, consists of an unique event evaluate-expression. The event grammar is a set of axioms that describe 
possible patterns of basic relations between events of different type in the program execution history, it is not intended 
to be used for parsing actual event trace. 
The rule A : : ( B C 1 establishes that if an event a of the type A occurs in the trace of a program, it is necessary 
that events b and c of types B and C, also exist, such that the relations b IN a, c IN a , b PRECEDES c hold. 
For example, the event grammar describing the semantics of a PASCAL subset may contain the following rules. 
The names, such as execute-program, and ex-stmt denote event types. 
execute-program :: ( ex-stmt * ) 
This means that each event of the type execute-program contains an ordered (w.r.t. relation PRECEDES) 
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sequence of zero or more events of the type ex- s tmt . 
ex-stmt :: ( label? ( ex-assignment 1 ex-read-stmt 1 ex-write-stmt I 
ex-reset-stmt I ex-rewrite-stmt I ex-close-stmt 1 ex-cond-stmt I 
ex-loop-stmt 1 call-procedure) ) 
The event of the type ex-stmt contains one of the events ex-assignment, ex-read-stmt, and so on. 
This inner event determines the particular type of statement executed and may be preceded by an optional event of the 
type label (traversing a label attached to the statement). 
ex-assignment :: (ex-righthand-part destination) 
The order of event occurrences reflects the semantics of the target language. When performing assignment state- 
ment first the right-hand part is evaluated and after this the destination event occurs (which denotes the assignment 
event itself). The event grammar makes FORMAN suitable for automatic source code instrumentation to detect all 
necessary events. 
An event has attributes, for instance, source text fragment from the corresponding target program, current values of 
target program variables and expressions at the beginning and at the end of event, duration of the event, previous path 
(i.e. set of events preceding the event in the target program execution history), etc. 
FORMAN supplies a means for writing assertions about events and event sequences and sets. These include quan- 
tifiers and other aggregate operations over events, e.g., sequence, bag and set constructors, boolean operations and 
operations of target language to write assertions on target program variables [2] [3]. Events can be described by pat- 
terns which capture the structure of event and context conditions. Program paths can be described by regular path 
expressions over events. 
The main extension for the parallel case [4] consists of the introduction of a new kind of composite event -- “snap- 
shot,’’ which can be considered an abstraction for the notion “a set of events that may happen at the same time.” The 
“snapshot” event is a set of events each pair of which is not under the relation PRECEDES7 this makes it possible to 
describe and to detect at run-time such typical parallel processing faults as data races and deadlock states. 
3 Examples of Debugging Rules and Queries 
In general, a debugging rule performs some actions that may include computations over the target program execu- 
tion history. The aim is to generate informative messages and to provide the user with some values obtained fi-om the 
trace in order to detect and localize bugs. Rules can provide dialog to the user as well. An assertion is a boolean 
expression that may contain quantifiers and sequencing constraints over events. 
Assertions can be used as conditions in the rules describing actions that can be performed if an assertion is satisfied 
or violated. A debugging rule has the form: 
assertion SAY (expression sequence) 
ONFAIL SAY (expression sequence) 
The presence of metavariables in the assertion makes it possible to use FORMAN as a debugger query language. 
The computation of an assertion is interrupted when it becomes clear that the final value will be False, and the current 
values of metavariables can be used to generate readable and informative messages. 
The following examples have been executed on our prototype FORMANPASCAL assertion checker [2], [3]. The 
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PASCAL program reads a sequence of integers from file XX.TXT. 
program el; 
var X: integer; 
XX: file of text; 
begin 
x:= 7; 
( *  initial value is assigned here * )  
reset (XX, ‘XX.TXT’ ) ; 
while Xc>O do 
read(XX, X) 
end. 
The contents of the file XX.TXT are as follows: 
11 5 3 7 8 9 3 1 3  2 3 45 8 754 45567 0 
Example of a Query I .  In order to obtain the history of variable X the following computation over event trace can 
be performed. The rule condition is TRUE, and is shown as a side effect the whole history of variable X. 
TRUE 
SAY ( ‘The history of variable X is:’ 
[D: destination IS X FROM execute-program APPLY VALUE(D) 3 ) 
The [ . . . 1 construct above defines a loop over the whole program execution trace (executegrogram 
event). All events matching the pattern destination I S  X are selected from the trace and the function VALUE is 
applied to them. The resulting sequence consists of values assigned to the X variable during the program execution. 
When executed on our prototype the following output is produced: 
Assertion #1 checked successfully . . .  
The history of variable X is: 7 11 5 3 7 8 9 3 1 3  2 45 8 754 45567 0 
Example of an Assertion 2. Let’s write and check the assertion : “The value of variable X does not exceed 17.” 
FOREACH *S: ex-stmt CONTAINS (D: destination IS X) FROM executegrogram 
30 
VALUE(D) < 17 
ONFAIL 
SAY(’Va1ue ’ VALUE(D) ‘is assigned to the variable X in stmt ’ 1  
SAY (S) 
SAY(’This is record # ’  CARD[ ex-read-stmt FROM PREV-PATH(S)] + 1 ’in the 
file XX. TXT‘ ) 
We check the assertion for all events where the value of X may be altered. These are events of the type destina- 
tion which can appear within ex-assignment-stmt or ex-read-stmt events. In order to make error mes- 
sages about assertion violations more informative we include the embracing event of the type ex-stmt. 
Metavariables S and D refer to those events of interest. When the assertion is violated for the first time, the assertion 
evaluation terminates and current values of metavariables can be used for message output. The value of a metavariable 
when printed by the SAY clause is shown in the form: 
event-type:> event-source-text 
Time= event-begin-time . .  event-end-time 
Event begin and end times in this prototype implementation are simply values of step counter. 
Since we expect the assertion might be violated when executing a Read statement, it makes sense to report the 
record number of the input file x x  . txt where the assertion is violated. The program state does not contain any vari- 
ables which values could provide this information. But we can perform auxiliary calculations independently from the 
target program using FORMAN aggregate operations. In this particular case the number of events of the type 
ex-read-stmt preceding the interruption moment is counted. This number plus 1 (since the violation occurs when 
the read statement is executed) yields the number of an input record on which the variable X was first assigned the 
value exceeding 17. 
Assertion # 2 violation! 
Value 45 is assigned to the variable X in stmt 
ex-stmt : 7  Read( XX , X ) Time= 73 . .  78 
This is record # 11 in the file XX.TXT 
Example of a Query 3. Profile measurement. In order to obtain the actual number of statements executed, the fol- 
lowing query can be performed: 
TRUE 
SAY(’The total number of statements executed is:‘ 
CARD[ ALL ex-stmt FROM executejrogram 1 )  
The ALL option in the aggregate operation indicates that all nested events of the type ex-stmt should be taken 
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into account. 
Assertion #3 checked successfully . . .  
The total number of statements executed is: 18 
Example of a generic assertion which must be true for any program in the target language. 
“Each variable has to be assigned value before it is used in an expression evaluation.” 
FOREACH * S: ex-stmt FROM execute-program 
FOREACH * E: eval-expression CONTAINS (V. variable) FROM S 
EXISTS D: destination FROM PREV-PATH(E) SOURCE-TEXT(D) = SOURCE-TEXT(V) 
ONFAIL 
SAY( ‘In event’ S) 
SAY( ‘in expression evaluation’) 
SAY(E) 
SAY( ‘uninitialized variable’ SOURCE-TEXT(V) ‘is used’) 
For the following PASCAL program our prototype detects the presence of the bug described above. 
program e2; 
var X , Y :  integer; 
begin Y:= 3; 
if Y c 2 then begin 
x:= 7 ;  Y:= Y + x 
else Y:= X - Y ( * * *  here the error appears: X has no value! * * * )  
end. 
Assertion #4 violation! 
In event ex-stmt : >  If ( Y < 2 1 then X := 7 ; Y := ( Y + x ) ; 
else Y := ( X - Y ) ; Time= 10 . . 3 5  
in expression evaluation 
eval-expression : >  ( X - Y ) Time= 20 . .  29 
uninitialised variable X is used 
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Debugging rules can be considered as a way of formalizing reasoning about the target program execution -- 
humans often use similar patterns for reasoning when debugging programs. For example, if the index expression of an 
array element is out of the range, the debugger can try a rule for eval-index events that invokes another rule about 
wrong value of the event eval-expression, which in turn will cause investigation of histories of all variables included 
in the expression. 
Yet another application of generic assertions and debugging rules may be for describing run-time constraints 
(sequences of procedure calls, actual parameter dependences, etc.) for nontrivial subroutine packages, e.g. for the 
MOTIF package for GUI design. A library containing assertions and debugging rules relevant to such a package may 
be useful for writing C programs calling subroutines from the package. 
4 Conclusions 
In brief, our approach can be explained as “computations over a target program event trace.” We expect the advan- 
tages of our approach to be the following: 
The notion of an event grammar provides a general basis for program behavior models. In contrast with previous 
approaches, the event is not a point in the trace but an interval with a beginning and an end. 
Event grammar provides a coordinate system to refer to any interesting event in the execution history. Program 
variable values are attributes of an event’s beginning and end. Event attributes provide complete access to each 
target program’s execution state. Assertions about particular execution states as well as assertions about sets of 
different execution states may be checked. 
The PRECEDES relation yields a partial order on the set of events, which is a natural model for parallel program 
behavior. 
The IN relation yields a hierarchy of events, so the assertions can be defined at an appropriate level of granularity. 
A language for computations over event traces provides a uniform framework for assertion checking, profiles, 
debugging queries, and performance measurements. 
The access to the complete target program execution history and the ability to formalize generic assertions can be 
used in order to define debugging rules and strategies. 
The fact that assertions and other computations over target program event trace can be separated from the text of 
the target program allows accumulation of formalized knowledge about particular programs and about the whole 
target language in separate files. This makes it easy to control the amount of assertions to be checked. 
According to [7] and 1121 approximately 40-50% of all bugs detected during the program testing are logic, struc- 
tural, and functionality bugs, i.e. bugs which could be detected by appropriate assertion checking similar to the dem- 
onstrated above. 
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Abstract. This paper suggests an approach to the development of software testing and debugging automation tools 
based on precise program behavior models. The program behavior model is defined as a set of events (event trace) with 
two basic binary relations over events -- precedence and inclusion, and represents the temporal relationship between 
actions. A language for the computations over event traces is developed that provides a basis for assertion checking, 
debugging queries, execution profiles, and performance measurements. 
The approach is nondestructive, since assertion texts are separated from the tarset program source code and can be 
maintained independently. Assertions can capture both the dynamic properties of a particular target program and can for- 
malize the general knowledge of typical bugs and debugging strategies. An event grammar provides a sound basis for 
assertion language implementation via target program automatic instrumentation. Event grammars may be designed for 
sequential as well as for parallel programs. The approach suggested can be adjusted to a variety of programming lan- 
guages. 
Ke-words. Program behavior models, events, event grammars, software testing and debugging automation 
1 Introduction 
Dynamic program analysis is one of the least understood activities in software development. A major problem is still 
the inability to express the mismatch between the expected and the observed behavior of the program on the level of 
abstraction maintained by the user [ 1 I]. In other words, a flexible and expressive specification formalism is needed to 
describe properties of the software system’s implementation. Program testing and debugging is still a human activity per- 
formed largely without any adequate tools and consuming more than 50% of the total program development time and 
effort [ 101. Debugging concurrent programs is even more difficult because of parallel activities, non-determinism and 
time-dependent behavior. 
One way to improve the situation is to partially automate the debugging process. Precise ntodel ofprogram behavior. 
becomes the first step towards debugging automation. It appears that traditional methods of programming language 
semantics definition don’t address this aspect. 
In building such a model several considerations were taken in account. The first assumption we make is that the model 
AI2000.doc 3 5  
is discrete, i.e. comprises a finite number of well-separated elements. This assumption is typical for Computer Science 
methods used for static and dynamic analysis of programs. For this reason the notion of event as an elementary unit of 
action is an appropriate basis for building the whole model. The event is an abstraction for any detectable action per- 
formed during the program execution, such as a statement execution, expression evaluation. procedure call, sending and 
receiving a message, etc. 
Actions (or events) are evolving in time and the program behavior represents the temporal relationship between actions. 
This implies the necessity to introduce an ordering relation for events. Semantics of  parallel programming languages and 
even some sequential languages (such as C )  don’t require the total ordering of actions. so parrial event ordering is the 
most adequate method for this purpose [ 181. 
Actions perfonned during the program execution are at different levels of granularity, some of them include other 
actions, e.g. a subroutine call event contains statement execution events. This consideration brings to our model incbisiort 
relation. Under this relationship events can be hierarchical objects and it becomes possible to consider program behavior 
at appropriate levels of granularity. 
Finally, the prograin execution can be modeled as a set of events (event trace) with two basic relations: partial ordering 
and inclusion. The event trace actually is a model of program’s behavior temporal aspect. In order to specify meaningful 
program behavior properties we have to enrich events with some attributes. An event may have a type and some other 
attributes. such as event duration, program source code related to the event, program state associated with the event (i.e. 
program variable values at the beginning and at the end of event), etc. 
The next problem to be addressed after the program behavior model is set up is the formalism specifying properties of 
the program behavior. This could be done in many different ways, e.g. by adopting some kind of logic calculi uredicare 
logic, teinporal logic). Such a direction leads to tools for program static verification, or in more pragmatic incarnations to 
an approach called model checking [ 131. As indicated in [ I ]  “Dynamic analysis is limited to checking observed behaviors. 
and so in principle provides weaker assurances. but this is balanced by checking a wider range of properties and typically 
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by better perfonnance ... .” 
Since our goal is debugging automation, i.e. a kind of program dynamic analysis that requires different types of asser- 
tion checking, debugging queries, program execution profiles, and so on, we came up with the concept of a conipriratioii 
over the event trace. It seems that this concept is general enough to cover all the above mentioned needs in the unifying 
framework, and provides sufficient flexibility. This approach implies the design of a special programming language for 
computations over the event traces. We suggest a particular language called FORMAN [2], [4], [16] based on functional 
paradigm and the use of ex’ent patterns and aggregate operations over events. 
Patterns describe the structure of events with context conditions. Program paths can be described by path expressions 
over events. All this makes it possible to write assertions not only about variable values at program points but also about 
data and control flows in the target program. Assertions can also be used as conditions in rules which describe debugging 
actions. For example, an error message is a typical action for a debugger or consistency checker. Thus, it is also possible to 
specify debugging strategies. 
The notions of event and event type are powerful abstractions which make it possible to write assertions independent of 
any target program. Such generic assertions can be collected in standard libraries which represent the general knowledge 
about typical bugs and debugging strategies and could be designed and distributed as special software tools. 
FORMAN is a general language to describe computations over program event trace that can be considered as an exam- 
ple of a special programiing pai-udigvi. Possible application areas include program testing and debugging, performance 
measurement and modeling. program profiling, program animation, program maintenance and program documentation 
[6 ] .  A study of FORMAN application for parallel programming is presented in [5] 
2 Events 
FORMAN is based on a semantic model of target program behavior in which the prograin execution is represented by 
a set of events. An event occurs when some action is performed during the program execution process. For instance, a 
message is sent or received, a statement is executed, or some expression is evaluated. A particular action may be per- 
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formed many times, but every execution of an action is denoted by a unique event. 
Every event defines a time interval which has a beginning and an end. For atomic events. the beginning and end points 
of the time interval will be the same. All events used for assertion checking and other computations over event traces must 
be detectable by some implementation (e.g. by an appropriate target program instrumentation.) Attributes attached to 
events bring additional information about event context, such as current variable and expression values. 
In order to give some support for our notion of event let us consider a well-known idea such as a counter. Usually the 
history of a variable X when used as a counter looks like: 
x := 0; ... 
Loop ... 
x := x - 1; ... 
endloop; .. 
In order to check whether the actual behavior of the counter X matches the pattern described by the program fragment 
ab0i.e we have to consider the following events. Let Initialize-X denote the event of assigning 0 to the variable X. 
Augment-X denote the event of incrementing X, and Assign-X denote an event of assigning any value to the variable X. 
One could check whether X behaves as a counter when a program segment S is executed in the following way. First, the 
sequence A of all events of the type Assign-X from the event trace of program segment S has to be extracted preserving 
the ordering between events. Second, A has to be matched with the pattern: 
I ni t i a1 i z e-X ( Augment-X ) * 
where'*' denotes repetition zero or more times. If the actual sequence of events does not match this pattern we can 
report an error. Therefore, assertion checking can be represented as a kind of computation over target program event trace. 
Another informal example involves parallel events. Let us suppose that Assign-Y denotes an event of assigning a value 
to the shared variable Y through any of several parallel processes. Then, detecting a set of events of the type Assign-Y 
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that happen “at the same time” (i.e. are not under the precedence relation) may be evidence of a possible data-race condi- 
tion in the program execution. 
The program state (current values of variables) can be considered at the beginning or at the end of an appropriate event. 
This provides the opportunity to write assertions about program variable values at different points in the program execu- 
tion history. 
Program profiling usually is based on counting the number of events of some type, e.s. the number of statement execu- 
tions or procedure calls. Performance measurements may be based on attaching the duration attribute to such events and 
summarizing durations of selected events. 
3 Event Trace and the Language for Computations Over Event Traces 
FORMAN is a high-level specification language for expressing intended behavior or known types of error conditions 
when debugging or testing programs. It is intended to be used in conjunction with a high-level programming language 
which is called the target lunguge. 
The model of target program behavior is formally defined through a set of general axioms about two basic relations. 
which may or may not hold between two arbitrary events: they may be sequentially ordered (PRECEDES), or one of them 
might be included in another composite event (IN). For each pair of events in the event trace no more than one of these 
relations can be established. 
There are several general axioms that should be satisfied by any events a, b. c in the event trace of any target program. 
1) Mutual exclusion of relations. 
a PRECEDES b => not (a  I N  b) and not (b I N  a) 
a I N  b => not(a PRECEDES b) and not (b PRECEDES a) 
2) Noncommutativity 
a PRECEDES b => not ( b PRECEDES a) 
a IN b => not( b IN a)  
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3) Transitivity. 
(a PRECEDES b ) and ( b PRECEDES c ) => ( a PRECEDES c )  
(a I N  b ) and ( b I N  c ) =:, ( a I N  c)  
Irreflexivity for PRECEDES and IN follows from 2) .  Note that PRECEDES and h’ are irreflexive partial ordering. 
4) Distributivity 
( a  I N  b) and (b PRECEDES c )  => ( a  PRECEDES c )  
(a  PRECEDES b) and ( c  I N  b) => ( a  PRECEDES c )  
(FOR ALL a I N  b (FOR ALL c I N  d (a PRECEDES c )  ) ) => (b P R X E D E S  d )  
In order to define the behavior model for some target language, types of events are introduced. Each event belongs to 
one or more of predefined event types, which are induced by target language abstract syntax (e.g. execute-statement, send- 
message, receive-message) or by target language semantics (rendezvous. Lvait. put-message-in-queue). 
The target program execution model is defined by an event grammar. The event may be a compound object and the 
grammar describes how the event is split into other event secpences or sets. For example, the event execute-assignment- 
statement contains a sequence of events evaluate-right-hand-part and execute-destination. The evaluate-right-hand-part, in 
turn, consists of an unique event evaluate-expression. The event grammar is a set of axioms that describe possible patterns 
of basic relations between events of different type in the program execution history. it is not intended to be used for pars- 
ing actual event trace. 
The rule A : : ( B C) establishes that if an event a of the type A occurs in the trace of a program, it is necessary that 
events b and c of types B and Ct also exist, such that the relations b I N  a ,  c IN a, b PRECEDES c hold. 
For example, the event graminar describins the semantics of a PASCAL subset may contain the following rules. The 
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names, such as execute-program, and ex-stmt denote event types. 
execute-program : :  ( ex-stmt * ) 
This means that each event of the type execute-program contains an 
sequence of zero or more events of the type ex- stmt. 
rd red (w.r.t. relation PRECEDES) 
ex-stmt : :  ( label? ( ex-assignment 1 ex-read-stmt I ex-write-stmt I 
ex-reset-stmt I ex-rewrite-stmt 1 ex-close-stmt I ex-cond-stmt I 
ex-loop-stmt 1 call-procedure) 1 
The event of the type ex-stmt contains one of the events ex-assignment, ex-read-stmt, and so on. This 
inner event determines the particular type of statement executed and may be preceded by an optional event of the type 
l a b e l  (traversing a label attached to the statement). 
ex-assignment :: (ex-righthand-part destination) 
The order of event occurrences reflects the semantics of the target Iang~iage. When performing assignment statement 
first the right-hand part is evaluated and after this the destination event occurs (which denotes the assignment event itself). 
The event grammar makes FORMAX suitable for automatic soiirce code instrumentation to detect all necessary events. 
An event has attributes. for instance, source text fragment from the corresponding target program, current values of tar- 
get program variables and expressions at the beginning and at the end of event, duration of the event, previous path (i.e. set 
of events preceding the event in the target program execution history), etc. 
FORMAN supplies a means for writing assertions about events and event sequences and sets. These include quantifiers 
and other aggregate operations over events. e.g., sequence, bag and set constructors, boolean operations and operations of 
target language to write assertions on target program variables [3] [4]. 
Events can be described by patterns which capture the structure of event and context conditions. Program paths can be 
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described by regular path expressions over events. 
The main extension for the parallel case [5] consists of the introduction of a new kind of composite event -- “snapshot,” 
which can be considered as an abstraction for the notion “a set of events that may happen at the same time.” The “snap- 
shot” event is a set of events each pair of which is not under the relation PRECEDES and makes it possible to describe and 
to detect at run-time such typical parallel processing faults as data races and deadlock states. 
All this makes i t  possible to fonnalize assertions of the following types: 
“all variables in the program inmt be initialized before using in some expression,” 
“file must be opened, then the read statement is performed zero or more times and after that the close statement is 
executed,” 
“at least one variable changes its value during one loop L iteration,” 
I “after the execution of a subprogram P the value of variable X remains unchanged,” 
I “there is an attempt to assign values to the same variable in two parallel processes” (data race condition). 
“deadlock for parallel processes P1 and P2 is detected.” 
In addition to debugging and testing, FORMAN can also be used to specify profiles and performance measurements. 
4 Examples of Debugging Rules and Queries 
In general, a debugging rule perforins some actions that may include coinputations over the target program execution 
history. The aim is to generate informative messages and to provide the user with some values obtained from the trace in 
order to detect and localize bugs. Rules can provide dialog to the user as well. An assertion is a boolean expression that 
may contain quantifiers and sequencing constraints over events. 
Assertions can be used as conditions in the niles describing actions that can be perfonned if an assertion is satisfied or 
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violated. A debugging rule has the fonn: 
assertion SAY (expression sequence) 
ONFAIL SAY ( expre s s ion s e quenc e ) 
The presence of metavariables in the assertion makes it possible to use FORMAN as a debugger queT language. The 
computation of an assertion is intemlpted when it becomes clear that the final value will be False, and the current values 
of metavariables can be used to generate readable and informative messages. 
The followin,o examples have been executed on our prototype FORMAN/PASCAL assertion checker [3]. [4]. The PAS- 
CAL program reads a sequence of integers from file XX.TXT. 
program el; 
var X: integer; 
XX: file of text; 
begin 
x:= 7; 
( *  initial value is assigned here * )  
reset (XX, ‘XX.TXT’ ) ; 
while Xc>O do 
read(XX, X) 
end. 
The contents of the file XX.TXT are as follows: 
11 5 3 7 8 9 3 1 3  2 3 45  8 754 45567 0 
E-wnple ?fa Piwry 1. In order to obtain the history of variable X the following coinputation over event trace can be 
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performed. The rule condition is TRUE, and is shown as a side effect the whole history of variable X. 
TRUE 
SAY ( 'The history of variable X is:' 
[D: destination IS X FROM executegrogram APPLY VALUE(D) 1 1 
?he [ . . . 1 constnict above defines a loop over the whole program execution trace (execute-program event). 
All events matching the pattern destination IS X are selected from the trace and the function VALUE is applied to 
them. The resulting sequence consists of values assigned to the X variable during the program execution. 
When executed on our prototype the following output is produced: 
Assertion #1 checked successfully... 
The history of variable X is: 7 11 5 3 7 8 9 3 13 2 4 5  8 754  45567  0 
Exantple o fun  Assertion 2. Let's write and check the assertion : "The v n h e  of variable X does not exceed 17." 
FOREACH *S: ex-stmt COSTAINS (D: destination IS X) FROM execute-program VALUE(D) < 17 
ONFAIL 
SAY('Va1ue ' VALUE(D) 'is assigned to the variable X in stmt .) 
SAY(S) 
SAY('This is record #' CARD[ ex-read-stmt FROM PREV-PATH(S)] + 1 'in the file XX.TXT') 
We check the assertion for all events where the value of X may be altered. These are events of the type destination 
which can appear within ex-assignment-stmt or ex-read-stmt e\.ents. In order to make error messages about 
assertion violations more informative we include the embracing event of the type ex-s tmt . Metavariables S and D refer 
AI2000.doc 4 4  
to those events of  interest. When the assertion is violated for the first time, the assertion evaluation terminates and ctirrent 
values of metavariables can be used for message output. The value of a metavariable Lvhen printed by the SAY clause is 
shown in the fonn: 
event-type:> event-source-text 
Time= event-begin-time . .  event-end-time 
Event begin and end times in this prototype implementation are simply values of step counter. 
Since we expect the assertion might be violated nhen executing a Read statement, it makes sense to report the record 
number of the input file xx . txt where the assertion is violated. The program state does not contain any variables which 
values could provide this information. But we can perform auxiliary calculations independently from the target program 
using FORMAN aggregate operations. In this particular case the number of events of the type ex-read-stmt preced- 
ing the interruption moment is counted. This number plus 1 [since the violation occLirs \!.hen the read statement is exe- 
cuted) yields the number of an input record on which the variable X \\'as first assigned the value exceeding 17. 
Assertion # 2 violation! 
Value 45 is assigned to the variable x in stmt 
ex-stmt : >  Read( XX , X 1 Time= 73 . .  78 
This is record # 11 in the file XX.TXT 
Example of a Query 3. Profile measurement. In order to obtain the actual nuitiber of statements executed, the following 
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query can be performed: 
TRUE 
SAY('The total number of statements executed is:' 
CARD[ ALL ex-stmt FROM executegrogram I )  
The ALL option in the aggregate operation indicates that all nested events of the type ex-stmt should be taken into 
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account. 
Assertion # 3  checked successfully... 
The total number of statements executed is: 18 
Example of a generic assertion which lnust be true for any prograln in the target language. 
“Each variable has to be assigned value before it is used in an expression evaluation.” 
FOREACH * S: ex-stmt FROM execute-program 
FOREACH * E: eval-expression CONTAINS ( V  variable) FROM S 
EXISTS D: destination FROM PREV-PATH(E) SOURCE-TEXT(D) = SOURCE-TEXT(V) 
ONFAIL 
SAY( ‘In event’s) 
SAY( ‘in expression evaluation’) 
SAY(E) 
SAY(‘uninitia1ized variable’ SOURCE-TEXT(V) ‘is used’) 
For the following PASCAL program our prototype detects the presence of the bug described above. 
program e2; 
var X,Y: integer; 
begin Y:= 3; 
if Y c 2 then begin 
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x:= 7 ;  Y:= Y + x 
else Y : =  X - Y ( * * *  here the error appears: X has no value! * * * )  
end. 
Assertion #4 violation! 
In event ex-stmt :>  If ( Y c 2 ) then X := 7 ; Y := ( Y + X ) ; 
else Y : =  ( X - Y 1 ; Time= 10 . .  35 
in expression evaluacion 
eval-expression : >  ( X - Y ) Time= 20 . .  29 
uninitialised variable X is used 
Debugging rules can be considered as a n a y  of formalizing reasoning about the target program execution -- humans 
often use similar patterns for reasoning when debugging programs. For example, if the index expression of an array ele- 
ment is out of the range, the debugger can try a nile for eval-index events that invokes another rule about wrong value of 
the event eval-expression, which in turn will cause investigation of histories of all variables included in the expression. 
Yet another application of generic assertions and debugging mles may be for describing run-time constraints 
(sequences of procedure calls, actual parameter dependences, etc.) for nontrivial subroutine packages, e.g. for the MOTIF 
package for GUI design. A library containing assertions and debugging rules relevant to such a package may be useful for 
writing C programs calling subroutines from the package. 
5 Related Work 
What follows is a very brief survey of basic ideas known in Debugging Automation to provide the background for the 
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approach advocated in this paper. 
5.1 Event Notion 
The Event Based Behavioral Abstraction (EBBA) method suggested in [8] characterizes the behavior of the whole pro- 
gram in tenns of both primitive and composite events. Context conditions involving event attribute values can be used to 
distinguish events. EBBA defines two higher level means for modeling system behavior -- clustering and filtering. Clus- 
tering is used to express behavior as composite events, i.e. aggregates of previously defined events. Filtering serves to 
eliminate from consideration events which are not relevant to the model being investigated. Both event recognition and fil- 
tering can be perfonned at run-time. 
An event-based debugger for the C programming language called Dalek [23] provides a means for description of user- 
defined events which typically are points within a program execution trace. A target prograin has to be instrumented in 
order to collect values of event attributes. Composite events can be recognized at run-time as collections of primitive 
events. 
FORMAN has a more comprehensive modelling approach than EBBA or Dalek. based on the event grainmar. A lan- 
guage for expressing computations over execution histories is provided, which is missing in EBBA and Dalek. The event 
grammar makes FORMAN suitable for automatic source code instrumentation to detect all necessary events. FORMAN 
supports design of universal assertions and debugging rides that could be used for debugging of arbitrary target programs. 
This generality is missing in EBBA and Dalek approaches. The event in FORMAK is a time interval, in contrast wirh the 
event notion in previous approaches where events are considered pointwise time moments. 
The COCA debugger [ 141 for the C language uses the GDB debugger for tracing and PROLOG for debugging queries 
execution. It provides a certain event grammar for C traces and event patterns based on attributes for event search. The 
query language is designed around special primitives built into the PROLOG query evaluator. We assume that FORMAS 
is more suitable for trace computations as it has been designed for this specific purpose. 
5.2 Path Expressions 
Data and control flow descriptions of the target program are essential for testing and debugging purposes. It is useful to 
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give such a description in an explicit and precise fonn. The path expression technique introduced for specifying parallel 
programs in [ 121 is one such fonnalisin. Trace specifications also are used in [22] for software specification. This tech- 
nique has been used in several projects as a background for high-level debugging tools, (e.g. in [ I 11). where path rules are 
suggested as kinds of debugger commands. FORMAN provides flexible language means for trace specification including 
event patterns and regular expressions over them. 
5.3 Assertion Languages 
Assertion (or annotation) languages provide yet another approach to debugging automation. Thr approaches currently 
in use are mostly based on boolean expressions attached to selected points of the target proz oram. like the assert macro in 
C. The ANNA [20] annotation language for the Ada target language supports assertions on \xiable and type declarations. 
In the TSL [ 193, [XI annotation language for Ada the notion of event is introduced in order to describe the behavior of 
Tasks. Patterns can be written which involve parameter values of Task entry calls. Assertions are written in Ada itself, 
using a number of special pre-defined predicates. Assertion-checking is dynamic at run-time, and does not need post-mor- 
tem analysis. The RAPIDE project [2 I ]  provides a reach event-based assertion language for software architecture descrip- 
tion. 
In [7] events are introduced to describe process communication, termination. and connection and detachment of pro- 
cess to channels. A language of Behavior Expressions (BE) is provided to write assertions about sequences of process 
interactions. BE is able to describe allowed sequences of events as well as some predicates defined on the values of the 
variables of processes. Event types are process communication and interactions such as send, receive. terminate, connect, 
detach. Evaluation of assertions are done at run-time. No composite events are provided. 
Another recent experimental debugging tool is based on trace analysis with respect to assertions in temporal interval 
iogic. This work is presented in [ 171 where four types of events are introduced: assignment to variables. reaching a label, 
interprocess communication and process instantiation or termination. Composite events cannot be defined. Different vari- 
eties of temporal logic languages are used for program static analysis called Model Checking [13]. 
In [26] a practical approach to prograinining with assertions for the C language is advocated. and it is demonstrated that 
even local assertions associated with particular points within the program may be extremely useful for program debug- 
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ging. 
The FORMAN language for computations over traces provides flexible means for lvriting both local and global asser- 
tions, including those about temporal relations behveen events. 
5.4 Algorithmic Debugging 
The original algorithmic program debugging method was introduced in [25] for the Prolog language. In [27] and [I51 
this paradigin is applied to a subset of PASCAL. 
The debugger executes the program and builds a trace execution tree at the procedure level while savins some useful 
trace infonnation such as procedure names and input/output parameter values. The algorithmic debugger traverses the 
execution tree and interacts with the user by asking about the intended behavior of each procedure. The user has the possi- 
bility to answer “yes” or “no” about the intended behavior of the procedure. The search finally ends and a bug is localized 
within a procedurep when one of the folloning holds: procedurep contains no procedure calls. or all procedure calls per- 
formed from the body of procedure p fulfill the user‘s expectations. 
Algorithmic debugging can be considered as an example of debugging strategy, based on some assertion language (in 
this case assertions about results of a procedure call.) The notion of computation over execution trace introduced in FOR- 
MAN may be a convenient basis for describing such debugging strategies. 
6 Conclusions 
In brief, our approach can be explained as ”coinputations over a tarset program event trace.” We expect the advantages 
of our approach to be the following: 
The notion of an event grammar provides a general basis for prograin behavior models. In contrast with previous 
approaches. the event is not a point in the trace but an interval with a beginning and an end. 
Event grammar provides a coordinate system to refer to any interesting event in the execution history. Program variable 
values are attributes of an event’s beginning and end. Event attributes provide complete access to each target 
program’s execution state. Assertions about particular execution states as well as assertions about sets of different 
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execution states may be checked. 
The PRECEDES relation yields a partial order on the set of events, which is a natural model for parallel program 
behavior. 
The IN relation yields a hierarchy of events, so the assertions can be defined at an appropriate level of granularity. 
.A language for computations over event traces provides a uniform framework for assertion checking, profiles. 
debugging queries, and perfonnance measurements. 
The access to the complete target program execution history and the ability to fonnalize generic assertions can be used 
in order to define debugging rules and strategies. 
The fact that assertions and other computations over target program event trace can be separated from the text of the 
target program allows accuinulation of formalized knowledge about particular programs and about the whole target 
language in separate files. This makes it easy to control the amount of assertions to be checked. 
According to [9] and [24] approxiinately 40-50% of all bugs detected during the prograin testing are logic, structural, 
and functionality bugs, i.e. bugs which could be detected by appropriate assertion checking similar to the demonstrated 
ab0i.e. 
It appears that the approach initially designed for program behavior modeling may be used in other dynamic system 
behavior models as well. The methodology is based on identifying event types representing essential actions performed 
within the system, and defining the basic relations PRECEDES and I5 for those events (event grammar), and appropriate 
event attributes. Then the FORMAN-like language for computations over event traces inay be developed to specify behav- 
ior properties, to perfonn queries and other kinds of dynamic analysis. 
This work was supported in part by NSF grant #9510732. 
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Abstract 
This paper presents an approach to achieving reliable cost-effective software via automatic program 
generation patterns. The main idea is to certify the patterns once, to establish a reliability property for all 
of the programs that could possibly be generated from the patterns. We focus here on properties that can 
be checked via computable static analysis. Examples of methods to assure syntactic correctness and 
exception closure of the generated code are presented. Exception closure means that a software module 
cannot raise any exceptions other than those declared in its interface. 
1. Introduction 
Our goal is to provide cost effective means for creating reliable software. We are addressing the 
issue by improving the technology for automatic software generation, with particular attention to 
reliability issues. 
We take a domain specific view of this process: a domain is a family of related problems addressing 
a common set of issues. A domain analysis identifies the problem and issues, formulates a model of these, 
and determines a corresponding set of solution methods. Users of the proposed computer-aided software 
generation system describe their particular problem using a domain specific problem modeling language 
that provides concrete representations of problems in the domain. The system then automatically 
determines which solution methods are applicable, customizes them to the specific problem instance 
described using the modeling language, and then automatically generates a program that will solve the 
' specified problem. 
We seek to provide tool support for the above process that can be applied to many different problem 
domains, and that can generate code in any programming language. Therefore we seek uniform and 
effective methods for generating software generators of the type described above, given definitions of the 
problem modeling language, the target programming language, and the roles for synthesizing solution 
programs. A simple architecture for this process is shown in Figure 1. 
The specific goals of this paper are: (1) to provide a simple example of a language for expressing 
software patterns that are specific enough to be used as synthesis rules and (2) to provide examples of 
static rules in this language. We address the problems of certifying that all programs which can be 
generated. from a given set of rules: (1) are syntactically correct and (2) will not raise any exceptions other 
than those explicitly specified in an interface description. 
This is a step towards a coordinated system of static and dynamic checks, to be performed on 
program synthesis rules. Our hypothesis is that the most cost effective way to improve software quality is 
to systematically improve and certify the rules used to generate a domain-specific software generator. 
This approach directly addresses the issue of correctly implementing given software requirements. It also 
indirectly addresses the issue of getting the right requirements, because it should eventually enable rapid 
prototyping of product quality systems by problem domain experts, who need not be software experts. If 
the requirements are found to be inappropriate, the domain experts will simply update the problem models 
and regenerate a new version of the solution software. 
We will refer to the software generation patterns as templates. Our rationale for the claim of cost 
effectiveness is that the benefits of quality improvements to the templates can be extended to all past and 
future applications of the generators - by regenerating the generator using the improved templates and 
then regenerating the past applications. The regeneration process can be completely automated, thereby 
reducing labor costs, eliminating a source of random human errors, and speeding up the process of 
repairing a known fault throughout a large family of software systems. 
~ 
This research was supported in part by the U. S. Army Research Office under contract/grant number 
35037-MA and 40473-MA, and in part by DARPA under contract #99-F759. 
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The relation to the theme of this workshop is that fast moving scenarios can be addressed by 
automatically generating new variants of the software that reflect changing issues in the problem domain. 
Our approach should reduce the explicit quality assurance efforts needed each time the software is 
changed. By amortizing the quality assurance effort applied to the template over many applications of the 
same templates, we can reduce quality assurance costs. The benefits increase with the number of systems 










Program Generator I 




Figure 1. Model-Based Software Generator Architecture 
This paper focuses on static checks that can be completely automated. Our research is also addressing 
testing and debugging of program synthesis rules and proofs of rule properties that require human 
assistance with deeper reasoning. These efforts are outside the scope of the current paper, which is 
organized as follows: 
Section 2 formalizes software generation patterns and defines a uniform construction to 
obtain a template language for any target programming language. 
Section 3 describes methods for statically certifying syntactic correctness generated code, 
and gives an example. 
Section 4 does the same for analysis of exceptions. 
Section 5 contains comparisons to previous work 
Section 6 presents conclusions. 
2. Template Lanpuages 
The purpose of a template language is to define software synthesis patterns for a given target 
language. We create such languages based on a functional object model of code generation templates. We 
take a functional (i.e. side-effect-free) approach because this simplifies the algebraic basis of the approach 
and supports effective static analysis methods such as those presented in Section 3 and 4. 
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We view template languages as extensions of the corresponding target programming languages. 
Because many different programming languages are created, we will need many different template 
languages. However, all of these can be defined at once by providing uniform construction such as that 
shown in Figure 2.  
This is a very simple construction, but it is very expressive. In addition to providing substitution of 
actual values for generic parameters, as in the generic units of Ada and the templates of C++, our 
construction includes conditionals that are evaluated at code generation time, and the ability to invoke 
other templates. Recursion is included. 
Template-language = {template, formal-def, template-expression} 
DEF-TEMPLATE(id[template], type, seq[formal-defl, template-expression): 
template -- where type E target-language 
DEF-FORMAL(temp1ate-parameter, type): formal-def 
-- declares the type of a formal parameter 
template-parameter < { id[any], template-expression} 
IF(temp1ate-expression, template-expression, template-expression): 
APPLY(id[template], seq[template-expression]): template-expression 
template-expression 
template-expression < t arge t-1 anguage 
Figure 2. Template Abstract Syntax 
The construction depends heavily on the use of inheritance in object-oriented modeling of 
programming languages. The situation is illustrated in Figure 3. 
Figure 3. Generic Template Language 
In object-oriented modeling, class-wide types‘ are viewed as open and extensible. Specifically, each 
time we add a subclass with a new constructor, we add more instances to the class-wide type, thus 
extending its value set. 
We model the abstract syntax of a language using a type for each kind of semantic entity. In a 
properly constructed abstract syntax, there should be one such type for each non-terminal symbol. Each 
constructor of these types corresponds to a production of the grammar. Subclass relationships, denoted by 
“9, specify that every instance of the subclass is also an instance of the parent class. Multiple inheritance 
is allowed. For example, in line 6 of Figure 2 says that every template parameter is a kind of identifier, 
and also is a kind of template expression. This kind of subclass relationship is used to incorporate 
reusable types in a library of programming language building blocks, such as identifiers, and to specialize 
reusable concepts to the application, such as template expression. If T is a type and S is a set of types, 
T<S means T is a subclass of each element of S .  This represents multiple inheritance. 
~~ 
This is Ada 95 terminology. The instances of a class wide type include its direct instances and those of 
all its subclasses, transitively. 
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Subclassing is also used to interface between a target programming language and its extensions. In 
Figure 2, "target-language'' denotes the set of types comprising the abstract syntax of the target language. 
Figure 4 shows a very simple example of a target language that illustrates how this works. 
target-language = (stmt, exp) 
assign(var, exp): stmt 
if(exp, stmt, stmt): stmt 
integer < exp -- integer literals 
var (id[any], exp] -- program variables 
apply(id[fi~nction], seqrexp]): exp -- operations 
subtype rule: x < y => id[x] < id[y] where x, y E type 
Figure 4. Example: Micro Target Language 
The example in Figure 5 defines a code generation pattern that embodies Newton's method for 
polynomial evaluation, which is optimal in terms of number of evaluation steps needed. This is a very 
simple example of a code generation pattern that is nevertheless realistic, because it embodies a solution 
method. The example also illustrates the use of all the constructs in the template language. We use infix 
syntax for the exp constructors * and + to improve legibility (e.g. x*y is short for the term apply(*, x, y)). 
An additional benefit of considering the abstract syntax to be an algebra rather than a tree is that we 
can used well-studied transformation rules. In particular we can associate equational axioms with the 
programming language types that define normal forms. Figure 5 illustrates the use of such axioms as 
rewrite rules that simplify the code produced by the generator in a follow-on normalization process. This 
is one way to incorporate optimizations into the program generation process, which is useful for 
unconditional transformations. 
TEMPLATE evaluate-polynomial (v: var, c: seq[integer]): exp 
-- c contains coefficients of a polynomial, lowest degree first 
IF not (is-empty (c) ) -- use operations of boolean and seq 
THEN v * (evaluate-polynomial (v, rest(c))) + first (c) 
ELSE 0 
END TEMPLATE 
Template application evaluate-polynomial(x, [ 1,2,3]) generates 
x * (x * (x * 0 + 3) +2) + 1 
Normalization with integer rules i * 0 = 0, i + 0 = i reduces to 
x * (x * 3 + 2) + 1 
Figure 5. Example: Generation Pattern 
Code generation using the template language is a very much like evaluation in a functional 
programming language with call-by-value semantics. Analysis of templates can take 'advantage of 
equational reasoning, substitution, and structural induction. The limitation to primitive recursion 
facilitates the latter. The recursion in the example is structural because rest is a partial inverse for the 
sequence constructor add (i.e. rest(add(x, s)) = s). 
3. Svntactic Correctness of Generated Code 
We treat the abstract syntax structures of the target language as the values of the abstract data types 
representing the programming language. We require these types to provide a pretty printing operation that 
outputs such objects as text strings according to the concrete syntax of the target language, with a 
readable format. Establishing correctness of these pretty printing operations is straightforward, and in fact 
their implementations can be generated from an appropriately annotated grammar for the concrete syntax. 
Given trusted pretty printing operations for the object model of the target language, syntactic 
correctness of the output reduces to the type-correctness of the ground terms generated by the evaluation 59 
of the templates. This can be checked using a simple type system for the template language and 
conventional type checking methods. Note that we are referring to the types associated with the signatures 
of the constructors in the object model of the target programming language, rather than the types within 
the target programming language, which may not even be a typed language. The process is illustrated 
Figure 6.  The computed type annotations are shown in italics. The type annotations associated with the 
implicit induction step, where the type signature of the template itself is used, is highlighted in bold 
italics. The indentations of the type annotations reflect the structure of the derivation. 
TEMPLATE evaluate-polynomial (v: var, c: seq[integer]): exp 
IF not (is-empty (c : seq[infeger] ) : boolean ) : boolean 
THEN +(  * (  v : var, 
evaluate-polynomial 
(v : var, 
rest(c: seq[integer] ) : seq[integerfi 3 exp 
) :exp 
first (c: seq[integer] ) : integer 
) :exp 
-term form of v* evaluate-polynomial (v, rest(c)) + first (c) 
$ : integer ELSE 0 
END TEMPLATE 
Types conform because integer c m#var c exp 
Relevant signatures: +(exp, exp) :exp, *(exp, exp) :exp, 
first(seq[T]): T, rest(seq[T]): seq[T], 
is-empty(seq[T]): boolean, not(boo1ean): boolean 
Figure 6. Example: Syntactic Correctness of Generated Code 
Note that induction has been carried out implicitly, as a routine step of the type checking calculation. 
This is sufficient to establish partial type correctness of the templates, which implies syntactic correctness 
of all code that could be generated by the template, it does not automatically guarantee total correctness, 
because we still have the possibility that evaluation of the template might fail to terminate. 
Total correctness is established by the type check if we check that all recursions are primitive. The 
example satisfies this condition because rest is a partial inverse of the compound sequence constructor; 
rest(add(x,s)) = s. This means that the induction is in fact structural, and hence that evaluate-polynomial 
is total. Thus the template will produce syntactically correct code for all input values that conform to the 
type signature of evaluate-polynomial. 
We note that given declarations of the target language constructors that define the abstract syntax and 
the corresponding partial inverse operations, it is straightfonvard to automatically check that all recursive 
calls are primitive with respect to any given parameter position. This implies that structural induction can 
be applied uniformly and completely automatically in this context. Furthermore, our experience suggests 
that structural recursions are sufficient to define the code generation templates needed in practice, and that 
template designers can live within the restriction to structural recursions without undue hardships. 
4. Exceotion Closures for Generated Code 
One common source of software failure is unhandled exceptions. This section explains a method for 
certifying that all programs generated from a given template cannot generate any unhandled exceptions 
when placed in a context that handles a specified set of exceptions. 
Our approach is to refine the type system to record the set of exceptions that might be raised by the 
evaluation of any expression of the target language. A similar structure can be used to analyze the set of 
exceptions that might be raised by execution of a statement of the target language. 
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The refinement replaces the single target language type exp with a parameterized family of types 
exp[set[exception]]. The intended interpretation of this type structure is that evaluation of an expression 
of type exp[S] might raise an exception e only if eE S .  Since we do not require all exceptions in S to be 
producible, this family of types has a rich subclass structure defined by the following relation: 
S l c  52 * exp[Sl] S exp[S2] 
The type signatures of an operation are specified explicitly for argument expression type that cannot 
raise any exceptions, and are extended to all other types by the following rule, which describes the 
essential pattern for propagating exceptions: 
F(exp[0]) : exp[S1] 3 f(exp[S2]): exp[SI u S2] 
The rule for operations with multiple arguments is similar. Similar rules apply to language constructs 
representing exception handlers. Exception handlers follow rules of the form 
(TRY exp[SI] CATCH e USE exp[S2]): exp[(SI-{e}) u S2]. 
Figure 7 shows the exception analysis for our running example. The parts added to the version in 
Figure 6 are underlined. 
TEMPLATE evaluate-polynomial (v: var, c: seq[integer]): exp [ { ovf 1 } 3 
IF not (is-empty (c : seq [integkrlboole&n boolean 
THEN +(*(v : vqr 
evaluate-polynomial(v: var, 
first (c: seq[inte+rlinteg$r e d ( o v f l } ]  
rest(c : seq t integer$e)l[infegeF 1 exp f {ovfZ)j 
-- term form of v * evaluate-polynomial (v, rest(c)) + first (c) 
ELSE 0 : integer 
END TEMPLATE 
Types conform because integer < exp [@I c exp [ { ovf 1 } 1 and 
var < exp [a] 5 exp { ovfl}  1 
Relevant signatures: +(exp, exp): exp [ { ovf 1 } 1 , *(exp, exp): exp [ { ovf 1 } 1 , 
first(seq[T]): T, rest(seq[T]): seq[T], is-empty(seq[T]): boolean, , not(boo1ean): boolean 
- 
Figure 7. Exception Closure of Generated Code 
Note that we require the author of the template to specifjr in the type declaration of a template the set 
of exceptions the generated expression is allowed to raise. This acts as an induction hypothesis in our 
exception analysis, which is used when analyzing the recursive call of evaluate-polynomial. It also 
provides useful information for the user of the generated code. 
The analysis shown in the figure establishes a partial exception closure: it guarantees that all 
expressions generated by the template can at most raise only the exception ovfl representing integer 
overflow. 
To establish a total exception closure, we have to address clean termination of the template expansion 
at program generation time. The primitive recursion check explained in the previous section guarantees 
there will be no infinite recursions, so that termination is guaranteed. However, for clean termination, we 
must also check that evaluation of the template will not raise any exceptions at program generation time. 
Note that the analysis in Figure 7 addresses run-time exceptions. When viewed as constructors of the 
abstract syntax, + and * are total operations. Overflow exceptions can occur only when those expressions 
are evaluated, not when they are constructed. 
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The sequence operators first and rest are different: they are partial query methods of the abstract 
syntax, not total constructors. If applied to an empty sequence, they raise a sequence underflow exception. 
However, this can occur only at program generation time, not at run time. 
To certify clean termination of template at program generation time requires a type refinement to 
record sets of possible exceptions and an additional kind of type refinement to record domains of partial 
methods such as first and rest. We can introduce a subtype nseq[T, S] < seq[T, S] consisting of the 
nonempty sequences, and refine the signatures of the partial sequence operations first and rest as follows. 
first(nseq[T, 01): T[01 , rest(nseq[T, 01): seq[T, 01 
first(seq[T, 01): T[seq-underflow], rest(seq[T, 01): seq[T, { seq-underflow)] 
Type analysis requires a bit of inference in this case, because we have to use the guard of the 
template language conditional IF together with the rule 
s : seq[T, S] and not is-empty (s) 3 s: nseq[T, S] 
This inference is easy because the guard matches the subtype restriction predicate for nseq[T]. 
This match did not occur by accident - the purpose of the guard is precisely to ensure that the 
operations first and rest are used only within their domain of definition. In the interests of being able to 
produce certifiably robust code, we claim that it would not be unduly burdensome to require that template 
designers associate domain predicates with all partial operations, and use those domain predicates 
explicitly in guards whenever they are needed to ensure the partial operators are used within their proper 
domains of definition. For example, first could be associated with a domain predicate 
first-ok (seq[T]) : boolean where 
first-ok (s) = not (is-empty (s)). 
This would enable a fast and shallow analysis of guard conditions to certify absence of exceptions in 
cases like this. Some such restriction is necessary for practical engineering support because the problem 
of checking whether an unconstrained guard condition implies the domain predicates of arbitrary guarded 
partial operations is undecidable. 
An alternative is an exception analysis that includes exceptions in the closure even in cases where the 
guard condition ensures they will never arise. We suggest that it is more practical to handle a common 
subset of efficiently recognizable forms, and to ask designers to work within the constraints of those 
recognizable forms. We believe this would be less burdensome than the alternative of manually analyzing 
the cases where a type check insensitive to guard conditions would nominate exceptions that cannot in 
fact occur, and that it would lead to a more robust software by making it practical to do complete analysis 
of exception closures. For example, we could require the example of Figure 7 to be written in a stylized 
form that looks like the following: 
IF first-ok (c) and rest-ok (c) 
THEN ... first (c) ... rest (c) ... 
A similar type check would have to be applied to the implementations of first and rest to ensure that they 
would in fact terminate cleanly whenever the domain predicates are true. 
5. ComDarisons to Previous Work 
One of ow contributions has been to formalize and abstract the idea of a program generation pattern, 
to make it independent of the details of the target programming language and the process of instantiating 
the patterns. The purpose of this was to create context in which systematic analysis of program 
generation patterns becomes possible and in some cases becomes decidable. 
Program generation patterns have been evolving for a long time. Macros are an early form of the 
idea. However, macros are notoriously difficult to analyze, partially because they traditionally operate on 
uninterpreted text. This makes the connection between macro definitions and the behavior they 
ultimately denote complicated and potentially very indirect. The macros in LISP are an improvement 
because they are based on abstract syntax trees rather than characters. However, in this context a second 
source of complexity becomes apparent: a macro can expand to produce another macro, and the number 6 2 
The sequence operators first and rest are different: they are partial query methods of the abstract 
syntax, not total constructors. If applied to an empty sequence, they raise a sequence underflow exception. 
However, this can occur only at program generation time, not at run time. 
To certify clean termination of template at program generation time requires a type refinement to 
record sets of possible exceptions and an additional kind of type refinement to record domains of partial 
methods such as first and rest. We can introduce a subtype nseq[T, S] < seq[T, S] consisting of the 
nonempty sequences, and refine the signatures of the partial sequence operations first and rest as follows. 
first(nseq[T, 01): T[01, rest(nseq[T, 01): seq[T, 01 
first(seq[T, 01): T[seq-underflow], rest(seq[T, 01): seq[T, { seq-underflow}] 
Type analysis requires a bit of inference in this case, because we have to use the guard of the 
template language conditional IF together with the rule 
s : seq[T, S] and not is-empty (s) s: nseq[T, S] 
This inference is easy because the guard matches the subtype restriction predicate for nseq[T]. 
This match did not occur by accident - the purpose of the guard is precisely to ensure that the 
operations first and rest are used only within their domain of definition. In the interests of being able to 
produce certifiably robust code, we claim that it would not be unduly burdensome to require that template 
designers associate domain predicates with all partial operations, and use those domain predicates 
explicitly in guards whenever they are needed to ensure the partial operators are used within their proper 
domains of definition. For example, first could be associated with a domain predicate 
first-ok (seq[T]) : boolean where 
first-ok (s) = not (is-empty (s)). 
This would enable a fast and shallow analysis of guard conditions to certify absence of exceptions in 
cases like this. Some such restriction is necessary for practical engineering support because the problem 
of checking whether an unconstrained guard condition implies the domain predicates of arbitrary guarded 
partial operations is undecidable. 
An alternative is an exception analysis that includes exceptions in the closure even in cases where the 
guard condition ensures they will never arise. We suggest that it is more practical to handle a common 
subset of efficiently recognizable forms, and to ask designers to work within the constraints of those 
recognizable forms. We believe this would be less burdensome than the alternative of manually analyzing 
the cases where a type check insensitive to guard conditions would nominate exceptions that cannot in 
fact occur, and that it would lead to a more robust software by making it practical to do complete analysis 
of exception closures. For example, we could require the example of Figure 7 to be written in a stylized 
form that looks like the following: 
IF first-ok (c) and rest-ok (c) 
THEN ... first (c) ... rest (c) ... 
A similar type check would have to be applied to the implementations of first and rest to ensure that they 
would in fact terminate cleanly whenever the domain predicates are true. 
5. ComDarisons to Previous Work 
One of our contributions has been to formalize and abstract the idea of a program generation pattern, 
to make it independent of the details of the target programming language and the process of instantiating 
the patterns. The purpose of this was to create context in which systematic analysis of program 
generation patterns becomes possible and in some cases becomes decidable. 
Program generation patterns have been evolving for a long time. Macros are an early form of the 
idea. However, macros are notoriously difficult to analyze, partially because they traditionally operate on 
uninterpreted text. This makes the connection between macro definitions and the behavior they 
ultimately denote complicated and potentially very indirect. The macros in LISP are an improvement 
because they are based on abstract syntax trees rather than characters. However, in this context a second 
source of complexity becomes apparent: a macro can expand to produce another macro, and the number 
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of expansion steps before the generated source code actually appears is potentially unbounded. This 
makes the system very difficult to analyze. At the other extreme are the generic units of Ada. These are 
strongly typed, clearly connected to the abstract syntax of the language, and the results of instantiating 
them are easy to analyze. However, they do not allow conditional decisions at instantiation time, and are 
restricted in the sense that the abstract syntax trees of all possible instantiations have exactly the same 
shape, up to substitution for the formal parameters of the pattern. A language-independent version of the 
idea can be found in [ 5 ] ,  although this appears to be largely text-based. 
Another aspect of our approach is to model languages as algebras rather than as abstract syntax trees. 
A hint of this idea appears in [4], although it is not exploited there for enabling analysis to any significant 
degree. The work of the CIP group [l] develops this idea further and takes advantage of the reasoning 
structures that come with the algebraic modeling approach, such as term rewriting and generation 
induction principles. This suggests extension to a full object-oriented view, which includes inheritance. 
The Refine system is the earliest context we know of where grammars are treated as object models with 
potential inheritance structures, although the documentation does not give any hint about the significance 
of this capability. In this paper we demonstrate the usefulness of algebraic models of syntax with 
inheritance, for defining language extension transformations that can be applied to all possible target 
languages. 
Another theme is lightweight inference [2]. We have demonstrated that some useful types of static 
analysis for program generation patterns can be performed via computable and indeed reasonably 
efficient methods. The processes described here can be implemented using technologies typically used in 
compilers, such as object attribution rules, they terminate for all possible inputs, and do so in polynomial 
time. We believe this approach will scale up to large applications, and are currently working out the 
details to support a tight analysis of the efficiency of the process. 
This paper has explored static analysis of meta-programs to check syntactic correctness and 
exception closure of the generated code. Another kind of static analysis in this family, type checking of 
meta-programs to ensure the type correctness of the generated code, is considered by another paper in this 
proceedings [3]. 
6. Conclusions 
We believe that formal models of program generation templates can support a variety of quality 
improvement processes that can help achieve cost-effective software reliability. This paper has presented 
a simple example of such a formal model and two such quality improvement processes, certification of 
syntactic correctness and freedom from unexpected exceptions for all programs that can be generated 
from a given program generation pattern. We expect the greatest advantages of this approach to be 
realized when it is applied to realize flexible and reliable systems in a product line approach. This 
approach should be augmented with systematic methods for domain analysis that culminates in the 
development of a domain-specific library of solutions embodied in a domain-specific software 
architecture that is populated with components produced by model-based software generators. When the 
technology matures, it should become possible for problem domain experts to specify their problem 
instances in terms of familiar problem domain models, and to have reliable software solutions to their 
problems automatically generated, without direct involvement of computer experts. 
The economic advantage of this approach comes from the ability to automatically reap the benefits of 
each quality improvement for all past and future instantiations of the template (if past applications are 
regenerated). We believe that it will be profitable to explore methods for lifting many known program 
analysis techniques from the level of individual programs to the level of program generation patterns. 
This should be explored for a variety of issues that range from certifying absence of references to 
uninitialized variables, absence of deadlock, and many others, perhaps ultimately to template-based proof 
of post conditions and program termination for generated programs. 
To make this vision practical, many engineering issues must be addressed, including presentation 
issues, methods for lightweight inference [2] and support for transforming and enhancing complex sets of 
analysis rules. Other issues include systematic methods for dynamic analysis, testing, and debugging of 
program generation rules. It is not reasonable to expect progress to occur in an instantaneous quantum 
leap to perfection. A realistic process is a gradual one, where simple sets of program generation rules are 
deployed, and gradually tuned, improved, certified, and extended. A key issue is enabling rule 
enhancement and exception closure extension without invalidating all previous effort on analysis and 
certification of the previous versions. 6 4  
The difference between the program generation approach proposed here and current compiler 
generation tools is the associated static analysis capabilities for the program generation rules. It is 
possible that in the future, ultra-reliable compilers will be built using techniques derived from those 
introduced in this paper. 
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Abstract: This paper aims at structurising detection of 
different types of Stuck-at faults for a wide range of 
Multistage Interconnection Networks (MINs). The results 
reported so far in this respect are mainly based on direct 
combinatorial analysis of the concerned networks with 
very little consideration towards the modelling aspects. 
The graphical representation coupled with well-defined 
semantics allowing formal analysis has already established 
Petri Net as an effective tool for modelling dynamic 
systems. However, the existing variants of high level nets 
had certain limitations in modelling the dynamic behaviour 
of mapping a permutation through MIN and further 
analysis of the same. This has inspired the authors to 
propose a couple of new high level net model, called MP- 
net and S-net in their earlier works. The S-net model uses 
tokens to hold and propagate information apart from 
controlling firing of events. It uses two different types of 
places and transitions each as has been defined 
subsequently. In this paper, we have concentrated in 
detection of fault in MINs using this S-net model. 
Keywords 
Petri Net, MZN, Stuck-at-fault, S-net, Data Place, 
Control Place 
I. Introduction 
Generalized Stochastic Petri Net (GSPN) is a performance 
analysis tool [ll]  based on the graphical system 
representation typical of Petri nets, in which some 
transitions are timed, while others are immediate. 
Distributed, parallel and real time systems may be 
modelled using this GSPN. However, for any large system 
comprising of large number of components the time 
distributions and relations between components are often 
quite complex [07, 081. This largeness and complexity is 
reflected in the corresponding GSPN models. 
The capability of incorporating time as a parameter in net 
based models have been taken care of with the 
introduction of Time Petri Nets [ 131 and Timed Petri Nets 
[12, 14, 151. The Timed Petri nets are derived from Petri 
nets by associating a finite firing duration with each 
transition. The classical firing rule of Petri nets is thus 
modified to account for the time taken to fire a transition 
Swapan Bhattacharya 
Department of Computer Science & Engineering 
Naval Post-Graduate School 
Montery 
CA, USA 
email : swapan@cs.nps.navy.mil 
and also to express that a transition must fire as soon as it 
is enabled. Time Petri Nets (TF”) are more general in the 
sense that a Timed Pem net can be modelled by using 
Time Petri net, but the reverse is not true. For both of these 
models, firing of a transition is a non-atomic operation. 
The firing is said to be in progress in between a start firing 
event and an end-firing event. 
In the context of MINs, binary values are used to represent 
information pertaining to data as well as control. A study 
of different variants of high level nets, as discussed above, 
indicates that for modelling different processing elements 
of distributed computation, some additional flexibility is to 
be incorporated in the basic modelling tool to take care of 
variations in structures and functionality of these hardware 
elements. 
In the Modified Petri Net (MP-net) model [03], as defined 
by us earlier, two different types of Places and Transitions 
are used [03]. The MP-net model for a NxN network 
consisting of O(log2N) stages would involve O(Nlog.2N) 
number of subnets, one each for every 2x2 cross-bar 
switch that constitute the MIN. The total number of Data 
and Control places as well as the number of Controlled 
transitions will therefore be O(Nlog2N). This would lead to 
an unmanageable and complex situation for the description 
of a large system. Thus it has been felt that the proposed 
MP-net model requires further compacmess. The 
Stochastic behavior of MP-net is coupled with the 
properties of Colored Petri net [lo] to propose a new 
powerful high level net called S-net. It has been achieved 
by equipping each token with an attached data value called 
the Token color. In S-net, there has been a significant 
improvement in total number of places as well transitions 
comparing Mp-net. Both redundant path MINs like Benes 
and non-redundant path MINs like Omega or Baseline 
have been modelled using S-net [01][03]. 
Essentially, a variant of Coloured and Stochastic nets, the 
S-net has been established as an ideal tool for modelling 
any element that has to handle two different types of 
signals in repetitive, modular units. It has been already 
used to model different types of MINs, e.g. Omega, Benes, 
Baseline networks, etc [03]. It has also been found that 
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using S-net, a MIN of NxN size can be modelled with 
3N/2 number of places only as against O(Nlog2N) number 
of switching elements for the corresponding MIN. As far 
as studying the MINs, the results reported so far [02], [W], 
[07] are mainly based on direct combinatorial analysis of 
the concerned networks with very little consideration 
towards the modelling aspects. In the present paper, we 
have concentrated in detection of fault in MINs using this 
S-net model. The definition of S-net and some of the 
relevant terminologies that are essential to understand the 
actual problem of permutation mapping and fault detection 
using the model are presented in the following section. 
II. Definition and Terminology 
2.1 S-net Model 
An S-net model uses two different types of places and 
transitions each that enables it to handle data and control 
signals as two separate entities. S-net is represented by a 
seven-tuple {D, C, P, T,, Ti, I, 0}, where, 
D ={ di : di is a Data place] ; 
A data place holds exactly one token in it at some instance. 
The token value is a positive integer that indicates the 
information held by the element being modelled. A token 
stored in Data place is not used to decide the flow of 
Control. A Data place is always safe. 
C ={ ci : ci is a Control place} ; 
A control place holds token to enable corresponding 
Controlled transition for firing. A token value is 
represented by an ordered pair < x , p  where x represents 
token color and y is the control value, typically 0 and 1 for 
two logical states. The number of tokens in a Control place 
must not exceed the number of different colors used in the 
model and there can be only one token for a particular 
color in a single Control place. A Control place is k- 
bounded, where the maximum number of colors in the 
model is k. 
P = (p  : p is a color]; 
T, :=( t : t is a Controlled transition} ; 
A Controlled transition can have one and only one Control 
place at its input and the transition is enabled and fired in 
presence of some token of the same color as that for the 
current stage, having some pre-defined control value in the 
corresponding input Control place. 
Ti := { t : t is an Immediate transition} ; 
An Immediate transition is enabled and fued irrespective 
of the presence of token in its input place. In fact, none of 
the input places for an Immediate transition is a Control 
place. An Immediate transition is fired in between a start 
time and an end time in a stochastic manner. 
I = {Tc, Ti} + D" is the input function, a mapping from 
transitions to bags of Input places. 
0 = { T,, Ti} += D" is the Output function, a mapping from 
transitions to bags of Output Data places. 
Different sets of places and transitions as specified in the 
definition of S-net are disjoint. Unlike MP-net, in the 
proposed S-net model, the same Data places are to hold 
different data values for different colors as indicated by 
some member of the Color set P. Similarly, the token 
value to be stored in a Control place depends on the color. 
The firing rule for the two types of transitions are very 
similar to that for the MP-net except that incase of S-net, 
the color of the token is considered. Whenever a 
Controlled transition is fired in color p ,  tokens in its input 
Data places are transferred to corresponding output Data 
places following the directed arcs. The token in the 
Control place of color value p is removed after the 
Controlled transitions are fired. On the other hand, an 
Immediate transition connecting an input Data place Dk to 
an output Data place D,,, for color p transfers the token of 
Dk to D, on its firing. 
2.2 Propertiesof S-net 
The S-net (D, C, P, T,, Ti, I, 0) has been defined to 
structerise the performance analysis of MPP systems and 
some of its subsystems with the help of modelling through 
it. Before this, in the present section some of the basic 
properties of S-net has been discussed. 
2.2.1 Marking : The presence of token values in 
places, at an instance, is called marking of the S-net model. 
There will be two separate sets of markings OD(&, dl, ..,dD) 
for D Data places and *c(cO, clr .., cc) for C number of 
Control places such that dk for k E [ 1 ..D] is some positive 
integer a if the corresponding Data place holds a token of 
value a. On the other hand marking of a Control place ck 
for kE [ 1 ..C] is a set of ordered pairs a, b>, where a is the 
token color and b is the control value. 
In case of a 2x2 cross-bar switch, the control value is 
either 0 or 1, indicating the through and crossed states of 
the switch respectively. The number of elements in the set 
of ordered pairs ck must not exceed the number of different 
colors used in the model and there can be only one token 
of a particular color in a single Control place. As a 
Controlled transition is fired in a color p, the token of the 
same color in its input Control place is perished. Thus, 
after the last set of Controlled transitions of in an S-net 
model is fired, all the Control places are found empty. 
2.2.2 Initial State Definition : The initial state of a S- 
net is defined as a marking of Data and Control places. 
Initially all the Data places being used in a model holds 
one token each. In case a NxN multistage interconnection 
network is being modelled, the input permutation is stored 
as the initial state of the set of N Data places. A Control 
place, on the other hand, is initialised with k different 
tokens (m), for maximum m number of colors being 
used in the model. A controlled transition is enabled at 
color p, if the corresponding input Control place is 
initialized with a token of color p with appropriate control 
value. 
2.2.3 Boundedness : A place in a net is Safe if the 
number of tokens in that place never exceeds one The Data 
places in S-net are therefore Safe, by definition. Actually, 
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Safeness is a special case of the more general Boundness 
property. A place is said to be k-safe or k-bounded if the 
number of tokens in that place never exceed an integer 
value of k. A place that is 1-safe is simply called Safe 
place. Therefore the Control places used in a S-net, are p- 
bounded, where the maximum number of colors in the 
model is p. As the all places in a S-net are bounded, the S- 
net itself is bounded. 
2.2.4 Reachability : The initial marking of the Data 
places are changed as different Controlled and Immediate 
transitions are fired in different colors in an S-net model. A 
state *D is said to be reachable if a particular sequence of 
firing of Controlled and Immediate transitions exists 
following which the initial marking of Data places is 
modified to OD. A reachability set may be defined as the set 
of all markings reachable from the initial marking. The 
reachability analysis on an S-net model may be performed 
without direct consideration of the changes in marking of 
the Control places. 
III. Permutation mapping and Control matrix 
A permutation P consists of several individual 
transmissions in between two extreme inputloutput lines at 
the opposite ends of the MIN. A Control place may hold a 
token signifying the crossed state of corresponding 2x2 
switch. For example, let's consider that the Control place 
C1 holds a token in pass 1. This would result in shifting 
content of Data place D1 into D2 at the end of pass 1. 
Before the second pass begins, the time independent 
transitions cascading the basic blocks, are fired. This 
would take the original content of D1 onto D3. Thus after 
the execution of second pass, the content of first input line 
of the MIN will finally be mapped onto the thud or fourth 
output line, depending upon the content of C2 at pass 2. 
(Figre 1 : S-net model for a 4x4 Omega Network) 
Thus, it may be inferred that presence of a token in C1 for 
pass 1 and absence of a token in C2 for pass 2 enforces a 
transmission in between input line 1 and output line 3 of 
the Omega network under consideration. 
The effect of presence or absence of a token in C1 for pass 
2 and in C2 for pass 1 can be neglected. A matrix 
representation I may be proposed to depict the state of 
the model for the particular link. Here 1 represents 
presence of a token in the corresponding Control place, 0 
f.. ,I 
represents absence of token in the same and x is a don't 
care symbol. A matrix like the one presented above may 
be termed as Control matrix. For any NxN MIN, the 
dimension of the Control matrix would be (kxm) where k 
represents number of passes and m is the number of 
Control places in the model, which in any case would be 
d2.  
An entry {Gj : i [I ... k] , j [1 ... m]} in the Control matrix 
reflects the presence or absence of a token in Control place 
Cj for pass i. Considering a few links, the corresponding 
Control matrices for those are presented below : 
l ink1+3 : [i i) link3+ 2 : [i :) 
f I  x\ f x  I\ 
link 3 + 4 : 
oJ 1i*1+4:Ixd 
link2+ 1 : (i z ]  link4+ 2 : (i :] 
Thus, mapping of every individual transmissions can be 
followed using the proposed model. This is in line with 
the fact that that there exists a path in between every pair 
of input-output lines for an Omega Interconnection 
network. But Omega, being a blocking MIN, in a conflict 
free situation, the Control matrix for the entire 
permutation, which essentially is a group of n individual 
links, may be derived with the help of the Control Matrixes 
for individual links. 
Let's consider a permutation (2314) to be mapped using 
the proposed S-net model for Omega MIN. The 
transmission links involved are thus (1 + 3), (2 + l), 
(3 + 2) and (4 + 4). The respective Control matrices 
for the links are to be considered simultaneously to 
identify conflicts, if any. A conflict here may be of the 
type that for two different transmissions, a particular C, 
position is found to contain 1 in the Control matrix for 
some link and 0 in the Control matrix for some other for 
any two values of i and j where i [I ... k] and j [l ... m]. 
The Control Matrix for the permutation (2314) through 
Omega Network will be . f: :I 
IV. Detection of Fault using S-net 
The present paper aims at efficient detection of different 
types of faults using the proposed S-net or its variation. 
Corresponding to every stage of a MIN, there will be an 
expected output pattern for a set input pattern. Thus an 
input pattern (pl p2 p3 ... pn) gets modified at different 
stages of a MIN as it is mapped through the same. The 
different stuck at faults or complete failure of one or more 
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constituent crossbar switch(s) can be detected by 
observing the actual output patterns off the stages of the 
MIN and comparing it to the corresponding expected 
output pattern. In the event that these two patterns are not 
identical, presence of fault@), its type and position may be 
detected. But in case the expected and actual patterns are 
the same, certain types of stuck at fault(s) may still be there 
in individual switching elements. An algorithm has been 
proposed to detect faults and their positions in such cases. 
However, without using a High level net like the S-net 
model, all the input and output links of each and every 
switch is to be checked to detect fault(s). Thus O(Nlog2N) 
links are to be checked all together to detect all possible 
faults in a NxN MIN. Further, to detect fault in redundant 
and non-redundant type of MINs different approaches are 
to be adopted. The following algorithm extracts the main 
advantage of having only 0 0  representative data places 
for all the O(Nlog2N) links of a MIN quite efficiently. 
Thus detection of various faults for a wide range of MIN 
becomes much easier by using S-net model of the MIN. 
At a particular stage k of the MIN, the N/2 number of 
switches in the stage hold an input pattern (ikl ik2 .. im) at N 
input links. This is represented by the content of the N 
Data places for colour k before the Controlled Transitions 
are fired. Depending upon the content of the Control 
Matrix as mentioned above, the Controlled Transitions are 
fired and just before any of the Immediate Transitions for 
the pass are fired content of the Data places in the model 
reflect the expected output pattern ou .. w) off the 
stage k One may find whether the actual output pattern 
(oakl 0% .. oam) is same as (okl % .. w). A bitwise 
operation can detect some position q, where the actual 
content of the output link oak, and expected value oh are 
not the same. This indicates that the rql2? switch at stage 
k of the MIN is faulty. A O(Nlog2N) algorithm has been 
presented below to describe the fault detection in MINs 
using the proposed S-net model. 
Procedure DetectFault 
Begin 
flag = .T.; 
For k=l to M /* M is O(log2N) represents the number 
of stages in the MIN Y 
For q=l to N 
Derive O[k][q] from I[k][q] and Control matrix 
entry for pass k; 
If (O[k][q] @ OA[k][q])= 1 then 
Indicate fault in rql2 1" switch of stage k; 
flag = .F.; 
Endif 
Fire Immediate transitions; 
Endfor 
Endfor 
If flag = .T. then 
Endif 
Permutation may be mapped successfully; 
End 
The algorithm presented above checks for faults that might 
block a particular permutation. This, however, does not 
ensure that the whole MIN is fault-free even if the variable 
f i g  is found to be .T. after the final iteration is over. For 
example, if a switch is having a stuck-at-T fault and at the 
same time if the corresponding Control matrix entry for 
permutation P is set to 0, the permutation can be 
successfully even in presence of the fault. 
Thus for detection of multiple stuck at faults, in a non- 
redundant path network, the algorithm DetectFault is to be 
operated in two passes. In pass 1, all the control matrix 
entries are set to 0 whereby the Stuck-at-X, Stuck-at-U 
and Stuck-at-L faults are detected. In pass 2, all the 
control matrix entries are set to 1 and the Stuck-at-T, 
Stuck-at-U and Stuck-at-L faults are detected. Thus under 
fault-free condition, in pass 1, the Identity permutation 
should be realized, whereas in pass 2, the Complement 
permutation should be realized. 
Similarly for Redundant path and Partially Redundant 
MINs as well, all types of faults can be identified with the 
help of S-net model. There are two basic advantages in 
using the S-net model. Firstly, the approach provides a 
Snapshot in the sense that for different colours the same 
Data places are representing the entire network. In stead 
of looking into the four input/output links of each of the 
O(Nlog2N) switches, the reliability of the MIN may be 
decided just by observing content of a fixed number of N 
Data places for any NxN network. This helps in desiping 
a simple but efficient fault detection algorithm. 
Apart from this, the introduction of Control matrix makes 
it more convenient to understand mapping of a 
permutation through different stages of a MIN. This is 
also quite helpful for any performance analysis of the 
network as instead of physically setting the crossbar 
switches- with some control signal, the impact can be 
studied just by altering the corresponding Control matrix 
entry and then looking into the changes in the S-net model. 
V. Conclusion 
The methodology for modelling MINs using the 
proposed S-net, has a wide range of applicability. These 
high level net models are designed to achieve optimum 
compactness so that analysis can be done more efficiently. 
Total number of Data and Control places in the proposed 
S-net models for any MIN is much less than that of 2x2 
Cross-bar switches required to design the network itself. 
The number of switching elements required for a NxN 
MIN would be O(Nlog2N) whereas the corresponding S- 
net model would consist of only N number of Data places 
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and N/2 number of Control places. Moreover, for any NxN 
network, number of places is a constant linear function of 
N only. Modelling with S-net is thus quite effective for 
compact representation of Interconnection networks as 
well as for detecting different types of faults. In stead of 
looking into the input/output links of each of the 
O(Nlog2N) switches, the performance of a MIN may be 
studied and faults may as well be detected just by 
observing content of a fixed number of N Data places for 
any NxN network. Further, the introduction of Control 
matrix and the algorithm as discussed in section IV suggest 
that the present work may be extended to study and detect 
Stuck at faults in a wide range of MINs. It is, therefore, 
being proposed to consolidate this research work by taking 
care of the analysis of different Interconnection networks 
based on this model. 
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Abstract 
The major hurdle in developing distributed systems is the implementing the interoperability 
between the systems. Currently, most of the interoperability techniques require that the data 
or services to be tightly coupled to a particular server. Furthermore, as most programmers are 
trained in designing stand-alone application, developing distributed system proves to be time- 
consuming and difficult. This paper address the issues by creating an interface wrapper 
model that allows developers the features of treating distributed objects as local objects. A 
tool was developed to generate Java interface wrapper from a specification language called 
the Prototyping System Description Language. 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Interoperability between software systems is the ability to exchange services from one 
system to another. In order to exchange services, data and commands are relayed from the 
service providers to the requesters. Current business and military systems are typically 2-tier 
or 3-tier systems involving clients and servers, each running on different machines in the 
same or different locations. Current approaches for n-tier systems have no standardization of 
protocol, data representation? invocation techniques etc. Other problems with interoperability 
are the implementation of distributed systems and the use of services from heterogeneous 
operating environments. These include issues concerning sharing of information amongst 
various operating systems, and the necessity for evolution of standards for using data of 
various types, sizes and byte ordering? in order to make them suitable for interoperation. 
These problems make interoperable applications difficult to construct and manage. 
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I .  2 Current State-of-the-art soIiitions 
Presently, the solutions attempting to address these interoperability problems range from 
low-level sockets and messaging techniques to more sophisticated middleware technology 
like object resource brokers (COMA, DCOM). Middleware technology uses higher 
abstraction than messaging, and can simplify the construction of interoperable applications. It 
provides a bridge between the service provider and requester by providing standardized 
mechanisms that handle communication, data exchange and type marshalling. The 
implementation details of the middleware are generally not important to developers building 
the systems. Instead, developers are concerned with service interface details. This form of 
information hiding enhances system maintainability by encapsulating the communication 
mechanisms from the developers and providing a stable interface services for the developers. 
However, developers still need to perform significant work in incorporating the middleware’s 
services into their systems. Furthermore, they must have a good knowledge of how to deploy 
the middleware services to hl ly  exploit the features provided. 
Current middleware approaches have another major limitation in the design - the data and 
services are tightly coupled to the servers. Any attempt to parallelize or distribute a 
computation across several machines therefore encounters complicated issues due to this 
tight control of the server process on the data. 
1.3 Motivation 
Distributed data structures provide an entirely different paradigm. Here, data is no longer 
coupled to any particular process. Methods and services that work on the data are also 
uncoupled from any particular process. Processes can now work on different pieces of data 
at the same time. So far, building distributed data stnictures together with their requisite 
interface has proved to be more daunting than other conventional interoperability middleware 
techniques. The arrival of JavaSpace has changed the scenario to some extent. It allows easy 
creation and access of distributed objects. However, issues concerning data getting lost in the 
network, duplicated data items, out-dated data, external exception handling and handshaking 
of communication between the data owner and data users are still open. The developers have 
to devise ways to solve those problems and standardize them between applications. 
1.4 Proposal 
The situation concerning interoperability would greatly improve if a developer working on 
some particular application were provided with the features capable of treating distributed 
objects as local objects within the application. The developers could then modify the 
distributed object as if it is local within the process. The changes may, however, still need to 
be reflected on other applications using that distributed object without creating any problems 
related to inconsistency. The current research aims at attaining this objective by creating a 
model of an interface wrapper that can be used for a variety of distributed objects. In 
addition, by automating the process of generating the interface wrapper directly from the 
interface specification of the requirement, developers’ productivity is greatly improved. 
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The tools, named as Automated Interface Codes Generator (AICG), has been developed to 
generate the interface wrapper codes for interoperability, from a specification language called 
the Prototype System Description Language (PSDL) [LUQSS]. The tool uses the principle of 
distributed data structure and JavaSpace Technology to encapsulate transaction control, 
synchronization, and notification together with lifetime control to provide an environment 
that treats distributed objects as if there were local within the concerned applications. 
. 
2. Review of Existing Works 
2.1 ORB Approaches 
A basic idea for enhancing interoperability is to make the network transparent to the 
application developers. The existing approaches [ I ]  include 1)Building blocks .for 
interoperability, 2 )  Architectures for unified, systematic interoperability and 3) Packaging 
for encapsulating interoperability services. These approaches have been assessed using the 
Kiviat graphs by Berzins [ l ]  with various weight factors. The Kiviat graphs give a good 
summary of the strong and weak points of various approaches. ORE? and Jini are currently 
the more promising technologies for interoperability. 
There are however, some concerns with the ORB models. Sullivan [ 131 provides a more in- 
depth analysis of the DCOM model, highlighting the architecture conflicts between Dynamic 
Interface Negotiation (how a process queries a COM services and interface) and 
Aggregation (component composition mechanism). The interface negotiation does not 
function properly within the aggregated boundaries. This problem arises because components 
share an interface. An interface is shared if the constructor or QueryInterface functions of 
several components can return a pointer to it. Queryhterface niles state that a holder of a 
shared interface should be able to obtain interfaces of all types appearing on both the inner 
and outer components. However. an aggregator can refuse to provide interfaces of some 
types appearing on an inner component by hiding the inner component. Thus, QueryInterface 
fails to work properly with respect to delegation to the inner interface. 
Hence, for the ORB approaches, detailed understanding of the techniques is required to 
design a truly reliable interoperable system. Programmers however, are train mostly on 
standalone programming techniques. Adding specialized network programming models 
increases the learning as well as development time, with occasional slippage of target 
deadlines. Furthermore, bugs in the distributed programs are harder to detect and 
consequences of failure are more catastrophic. An abnormal program may cause other 
programs to go astray in a connected distributed environment [9 ] ,  [12]. 
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2.2 Prototyping 
The demand for large, high quality systems has increased to the point where a quantum 
change in software technology is needed [9 ] .  Rapid prototyping is one of the most promising 
solutions to this problem. Completely automated generation of prototype from a very high- 
level language is feasible and in-fact generation of skeleton programming structures is very 
common in the computer world. One major advantage of the automatic generation of codes is 
that it frees the developers from the implementation details by executing specification via 
reusable components [9] .  
In this perspective, an integrated software development environment, named Computer 
Aided Prototyping System (CAPS) has been developed at the Naval Postgraduate School, for 
rapid prototyping of hard real-time embedded software systems, such as missile guidance 
systems, space shuttle avionics systems, and military Command, Control, Communication 
and Intelligence (C3I) systems [ 113. Rapid prototyping uses rapidly constructed prototypes to 
help both the developers and their customers visualize the proposed system and assess its 
properties in an iterative process. The heart of CAPS is the Prototyping System Description 
Language (PSDL). It serves as an executable prototyping language at a specification or 
design level and has special features for real-time system design. Building on the success of 
computer aided rapid prototyping system (CAPS) [ 1 13’ the AICG model also uses the PSDL 
for the specification and automates the generation of interface codes with the objective of 
making the network transparent from the developer’s point of view. 
2.3 Transaction Handling 
Building a networked application is entirely different from building a stand-alone system in 
the sense that many additional issues need to be taken care of for smooth hnctioning of a 
networked application. The networked systems are also susceptible to partial failures of 
computation, which can leave the system in an inconsistent state. 
Proper transaction handling is essential to control and maintain concurrency and consistency 
within the system. Yang [ 161, examined the limitation of hard-wiring concurrency control 
(CC) into either the client or the server. He found that the scalability and flexibility of these 
configurations is greatly limited. Hence, he presented a middleware approach: an external 
transaction server, which carries out the concurrency control policies in the process of 
obtaining the data. Advantages of this approach are 1) transaction server can be easily 
tailored to apply the desired CC policies of specific client applications. 2) The approach does 
not require any changes to the servers or clients in order to support the standard transaction 
model. 3) Coordination among the clients that share data but have different CC policies is 
possible if all of the clients use the same transaction server. 
The AICG model uses the same approach, by deploying an external transaction manager 
provided by SUN in the JINI model. All transactions used by the clients and servers are 
created and overseen by the manager. 
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3. The Basic Model 
The AICG model is based on the concepts of encapsulating some of the features of the 
JavaSpace and Jini to provide a simplified ways of developing distributed applications. 
Section 3.1 examines the principles of JavaSpace and section 3.2 discusses some of the 
features of AICG model. 
Figure 1, AICG Model 
3.1 The JavaSpace Model 
JavaSpace model is a high-level coordination tool for gluing processes together in a 
distributed environment. It departs from conventional distribution techniques using message 
passing between processes or invoking methods on remote objects. The technology provides 
a fundamentally different programming model that view an application as a collection of 
processes cooperating via the flow of freshly copied objects into and out of one or more 
spaces. This space-based model of distributed computing has its roots in the Linda 
coordination language [3] developed by Dr. David Gelernter at Yale University. 
Figure 2,  JavaSpace operations 
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A space is a shared, network-accessible repository for objects. Processes use the repository as 
a persistent object storage and exchange mechanism. As shown in figure 2, processes 
perform simple operations to write new objects into space, take objects from space, or read 
(make a copy of) objects in a space. When taking or reading objects, processes use a simple 
value-matching lookup to find the objects that matter to them. If a matching object is not 
found immediately, then a process can wait until one arrives. Unlike conventional object 
stores, processes do not modify objects in the space or invoke their methods directly. To 
modify an object, a process must explicitly remove it, update it, and reinsert it into the space. 
During the period of updating, other processes requesting for the object will wait until the 
process write the object back to the space. 
Key Features of JavaSpace: 
Spaces are persistent: Spaces provide reliable storage for objects. Once stored in the 
space, an object will remain there until a process explicitly removes it. 
Spaces are transactionally secure: The Space technology provides a transaction model 
that ensures that an operation on a space is atomic. Transactions are supported for 
single operations on a single space, as well as multiple operations over one or more 
spaces. 
Spaces allow exchange of executable content: While in the space, objects are just 
passive data, however, when we read or take an object from a space, a local copy of 
the object is created. Like any other local object, we can modify its public fields as 
well as invoke its methods. 
3.2 The AICG Model 
The AICG interoperability approach proposes a tool for building distributed applications. 
The tool is designed to generate interface wrappers for data structures or objects that need to 
be shared, and are particularly useful for applications that can model as flows of objects 
through one or more servers. Build on top of JavaSpace, the AICG model hides the space and 
its implementation details entirely from the application. The interface wrapper allows 
applications to treat distributed data structures or objects as local within the application 
space. This enhanced interoperability by making the network transparent to the application 
developers. 
The interface wrappers are generated from an extension of a prototype description language 
called Prototyping System Description Language (PSDL). The extended Description 
language (PSDL-ext) expands property definitions that are specific only to AICG model. 
Some of the salient features of the AICG model are: 
Distributed objects are treated as local objects within the application process. The 
application code needs not depend on how the object is distributed, since the local 
object copy is always synchronous with the distributed copy. (see section 5 )  
Synchronization with various applications is automatically handled. Since the AICG 
model is based on the space transaction secure model. all operations are atomic. 
Deadlock is prevented automatically within the interface by having only a single 
distributed copy, and through transaction control. (see section 6, 8) 
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Any type of object can be shared as long as the object is serializable. Any data 
structure and object can be distributed as long as it obeys and implements the java 
serializable feature (see section 10.2). 
Every distributed object has a lifetime. The distributed object lifetime is a period of 
time guaranteed by the AICG model for storage and distribution of the object. The 
time can be set by developer (see section 7). 
All write operations are transaction secure by default. AICG transactions are based on 





Clients can be informed of changes to the distributed object through the AICG event 
model (see section 9). A client application can subscribe for change notification, and 
when the distributed object is modified, a separate thread is spawned to execute the 
callback method defined by the developer. 
The wrapper codes are generated from high-level descriptive languages; hence, they 






4. Developing Distributed Application with the AICG Tool 
PSDL definition of the distributed 
This section describes the steps for developing distributed applications using the AICG 
model. An example of a C4ISR application is introduced in section 4.2 to aid the explanation 
of the process. The same example will be used throughout this paper. 
- 
4.1 Development Process 
--  
The developer starts the development process by defining shared objects using the 
Prototyping System Description Language (PSDL). The PSDL is processed through a code 
generator (PSDLtoSpace) to produce a set of interface wrapper codes (figure 3). The 
interface wrapper contains the necessary codes for interaction between application and the 
space without the need for the developers to be concerned with the writing and removing of 
objects in the space. The developers can treat shared or distributed objects as local objects, 
where synchronization and distribution is automatically handled by the interface codes. The 
complete cycle for generating the interface codes is shown in figure 4. 
Figure 3, PSDL to Space 





Client Class r i  
distributed object 
Server Class - I I 
Figure 4, Generating the interface 
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4.2 Input definition to the Code generator 
The following example demonstrates the development of one of the many distributed objects 
in the C4ISR system. Airplane positions picked up from the sensors are processed to produce 
track objects. These objects are distributed over a large network and used by several clients’ 
stations for displaying the positions of planes. Each track or plane is identified by track 
number. The tracks are ‘owned’ by a group of track servers, and only the track servers can 
update the track positions and its attributes. The clients only have read access on the track 
data. Figure 5 shows the PSDL codes for the track object and its methods. Figure 6 shows the 






















PROPERTY SPACEMODE= READ 
END 
OPERA TOR setCullsigii 
SPECIFICA TION 




PROPERTY SPACE.tfOD ‘RITE 
PROPERTY TRANSL4CTIONTIkfE = 300 
END 
END 
OPERA TOR getCullsign 
SPECIFICA TION 




PROPERTY SPA CEMODE= READ 
END 
END 
OPERA TOR setPosition 
SPECIFICA TION 
END 
INPUTpost : position-ltype 
IMPL EMEhTA TIOA’ 
SPACE 
PROPERTY SPACEMODE = WRITE 
PROPERTY TRANSACTIONTIME = 2000 
END 
END 




OUTPUTpost : position-type 
SPACE 




PRO PER TY SPA CENA ME = DODSpaces 
PROPERTY OWNERSHIP = YES 
PROPERTY SECURITY = SERVER 
PROPERTY LEASE = I2000 
PROPERTY CLONE = MANY 
PROPERTY IZ’OTIFY = NO 
PROPERTY RETRY = I0 
END 
Figure 5,  Track example in PSDL 
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TYPE track-list 











OPERA TOR get/D 
SPECIFICA TION 





PROPERTY SPACEMODE= READ 
END 
END 
OPERA TOR setNewID 





PROPERTY SPACEMODE= WRITE 
END 
END 
OPERA TOR t-enioveID 
SPECIFICA TION 




PROPERTY SPACEMODE= WRITE 






PROPERTY SPACENAME= DODSpaces 
PROPERTY OWVERSHIP = YES 
PROPERTY SECURITY = SERVER 
PROPERTY LEASE = 0 
PROPERTY CLONE = ONE 
PROPERTY NOTiFY = YES 
PROPERTY RETRY = 5 
END 
Figure 6, Track list example in PSDL 
The PSDL grammar used for the AICG is an extended version of the original PSDL grammar 
(Appendix A). PSDL model is very extensive and can be used to model an entire distributed 
system. However, the AICG only used a portion of the PSDL to describe the interface 
between systems. In another word, interactions between applications are defined using the 
PSDL but not the application itself. Because of this, slight modifications on the PSDL 
grammar were needed. The complete listing of the changes in the grammar statements can 
also be found in Appendix A. 
The track PSDL starts with the definition of a fype called track. It has only one identification 
field tracknumber. Of course. the track objects can have more than one field, but only one 
field is in this case is used to uniquely identify any particular track object. The type 
track-list shown in figure 5 ,  on the other hand, does nor need an identification field since 
there is only one track-list object in the whole system. Track-list is used to keep a list of all 
the active tracks tracknumber in the system at that moment in time. 
All the operators (methods) of the type are defined immediately after the specification. Each 
method has a list of inpzrr and oilpiit parameters that define the arguments of the method. 
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The most important portion in the method declaration is the implementation. The developer 
must be able to define the type of operation the method supposed to perform. The operations 
are constructor (used to initialize the class), read (no modification to any field in the class) 
and write (modification is done to one or more fields in the class). These are necessary, as the 
code generated will encapsulate the synchronization of the distributed objects. 
The other field in the implementation portion of the method. is transactiontinze. 
transactiontime defines the upper limit in milliseconds within which the operation must be 
completed. The transaction property is discussed in detail in Section 8. 
Upon running the example on figure 5 through the generator tool, a set of Java interface 
wrapper files are produced. Developers can ignore most of the generated files except the 
following: 
0 
Track.java: this file contains the skeleton of the fields and the methods of the track 
class. The user is supposed to fill the body of the methods. 
TrackExtClient.java: this is the wrapper class that the client initialized and used 
instead of the track class. 
TrackExtServer.java: this is the wrapper class that the server initialized and used in 
replace for the track class. 
NotifyAICG.java : this class must be extended or implemented by the application if 
event-notification and call-back are needed. 
The methods found in the trackExtClient and trackExtServer have the same method names 
and signatures of the track class. In fact, the track class methods are been called within 
trackExtClient or trackExtServer. 
5. Distributed Data Structure and Loosely Coupled Programming 
Conceptually a distributed data structure is one that can be accessed and manipulated by 
multiple processes at the same time without regard for which machine is executing those 
processes. In most distributed computing models, distributed data structures are hard to 
achieve. Message passing and remote method invocation systems provide a good example of , 
the difficulty. Most of the systems tend to keep data structure behind one central manager 
process, and processes that want to perform work on the data structure must “wait in line” to 
ask the manager process to access or alter a piece of data on their behalf. Attempts to 
parallelize or distribute a computation across more than one machine face bottlenecks since 
data are tightly coupled by the one manager process. True concurrent access is rarely 
achievable. 
Distributed data structures provide an entirely different approach where we uncouple the data 
from any particular process. Instead of hiding data stnicture behind a manager process, we 
represent data structures as collections of objects that can be independently and concurrently 
accessed and altered by remote processes. Distributed data structures allow processes to work 
on the data without having to wait in line if there are no serialization issues. 
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The distributed protocol for modification ensures synchronization by enforcing that a process 
wishing to modify the object has to physically remove it from the space, alter it and write it 
back to the space. There can be no way for more than one process to modify an object at the 
same time. However, this does not prevent other processes from overwriting the corrected 
data. For example, in the n o p a l  JavaSpace, process A instead of performing a “take” follow 
by a “write operation, the programmer wrote a “read” operation, followed by a “write” 
operation. This results in 2 copies of the object in the Space. The AICG model prevents this 
by encapsulating the 3 basic commands from the developers. All modification on the object 
are automatically translated to “take”, followed by “write” and all operations that access the 
fields of the distributed object are translated to “read”. These ensure that local data are up-to- 
date and serialization is maintained. 
Loosely-coupled programming has it pitfalls also. Distributed objects may be lost if a 
process removes it from the space and subsequently crashes or is cut off from the network. 
Similarly, the system may enter in a deadlock state if processes request more than one 
distributed object while, at the same time, holding on to distributed objects required by other 
processes. In cases like this, the AICG model groups multiple operations into a transaction to 
ensure that either all operations complete or none occur, thereby maintaining the integrity of 
the application. With transaction control, deadlock is prevented if the process did not 
complete the operation within a certain permitted time. The application can retry the 
operation immediately or wait for a random time before performing the operation again 
6 .  Synchronization 
Synchronization plays a crucial role in any design of distributed application. Inevitably, 
processes in a distributed system need to coordinate with one another and avoid bringing the 
system into an unstable state such as deadlock. Creating distributed applications with AICG 
can significantly ease the burden of process synchronization since synchronization is already 
built into the AICG operations. Multiple processes can read an object in a space at any time, 
but when a process wants to update an object, it has to remove it from the space and thereby 
gain exclusive access to it first. Hence, coordinated access to objects is enforced by the 
AICG interface doing read. take and write operations. 
More advanced and complex synchronization schemes can be easily build upon from the 
basic atomic features of the AIGC operations. An example is semaphores. Semaphores, a 
synchronization construct that was first used to solve concurrency problems in operating 
systems, are commonly found in multithreaded programming languages, but are more 
difficult to achieve in distributed systems. Semaphores are typically implemented as integer 
counters that require special language or hardware support to ensure the atomic properties of 
the UP (signal) and DOWN (wait) operations. Using AIGC space model, we could easily 
implement a semaphore as a shared variable that holds an integer counter. By assigning a 
distributed variable or object as a semaphore, groups of distributed objects can be 
synchronized. Hence, the AIGC model permits the developers to develop more complicated 
distributed applications without being concerned about synchronization and deadlock. 
Furthermore, al! operations within the AICG model can impose transaction control with 
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timeout monitoring. After the timeout period, the transaction would rollback the application 
to a stable state. 
7. Object Life Time (Leases/Tirneout) 
Leasing provides a methodology for controlling the life span of the distributed objects in the 
AICG space. This allows resources to be freed after a fixed period. This model is beneficial 
in the distributed environment, where partial failure can cause holders of resources to fail 
thereby disconnecting them from the resources before they can explicitly free them. In the 
absence of a leasing model, resources could grow without bound. 
* 
There are other constructive ways to harness the benefit of the leasing model besides using it 
as a garbage collector. As for example, in a real-time system, the value of the information 
regarding some distributed objects becomes useless after certain deadlines. Accessing 
obsolete information can be more damaging in this case. By setting the lease on the 
distributed object, the AICG model automatically removes the object once the lease expires 
or the deadline is reached. 
Java Spaces allocate resources that are tied to leases. When a distributed object is written into 
a space, it is granted a lease that specifies a period for which the space guarantees its storage. 
The holder of the lease may renew or cancel the lease before it expires. If the leaseholder 
does neither, the lease simply expires, and the space removes the entry from its store. 
The AICG model simplified the Java Space lease model into two configurations. These are 
1. Generally, the distributed object lasts forever as long as the space exists, even if the 
leaseholder (the process that creates the object) has died. This configuration is 
enabled by setting the SPACE lease property in the Implementation to 0. 
2. In real-time environment, the distributed object lasts for a fixed duration of x ms 
specified by the object designer. To keep the object alive, a write operation must be 
performed on the object before the lease expires. This configuration is set through the 
SPACE lease property in the Implementation to the time in ms required. 
Hence, the developer must provide due consideration towards leasing while developing the 
application. If an object has a life time, it must be renewed before it expires. In the AICG 
model, renewal is done by calling any method that modifies the object. If no modification is 
required, the developer can consider defining a dummy method with the spacemode set to 
“write”. lnvoking that method will automatically renew the lease. 
8. Transactions 
The AICG model uses the Jini Transaction model, which provides generic services 
concerning transaction processing in distributed computing environment. 
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8.1 Jini Transaction ntodel: 
All transactions are overseen by a transaction manager. When a distributed application needs 
operations to occur in a transaction secure manner, the process asks the transaction manager 
to create a transaction. Once a transaction has been created, one or more processes can 
perform operations under the transaction. A transaction can complete in two ways. If a 
transaction commits successfully, then all operations performed under it are complete. 
However, if problems arise, then the transaction is aborted and none of the operations occurs. 
These semantics are provided by a two-phase commit protocol that is performed by the 
transaction manager as it interacts with the transaction participants. 
8.2 AICG Transaction iitodel 
AICG model encapsulates and manages the transaction procedures. All operations on the 
distributed object can be either with transaction control or without. Transaction control 
operations are controlied with a default lease of 2 sec. This default value of leasing time may, 
however, be overriden by the user. This is kept by the transaction manager as a leased 
resource, and when the lease expires before the operation committed, the transaction manager 
aborts the transaction. 
Transactions have the following desirable effect on the semantics of the AICG operations. 
When a distributed object is created, the object is not seen or accessible outside of the 
transaction until the transaction commits. However, when a distributed object is updated or 
read under transaction, it can come from new object created within the transaction or objects 
in the space. 
The AICG model by default. enable all transaction for w i r e  operations and the transaction 
lease time is two seconds. The developer can modify the lease time through the PSDL 
SPACE transactiontime property. 
PROPERTY 
transactiontime= 0: Disable transaction for that method 
/n: Set the lease time to n ms. 
All the read operations in the AICG model do not have transactions enabled. However, the 
user can enable it by using the property transactiontime with the upper limit in transaction 
time for the read operation. To used the same transaction for more than one operation, the 
following property must be set. 
PROPERTY 
transactionID = 99 : An ID number that are the same for more than one method. 
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9. AICG Event Notification 
In the distributed and loosely-coupled programming environment, it is desirable for an 
application to react to changes or arrival of newly distributed objects instead of “busy 
waiting” for it through polling. AICG provides this feature by introducing a callback 
mechanism that invokes user-defined methods when certain conditions are met. 
Java provides a simple but powerful event model based on event sources, event listeners and 
event objects. An event source is any object that “fires” an event. usually based on some 
internal state change in the object. In this case, writing an object into space would generate 
an event. An event listener is an object that listens for events fired by an event source. 
Typically, an event source provides a method whereby listeners can request to be added to a 
list of listeners. Whenever an event source fires an event, it notifies each of its registered 
listeners by calling a method on the listener object and passing it an event object. 
Within a Java Virtual machine (JVM), an application is guaranteed that it will not miss an 
event fired from within. Distributed events on the other hand, had to travel either, from one 
JVM to another JVM within a machine or between machines networked together. Events 
traveling from one JVM to another may be lost in transit, or may never reach their event 
listener. Likewise, an event may reach its listener more than once. 
Space-based distributed events are built on top of the Jini Distributed Event model, and the 
AICG event model fiirther extends it. When using the AICG event model. the space is an 
event source that fires events when entries are written into the space matching a certain 
template an application is interested in. When the event fires, the space sends a remote event 
object to the listener. The event listener codes are found in one of the generated AICG 
interface wrapper files. Upon receiving an event. the listener would spawn a new thread to 
process the event and invoke the application callback method. This allows the application 
codes to be executed without involving the developer in the process of event-management. 
There are a few steps for setting up AICG event for a particular application. Firstly, the 
distributed objects must have the SPACE properties for Notification set to yes. One of the 
application classes must iniplenzent (java term for inherit) the notifyAICG abstract class. The 
notifyAICG class has only one method. which is the callback method. The user class must 
override this method with the codes that need to be executed when an event fires. 
10. AICG Design 
This section explains the design of the AICG and the codes that are generated from psdl2java 
program. The codes used in this section to explain the AICG and the development processes 
are generated from the track PSDL of section 4.2. 
10.1 AICG Architectwe 
The AICG architecture consists of four main modules. They are the Interface modules, the 
Event modules, Transaction modules and the Exception module. The interface modules 
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implement the distributed object methods and communicate directly with the application. In 
reference to the example in section 4, the interface modules are entryAICG, track, trackExt, 
trackExtClient, trackExtServer. Instead of creating the actual object (track), the application 
should instantiate the interface object either the trackExtClient or tracExtServer. Event 
modules (eventAICGID, evenAICGHandler, notifyAICG) handle external events generated 
from the JavaSpace that are of interest to the application. Transaction modules 
(transactionAICG. transactionManagerAICG) support the interface module with transaction 
services. Lastly, the exception module (exceptionAlCG) defines the possible types of 
exceptions that can be raised and need to be catch by the application. Figure 7 below shows 
the architecture of the generated interface wrapper and the interaction with the other modules 
and application. 
Each time the application instantiate a track class by creating a new trackExtServer, the 
following events take place in the Interface: 
1. An Entry object is created together with the track object by the trackExtServer. The 
tack object is placed into the Entry object and stored in the space. 
2. Transaction Manager is enabled. 








Figure 7, Architecture of the generated interface wrapper and the interaction with the other 
modules and application 
Each time a method (getID, getcallsign, getposition) that does not modify the contents of the 
object is invoked, the following events take place in the Interface: 
1. When the application invokes the method through the Interface 
(trackExtServerArackExtClient). 
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2. The Interface performs a Space “get” operation to update the local copy. 
3. The method is then executed on the updated copy of the object to return the value 
back to the application. 
Each time a method (setcallsign, setposition), which does modify the contents of the object 
is invoked, the following events take place in the Interface: 
1. When the application invokes the method through the Interface 
2. The interface performs a Space “take” operation, which retrieves the object from the 
space. 
3. The actual object method is then invoked to perform the modification. 
4. Upon completion of the modification, the object is returned to the space by the 
interface using a “write” operation. 
10.2 Interface Modules 
The interface modules consist of the following modules; an entry (entryAICG) that are stored 
in space, the actual object ftrackExt )that are shared and the object wrapper (trackExt, 
trackExtClient, trackExtServe.). 
10.2.1 Entiy 
A space stores entries. An entry is a collection of typed objects that implements the Entry 
interface. The base class of the AICG distributed object: 
px5lic abstract class en:ryF.ICC- implements Entry 
1% 
!/ main identifcaEion n m b e r  
/ i  required by JavaSpace //default constructor 
public Inzeger entryIC; 
public entryAICGi ! 
public enzryAICG(int id) 
{ I  
1 
entry15 = new 1n:eoJer (id) ;
/ /  return the object stored in //the entry 
getajject ( ) ; 
public abstract Object 
1 
The Entry interface is empty; it has no methods that have to be implemented. Empty 
interfaces are often referred to as “marker” interfaces because they are used to mark a class 
as suitable for some role. That is exactly what the Entry interface is used for, to mark a class 
appropriate for use within a space. 
All entries in the AICG extend from this base class. It has one main public attribute, an 
identifier and an abstract method that returns the object. Any type of object can be stored in 
the entry. The only limitation is that the object must be serializable. Serializable allows the 
java virtual machine to pass the entire object by value instead of by reference. Here is an 
example “track” entry codes generated by the AICG from the PSDL file in figure 4. The 
interface contains the object track in one of the field and an ID. 
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public abstract class trackEntry 
extends entryAICG 
/ i  id is required if there are more 
/ /  than one similar object in 
/ /  the space 
public Integer id; 
/ /  track object 
public track data; 
/ /  default Constructor 
/ /  Constructor with information 
//extracted from the track PSDL 
f f file. 
public trackEntry(inz aid, Integer 
public trackEntry0 { ] 
iniD, track inData) { 
super (aid) ; 
data = inData; 
id = inID; 
1 
1 
public Oblect getobject 0 ( 
return data; 
j 
All Entry attributes are declared as publicly accessible. Although it not typical of fields to be 
defined in public in object-oriented programming style, the associative lookup is the way the 
space-based programs locate entries in the space. To locate an object in space, a template is 
specified that matches the contents of the fields. By declaring entry fields public, it allows 
the space to compare and locate the object. AICG encourage object-oriented programming 
style by encapsulating the actual data object into the entry. The object attributes can then be 
declared as private and made accessible only through clearly defined public methods of the 
object. 
10.2.2 Serialization 
Each distributed interface object is a local object that acts as a proxy to the remote space 
object. It is not a reference to a remote object but instead a connection passes all operations 
and value through the proxy to the remote space. All the objects must be serializable in order 
to meet this objective. The Serializable interface is “marker” interface that contains no 
methods and serves only to mark a class as appropriate for serialization. Here is the 
Serializable interface: 
public abstract interface Serializable 
/ /  this interface is empcy 
{ 
I 
In that case, the track class of the example needs to implement the interface Serializable. 
public class track impiements 
Serialitable { 
/ /  since Serializabie is a marker 
/ /  interface no methods need to be 
ifoverride. 
. .  
j 
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10.2.3 The Actual Object 
We now look at the actual objects that are shared between the servers and clients. The 
psdl2java generates a skeleton version of the actual class with the methods names and its 
arguments. The body of the methods and its fields need to be filled by the developers. The 
track class generated is shown below: 
public class track implements 
java.io.Serializable 
private Integer trackNcmber; 
public track(int inID1 ( 
/ /  insert the body here 
public int getID!I( 
1 
i 
/ /  insert the body here 
public void setPcsition 
(position-type post){ 
/ /  insert the body here 
1 
public position-tyype getPosition0 ( 
/ /  insert the body here 
I 
public Szring getcalisigni)( 
/ /  insert the bo&f here 
1 
public void setCalisign !S:ring 
/ /  insert the bo&/ here 
sign) ( 
1 
/ /  automatically oenerated do 
/ /  not delete!! 
public Integer auxoGetIDlO[ 
return trackNuirjer ; 
10.2.4 Object Wrapper 
Wrapping is an approach to protecting legacy software systems and commercial off-the-shelf 
(COTS) software products that require no modification of those products [ 13. It consists of 
two parts, an adapter that provides some additional finctionality for an application program 
at key external interfaces, and an encapsulation mechanism that binds the adapter to the 
application and protects the combined components [I]. 
In this context. the software being protected contains the actual distributed objects, and the 
AICG model has no way of knowing the behaviors of the distributed object other than the 
type of operations of the methods. The adapter intercepts all invocations to provide additional 
hnctionalities such as synchronization between the local and distributed object, transaction 
control, events monitoring and exceptions handling. The encapsulation mechanism has been 
explained in the earlier section (AICG Architecture). Instead of instantiation of the actual 
object, the respective interface wrapper is instantiated. Instantiating the interface wrapper 
would indirectly instantiate the actual object as well as storing the object in the space. 
Three classes generated for every distributed object. There are named with the object name 
appended with the following Ext, ExtClient, and ExtServer. 
10.3 Event Modules 
The event modules consist of the event callback template (notifyAICG), the event handler 
(evenAICGHandler ) and the event identification object (eventAICGID). 
10.3.1 Event Identification object 
The event identification object is used to distinguish one event from others. When an event of 
interest is registered, an event identification object is created to store the identification and 
event source. Together these two properties act to uniquely identify the event registration. 
The object has only two methods, an ‘equals’ method that check if two event identification 
objects are the same and a ‘ to string’ method which is used by the event handler for 
searching the right event objects from the hash table. 
10.3.2 Event Handler 
Event Handler is the main body of the event operation in the AICG model. It handles 
registration of new events, deletion of old events, listening for event and invoking the right 
callback for that event. Inside the event handler are in fact, three inner classes to perform the 
above functions. Events are stored in a hash table with the event identification object as the 
key to the hash table. This allows fast retriever of the event object and the callback methods. 
The event handler listens for new events from the space or other sources. When an object is 
written to the space, an event is created by the space and captured by the all the listeners. The 
event handler would immediately spawn a new thread and check whether the event is of 
interest to the application. 
/ /  csll when an ex:ernal event is 
/ /  “fired”. 
public void run ( )  ! 
Cjj ect source = event. GetSource ( 1 ; 
lcng id = event.getID0; 
l0r.g seqbi = 
i i  create a new event iaentifcation 
//object 
eventAICGID keyI!J= ned 
registerAICG telr.pReg; 
event. gecSeqJenceNunher ( ! ; 
eventAICGID(id,source); 
Szring key = new 
String(keyID.toString()l; 
I /  check if :he key exist in the 
/ /  hash table (storage) 
if ! (LempReg = !registerAICG) 
storage.get (key) ) !=r?ul l )  
{ 
/ /  check if the event is an old or 
/ /  duplicate event 
if (seqN > tempReg.seqNurn) { 
ternpReg.seqNurn = seqN; 
src.1istenerAICGEvents 
(tempReg.anyObj); 
] else ( 





) / /  end of notifyHandler 
10.3.3 The Callback Template 
The callback template is a simple interface class with an abstract method 
1istenerAICGEvents. Its main function is to allow the AICG model to invoke the application 
program when certain events of interest is "fired". As explain earlier, the template need to be 
implemented by the application that wishes to have notification. 
public interface notifyAICG 
public abstract void 
1istenerAICGEvents (Object obj ) ; 
I 
I 
10.4 The Transaction Modiiles 
The transaction modules consist of transaction interface (transactionAICG) and the 
transaction factory (transactionManagerAICG). 
The transaction interface is a group of static methods that are used for obtaining reference to 
the transaction manager server somewhere on the network. It uses the Java MI registry or 
the look-up server to locate the transaction server. 
The transaction factory uses the transaction interface to obtain the reference to the server, 
which is then used to create the default transaction or user-define transaction. In short the 
transaction factory can perform the following: 
I. Invoke the transaction interface to obtain a transaction manager. 
2. Create a default transaction with lease time of 5 seconds. 
3. Create a transaction with a user define lease time. 
10.5 The Exception Module 
The exception module defines all the exception code that is return to the application when 
certain unexpected conditions occur in the AICG model. The exception include 
"NotDefinedExceptionCode"; unknown error occur. 
"SystemExceptionCode"; system level exceptions, such disk failure, network failure. 
"ObjectNotFoundException"; the space does not contain the object. 
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"CommunicationException"; space communication errors. 
"UnusableObjectException"; object comipted. 
"NotificationException"; events notification errors. 
"TransactionException"; transaction server not found, transaction expire before 
commit. 
"LeaseExpireException"; object lease has expired. 
"ObjectExistException"; there another object with the same key in the space. 
11. Conclusion 
This paper demonstrates the ease of sharing distributed objects and automates the generation 
of generic interface wrappers directly from the Prototype System Description Languages. 
However, the design has a performance price penalty. Every read operation requires the 
interface to synchronize the local object with the distributed object before the value is 
returned. Every write operation requires two Space operations. Adding the overhead for 
transactions, event monitoring and control, reading operations are in the range of a hundred 
milliseconds and writing is in the range of a few hundred of milliseconds. The high overhead 
lies within the Java Virtual Machine (JVM), the JavaSpace Model and the network latency. 
Current versions of JVM and JavaSpace are in a premature state in terms of performance. 
Even so, the performances are still suitable for most applications that are not time critical. 
Similar implementations of distributed systems with the above features of AICG interface in 
COMA and Java would not perform any better. Hence, the AICG model is still a viable 
option in developing interface wrapper for distributed system. 
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Computer Aided Prototyping in a Distributed Environment 
Abstract’ 
Jun Ge, Valdis Berzins, Luqi 
Department of Computer Science 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943 
U.S.A. 
Previous work on computer-aided prototyping system 
(CAPS) is stepping into a distributed environment to meet 
the requirement of integrating legacy systems in 
heterogeneous network. A three-module architecture 
design, including Supporting Database, System Tools and 
Execution Manager, is proposed in this paper for the 
distributed CAPS system (DCAPS). By using 
wrapper/glue technique, different prototyping tools in a 
heterogeneous environment share the input/output data 
files for prototypes. The architecture is generalized for the 
communication among legacy systems for data 
interchange. DCAPS not only provides a useful tool for 
distributed real-time system prototyping, but also is a 
demonstration of distributed system in heterogeneous 
environment. 
Key words: software interoperability, fast prototyping, 
distributed system, multi-agent system 
1. Introduction 
Computer aided prototyping has been found useful in 
software development, especially for large real-time 
systems. Prototyping provides the capability to accurately 
simulate requirements in new application areas. Previous 
work such as the Computer Aided Prototyping System 
(CAPS) has demonstrated real-time issues, software reuse 
and process scheduling in fast prototyping for a single 
processor computing environment However, it is still 
hard to make use of existing systems in a distributed 
environment, especially for real-time systems under a 
heterogeneous environment. With the fast development of 
networks and the Internet, interoperability has become the 
focus of current research. This paper extends research on 
CAPS to distributed and network computing. 
Distributed real-time software system prototyping and 
interoperability in a heterogeneous environment form the 
focus of this paper. In recent years, hard real-time, soft 
real-time and embedded systems are increasingly 
This research was supported in part by the U. S. Army 
Research Office under contractlgrant number 35037-MA 
and 40473-MA. 
important in various application areas from sbusiness to 
military applications. These systems have strict 
requirements on accuracy, safety and reliability. Usually 
such software is large and built on several legacy systems 
to make use of the partial or i l l  functionalities of these 
legacy systems. When the legacy systems are physically 
located in a distributed network, they are connected 
through certain network protocols. Fast prototyping of 
these systems helps the users in analysis, design, 
implementation, verification, validation and optimization. 
Approaches for modeling, realizing, reconfiguring and 
allocating logical processes and interactions to processors 
and communication links are needed to make prototyping 
useful in this domain. 
This paper describes a distributed CAPS system @CAPS) 
to fulfill the requirements for distributed software 
prototyping. Prototype System Description Language 
(PSDL), a prototyping language, is applied in the 
description of the real-time software in DCAPS system. 
PSDL provides the specifications not only for real-time 
constraints, but also for the connection and interaction 
among software components. PSDL has open syntax for 
the design of new features that arise in the context of 
distributed computing. Wrapper and glue technology is 
applied for the normalization and data transfer of legacy 
systems. A multi-agent technique is used to manage the 
execution process. 
Section 2 introduces the three-module architecture of 
DCAPS system. All the modules are described in detail in 
Section 3, 4 and 5 separately. Sction 6 gives a simple 
example prototype in DCAPS. 
2. System architecture 
Earlier work on computer-aided prototyping system 
(CAPS) uses PSDL, a prototype description language, to 
describe the real-time software [41. PSDL itself has an 
open structure so that the user is able to define new 
properties for software components, such as new-added 
network configurations. CAPS prototypes a software 
system in the following steps. First, user selects the 
software components from the reusable component 
libraries b construct the prototype in a graphic editor. 
This prototype is saved as a plain text file in PSDL format. 
User may also use the graphic user interface (GUT) 
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generator provided by CAPS to create the new GUI 
interface for the prototype. Then, the translator and 
scheduler work on this PSDL file to generate the 
wrappedglue code and dynamidstatic schedules 
respectively. Both the source code of reusable components 
and automatic generated source code will be compiled 
together to get the executable final software. It will be 
tested in CAPS (simulation) for both the execution 
correctness and the real-time requirements. 
As described above, CAPS consists of various prototyping 
tools to provide all these functionalities. They play 
different roles during the prototyping process. For 
example, the scheduler just needs the information of 
timing constraints for every component, while the 
translator does not care about such information other than 
the network configurations and data type definitions. 
When new properties are enabled in PSDL description of 
the prototype, for instance to prototype a networked 
software, some tools must be updated by new generations 
while the rest stay the same. Therefore, the architecture of 
CAPS must consider the evolution of its own components. 
CAPS tools were originally developed in SunOS operating 
system for components which are located on one 
processor. To consider the user’s requirement, the user 
interface is required to migrate to Windows NT operating 
system. At the same time, the old operating system is not 
supported by some new technologies. To avoid the 
complexity of migrating the whole system to a new 
operating system, CAPS now has to work in a distributed 
and heterogeneous environment. A new architecture 
becomes important for the system. On the other hand, 
CAPS is required to prototype software systems in 
distributed and heterogeneous environments. The 
requirements to develop the distributed CAPS (DCAPS) 
are consistent for constructing the distributed software 
prototypes, i.e., DCAPS itself is a demonstration of 
distributed software construction. A three-module 
architecture is proposed to design the distributed CAPS 
system (DCAPS). 
From the viewpoint of prototyping procedure, DCAPS can 
group its tools into three basic modules (Figure 1). 
Supporting 
Databases 
In this architecture, DCAPS provides users support from 
three aspects. Databases help users to manage and reuse 
the prototyping requirements and reusable software 
components. It also validates the prototypes for 
components’ evolution. Prototyping tools help user in 
automatically generating connection code, GUI code, and 
data type conversion code among components during the 
design process. Execution manager controls and visualizes 
the simulation process to validate the system design, 
particularly on real-time constraints. 
DCAPS inherits prototyping tools that were implemented 
in different operating systems including SunOS, Solaris 
and Windows NT. It provides different user interfaces for 
multiple operating systems including Windows NT. All 
the tools, which are in the three modules, are located in a 
distributed environment during one prototyping job. 
3.  Supporting databases 
Supporting databases provide intelligent guidance to users 
so that in a form of adaptive control it is integrated into the 
system prototyping. There are two types of database 
support involved in DCAPS system. One is the software 
reuse database. It contains the specifications for all the 
reusable software components so that they are able to be 
retrieved and to be accessed during the prototyping 
procedure and the execution (simulation). Software 
version control should also be considered within this 
database support. The other is the requirement database. 
It allows users to reuse the previous prototypes that are 
stored in the database. Thus it may shorten the design 
cycle and even optimize the design. The decomposition of 
this module is shown in Figure 2. ................................................... , 
Requi;? LT Software-reuse 1. : 
Database Database . . . . . . . . . . . Database Manager 
I I .............................................. 
%Request & response 
Figure 2. Supporting database system 
The browse and retrieve operations for the database 
includes both syntactic exclusion and semantic exclusion 
to narrow the search range [51[111. 
Prototyping -b Execution 
<Tools>p( Manager 
Figure 1. Three-module architecture design of DCAPS 
4. Prototyping tools 
Prototyping tools module is decomposed as follows 
(Figure 3). It includes GUI for various operating systems, 
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which includes a PSDL graphic editor, the prototype 
scheduler 19], the prototype translator (automatic code The different tools, which are located in different 
generator for data communication among components), computers, communicate with each other through TCP/IP 
source code compilers and code optimizers for various protocol. The wrapperlglue technique is applied, 
languages and operating systems. The major operating However, because the data types in communication are 
systems considered in DCAPS are SunOS, Solaris and known to each other. the wrappers among different tools 
Windows NT. Job Dispatcher works on a server platform are blank to each other. 
to receive user’s commands from GUI and to dispatch jobs 
to correspondent tools. 5. Execution manager 
The compiler in different operating systems just needs to 
work with the correspondent automatically generated code. 
With the change of language in a specific operating 
system, it is not necessary to change the other components 
of DCAPS. .................................................. 
1 ’  
(SunOS) (Solaris) 5 
: Code Optimizer Compiler Compiler : 
1 (SunOS) /I (SunOS) / /  (SunOS) 1 
Scheduler Translator PSDL editor ................................................. 
Figure 3. Decomposition of System Tools 
The DCAPS GUi can be further decomposed as in Figure 
4. 
......................................... 
E l e b a s e  
Editor i Prototype as 
PSDLfile& 1, GLd-’, 
user command DCAPS ! 
Wrapper Menu j 
support 
:- -: 
Execution q-1 Execution 
visualization 
Interface 
I I ........................................ 
Figure 4. Decomposition of DCAPS GUI 
The graphic PSDL editor should be enhanced for new- 
added properties in the PSDL description of prototype, 
such as network configuration, different timing constraint, 
etc. Even in such cases, the system architecture does not 
have to change at all.except that the respective modules are 
replaced. 
The execution of the distributed system. i.e., the simulation 
of the prototype, is managed by the Execution Manager. It 
uses a virtual centralized synchronization timer for 
different task schedules in  different processors. This 
subsystem must compensate for clock drift due to 
differences in clock rates without violating global timing 
constraints as long as clock drift rates remain within 
specified bounds. A multi-agent system is used in the 
distributed work to coordinate the computing processes. 
The Prototyping Scheduler generates one specific task 
schedule (both dynamic and static) for each node. 
Execution Manager provides a centralized Executor to 
administrate and to synchronize the processes in different 
platforms on which reusable components are located 
(Figure 5 ) .  The procedure of execution is also sent back to 
GUI of DCAPS so that the user may see a visualized 
process and have clear information on the prototype. 
Node B 
/ 1 7 7  Execution v i h t i m e r  agent 
Manager 
(Linux) (NT) 4 
I NodeA I 1 NodeC 1 
Legend: local timing agents 
Figure 5 .  Execution model for a distributed system 
In each node, for all the legacy components, the 
wrapper/glue technology is applied in data interchange 
(Figure 6). A form of software wrapper and glue 
technology provides standardized interactions between 
legacy systems in a heterogeneous network in DCAPS. It 
makes interoperability and integration possible for a 
distributed structure. Legacy systems under the wrappers 
collaborate through the message passing approach in the 
glue connection. Wrappers provide a generic interface for 
every single legacy system so that its input and output 
become uniform. both for consuming data from other 
legacy systems and for generating data to others. On the 
other hand. glue structure supports an abstract data class 
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for data transfer. It encodes any type of data to a common 
type before putting it into a data stream at the sender’s end. 
At the receiver’s end, the data is decoded to the required 
data type that may be different from that at the sending 
end. Wrapper and glue concepts are the basis of a formal 
model for software and hardware co-design. 
A multiple-agent system is generated automatically by the 
Prototyping Translator tool in the architecture as the 
“glue” for the network communication of the legacy 
system’s inputs and outputs. For each inpudoutput data 
flow, an agent is associated as an automatic pipe of data 
transmission. It makes use of the run-time libmy of 
network communication according to the specific network 
protocol in the node that is provided in component 
information. This “glue” allows the legacy systems not to 
worry about the network settings for the communication to 
other components. The communication among agents can 
reference to several available techniques such as 
JavaSpace, Jini [’I, etc. The technology used in real 
application should be selected according to the real 
network configuration. 
The “wrapper” code works with the component for data 
type controlkonversion, firing condition, exception 
handling, timing constraints, etc. The “wrapper” is simply 
composed in several different layers so that all the features 
that user concerns are tunable according to user’s 
selections. The “wrapper” communicates to the agents for 
data outgoing and incoming. Under certain specific 
conditions, some layer of the wrapper may become 
transparent based on enhanced information. For example, 
in the design of DCAPS, the inputloutput of different 
prototyping tools are standardized in advance. Therefore, 
the data type conversion is not required. Because DCAPS 
itself does not have real-time constraint, the wrapper for 
timing constraints is transparent. 
2............, 
I glue 
i ..... ...................... \ .... \ .......... f 
. . 
Timing . . constraints 
1.;.,..2 
For each processor, a local timing agent manages the 
execution tasks under the schedule. I/O data of each 
component is receivedkent between legacy system and the 
uniform software wrapper, which is automtically 
generated and transferred through glue agents generated by 
glue code, which hides the specific network configurations 
via derived design and network mode/parameters. 
6. Prototyping example 
The system of a weather station is prototyped in DCAPS to 
demonstrate the ability of prototyping the distributed 
software in heterogeneous operating system. 
Figure 7. Top level of weather-station prototype 
: c  
;, %,-*..$ ,: 
I .. .... 
Figure 8. Decomposition of sys-b 
Figure 6 .  Wrapper/glue architecture for one component 
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Figure 9. Decomposition of sys-a 
mu - 
Figure 10. Properties configuration for components 
As shown in Figure 7-9, weather station system consists of 
two parts: sys-b is the sensor and sys-a is the controller. 
The sensor system includes two sub-sensors which are 
wind direction sensor and temperature sensor. The 
measurements are converted in specified units. It reports 
the measurement results to the controller. The controller 
sends control signal of signal unit to the sensor system so 
that the sensor can be configured automatically. Both the 
sub-systems have their own user interfaces in the local 
systems. 
The two sub-systems are located in different computers. 
They are connected through network in TCP/IP protocol. 
A SOCKET communication run-time library is provided 
for data interchange. 
DCAPS provides the graphic user interface to edit the 
prototype in multi-level. For each component, it provides 
an interface (Figure 10) so that user may specie properties 
such as timing constraints, network configuration, data 
flow type, etc. PSDL editor also supports a GUI code 
generator so that user can create a personal-style user 
interface for the prototype. 
7. Conclusions 
The DCAPS system provides a useful tool for distributed 
real-time software fast prototyping. A three-module 
architecture is proposed to make DCAPS system suitable 
for distributed environment. The wrappedglue method 
used in DCAPS can be generalized to system construction 
and interconnection of legacy systems. By automatically 
generating the codes for the “wrappers and glue” and 
providing a powerful environment, DCAPS allows the 
designers to concentrate on the difficult interoperability 
problems and issues, freeing them from implementation 
details. It also enables easy reconfiguration of software 
and network properties to explore design alternatives. 
DCAPS is an on-going research project for the 
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Abstract 
Speech technology has been moving ever increasingly 
into the domain of the everyday computer user. Computer 
users would use speech technology more readily if they 
could speak to the machine like they could talk to another 
person. With advances in visual agent and natural 
language technologies, this concept is already a 
possibility. In this paper, we present some ideas about a 
framework of a type of user interface agent known as a 
natural language agent which combines spoken language 
understanding and visual agent technologies into a simple 
to use computer interface. Preliminary results of two 
experimental agents based on the framework are 
discussed. Future work on creating complete natural 
language agent systems is also included. 
Keywords: natural language agents, visual agents, speech 
technologies. 
1 Introduction 
If you could decide how you wanted to communicate 
with your computer, would you really pick a keyboard 
and a mouse as the best way? Instead, what if we could 
communicate with our computer just like we do with 
people? We have been trained for many years to use the 
artifacts of keyboard and mouse to interface with our 
computers; but that’s the whole point, we’ve been trained 
to use them. Instead, we should be creating computer 
interfaces that adapt to the way people communicate with 
each other. In this area, we are on the cusp of a new age 
in human-computer interaction. The technologies 
necessary to support human-like communication with a 
computer are slowly coming of age; and when they do, 
everyone will be able to easily use a computer. 
The next generation of human-computer interaction 
will allow the user to interact with a computer system 
using the language they speak to others with every day 
and they get to choose how the computer will represent 
itself to them. Getting a system to use spoken language as 
an interface is just one piece of the puzzle. In order to 
effectively communicate, most human beings require a 
visual representation of who or what they are speaking to 
in order to feel comfortable with this means of 
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communication. Visual agents are a natural fit for this 
responsibility. By creating a visual avatar for the 
computer to use as the interface, the user feels more 
comfortable with the interaction because now they are 
talking to somebody. Additionally, a visual avatar can use 
such techniques as body language and other body 
movements to communicate on another level with the 
user, just like human beings do [l]. Thus, natural 
language agents (NLA) refer to a type of user interface 
agent that combines spoken language understanding and 
visual agent technologies to create a simple to use 
computer interface. 
This paper proposes a framework for NLA in the 
Microsoft (MS) Windows environment and discusses 
some preliminary results. Section 2 covers the state of the 
component technologies for NLA as they stand today. 
Section 3 describes the proposed natural language agent 
framework called Secret Agent. Some preliminary results 
based on the Secret Agent framework are given in Section 
4. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper with some 
remarks on future work. 
2 Natural Language Agents 
We have been exposed to natural language agents of 
all types through TV and movies over the years. 
However, there are many advances in fields other than 
computer science, which are necessary to support that 
level of technology. In the meantime, natural language 
agent computer interfaces can be created using 
technology available today that will allow an ordinary 
person to communicate with their computer just like it is 
another person. Ultimately, the agent could become the 
user’s everyday friend and helper. 
The components necessary to create a basic natural 
language agent include 1) a user-selected visual agent 
representation, 2) speech recognition, 3) speech synthesis, 
4) natural language understanding, 5) an interface to the 
system the agent is designed to help with, and 6 )  some 
additional utility functions. The visual agent gives the 
user a visual persona to which they can speak with during 
their interaction in order to increase the comfort of 
communicating with a computer. By giving the user 
control over the visual representation of the agent, the 
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user can customize and select the representation that is 
most entertaining or interesting to work with. Next, the 
speech recognition component allows the agent to 
translate the physical speech utterances of the user into 
meaningful words in the user's language. Also, the 
speech synthesis allows the agent to speak back to the 
user for complete spoken interaction. Then, the natural 
language understanding component is necessary in order 
to translate the words that a user speaks into ideas and 
concepts, so that the user can make meaningful requests 
or have a conversation with the agent. Finally, an 
interface to the system, which the agent is helping with, 
allows the agent to enact the requests that the user might 
make during a session with the agent. Additionally, more 
components can be added to the agent to increase its 
functionality and usefulness, including long-term 
memory, adaptation of conversation to user preferences 
and work habits, conversational capabilities, and others. 
For some of the technologies that were just discussed, 
there are a number of options available for Microsoft 
Windows-based components, such as: 
0 Visual Agent - MS Agent [2], CSLU Baldi [3 ]  
Speech RecognitiodSynthesis - MS Speech 
SDK [4] supporting IBM, Dragon, MS, and 
Lernout and Hauspie speech engines 
For natural language understanding, the field is still in 
the research phase (see MIT [S] and CMU [6]) though 
some expensive commercial work is being done today by 
Cycorp [7]. The remainder of the natural language agent 
components will need to be custom built until natural 
language agent technology becomes more common. 
3 Secret Agent Framework 
In general, an NLA has the structure shown in Figure 
1. It includes all the components discussed in Section 2 
and interfaces with both the application and operating 
system. The Secret Agent framework (SAF) is designed 
to encapsulate the visual agent and speech technologies 
that are necessary for any NLA application. 
Figure 1. Generic NLA framework. 
The goal of the SAF is to base the framework on the 
most publicly accessible and standardized components 
that could be found for MS Windows. Since MS Agent 
and the MS Speech API are the de facto standards for 
visual agents and speech in MS Windows, they are chosen 
for the SAF. Figure 2 shows the structure of the modules 
in the SAF. A separate speech synthesis module is not 
needed in this case, because it is incorporated into MS 
Agent. Since the SAF incorporates visual agent and 
speech technologies, it can be used in any number of 
applications, such as tutoring and personal assistant 
applications, that require these technologies. 
Figure 2. Secret Agent Framework (SAF). 
Since both of the visual agent and speech technologies 
support the MS Component Object Model (COM) [8], the 
SAF is implemented using C++ and direct COM 
interfaces for maximum flexibility in control of the COM 
objects provided by the technologies. 
Additionally, the SAF provides a number of user 
configurable options that are accessible via a dialog built 
into the framework. Using these options, the user has full 
control over the agent visual representation, speech 
recognition engine and speech synthesis voice used for 
the agent. Also, an optional speech window allows the 
user to see what the agent has heard so the user knows 
when the speech engine needs to be trained. 
4 Some Example Agents 
The first SAF-based NLA is based an old BBS door 
program called Eliza. Joseph Weizenbaum originally 
created Eliza as a challenge to the Turing test. Since Eliza 
is based on the Rogenan mode of therapy in which the 
therapist strives to eliminate all traces of his of her 
personality from the dialog, Weizenbaum had planned to 
show that the test could be beat through the use of 'tricks' 
instead of true 'intelligence' [9]. A conversation engine is 
built into the NLA that would mimic the functionality of 
the original Eliza application. The result is a natural 
language agent that responds to everything the user says. 
Depending on the complexity and topic of the 
conversation, the agent can maintain the illusion of 
conversationally competence anywhere from 2 responses 
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to an entire conversation just like the original Eliza. This 
NLA uses the same algorithms for the conversation 
engine as the original Eliza application, but adds the extra 
levels of visual agent and speech technologies. 
The Eliza conversation engine is written in C++ as an 
object, which could communicate with the Secret Agent 
fi-amework. With the response per utterance mode that 
Eliza works in, the objects are easily integrated. The only 
other key feature of interest is that Eliza uses a word 
matching heuristic to approximate conversational 
competency. Every word pattern handled by the 
conversation engine is associated with a standard 
response that may employ words in the user’s original 
utterance. If words fiom the user’s utterance are used, the 
words involved are conjugated and transposed to make 
the response fit the user’s input. This is what gives the 
user the perception of speaking to a psychiatrist. The 
word patterns and responses are stored in a configuration 
file that is loaded by the application at startup, and can be 
easily modified and expanded. 
Figure 3. Conversational NLA. 
The second SAF-based NLA stems from the fact that 
users will want a natural language agent to help control 
the applications that they use everyday. In this respect, we 
choose a web browser as the application of choice. Two 
factors are behind the selection of a web browser 
application: the high demand for web centric applications 
in today’s market, and the availability of a web browser 
application interface. Using the SAF as the basis, 
command-understanding capability, an interface to a web 
browser and some limited 0 s  interaction are added. To 
approximate natural language commands, the following 
methods are prototyped continuous dictation, fiame- 
based grammar and a standard grammar. A standard 
grammar is created for this NLA due to the simplicity of 
creation and lack of ambiguity of speech during use. It is 
also a standard natural language approximation technique 
used by most modem speech recognition applications. 
The technical work on the web browser agent is quite a 
bit more complicated due to the interface with an 
independent commercial application. Microsoft Internet 
Explorer is chosen as the web browser in the experiment, 
since MS provides classes that encapsulate a 
programmable interface to the browser using COM 
technology [ lo]. 
Most of the functions in the programmable interface 
are enabled in this NLA. These functions include: simple 
navigation commands (back, home, forward, etc.), 
scrolling capability and application control (toolbars, 
modes). Expansion is made to the functionality by 
allowing the user to navigate hyperlinks on a page 
through spoken commands. There are two parts to this 
feature. For text links, a routine is called after a page is 
loaded to dynamically update the grammar used by the 
speech recognition engine. For other links (such as 
pictures), another routine intercepts the incoming HTML 
page and adds numbers to each of the hyperlinks on the 
page, which can then be spoken to navigate to those links. 
Additional application capability is added to allow the 
user to verbally select buttons on dialog boxes that might 
come up during a typical web browsing session. Finally, a 
simple help section is added which outlines how the agent 
works as well as a list of supported commands. All the 
help and command information is stored in text files 
which can be modified and expanded. A detailed 
discussion on these two experiments can be found in [ 113. 
Commands 
Figure 4. Web browser NLA. 
5 Conclusion 
The two example agents are just the tip of the iceberg 
of what can be done with the SAF and other technology 
available today. The conversation agent could be 
programmed with a better natural language paradigm to 
allow it to interact in a more realistic way with the user. 
The web browser agent could be enhanced by creating 
interfaces to more applications (e-mail, word processing, 
etc.). Both of these experiments represent only two facets 
of the ultimate goal for NLA: to create conversationally 
competent NLA that can be used as the complete interface 
to a system. 
In order to achieve the goal of NLA, there are a 
number of things that need to happen. First, natural 
language understanding engines need to be created which 
can succeed in the domains that users want to use natural 
language technology. Next, any application that would 
like to interface with a natural language agent needs to 
provide an interface through which the agent can control 
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the application. Finally, the agent needs to be able to 
make the user feel comfortable by being able to learn and 
act like another person. Once these steps are achieved and 
integrated, NLA agents will become common fare. 
So what’s next? In the near future, NLA or 
comparable technology will be a standard 0 s  component 
in the consumer computing marketplace. Already, 
products such as IBM ViaVoice Millennium [12] are 
filling the void by creating the first commercial versions 
of NLA. 
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Abstract 
This paper presents a case study of implementing a large dis- 
tributed system in Scheme. Metcast is a request-reply and 
subscription system for dissemination of real-time weather 
information. The  system stores a large amount of weather 
observation reports, forecasts, gridded data produced by 
weather models, and satellite imagery. .A Sfctcast server 
delivers a subset of these data in response to a query for- 
mulated in a domain-specific language. Decoders of \\'orld 
Xlcteorological Organization's da ta  feed, the Sletcast server, 
S l I L  encoders and decoders, ausiliary and monitoring CGI 
scripts are all written in Scheme. 
This paper considers two esamplcs that  demonstrate ben- 
efits of our choice of the implementation language: parsing 
of the data feed and a module system for the lletcast server. 
lye will also discuss estensions to Scheme as wcll hs perfor- 
marice. 
1 Overview of Metcast 
Mefcas t  is a request-reply and a subscription system for 
distributing, disseminating, publishing and broadcasting of 
real-time weather information [I].  The  system comprises 
clients and scrvers communicating in an HTTP protocol. 
.-I lletcast server maintains a database of weather observa- 
tion reports. forecasts, advisories, gridded data produced by 
wcaclicr models, as well as of satellite imagery and plain text 
messages and discussions .I\ Metcast client uses a web form 
or a domain-specific, flesible request language to retrieve 
a sutsct  of da t a  from a lfctcast database 121 -1 Metcast 
server - which is an application (web) server - parses re- 
quests, queries the  database and sends the requested data 
in a single- or a multi-part reply. .A server may act as a 
client to request a subset of data for further redistribution. 
Metcast servers are in operation on several U.S. Savy Sle- 
teorology and Oceanography centers worldwide. Clients are 
deployed on great xnaxiy sites throughout the U.S. Xavy as 
well as US. Air Force, DoD. X.XT0, X0A.X and other gov- 
ernment agencies. 
One particular source of original da ta  is IYorld lfete- 
orological Organization's (1VMO) data feed, containing a 
great number of land and sea surface and depth,'height pro- 
file reports, forecasts, advisories, discussions, etc. - for the 
whole globe. .S set of decoders processes the feed, and stores 
'This work h i u  been supported by SPAWAR PMN'-185. FSMOC 
and in part by the Xation-al Research Council, Naval Postgraduate 
School. and the Army Rescarch Ofice  under cotitracts 39690-M.4 and 
40473-AIA-SP. 
raw arid decoded data in a da:abase. A Lfetcast server dis- 
tributes this information in an S l I L  OSlF format [3]. 
The Sletcast server, the set of decoders for various U'SIO 
data formats, auxiliary and monitoring CGI scripts are all 
written in Scheme. Metcast clients are written in C++, 
Java, Scheme, Perl, Python, JavaScript, and Visual Basic. 
The server and related modules are implemented in 12800 
lines of Sclieme code, counting the comments. U?dO da ta  
feed decoders add 8400 more lines. T h e  size of common 
estension libraries is 5400 lines of Scheme dnd some embed- 
ded C code. A Gambit-C 3.0 Scheme interpreter enhaaced 
with compiled-in estensions hzs been used throughout the  
project. 
2 
Scheme proved to be particularly helpful in parsing of the 
iv110 data feed. i1'lIO cod2 is a rather old, ad hoc, pe- 
culiar, somewhat inconsistent. tangled da ta  format with a 
number of options, exceptions and special cases. Further- 
more, received bulletins often contain errors due to  manual 
miscoding and trarismission problems. 
A typical LYhIO report - for example, a surface synoptic 
report - is a sequence of code groups separated by white 
space. .I\ code group is a string of letters, numbers and 
a few special characters. A code group or groups encode 
the result of Observation of a par:icular quantity, e.g., cloud 
conditions, temperature, etc. If code groups were atomic 
tokens, a report could easily be parsed by a LR(1) automa- 
ton. Alas, code groups are composite entities tha t  encode 
information in idiosyncratic ways. T h e  mere identification 
of a code group depends on its position and contest, nhich 
may encompass all previously sccn code groups. 
We have implemented a report decoder as a combination 
of a table-driven automaton and code-based group parsers. 
The latter recognize, parse, and validate a particular code 
group. The decoder takes a list of code groups and returns 
an associative list, an  -4bstract Syntax "Tree" (XST). A spe- 
cial procedure later Tvalks the AST and records the parsed 
data in a database upload buEer. Of a particular help -was 
Scheme's ability to store and pass procedural values 
other values. This let us implement decoders as composi- 
tions of code group parsers. For example, a very typical 
duction <a>? <b>* <c>? can be parsed by a combination 
(sequence parse-a (sequence (loop parse-b) parSe-C) 1. 
This cornposition of group parsers is represented by a list 
(parse-a (repetition-f lag pwse-b)  parse-c) .  Given this 
list and the list of code groups to decode, a main driver walks 
both lists, applying the current parser to  the current code 
Parsing of the data feed 












group. The result of the application as well as the repeti- 
tion flag deterxriirie if the current code group is consumed, if 
the nest parser should be chosen, axid how .%ST should be 
estended. 
They 
receive as arguments tlie current code group and the AST, 
axid should return: 
an association (a name-value pair) or a list of such 
0 a symbol pass if the parser failed to recognize the code 
group. The  code group should be given to the next 
parser; 
0 zf meaning a syntax error is detected a t  the current 
token; 
a symbol terminate to stop parsing of the report. 
In the successful c a e  (the first one above), the  current token 
is assumed consumed. Any group parser may examine the 
XST (that is, the results of the previous pa re r s )  and may 
even modify the .-\ST. Therefore our parsing technique is 
somewhat similar to attribute grammars. Figure 1 shows 
an  esamplc of a group parser. 
2),  which was used frequently throughout the project and 
proved very helpful. .4s Fig. 1 shows, once the  current token 
has been recognized as a potential <temperature-dev-point> 
group. and- let* carries on a sequence of elementary parsing 
decisions, all of wh id i  must succeed. 
The Mctcast decoder is continually processing incoming 
files, u.iiicli iire delivered every 1-3 minutes. -4 rather large 
batch of reports - 8 plain-test bullctixis, 141 sea surface ob- 
servation reports, 777 upper-air level data. 2 terminal air- 
drome forecasts and 332 synoptic reports - takes 8 %-all-clock 
seconds to parse and 19 seconds to upload and record into 
the database. Tlic platform is Sun Enterprise-450 server 
with two ukraSP.ARC-I1 CPus  and 512 LIB RAM. running so- 
lark 2.6 and Ixiforrnis 7.3 databwe. Keeping in mind that  
incoming reports have up to 10-niinute delay from tlie time 
of issue, the total processing time at the Metcast end - under 
1 minute - is entirely acceptable. 
.All the group parsers have the same interface. 
associations to add to the .%ST; 
The example demonstrates an  a d - l e t *  construction (SRFI- 
3 
Schcnie turned out to be a good implementation language 
for a web application server as well. One part  of the server 
is a coinples finite state machine that decides when a multi- 
p x t  reply is called for, arid sends the corresponding hliME 
headers. The problem is not trivial as it is generally im- 
possible to predict the number of non-empty replies for a 
comples request. Espressing such finite automata as sets 
of mutually-recursive procedures made the code clear and 
flexible. 
Scheme was conducive to compilation and interpretation 
of the S-espression-based Netcast Request Language 121. .A 
request language phrase is compiled into a dictionary - an 
ordered sequence of bindings, - which constitutes the en- 
vironment to look up all data needed to construct a blet- 
cast database query. ?his hierarchical repository follows 
neither the static scope of Scheme espressions, nor the dy- 
namic scope of procedure activations. Some bindings may 
be to procedures, which may push additiooal associations 
into rhe environment arid thus affect further lookups. 
Metcast server has a highly modular structure. The main 
program is responsible for receivir.g and parsing of a request, 
Implementing the Web application server 
and packing of replies. Esecution of a particular product r e  
quest is delegated to a separate module (plug-in). The  hier- 
archical repository was indispensable in implementing a pa- 
rameter bus, Jvhich maintains the configuration for the main 
server and all plug-ins. The  parameter bus also provides a 
uniform interface for invocation of modules and  passing of a 
complex set of esplicit and default parameters. For example, 
the main hfetcast server module contains a form (include 
"metar. scrn") that loads a plug-in metarscm. T h e  latter file 
defines procedures perf  orm-metar-request and  perform- 
MSL-request. The  file binds these procedures to the cor- 
responding Request Language verbs and  the configuration 
information: 
(envSbind* 
'((HETAR (executor . ,perform-metar- request) 
(mine-type . "text/x-omf")) 
(n ise- type  . "text/x-msl") 1 
(MSL (executor . ,perform-HSL-request) 
(OaJ-L0ADER:st-constraint . 
, (lambda cons t r -1  
(envzbind s t - cons t r a in t  cons t r -1 ) ) )  1) 
Itihcn metar.scm is loaded, the above initialization expres- 
sion is evaluated. The  hletcast server thus gains an ability 
to  process requests for METAR and MSL products. The  main 
server module contains a long chain of ( inc lude  "xxx.su11") 
expressions, which define a set of requests a server accepts, 
Adding or replacing support for a particular product re- 
quests is as simple as loading or reloading the corresponding 
plug-in. This re-configuration and linking-in of the modules 
is possible while the server is running - although we have 
not pursued this opportunity. The  flexible module linking 
mechanism wa5 beneficial even in the static case as it made 
incremental development and evolution of the server easier. 
4 Extensions to Scheme 
Implexnenting Netcast required several extensions of the 
Gambit-C Scheme system: libraries of common procedures, 
and interfaces to  esternal applications and the 0s.  Detailed 
descriptions for all extensions along with the commented 
source and validation code are freely available from a web 
site [J]. 
IVe have already mentioned one helpful extension: and-- 
l e t * ,  an ASD with local bindings, a guarded LET' special 
form. An input parsing library w-as another extension. It is a 
set of procedures that either skip, or build and return tokens 
following inclusion or delimiting semantics. T h e  input pars- 
ing library has been used on very many occasions: in split- 
ting WMO data  feed files into bulletins and bulletins into 
code groups; in parsing of a QUERY-STRING or HTML form 
POST submissions; in breaking the response stream from a 
database query into rows and columns of data; in parsing of 
XML. 
Another kind of extension - made possible by Gambit's 
excellent Foreign Function Interface - deals with accessing 
processes, files, directories, communication pipes and other 
objects esternal to a Scheme system. Scanning of a POSIX 
directory is implemeuted in a truly Scheme style and spirit: 
The  0S:for-each-file-in-directory iterator combines the best 
features of for-each, map, and f i l t e r ,  and permits prema- 
ture termination of iterations. 
X very helpful extension that  goes far beyond Scheme 
is opening and communicating through uni-, bi-directional, 
and TCP pipes as if they were regular files. This exten- 
sion allows Scheme code to talk to esternal applications or 
1 0 5  
- _  4 Y i  
; <temperature-dev-point> ::= <tamp> "/" cdeu-point>? 
; <temp> : := "N"? <tvo-d ig i t s>  
( lazbda (token AST) ; "/" must be e i t h e r  i n  t h e  pos 2 o r  3 
<deu-point> : := "H"? <tvo-d ig i t s>  
( l e t  ( (s lash-pos  (str ing- index token # \ / I ) )  
( i f  (not  (memv slash-pos ' ( 2  3 ) ) )  'pass 
(and-lc t * 
(tempr 
( (negate  (lambda (I) ( a d  x ( -  x ) ) ) )  
( i f  (char=? #\H ( s t r ing- re f  token 0)) 
(negate ( s t r ing- > in tege r  token 1 3 ) )  
(s t r ing->integer  token 0 2)) )  
(dp-pos (++ slash-pos))  
(dp (if (>= dp-pos ( s t r ing- leng th  token))  'none 
( i f  (char=? #\N ( s t r ing- re f  token dp-pos)) 
(negate ( s t r ing -> in tege r  token (++ dp-pos) (+ 3 dp-pas))) 
( s t r ing -> in tege r  token dp-pos (+ 2 dp-pas)))))) 
( i f  (eq? dp 'none) 
(cons 'T ternpr) 
( l i s t  (cons 'T  tcapr)  (cons 'DP d p ) ) ) ) ) ) )  
Figure 1: A <temperature-dev-point> group parser 
internet services. One particular kind of such an external 
application is a command-line SQL tool, which allowed us 
to build a portable databasc.acccss library 141. .L\ database 
query interface is implemented in a Scheme spirit as well, as 
a gcncrd iterator over a collcction of sclected rows. 
5 Illusory and real difficulties 
Choosing an implernerltatiorl language other than C or CT- 
inevitably raises the question of performance. IVe have run 
several benchmarks to ascertain the total performance and 
its contribumg factors. For csample, a sample request that 
retrieves 707 IVSIO messages (totaling s2IIC of output) took 
75.6 sec (real). 24.1 sec (user) and under 0.1 sec of thesystem 
time. This running time comprises: loading and interpreta- 
tion of the Metcast server script. database connection and 
qucry, Request Language interpretation, and output format- 
ting. I1.e conducted several esperirnents to isolate each of 
tlicsc factors, on the S u n  E4SO platform described above. 
Connecting to a database with a SQL command-line tool 
dbacccss and running t h e  query took 1.3 sec (real) and 1.0 
sec (user). T h u s  the database interface - however ugly and 
inefficient it looks - is not the bottleneck. Parsing of the 
database reply in (interpreted) Schcnlc code adds 3.8 sec 
(real) and 2.2 sec (user) time. That is noticeable yet in- 
significant compared to  the total time above. Instrumenta- 
tion of the Metcast server showed that the Server start-up 
time is under 1.0 sec of real time. This fact war one of the 
txvo biggest surprises. Given the complexity of the start-up 
process - launching of the Gambit interpreter, reading of 
the main script and 15 included scripts totaling 12800 lines 
of code. macro-expansion and byte-compilation - one would 
have espected the start-up to be a significant factor if not 
the bottleneck. The other biggest surprise was the fact that  
the most of the running time - 20 seconds - was spent within 
7 lines of code, which copy characters from one stream to  
another while unescaping newlines. .4 makeshift optimiza- 
tion - copying streams line-by-line rather than character-by- 
character, and utilizing Gambit's undocumented function 
= = w i t e - s n b s t r i n g  - reduced the benchmark real running 
time from 25.6 sec down to 17.0 sec. 
6 Conclusions 
Implementation of a web app cation server an1 IVhlO de- 
coders in Scheme showed tha t  the language is up t o  the 
task. T h e  elegance of Scheme and its ability to easily express 
guarded execution, finite-state machines as sets of niutually 
recursive actions, hierarchical repositories with procedural 
bindings turned out  to be most important. Built-in garbage 
collection, iterators, safety, the ease of incremental testing 
cannot be overestimated either. Despite obvious inefficien- 
cics, so far overall hletcast server performance is deemed 
sat is fac tory by customers. 
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SUMMARY 
We suggest that empirical studies of maintenance are difficult to understand unless the context of the 
study is fully defined. We developed a preliminary ontology to identify a number of factors that influence 
maintenance. The purpose of the ontology is to identify factors that would affect the results of empirical 
studies. We present the ontology in the form of a UML model. Using the maintenance factors included in 
the ontology. we define two common maintenance scenarios and consider the industrial issues associated 
with them. Copyright 2 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 
KEY WORDS: empirical research: maintenance fxtors; maintenance scenarios: evolutionary maintenance: independent 
maintenance groups: maintenance ontolosy 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper arose from a discussion session held at the 3rd Annual Workshop on Empirical Studies 
of Software Maintenance ('WESS '98'). The task of the session was to consider the question 'What 
are the differences between maintenance tools/methods/skills and those of development?' From the 
point at which members of the group stated their preliminary positions, it was evident that we would 
find it difficult to give a single answer. The position statements ranged from what can be paraphrased 
as 'Nothing much' to -Lots of stuff.' 
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As the discussion continued. it became clear that our difficulties arose from our different views 
of what constituted 'maintenance'. We concluded that ~ v e  could not ansLver any serious questions 
about maintenance methods, tools or skills un t i l  u'e had a description of maintenance rich enough 
to encompass all our different esperiences of maintenance. i i ' e  concluded that \vhat we needed M ' ~ S  
an ontology of maintenance-that is. a spcci tication of a conceptualisation (Gruber. 1995). This 
ontology should not be only a hierarchy of teriiis. but a framework talking about the maint- Lnance 
domain and identifying the factors that affect maintenance. supported b- a tasonomy describing the 
different factor levels. 
We believe that such an ontology Lvould ha\.e four major benetits for the maintenance research 
community. It Lvould: 
1 .  allow researchers to providc a context within which specitic questions about maintenance can 
2. help to understand and resolve contradictor!, results observed in empirical studies: 
3. provide a standard frameuork to assist the reporting of empirical studies in a manner such 
1. provide a frameLvork for catqorising empirical studies and organising them into a body of 
be investigated: 
that they can be classified. understood and replicated: and 
knorvledsc. 
Furthermore. i f  \ve could report our rehearch results in a s>.stematic fashion. clarifying the contest 
to Lvhich the results apply. i t  v.wld also help industrial adoption of research results. 
In  Section 7. present an o\wvieiv of the ontology. In Section 3 \ve describe our proposed 
maintenance ontology in  more detail. In Section 4. \ve look at t\vo maintenance scenarios and 
consider hoLv the ontology ciin he used to help churucterise the difference bet\veen the scenarios. 
2. OVERVIEW 
de Almeida. de Menezes and da Rocha ( 199s) describe the process of constructing an ontology 
as involving the folloLving acti\.ities: 
0 purpose identification and requirement specification: 
ontology capture and formalisation: 
0 integration of existing ontologies: and 
0 ontology evaluation and documentation. 
KnoLvledge captured in an ontology is uv~a l l>  represented i n  a graphical notation. For instance. 
GLEO (Graphical Language for Expressing Ontologies) u'as used to describe a software process 
ontology (de Almeida. de Menezes and da Rocha. 1998). 
In this paper, we consider only a part of the ontology construction process. Lye consider only 
purpose identification and requirement specification and ontology capture. Moreover. since we do 
not intend to provide a formiil description. \ve present our ontology in a subset of UML (Unified 
Modelling Language) notation (Fotvler and Scott. I997 j instead of GLEO. UlIL has been used by 
other researchers to describe knoudedge. For example, Hasselbring ( 1999) used LiML to describe 
knoLvledge concerned u i t h  health care information systems. Since UhlL is a standard object- 
oriented notation. ive believe it  tvill  make our ideas more accessible to softivare engineering and 
1 0 8  
ONTOLOGY OF SOFTWARE >l.AISTES.ASCE 
Maintenance Activity Types Product 
Corrections 
New Requirements 
Implementation Changes  Composition 
Size 
%# Age 






Peopleware Process Organisation 
Skills Engineering Management 




Customer  and User #% 
software maintenance researchers. Furthermore. it is possible to improve the representation of the 
ontology at a later date by inserting the axioms needed to formalise the \vhole model. 
As a result of our discussions at the U'ESS 9s workshop. we identified a number of domain factors 
that we believe influence the maintenance process. Figure 1 sho\vs these factors and how they can 
be classified. Figure 1 \vas the I;tarting point for our ontology. Lvhich is described in more detail 
in Section 3. In order to describe empirical maintenance research. we believe that the maintenance 
factors must be specified. This tvi l l  allow rcsearchers to better understnnd the maintenance context 
and to plan the research needzd to investigate the relationships among these factors and the 
maintenance context. A better understanding of the relationships that exist between factors and 
context should lead both to improvements in the maintenance process and to the development of 
new research topics. 
The maintenance process describes holv to organise maintenance activities. It is similar to the 
software development process. hut the focus is on product correction and adaptation, not just 
on the transformation of requirements to soft\vare functionality. We take the same viewpoint 
when considering methods and tools. It is not usually necessary to define nen. methods or 
tools to accomplish maintenance activities: conventional software development tools are usually 
sufficient. However. the maintenance process detines hov. these methods and tools should be applied 
to maintenance activities. and tvhich skills and roles are necessary to carry out the activities. 
Previous research Lvork has considered the definition of methods (Karam and Casselman. 1993), 
process description (Pfleeger. 199s). softn.are environment ontology (de Almeida. de Menezes 
and da Rocha. 1998). and tool classification (Pressman. 1997). Although these research results 
considered the. softLvare development process as the basic framework. they are also useful in the 
context of the maintenance process. 
In order to understand the relationships among maintenance domain factors. ive need to specify 
each factor and define the impact that i t  has 011 maintenance activities. Nest. the relationships 
themselves can be captured and validated. Validation usually requires empirical studies and 
experiments. 
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Figure I has some similarities with the framework fc>r softtvarc maintenance suggested by 
orammer. HaLvorth. Sharp? and Hale ( 1992). They defined a fr3riien~ork based on fotir entities: pro= 
source code. ninintenance requirement and environment. They suggested that each of these basic 
entities in the framework interacted to a degree Lvith the other entities. Each of the entities and 
each combination of possible interactions contribute to a research area and detine the type of 
attributes that can be manipulated. For example. one area of research is source code attributes. 
and another is the interaction betivcen source code attributes and programmer attributes. They 
use the area.$ to classify existing research and discuss the \yay in which experiments aimed at 
considering interactions could be designed. In our antolopy. ~ ' e  have peneralised the concepts 
of maintenance requirement. soLirce code and prograrnnicr to maintenance activity. product. and 
maintenance engineer respectively. We ha1.e also introduced another concept: the maintenance 
orpnisation process. Fi.e have omitted an environment entit). because our more generalised concepts 
include enVi:onmental considerations. The main difference betivcen thc Habvorth. Sharpe and Halt 
frame\vork and our ontology is that they are concerned lvith the structure of empirical experiments. 
So. they are not concerned ivith the nature ofthe attribute.; attached to each of their entities. whereas 
our main concern is the attributes and the ivay in Lvhich thcy define the context of empirical research. 
3. THE 3IXINTENAiVCE ONTOLOGY 
3.1. Purpose specification and requirements specification 
Before di\cti.\sing our conceptualisation of the niainrencince domain. we need to consider the 
first >tag< of ontology development. u.hich is purpose specification and requirements specification. 
de .\lmeidJ. de hlenezes and da Rocha (19%) define the activity of purpose specification to be 
'to clearl). define it.; purpose and intended uses, that i \ .  the competence of the ontology'. The 
competenc! of th2 ontology identifies the questions the ontology is meant to anslver. 
In our case. the purpose of our ontolog\.. is to identifJ. contextual factors that influence the results 
of empirical studies of maintenance. For example. >uppose a researcher \yere investigating the 
inipiict on producti\.ity of new nuintenance tools but did not specify the experience of the tool users. 
In this case. i t  tvould be difticult for other researchers to replicate the study. or for practitioners to 
knon whzther or not the result\ \vex likely to appl!. in  their own situation. Furthermore. it is not 
just the experience of tool users tha: is likely to affect the study's results and their interpretation. 
Other factor;. that need to be specified include the type of product being maintained. and the type of 
maintenance tasks beinp performed. 
In obser\.ational studies of maintenance. researchers measure maintenance performance 
characteristics such as the quality of maintained product.;. or the productivity or efficiency of 
the maintenance process for different products or different maintenance activities. in  order to 
identify hon and uhy  these performance characteristic!, vary. In controlled experiments. researchers 
investigate the impact of one or niore factors that  they believe affect maintenance qualit? or 
productivit) by varying the factors in a systematic fashion. while controlling other factors. 
Thus. in order to Support empirical studies of both kind\. each factor in our ontology needs to 
ansiver the follon.ing conipetency question: 
lihiiltl inricitioiis iii tlii.rfiicror (i. c.. conc<pt) iiiji{reiicr etyiricyil stuclies rf 
iiiuiii rc,i i  L I I I L Y  prodi {ctii .f! qi it r 1 it), or cy]ic.inic:v ? 
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For the purposes of ontology capture. t i e  do not believe it  is neccssary to identify every possible 
interaction between maintenance factors and maintenance performance. However. \ye do need to 
present a reasoned argument explaining at least one interaction for each factor. This can also be 
regarded as a contribution to ontology e\duation. Any such explanation would depend on being 
able to identify the bvay in which each element can vary in different circumstances. This implies a 
second competency question: 
\Vhat is the nature of the variations in  this f x t o r ?  
This second question leads to preliminar!. taxonomies of maintenance elements. The tasonomy is 
also intended to help practitioners identify ahether or not empirical results are likely to be relevant to 
their specific maintenance situation. The tlvo competency questions already identified are sufficient 
to represent the viewpoint of practitioners as nel l  as researchers. 
Finally. u.e hoped that our tasonomy bvould also cast some light on our original workshop goal. 
which uas to consider the differences betlveen maintenance and development from the viewpoint 
of skill. tools and methods. This leads to a third and final competency question: 
To \!.hat extent do maintenance methods/tools/skillr differ from those of development? 
To address this question full;. u'e would need a s o f t ~ x e  process ontology as nell as a 
maintenance ontology. Thus. \ye have not addressed this competency question fully. We do, 
however. point out sorile of the differences we found betn.een our maintenance ontology and the 
de Almeida. de Menezes and da Rochn software process ontolosy, and identify some concepts that 
are of relevance only to maintenance. 
The follo\ving sections define our ontology. Because the domain is very complex, ive describz 
each main dimension shoLvn in Figure 1 separately. with the final integrated ontology shown later 
in Figure 7. I n  the next sections \ye present our ontology of softivare maintenance with definitions 
of all the main concepts (i.e., maintenance factors). Where possible. we make use of definitions and 
concepts used by de Almeida. de hlenezes and da Rocha ( 1995 ) in their software process ontology. 
iVe also consider the different properties of the maintenance factors that impact the maintenance 
proce.ss and can thus affect the results of empirical studies. 
3.2. Maintained product 
Figure 2 shows our product ontology. Table 1 defines the concepts used in the ontology. 
Characteristics of these elements that affect maintenance performance are discussed in the following 
sections. Note that in their software process ontology. de Almeida. de Menezes and da Rocha do not 
consider the relationship between the total product and its composite artefacts. 
3.2.2. Pi-odiict size 
The size of the product affects the number and o r p n i m i o n  of the staff needed to maintain it. 
Table 2 suggests a coarse-grain size nieasure for classification purposes. There are relationships 
I 
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The product is t h t  softtiare application. product or package thJ t  is undergoing 
modification. X p">dUCt is a conglonitrate of ;1 number of different artefacts. 
A change to the baseline product that irnpl2nients or document> a maintenance 
activity. An upgrade may bc. a new \ersion ot'the product. an object code patch, 
or a restriction notice. 
Artefacts that together correspond t o  ;I softuare product can be of the following 
types: document> that can be subdivided into ttstual and graphical documents. 
COTS products. anJ object code components. Testuol docunicnt. include source 
code listings. p l~n . ; .  design and reqtiircmcnti specitications. 
Tddc 3. ProJucr size 
Product size hlaintcncince team size 
s 171;11 I I person 
hlcdiurn 1 tea111 
Large bl ul t i ple teami 
between the size measure nnd ii1r:intenance team organiwion. For example, geographically 
distributed maintenance teams usually maintain large products. The size of the enhancements and 
the size of the product are likely to affect maintenance productivity. The larger the product the more 
likely i t  is that product knowledge will he spread unevenly among the maintenance staff, making 
it more difficult to diagnose the cause of some problems and identify all the modifications needed 
to support a large enhancement. In addition. when many people are Lvorkinp together on a large 
enhancement, there are more opportunities for misunderstandings that can lead to quality problems. 
Thus, maintenance activities on Ixge  products nu!. be less productive than maintenance activities 
on small products. 
3.2.3. Applimtioii donirriii 
Many researchers (e.g.. Mas\vell, v:m Wassenhove and Dutta, 1966) have observed major 
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productivity differences between products from different application domains. I\\.;. bclieve such 
differences apply to maintenance activities as well as development activities. In  addition. the 
application domain (e.g.. finance. telecommunications. command and control. etc.) places domain 
knowledge requirements on maintenance human resources. It also places constraints on the 
maintenance artefacts and product. For example. safety critical system maintenance must. at all 
cost, preserve software reliability requirements. whereas in the telewmmunications ivorld there is 
more emphasis on fast upgrades to software in order to minimise time to market. These different 
constraints mean that different aspects of mLiintenance performance are optiniised. 
3.2.4. Proclrrct cige 
The age of a product (i.e., the as? in years since first release) can affect maintenance in different 
ways: 
0 If the development technology is very old. it may be difficult to tind maintenance human 
resources Lvith skills in the old technology (hence. the practice of 'grey-sourcing' the 
maintenance of sonie products by bringing older programmers out of retirement ). I n  addition. 
it may be difficult to find support tools. such a i  compilers and static analysers. and support 
for the tools. 
0 If the product is old. it mriy be difticult to access the original developers or the original 
development documentation. This can lead to products or parts of products that no one 
understands well enough to change. 
Thus. in general we expect maintenance performance to be better for J'ounger than older products. 
3.2.5. Prodi r ct iiiatr r r-it! 
Product maturity is different from product age. I t  concerns the life cycle o f a  product after initial 
release. The basic phases in the life of a product and their relationship with maintenance tasks 
and user population are sumniariwl in Table 3, \vhich is similar to the life cycle described by 
Kung and Hsu ( I  998). The maintenance life cycle start5 at first release and ends uhen a product 
is withdrawn from use. I t  is important to note that large enhancements cause mini-cycles, \vhere 
a product can be forced back into periods of infancy and adolescence as a result of poor quality 
product releases. Table 3 suggests that the type of maintenance tasks undertaken by an organisation 
is related to the maturity o f a  product. as is the size of its user population. Note that a consideration of 
user population is irrelevant for some custom-built products that have a single client-single mission 
profile. 
3.2.6. Proclrrct cotnpositiori 
The level of abstraction of the component artefacts of a product affects the skills required by 
maintenance engineers and the tools they need to support them. If products are generated from 
designs. maintenance engineers need access to the code generation tools. If the product is composed 
of black box components (e.g.. a COTS product). maintenance engineers need integration skills 
rather than coding skills. 
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Tabl: 3. 3laintenance life cyck 
hlaintenance' task 
Life cycle stage prevalence User population 
Iiifmcy-afrtr release. initial users start reporting Correction5 Small 
Adulcicence-as the user population prows. defect Corrections. GroLving 
reports still predominate but there may he chmges to 
amend the system bch. A\ .' lour. 
Adulthood-the product is relutively dsfect free. but i f  
i t  is accepted by a uidc user population there \ \ i l l  be 
requests for new functionalit). In  addition. as change 
accurnulatg there ivill be a need to re\tructure part5 of 
the system to avoid design decay. so implementations 
changes to improve code structurct ma! be requird. 
Senility (Ie,oacy)-there are ncuer products available unJ  Corrections Declining 
only a feu. users remain to he supported. L'sually only 








3.2.7. Prodiict arid at-tefcict qimlit). 
The original software development p r o w s  and the quality of the product it  delivered place 
constraints on the subsequent maintenance process. In our experience i t  is easier to maintain a 
good quality product than a poor quality product. \\,here 'quality' includes issues such as product 
structure. documentation. and the quality of individual artefacts. Furthermore. the less contact a 
maintenance organisation h;ii uith the original s o f t n x e  developers. the more i t  is dependent on 
the availability of good quality documentation. bearins in mind that there are many different forms 
of documentation associated Lvith a softuare product. In terms of defining the impact of document 
quality on maintenance activities. we need to assess the extent to which documentation is: 
0 complete. 
0 accurate. and 
0 readable. 
For old products. documentation is often poor or non-existent. I n  such cases. maintenance 
engineers need specialised tools such as re-engineering tools. Thus, comparisons of maintenance 
performance across different products ~ v i l l  be of limited value unless it is clear that thz maintenance 
tool requirements of each product have been met to an equivalent degree. and that the quality of the 
component artefacts is comparable. 
3.3. hlaintenance activities 
Figure 3 shows our maintenance activity ontology. Lvhich is derived from de Almeida. de Menezes 
and da Rocha's software development activity ontology. We have amended that ontology to consider 
maintenance activities rather than softivarc construction activities. and have omitted elements that 
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do not have any m:ijor impact o n  maintenance performance. In particular. we have added the 
concept of an investisation activity. and. instead of having a con.rtruction activity. $ye have a 
maintenance activity. Furthermore. we have identified configuration management as one of the 
types of nianqement activity. IVe have also included the resource concept in this ontology. ivhereas 
de Alnieida. de Menezes and da Rocha (199s) had a separate resource ontology. Definitions of 
the elements in the ontology are given in Table 4. A discussion of the impact of the elements on 
maintenance performance follous. 
In our vieLv. one of the major differences between software development and software 
maintenance is that development is requirement-driven and niaintenance is event-driven. This means 
that the stimuli fix.. the inputs) that initiate a maintenance activity are unscheduled (random) events. 
Input events usually originate from the users (or client or customer) of the software application. 
but may also originate from niaintenance hunian resource (engineers or managers). Thus. the first 
activity needed by a maintenance process (after the administrative process of logging the event) is 
an investigation activity. whereby a maintenance engineer is assigned to assess the nature of event. 
which can be either a problem report or chanpe request. On completion of an investigation activity. 
maintenance managers must decide whether or not to proceed with a maintenance modification. 
This is discussed in more detail in Section 3.4.3. 
h,Iaintenance modifications are often referred to as corrective. adaptive or perfective following 
Swanson's typology (Snanson and Chapin. 1995). Hoivever. since identifying a modification as 
an adaptive or a perfective maintenance activity depends on the reason for the change. and not 
on an objective characteristic of the change. ive have used the follouing definition for types of 
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Table 4. hlainteiiance acrivity oiltology definitions 
Invcsrigation 




ac t ivi  t! 
Qua!it) 
assurance 
a d \  it! 
An action of one of the folloning types: an investisation activity. ;I modification 
activity. a management activith. o r  a quality aswrance activity. An activity may 
be mads up of a number of sub-activities. Usuallj. it takes as input one. or more 
csisting artifacts and outputs zero. onr‘ or many new or moditied artifact.,. 
An activity that assesses the impact of undertaking a modification arising from a 
c h q e  request or problem rcpnrt. 
A n  activity that takes one or more input artchcts and produces onz or more 
output artducts that. u.hen incorporated into an existing system. change its 
behaviour or implementation. 
An activity related to the maniigenicnt of the maintcniince process or to the 
configuration control of the maintuined product (see Figure 5 and Tuble 6). 
An activity aimed at ensuring that a modification activity does not damage the 
integrity of the product bring maintained. Quality asLirilncc activities may be 
cla,\itied as testing or ccrtitixtion activities (entity omitted from Figurcs 3 
and 7 ) .  
Everythins that is tised to p d o r m  an acti\.ity. Resources may be hardxire. 
snft\viire or human resource>. 
iiiaintmw;e changes: 
0 Coiwc.rioii.s that correct a defect-i.e.. a discrepancy between the required behaviour of a 
0 €iil:ciiic.c,iiieiit.r that implement a chanse to th2 system that changes the behaviour or 
proituct/application and the observed behrtviour. 
iniplmentation of the system. U‘e subdivide enhancements into three types: 
enhrtncements that change existing requirements, 
enhancements that add new system requirements. and 
etihancenient> that change the implementation but not the requirements. 
Broadl! ipeakinz. enhancements that are necessary to change existing requirements can be 
equated to SLvanson’s perfective niaintenance changes. Those that are necessary to add new 
requirements to a system can be equated to adaptive maintenance. Changes that do not affect 
requirements but only affect implementation might be referred to as preventive maintenance (by 
analogy to ivhat happens Lvhen you have your car serviced). Note that corrections may result in 
similar types of product modifications. but we do not feel that it is necessary to define correction 
subtypes. 
There i i  not a one-to-one relationship betLveen problem reports and corrective maintenance. 
Sometimei. thc ‘problems‘ noted by users are requests for behaviours that uere not originally 
required. In such cases. the problem report leads to an enhancement rather than a correction. It 
is important to determine uhether maintenance \vork is a correction or an enhancement because the 
activities are often budgeted separately. In fact. many of the disputes between the custorner/client 
and maintainers revolve around whether a change is a correction or an enhancement. If the 
customedclicnt did not fu l ly  and unambiguously define the required behaviour. it is often difficult 
to decide Lvhether a modification is a correction or an enhancement. 
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Characteristics of maintenance activities that affect the productivity and efficiency of maintenance 
activities include the size of the modification and the criticality of the modification. Large 
enhancements. particularly large enhancements of large products. are likely to require effort from 
several different maintenance engineers. and will thus incur coordination and communication 
overheads. Smaller enhancements that can be performed uithin schedule by one maintenance 
engineer are usually more productive. The Criticality of an enhancement or correction impacts 
the elapsed time it takes for the modification to be delivered to useis, since the scheduling of the 
modification n i l 1  be determined mainly by its criticality. 
To accomplish the different maintenance activities. maintenance engineers require different 
degrees of product understanding and different types of development tools. A corrective activity may 
require only the ability to locate faulty code and make localised changes. \vhereas an enhancement 
activity may require a broad understanding of a large part of the product (Singer. 1998). In the first 
case, a maintainer u i l l  require testing or simulation tools to recreate the problem and debugging 
tools to step through suspect code. In the second case. a maintainer's tool requirements n.ill 
depend on the quality of the development documentation. and the availability of the development 
environment. If the maintainer has poor documentation and little of the orisinal development 
environment. he/she may require re-engineering tools and/or code navigation and cross-referencing 
tools. 
The efficiency and quality of investigation activities depends on the niuintenance engineer 
knowing the current status of patches and planned modifications that apply to the part of the product 
involved with the new problem report or change request. The availability of such information 
depends on the effectiveness of the product contipration control and change control process. A 
good configuration control process is necessary to identify the stittiis of each product component. 
including information such as the currently applied patches. .A formal chang: control process might 
slow down the rate at which the maintenance process responds to input stimuli. but may improve 
the ability of the change control and maintenance processes to preserve the integrity of the product 
under maintenance and its constituent artefacts. 
3.4. Software maintenance process 
3.4. I .  7iro processes 
Within a software maintenance departnient. there are two different maintenance processes: 
0 the maintenance process used by individual maintenance engineers to implement a specific 
0 the organisation level process that manages the stream of maintenance requests from 
modification request. and 
customers/clients. users and maintenance en,' wwers. 
We consider both types of process separately. In order to use terminology similar to that used 
by de Alrneida. de Menezes and di\ Rocha ( 1998). v.e refer to our definition of the first process 
as the software maintenance procedure ontology (see Figure 4). de Almeids has no equivalent to 
the second process in his ontology. We refer to the second process as the maintenance organisation 
process (see Figure 5) .  
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Fiiiire 4. Thr tti(iI'tiruimce p'vcrc!iire otirolo~~ 
Table 5 .  hlaintenmce procedure ontology definitions 
Detelopment 
technology 
The rechnology used u.hen the product and i r i  constitucnr artefacts were 
originally constructed. for example. knotvledgc-based system technology. 
conventionril data processing technolog). The original d:vclopnient 
technology constrains the possible maintenance procedures. 
Thc philosophy adopted during the original construction of the maintained 
product. for esample. the object-oriented paradigm or procedural paradigm. 
The original paradigm constrains the possible maintenance procedures. 
The conduct folloived to pzrform an activity. A procedure may be classified 
as a method. ttchnique or script. A procedure may be adopted to perform a 
specirii activity from a set of possible procedures. 
h I t  thocl A systematic procedure defining steps and heuristics to permit the 
accomplishincnt of one or more activities. 
Script A guideline for con~tructin_E/amending a specific type of document. 




3.4.2. 5'ofnLw-e iiicliiiteiicIitce pi-ncedrire 
The sofnvare maintenance procedure ontolosy shonx in Figure 1 is used to modify one or more 
artefacts in order to irnplement a required softivare modification. The concepts sh0u.n in Fizure 4 arc 
defined in Table 5 .  The definitions have been adapted from de Almeida. de Menezes and da Rocha's 
definitions. 
Artefacts are not solely source and object code items. They comprise documents. system 
representations and plans. etc'.. constructed throughout the sohvare development process. and 
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modified during maintenance. .A variety of different scripts. methods and techniques are used to 
construct and modify such artefacts. and they are usually available to support maintm:ince activities. 
Maintenance activity performance Lvill be affected hy the choice o f  sof tnxe  development 
technology and development paradigm. It uill also be affected by the estent to Lvhich procedures 
are automated. In general. development technologies such as the development 1ungua:e and the 
development paradigm place constraints on maintenan<e activities. and skill requirements on 
maintenance human resources. The ISO/IEC 12207 Standard detines an 'activity' as a life cycle 
phase and a 'task' as something done a,$ part of an activity. Here tve are using only the term 
'activity'. but an activity can be decomposed into smaller activities. therefore capturing the ISO/IEC 
definitions. 
In addition, the chosen developnitnt technology may present a significant risk to product 
maintainabilitv. A software product cannot continue to be maintained if its development 
environment is not a\.ailable to its niaintainers. For products with a long lifetime it  is necessary 
to ensure that technologies such as compilers. code generators and CASE tools will themselves be 
supported rhroughout the estimated lifetime of the product. 
3.4.3. Mniiiteiiciricr orgciriisaticm pt-ocrsses 
Figure 5 sho\vs the maintenmce orgmisation proce Table 6 briefly defines t h t  concepts used 
in  the model. 
A maintenance organisation niiist hxidle a stream of maintenance requests from user?;. customer 
and maintainer3. Thus. a muijor r le i i im of 11 maintenance organisation is event management 
(Siessink and van \.'lict. 19'9s). Another rnrijor element of a maintenance organisation is 
configuration management. Conhpuration man:igement is thc process responsible for releasing new 
system versions and s!xem miendments to users. In addition. contiguration control systems need 
to protect the integrity of the product \\hen i t  is bcing niuditied. I n  particular. they need to ensure 
that maintenance engineers know the current repair st;itus of the product and product components. 
If the configuration control s> stem is inadequate. maintenance activities \vill be less efticient and 
there is a danger that product quality \\.ill be compromised. 
In addition. there needs to be a nimigenient process for authorising or rejecting modification 
activities after initial investigation of the trigger event. Thih is usually the responsibility of a change 
control board. The authorisation process may also include a process of negotiation with the client 
about contractual arrangements for implementing a required modification (e.g.. budgets/price and 
tinie-scales). Only after a proposed modification activitj is approved by the change control board 
and any necessary contractual arrangements are agreed ivith the client (\vhich. for applications like 
operating systems or self-standing procluct.s. may be the marketing department). \ \ i l l  the proposed 
modification activity be scheduled. A change control board can be organised as a formal process 
involving meetings betoten users and custoniers/clieiits and maintenance manapers. or as a simple 
working procedure. The level of formality can affect quality and efficiency. formal change control 
boards are likely to sloiv the ni:iinten;ince process but ;ire better able to protect the integrity of the 
product beins maintained. 
The efficiency of maintenance munrigement activitieh is Liffected by the use of support tools. 
Most organisations h a w  con l ipa t ion  control tools. There are also many tools to assist event 
management. For example. mrin): maintenance organisations use 'help' desk tools. tvhich allow 
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approvg! s c h w  \ \ 
I . \ 
Configuration Manzgernent 
Change Control 
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Maintenance organ,sa:ion 
h s  3' 
I EventManagemen; 1 v I I Main!enance 0rganisa:ion S:ructure 1 - 
events to be logged into an organisation and their progress tracked though the various maintenance 
tasks needed to resolve the event. Another type of tool that supports the interface bctween the user 
population and a maintenance orgnniiation is a 'kno\vn error log'. Lvhich identifies all currently 
knonm errors and their aorkarounds or fixes. 
The volume and type of maintenance requests affect the performance of the maintenance 
organisation. For example. if there are a large number of defects reported, there may be insufficient 
resources to undertake perfective or preventive modifications. 
Service level agreements define the maintenance organisation's performance t a r p s .  Differences 
in achieved performance level may. thtrefore. be due to different performance targets. Maintenance 
organisations must be engineered to meet their service level agreements. This is often done by 
separating various support activities into kvell-dqfined role, that can be performed by staff with 
specinlised skills. For example. man). maintenance organisations use the concept of support levels 
to separate staff. whose main concern is to support t h t  user population and those concerned with 
correcting or enhancing softuare. 
At its simplest there mu\'just be tnu support levels: 
0 Level I-this level provides the personnel n,ho staff the help desk. 
0 Level 2-this level provit1c.s the personnel n h o  make changes to software. 
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Table 6. 3laintenance organisation process ontology definitions 









An agreement between the providers of a maintenance service and the 
customers of a maintenance service that specifies the performance targets 
for the mainterinnce service. 
The process u3ed to manage the maintenance seriice (a5 opposed 
to the procedure used to manage individual maintenance requests). 
The organisation process is established and niaintAned by senior 
maintenance manager.;. It is responsible for defining the structure of 
the maintenance organisation such that i t  can fulrill its service level 
agreement. Maintenance management has three main concerns other rhnn 
the normal concerns of quality assurance and project niana=. O-nient: event 
management. configuration control. change control. 
Event management is the process responsible for handling the stream of 
events received by the maintenance organisation. 
Change control is the process responsible for evaluating the results of 
maintenance event investigations and deciding tvhether or not to approv? 
a product modification. 
Configuration management is responsible for maintaining t h t  integrity 
of the product i n  terms of its version and modification status. It is also 
responsible for the production of product u p p d e s .  
The roles undertaken by maintenance human resources in a mrintenance 
organisation i n  order to perform the required administrstive procedures. 
X problem report. or change request originating from a CUStOlii?r or user 
of the maintained produa or a member of the maintenance org-nisation. 
The outcome of investigating the cause and implications ofa in..: qmtenance 
event. 
However. at lcast three support levels is the more common situation: 
0 Level I-the help desk staff are non-technical. and arc responsible for logging problems and 
identifying the technical support person most likely to be able to assist a user. 
0 Level ?-the technical support personnel know how to communicate with users and 
understand their problems, and they can advise on workarounds and quick fixes. 
0 Level 3-the maintenance engineers are authorised to make chanses to the product. 
The separation of maintenance services across different service levels makes it clear that not all 
maintenance work results in product modification. Users may simply require advice about ho\v to 
use the product or how to circumvent a known problem with the product. The number of levels 
and the specific roles they support affect the performance of the maintenance service. For esample, 
if there are too many Ie;.els there may be an unacceptable delay in responding to certain types of 
maintenancc request. 
The other main role for a maintenance organisation is the planning and scheduling of maintenance 
releases. This involves identifying the content of difference releases and a release cycle that is 
appropriate to customer requirements. Factors such as the interval bztueen scheduled maintenance 
releases and the extent of change permitted to a product can have a significant impact on the quality 
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Product 
of the maintained product (Lehman. Perry and Ramil. 1998). The procedures for releasing object 
code fixes (for example. f ix  on fail, or periodic collated updates) can also affect product quality 
Wellor. 1953). 
3.5. Peopleware 
3.5.1. Th.0 groups 
Software production and maintenance are human intensive activities. Furthermore. they involve 
people working together i n  teams, which are in turn part of larger organisations. Thus, no complete 
description of factors affecting maintenance can ignore the human and social elements. There are 
two types of staff involved in a maintenance process: the staff in the maintenance organisation, and 
the staff in the customedclient organisation. Figure 6 shows our initial model of these factors. The 
definition of peopleware concepts is given in Table 7. 
3.5.2. Mci in tenciri ce orgat I isntioii st@ 
3.5.2.1. Srujjfatririufes. Staff attitudes and motivation are generally agreed to impact on the quality 
of any activity. In the area of software maintenance. problems with motivation are expected because 
software maintenance is often perceived to be of less importance and less kvell-rewarded than 
development. 
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The organisation or organisations that use thc maintaind prodt:;t and 
have a defined rtlationship n i t h  the niaintenance orgrtni4on. 
The organisation that niaintains thc. product or product>. 
Employees of the maintenance o r  client organisation. hlainienance 
organisation si.ift' can be classified as managers or cngineei.. (For 
simplicity u'e ha\ e omitted specialised Q.4 iraff \vho ma! be coi ;dered 
a special claj2; of engineer.) Employees of the client orgmissrion can 
be classified a5 users or custonicrs. XIanagers in the rnaixtnance 
organisation negotiate u i th customers to dcterminzl servi2e level 
agreements and ;om and scheduling of rcquireinent enhan;cmearj. 
Management often compounds attitude problems by: 
0 making maintenance work equivaltnt to a punishment. and 
0 assigning novices to maintenance ivork. 
This factor seems difficult to characterise. but is likely to have a major impact on the productivity 
and quality of maintenance activities and the extent to ivhich the maintenance staff is receptive to 
process chmge. 
3.5.2.2. S r a j  r-esponsibiliries. One area that seems to have a major impact oil the entire 
maintenance culture of an or,oanisation is nhether or not there is a strict separation between staff 
responsible for software development and those responsible for softivare maintenance. 
At one extreme. there is no real separation betneen development and maintenance. This seems 
to be associated with a particular type of product. i.e.. a product undergoing continual evolution 
that is released periodically to clients and users. The softnare developers incorporate corrective, 
perfective and preventive maintenance tasks into a process aimed at a continuing stream of planned 
enhancements. In such an environment there may be no practical difference between the tools and 
procedures iljed for 'development' and those used for 'maintenance'. Furthermore. the personnel 
themselves do not make any significant distinction bettveen development and maintenance. Lvhich 
reduces motivation problems. 
At the other extreme, there are maintenance organisations that are completely stparate from 
development departments. and indeed may not Lvork for the same company that develc7ped the code 
they maintain. In  such an environment. maintenance programmers may need specially designed 
tools to support their maintenance tasks. 
Another issue is uhether staff are responsible for the maintenance of a single product or group 
of products li.e.. a product portfolio). I t  is usual for an evolutionary style of development to be 
organised around a single product or product family. Lvhereas a separate mnintenunce group usually 
looks after a portfolio of differcnt product>. 
These art issues that should concern maintenance managers Lvhen service level agreements are 
defined. or xhen they are initially bidding for a maintenance contract. 
1 2 3  
B. A. KITCHEKHXM ETAL.  
3.5.2.3. SraffSkills. In general. the more skilled the maintenance staff. the better the productivity 
and quality of maintenance activities. Different activities require different skills. so these factors 
need to be controlled or specified during empirical studies of maintenance activities. 
3.5.3. Cirstonier mid user stnf 
Customer and user issues that affect maintenance are: 
The size of the user population. which affects the amount of \vork required to support a 
particular application. 
The variability of the user population, which affects the scope of maintenance tasks. The more 
varied the user population, the more varied the problems they will encounter and refer to the 
maintenance staff. 
Whether or not the client and maintenance organisation are pan of the same company. 
Relationships between client and maintenance group may be less co-operative if the groups 
are from different companies. 
The extent to which the customer/client and users have common goals. Customers/clients 
fund maintenance activities. If they do not understand the requirements of the real users, they 
ma? impose inapproprim servicz level agreements. to the detriment of the product users who 
will in turn become less satisfed nith the maintenance organisation. 
4. TWO i$IAINTENAYCE SCENARIOS 
4.1. Organisation distinction 
Figure 7 shous the full maintenance ontology. In this section, we use this ontology to specify t\vo 
different maintenance scenarios. Staff responsibility seems to be one of the most important factors 
in the above ontology. Our discussion at the WESS workshop continually returned to the issue of 
whether or not the maintainers and software developers \yere the same people. 
Therefore. in this section, \ye define two maintenance scenarios based on this distinction: 
0 Evolutionary development, and 
0 Independent maintenance organisation. 
We show how the factors identified in  the ontology differ in the two scenarios. In addition, we 
consider for each the related industrial concerns. 
4.2. Evolutionary development 
Table 8 specifies the evolutionary development scenario. In this maintenance scenario. 
practitioners are often concerned with optimisins the evolutionary process. Particular concerns 
i nc 1 ude : 
0 optimisation (and/or minimisation) of inter-release intervals, 
0 prediction of release qu;llity/reliability, 
Copyright C 1999 John " i t q  gL Son.<. Ltd. J.  Sofin\: .\.fnitir: Res. Pnicr. 11. 365-359 (1999) 
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Types of maintenance 
Customer and user types 
Document quality 
Rlaintenmce engineers are responsible both for producing new product 
upgrades and fcx correcting problem.; i n  past rc1eust.s. Staff are 
r e s p o n d k  for the evolution of a single product or product family. 
Ustiall> large. Esamples: Space Shuttle. hlicrosoft LVord. ICL VME 
Operating s> stem. Yoti. houever. large products often encourage 
small companies to produce small add-on products. These small 
proclucts track tli: evolution of larger product\. For euample PKZIP 
tools have evolved i n  line ivith Microsoft products from DOS to 
LikIou.s 3.1 to LVindoivs 9s. 
The msint-nance and development technologies arz identical. 
hlainrcnance activities do not require additional staff skills or tools. 
Application donlain knou ledge is required both for niaintenance and 
development. 
.As the product age\. the original softuare developer\ will move to 
other jobs i o  so ix  expertise is lost. However. there is also some 
continuity rebulting from the overlap between older stuff Ieavinp and 
new staff joinins the group. 
The impact of niaturity on an evolving product depends on the client 
and user pnpulxion. For shrink-wrapped products. there is a danger 
that ~i i~int t iunce rqussts arising from a large user population will 
interfere u i th enhznc'eiiient activities. For esaniple. defect reports 
arising from rele2.e / i  \ \ i l l  be received during the development of 
relca.\e I I  - 1. Thi> can he even niore complicated i f  different clients 
do nor tippcle i n  the s m e  time scale. so some client u i l l  be reporting 
Je fec t~  tvith relcu\e / I  - 2 ahile others are reporting problems with 
release / i  - I .  I f  on- product release is of particularly poor quality. 
i t  ma> gensrdtc enough defect reports to prevent software developers 
u.orkins on the n-xr planned release. For ctistoni products. such as 
the Spc'e Shuttle. releases are co-ordinated with the specific client 
activities so there is less of a problem. 
The niana,oeiiient v:ill need to provide a means to administer the 
streaiii of defect reports from users. Release schedules are based 
on prioritiiing cti,tonier requirements. Enhancements are funded 
either by clients (malogous to development projects). or licensing 
apxriient, or product sales. Licensing agreements or product sales 
usually covers maintenance costs. 
Support Iev:ls are often used to separate software developers from 
support staff ivho invrface with users. 
Staff regard themsslves as softtvare engineers rather than developers 
and maintainers so there are less likely to be problems motivating staff. 
All enhancement activitieb are referred to as evolutionary develop- 
ment. 
See product marurit\. 
I n  prinLiple. the original softivarct documentation would continue to be 
updated as part of ths evolutionary release cycle. However. in practice 
this nould depend on the organisational culture and manapnent 
practises. 
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Types of maintenance 
Customer and user types 
Document quality 
Maintenance engineers are responsible for produsing product 
upgrades that may include changes due to enhancements and 
corrections of maintenance tasks. They ivill usually not have 
been involved in  original product development. Staft' is usually 
responsible for a portfolio of products. 
individual elements i n  a portfolio \vill be of different sizes. 
Usually different products in  different portfolios will have 
been produced using different technologies. The maintenance 
organisation will often need to support many different technologies 
although the technologies. required by an individual maintainer 
will usually be restricted. 
If  the portfolio of products is ver! diverse. i t  will be difficult 
to ensure that all maintenance staff hake appropriate domain 
knowledge. 
Different products will have different ages. This makes the 
maintenance of portfolios complex and pluming and costing 
maintenance activities difficult. 
Different products \vill have different levels of maturity. 
The management \ \ i l l  nerd to provide a means to administer the 
stream of defect reports from users. They nted fairly complex 
estimating and risk management procedures to cope \vith the 
complexity inherent i n  administering portfolios. This trill be less 
formal if the client and maintenance group aork for the same 
company. Relationships uith customers are usually mandated 
by a service agreement. although adaptive maintenance may be 
managed like a development project. 
Support levels are often used to separate softivare developers from 
support staff who interface u i t h  users. 
Motivation is likely to be particularly important in maintenance 
groups. 
All the standard types of maintenance are performed. 
There seem to be two different scenarios: One client-many users. 
e.g. in-house support groups. Many Clients-many users. e.g. a 
third party maintenance shop. Note that in some cases the number 
of items in the portfolio is important. Some maintenance shops 
support one large custoni product in  each client portfolio. e.g. 
Deplmment of Defense i n  the U.S.4.  
This is a critical issue for third party maintenance shops since 
they seldom have any access to software developers. For in-house 
support groups i t  may be lcss of a problem because they may have 
access to the original developers. 
Copyright C, 1999 John W i k y  & Sons. Ltd 
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0 effort estimation for individual enhancement projects. and 
0 planning functional contents of releases to minimise the risk of destabilising the product while 
achieving customer/client required functionality. 
Another important concern is the impact of new development paradigms on system evolution. 
e.g., RAD products, COTS-based products and object-oriented products. 
4.3. Independent maintenance group 
Table 9 specifies the independent maintenance group scenario. In this scenario, industry concerns 
differ according to whether or not the maintenance ‘shop’ is in-house or a third-party organisation. In 
particular, third-party organisations have concerns about bidding for maintenance contracts (in terms 
of estimation processes and accuracy and risks), that are less important for in-house maintenance 
groups (unless they are candidates for outsourcing). Furthermore. outsourcing organisations- 
particularly those that takeover in-house organisations-have major management concerns about 
the issues of achieving a common organisational culture and changing the u.orking methods of 
organisations they absorb (Tittle. 1998; Ketler and Willems, 1999). 
All types of maintenance group have concerns about maintenance task estimating and planning 
and improving efficiency of maintenance activities. An important issue for such organisations 
is the need for re-engineering methods and tools to address the problem of lack of adequate 
specification/design documentation in older products. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has presented an ontology of software maintenance aimed at assisting researchers to 
report sufficient contextual detail for other researchers and practitioners to understand the results 
of empirical studies. We developed the ontology from our personal experiences of the maintenance 
process and have discussed two different maintenance scenarios in terms of the ontology. Figure 7 
summarises the ontology, modelled in UML. 
One of the problems with the model is that competency questions provide a criterion for inclusion 
of a factor in the model, but they do not provide completion criteria. nor do they provide any concept 
of relative importance. Thus, the elements identified in the model are things that a researcher needs 
to report when describing empirical studies. but there may be other factors we have not included. 
We must emphasise that, even using this ontology as a guide. it is still the responsibility of the 
individual researcher to attempt to identify any special conditions that apply to hisher results. 
Formally, the ontology presented in this paper is not complete. i i k  have not attempted to formalise 
the ontology using predicate logic. nor have we fully evaluated it. Furthermore. since we are not 
attempting to integrate our ontolo,ay into a knowledge-based system. we do not believe such a 
formalisation is necessary. In its current form, we believe the ontology provides useful insights 
into the type of information researchers should report if ~ v e  are to understand fully the results of 
empirical studies of maintenance. Only if the software maintenance community were considering 
a large-scale database to register empirical research results. would a forrnalised, fully-evaluated 
ontology be necessary. 
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Abstract 
This paper addresses the problem of how to produce reliable software that is also flexible and cost 
effective for the DoD distributed software domain. DoD s o h a r e  systems fall into two 
categories: information systems and war fighter systems. Both types of systems can be distributed, 
heterogeneous and network-based, consisting of a set of components running on different 
platforms and working together via multiple communication links and protocols. We propose to 
tackle the problem using prototyping and a “wrapper and glue” technology for interoperability 
and integration. This paper describes a distributed development environment, CAPS (Computer- 
Aided Prototyping System), to support rapid prototyping and automatic generation of wrapper 
and glue software based on designer specifications. The CAPS system uses a fifth-generation 
prototyping language to model the communication structure, timing constraints, I/O control, and 
data buffering that comprise the requirements for an embedded software system. The language 
supports the specification of hard real-time systems with reusable components from domain 
specific component libraries. CAPS has been used successfully as a research tool in prototyping 
large war-fighter control systems (e.g. the command-and-control station, cruise missile flight 
control system, missile defense systems) and demonstrated its capability to support the 
development of large complex embedded software. 
1 .  Introduction 
DoD software systems are currently categorized into Management Information Systems (MIS) 
and War Fighterkmbedded Real-time Systems. Both types of systems can be distributed, 
heterogeneous and network-based, consisting of a set of subsystems, running on different 
platforms that work together via multiple communication links and protocols. This paper 
addresses the problem of how to produce reliable software that is also flexible and cost effective 
for the DoD distributed software system domain, as depicted in the shaded area in Figure 1. 
* This research was supported in part by the U. S. Army Research Office under contractfpnt number 
35037-MA and 40473-MA. 
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Figure 1. DoD Computer-based systems 
Many DoD information systems are COTS/GOTS based (commercial/govemment off-the-shelf, 
including “legacy systems”). While using individual COTS/GOTS components saves DoD money, 
it shifts problems fiom software development to software integration and interoperability. It is a 
common belief that interoperability problems are caused by incompatible interface and data 
formats, and can be fixed “easily” using interface converters and data formatters. However, the 
real challenges in fixing interoperability problems are incompatible data interpretations, 
inconsistent assumptions, requirement extensions triggered by global integration issues, and timely 
data communication between components. Many DoD information systems, especially C4ISR 
systems, operate under tight timing constraints. Builders of COTS/GOTS based systems have no 
control over the network on which components communicate. They have to work with available 
infrastructure and need tools and methods to assist them in making correct design decisions to 
integrate COTS/GOTS components into a distributed network based system. Similar integration 
and interoperability problems are common in the commercial sector, and real-time issues are a 
growing concern. For example, just-in-time manufacturing, on-demand accounting, and factory 
automation all involve timing requirements. Although software engineers have more control over 
interfaces and data compatibility between individual components of war fighter systems, they 
encounter similar data communication problems when they need to connect these components via 
heterogeneous networks. 
We can tackle the problem using prototyping and a “wrapper and glue” technology for 
interoperability and integration. Our approach is based on a distributed architecture where 
components collaborate via message passing over heterogeneous networks. It uses a generic 
interface that allows system designers to specify communication and operating requirements 
between components as parameters, based on properties of COTS/GOTS components. A separate 
parameterized model of network characteristics constrains the concrete “glue” software generated 
for each node. The model enables partial specification of requirements by the system designers, 
and allows them to explore design alternatives and determine missing parameters via rapid 
prototyping. 
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2. The Wrapper and Glue Approach 
The cornerstone of our approach is automatic generation of wrapper and glue software based on 
designer specifications. This software bridges interoperability gaps between individual 
COTWGOTS components. Wrapper software provides a common message-passing interface for 
components that frees developers fiom the error prone tasks of implementing interface and data 
conversion for individual components. The glue software schedules time-constrained actions and 
carries out the actual communication between components. (See Figure 2) 
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Figure 2 .  The wrapper and.glue software 
Our glue-and-wrapper approach uses rapid prototyping and automated software synthesis to 
improve reliability. It differs from proxy and broker patterns in the object-oriented design 
literature [4] in that it provides a formal model to support hardware/software co-design. Existing 
pattern approaches focus on low level data transfer issues. Our approach allows system designers 
to concentrate on the difficult interoperability problems and issues, while freeing them fiom 
implementation details. Prototyping with engineering decision support can help identify and 
resolve requirements conflicts and semantic incompatibilities. 
Glue code works on two levels. It controls the orderly execution of components within a 
subsystem, and ensures the timely delivery of information between components across a network. 
Automated generation of glue code depends on automated local and distributed scheduling of 
actions on heterogeneous computing platforms. Identifying timing constraint conflicts and 
assessing constraint feasibility are critical in designing and constructing real-time software quickly. 
Checking whether a set of timing and task precedence constraints can be met on a chosen 
hardware configuration is known to be a difficult problem. Computer aid is needed in tackling 
such problem. 
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3 .  The Computer Aided Prototyping System (CAPS) 
The value of computer aided prototyping in software development is clearly recognized. It is a 
very effective way to gain understanding of the requirements, reduce the complexity of the 
problem and provide an early validation of the system design. Bernstein estimated that for every 
dollar invested in prototyping, one can expect a $1.40 return within the life cycle of the system 
development [ 11. To be effective, prototypes must be constructed and modified rapidly, 
accurately, and cheaply [8]. Computer aid for rapidly and inexpensively constructing and 
modifling prototypes makes it feasible [lo]. The Computer-Aided Prototyping System (CAPS), a 
research tool developed at the Naval Postgraduate School, is an integrated set of software tools 
that generate source programs directly from high level requirements specifications [7] (Figure 3). 
It provides the following kinds of support to the prototype designer: 
(1) timing feasibility checking via the scheduler, 
(2) consistency checking and automated assistance for project planning, configuration 
management, scheduling, designer task assignment, and project completion date 
estimation via the Evolution Control System, 
(3) computer-aided design completion via the editors, 
(4) computer-aided software reuse via the software base, and 
( 5 )  automatic generation of wrapper and glue code. 
The efficacy of CAPS has been demonstrated in many research projects at the Naval Postgraduate 
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3.1 Overview of the Caps Method 





construction, execution, and requirements evaluatiodmodification (Figure 4). 





Figure 4. Iterative Prototyping Process in CAPS 
The initial prototype design starts with an analysis of the problem and a decision about which 
parts of the proposed system are to be prototyped. Requirements for the prototype are then 
generated, either informally (e.g. English) or in some formal notation. These requirements may be 
refined by asking users to verify their completeness and correctness. 
After some requirements analysis, the designer uses the CAPS PSDL editor to draw dataflow 
diagrams annotated with nonprocedural control constraints as part of the specification of a 
hierarchically structured prototype, resulting in a preliminary, top-level design free from 
programming level details. The user may continue to decompose any software module until its 
components can be realized via reusable components drawn from the software base or new atomic 
components. 
This prototype is then translated into the target programming language for execution and 
evaluation. Debugging and modification utilize a design database that assists the designers in 
managing the design history and coordinating change, as well as other tools shown in Figure 3. 
3.2 CAPS as a Requirements Engineering Tool 
The requirements for a software system are expressed at different levels of abstraction and with 
different degrees of formality. The highest level requirements are usually informal and imprecise, 
but they are understood best by the customers. The lower levels are more technical, precise, and 
better suited for the needs of the system analysts and designers, but they are fiuther removed from 
the user’s experiences and less well understood by the customers. Because of the differences in the 
kinds of descriptions needed by the customers and developers, it is not likely that any single 
representation for requirements can be the “best” one for supporting the entire software 
development process. CAPS provides the necessary means to bridge the communication gap 
between the customers and developers. The CAPS tools are based on the Prototype System 
Description Language (PSDL), which is designed specifically for specifjmg hard real-time 
systems [5, 61. It has a rich set of timing specification features and offers a common baseline from 
which users and software engineers describe requirements. The PSDL descriptions of the 
prototype produced by the PSDL editor are very formal, precise and unambiguous, meeting the 
needs of the system analysts and designers. The demonstrated behavior of the executable 
prototype, on the other hand, provides concrete information for the customer to assess the 
validity of the high level requirements and to refme them if necessary. 
3.3 CAPS as a System Testing and Integration Tool 
Unlike throw-away prototypes, the process supported by CAPS provides requirements and 
designs in a form that can be used in construction of the operational system. The prototype 
provides an executable representation of system requirements that can be used for comparison 
during system testing. The existence of a flexible prototype can significantly ease system testing 
and integration. When final implementations of subsystems are delivered, integration and testing 
can begin before all of the subsystems are complete by combining the final versions of the 
completed subsystems with prototype versions of the parts that are still being developed. 
3.4 CAPS as an Acquisition Tool 
Decisions about awarding contracts for building hard real-time systems are risky because there is 
little objective basis for determining whether a proposed contract will benefit the sponsor at the 
time when those decisions must be made. It is also very difficult to determine whether a delivered 
system meets its requirements. CAPS, besides being a useful tool to the hard real-time system 
developers, is also very useful to the customers. Acquisition managers can use CAPS to ensure 
that acquisition efforts stay on track and that contractors deliver what they promise. CAPS 
enables validation of requirements via prototyping demonstration, greatly reducing the risk of 
contracting for real-time systems. 
3.5 A Platform Independent User Interface 
The current CAPS system provides two interfaces for users to invoke different CAPS tools and to 
enter the prototype specification. The main interface (Figure 5)  was developed using the TAE+ 
Workbench [ 113. The Ada source code generated automatically from the graphic layout uses 
libraries that only work on SUNOS 4.1 .X operating systems. The PSDL editor (Figure 6),  which 
allows users to specify the prototype via augmented dataflow diagram, was implemented in C t t  
and can only be executed under SUNOS 4.1.X environments. A portable implementation of the 
CAPS main interface and the PSDL editor was needed to allow users to use CAPS to build PSDL 
prototypes on different platforms. We choose to overcome these limitations by reimplementing 
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the main interface (Figure 7) and the PSDL editor (Figure 8) using the Java programming 
language [2]. 
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Figure 7. Main Interface of the new CAPS Figure 5 .  Main Interface of CAPS Release 2.0 
Figure 6. PSDL Editor of CAPS Release 2.0 Figure 8. PSDL Editor of the new CAPS 
The new graphical user interface, called the Heterogeneous Systems Integrator (HSI), is similar to 
the previous CAPS. Users of previous CAPS versions will easily adapt to the new interface. There 
are some new features in this implementation, which do not affect the functionality of the 
program, but provide a friendlier interface and easier use. The major improvement is the addition 
of the tree panel on the left side of the editor. The tree panel provides a better view of the overall 
prototype structure since all of the PSDL components can be seen in a hierarchy. The user can 
navigate through the prototype by clicking on the names of the components on the tree panel. 
Thus, it is possible to jump to any level in the hierarchy, which was not possible earlier. 
4. A Simple Example: Prototyping a C31 Workstation 
To create a first version of a new prototype, users can select “New” from the “Prototype” pull- 
down menu of the CAPS main interface (Figure 9). The user will then be asked to provide the 
name of the new prototype (say “c3i-system”) and the CAPS PSDL editor will be automatically 
invoked with a single initial root operator (with a name same as that of the prototype). 
t TRANS 
Enter Prototype Name : , 2”COMPJ 
Ic3i-system I 
Figure 9. Creating a new prototype called C3I-System 
CAPS allows the user to specify the requirements of prototypes as augmented dataflow graphs. 
Using the drawing tools provided by the PSDL editor, the user can create the top-level dataflow 
diagram of the c3i-system prototype as shown in Figure 10, where the c3i-system prototype is 
modeled by nine modules, communicating with each other via data streams. To model the 
dynamic behavior of these modules, the dataflow diagram is augmented with control and timing 
constraints. For example, the user may want to specify that the weapons-interface module has a 
maximum response time of 3 seconds to handle the event triggered by the arrival of new data in 
the weapon-status-data stream, and it only writes output to the weapon-emep stream if the 
status of the weapon-status-data is damage, service-required, or out-of-ammunition. CAPS 
allow the user to specify these timing and control constraints using the pop-up operator property 
menu (Figure 1 l), resulting in a top-level PSDL program shown in Figure 12. 
To complete the specification of the c3i-system prototype, the user must specifL how each 
module will be implemented by choosing the implementation language for the module via the 
operator property menu. The implementation of a module can be in either the target programming 
language or PSDL. A module with an implementation in the target programming language is 
called an atomic operator. A module that is decomposed into a PSDL implementation is called a 
composite operator. Module decomposition can be done by selecting the corresponding operator 
in the tree-panel on the left side of the PSDL editor. 
CAPS supports an incremental prototyping process. The user may choose to implement all nine 
modules as atomic operators (using dummy components) in the first version, so as to check out 
the global effects of the timing and control constraints. Then, he/she may choose to decompose 
the commsjnterface module into more detailed subsystems and implement the sub-modules with 
reusable components, while leaving the others as atomic operators in the second version of the 
prototype, and so on. 
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Figure 10. Top-level Dataflow Diagram of the c3i-system. 
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Figure 12. Top-level Specification of the c3i-system 
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To facilitate the testing of the prototypes, CAPS provides the user with an execution support 
system that consists of a translator, a scheduler and a compiler. Once the user finishes specifymg 
the prototype, he/she can invoke the translator and the scheduler from the CAPS main interface 
to analyze the timing constraints for feasibility and to generate a supervisor module for each 
subsystem of the prototype in the target programming language. Each supervisor module 
consists of a set of driver procedures that realize all the control constraints, a high priority task 
(the static schedule) that executes the time-critical operators in a timely fashion, and a low 
priority dynamic schedule task that executes the non-time-critical operators when there is time 
available. The supervisor module also contains information that enables the compiler to 
incorporate all the software components required to implement the atomic operators and 
generate the binary code automatically. The translator/scheduler also generates the glue code 
needed for timely delivery of information between subsystems across the target network. 
For prototypes which require sophisticated graphic user interfaces, the CAPS main interface 
provides an interface editor to interactively sculpt the interface. In the c3i-system prototype, we 
choose to decompose the comms-interface, the track-database-manager and the user-interface 
modules into subsystems, resulting in hierarchical design consisting of 8 composite operators and 
twenty-six atomic operators. The user interface of the prototype has a total of 14 panels, four of 
which are shown in Figure 13. The corresponding Ada program has a total of 10.5K lines of 
source code. Among the 10.5K lines of code, 3.5K lines comes from supervisor module that was 
generated automatically by the translator/scheduler and 1.7K lines that were automatically 
generated by the interface editor [9]. 
5 .  Conclusion 
CAPS has been used successfully as a research tool in prototyping large war-fighter control 
systems (e.g. the command-and-control station, cruise missile flight control system, missile 
defense systems) and demonstrated its capability to support the development of large complex 
embedded software. Specific payoffs include: 
(1) Formulate/validate requirements via prototype demonstration and user feedback 
(2) Assess feasibility of real-time system designs 
(3) Enable early testing and integration of completed subsystems 
(4) Support evolutionary system development, integration and testing 
(5) Reduce maintenance costs through systematic code generation 
(6) Produce high quality, reliable and flexible software 
(7) Avoid schedule overruns 
In order to evaluate the benefits derived from the practice of computer-aided prototyping within 
the software acquisition process, we conducted a case study in which we compared the cost (in 
dollar amounts) required to perform requirements analysis and feasibility study for the c3i system 
using the 2167A process, in which the software is coded manually, and the rapid prototyping 
process, where part of the code is automatically generated via CAPS [3]. We found that, even 
under very conservative assumptions, using the CAPS method resulted in a cost reduction of 
$56,300, a 27% cost saving. Taking the results of this comparison, then projecting to a mission 
control software system, the command and control segment (CCS), we estimated that there would 
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be a cost saving of 12 million dollars. Applying this concept to an engineering change to a typical 
component of the CCS software showed a further cost savings of $25,000. 
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Figure 13. User Interface of the c3i-system 
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Abstract 
Current early risk assessment techniques rely on subjective human judgments and 
unrealistic assumptions such as fixed requirements and work breakdown structures. This is a 
weak approach because different people could arrive at different conclusions from the same 
scenario even for projects with a stable and well-defined scope, and such projects are rare. This 
paper introduces a formal model to assess the risk and the duration of software projects 
automatically, based on objective indicators that can be measured early in the process. The 
model has been designed to account for significant characteristics of evolutionary software 
processes, such as requirement complexity, requirement volatility and organizational efficiency. 
The formal model based on these three indicators estimates the duration and risk of evolutionary 
software processes. The approach supports (a) automation of risk assessment and, (b) early 
estimation methods for evolutionary software processes. 
1. Introduction 
Software applications have grown in size and complexity covering many human activities of 
importance to society. The report of the President s Information Advisory Committee calls 
software the new physical infrastructure of the information age . Unfortunately, the ability to 
build software has not increased proportionately to demand [Hall, 1997. pp xv], and shortfalls in 
this regard are a growing concern. According to the Standish group, in 1995 84% of software 
projects finished over time or budget, and $80 billion - $100 billion is spent annually on 
cancelled projects in the US. Developing software is still a high-risk activity. 
There have been many approaches to improving this situation, mostly focused on increasing 
productivity via improvements in technology or management. Although better productivity is 
certainly welcome, closer examination shows that these efforts address only half of the problem. 
A project gets over time or over budget if actual performance does not match estimates. Current 
estimation techniques are far from reliable, and tend to systematically produce overly optimistic 
estimates. More accurate early estimates could help reduce wasted resources associated with 
overruns and cancelled projects in two ways: if costs are known to be too high at the outset, the 
scope of the project could be reduced to enable completion within time and budget, or it could 
be cancelled before it starts, and instead the resources could be used to successfully complete 
other feasible projects. 
This paper therefore focuses on improved risk assessment for software projects. We address 
project risks related to schedule and budget, and focus mostly on completion time of the project. 
Current risk assessment standards are weak because they rely on subjective human expertise, 
assume frozen requirements, or depend on metrics difficult to measure until it is too late. This 
paper describes a formal risk assessment model based on metrics and sensitive to requirements 
volatility. Further details can be found in [Nogueira 20001. The model is specially suited for 
evolutionary prototyping and incremental sokware development. 
Section 2 defines the problem we are addressing. Section 3 analyzes relevant previous work. 
Section 4 presents and evaluates our project risk model. Section 5 outlines how systematic risk 
assessment fits into iterative prototyping. Section 6 concludes. 
This research was supported in part by the U. S. Army Research Office under contracdgrant number 1 4 5  1 
35037-MA and 40473-MA, and in part by DARPA under contract #99-F759. 
2. The Problem 
As the range and complexity of computer applications have grown, the cost of software 
development has become the major expense of computer-based systems [Boehm 198 I], 
[Karolak 19961. Research shows that in private industry as well as in government environments, 
schedule and cost overruns are tragically common [Luqi 1989, Jones 1994, Boehm 19811. 
Despite improvements in tools and methodologies, there is little evidence of success in 
improving the process of moving from the concept to the product, and little progress has been 
made in managing software development projects [Hall, 19971. Research shows that 45 percent 
of all the causes for delayed software deliveries are related to organizational issues 
[vanGenuchten 19911. A study published by the Standish Group reveals that the number of 
software projects that fail has dropped from 40% in 1997 to 26% in 1999. However, the 
percentage of projects with cost and schedule overruns rose from 33% in 1997 to 46% in 1999 
[Reel 19991. 
Despite the recent improvements introduced in software processes and automated tools, risk 
assessment for software projects remains an unstructured problem dependent on human 
expertise [Boehm 1988, Hall 19971. The acquisition and development communities, both 
governmental and industrial, lack systematic ways of identifying, communicating and resolving 
technical uncertainty [SEI 19961. 
This paper explores ways to transform risk assessment into a structured problem with 
systematic solutions. Constructing a model to assess risk based on objectively measurable 
parameters that can be automatically collected and analyzed is necessary. Solving the risk 
assessment problem with indicators measured in the early phases would constitute a great 
benefit to software engineering. In these early phases, changes can be made with the least 
impact on the budget and schedule. The requirements phase is the crucial stage to assess risk 
because: a) it involves a huge amount of human interaction and communication that can be 
misunderstood and can be a source of errors; b) errors introduced at this phase are very 
expensive to correct if they are discovered late; c) the existence of software generation tools can 
diminish the errors in the development process if the requirements are correct; and d) 
requirements evolve introducing changes and maintenance along the whole life cycle. 
Part of the problem is misinterpreting the importance of risk management. It is usually and 
incorrectly viewed as an additional activity layered on the assigned work, or worse, as an 
outside activity that is not part of the software process [Hall 1997, Karolak 19961. One of the 
goals of our research is to integrate a risk assessment model with previous research on CAPS’ at 
NPS [Ham 991. This integration is required in order to capture metrics automatically in the 
context of a modem evolutionary prototyping and software development process. This should 
provide project managers with a more complete tool that can enable improved risk assessment 
without interfering with the work of a project s software engineers. 
A second source of problems in risk management is the lack of tools [Karolak 19961. The 
main reason for this lack of tools is that risk assessment is apparently an unstructured problem. 
To systematize unstructured problems it is necessary to define structured processes. Structured 
processes involve routine and repetitive problems for which a standard solution exists. 
Unstructured processes require decision-making based on a three-phase method (intelligence, 
design, choice) [Turban et a1 19981. An unstructured problem is one in which none of the three 
phases is structured. Current approaches to risk management are highly sensitive to managers 
perceptions and preferences, which are difficult to represent by an algorithm. Depending on the 
decision-maker’s attitude towards risk, he or she can decide early with little information, or can 
postpone the decision, gaining time to obtain more information, but losing some control. 
A third source of risk management problems is the confusion created by the informal use of 
terms. Often, the software engineering community (and most parts of the project management 
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CAPS stands for Computer Aided Prototyping System [Luqi 19881. 2 
community [Wideman 19921) uses the term "risk" casually. This term is often used to describe 
different concepts. It is erroneously used as a synonym of "uncertainty" and "threat" [SEI 1996, 
Hall 1997, Karolak, 19961. Generally, software risk is viewed as a measure of the likelihood of 
an unsatisfactory outcome and a loss affecting the software from different points of view: 
project, process, and product [Hall 1997, SEI 19961. However, this definition of risk is 
misleading because it confounds the concepts of risk and uncertainty. In general, most parts of 
decision-making in software processes are under uncertainty rather than under risk. Uncertainty 
is a situation in which the probability distribution for the possible outcomes is not known. 
In this paper the term "riskt' is reserved to indicate the probabilistic outcome of a succession 
of states of nature, and the term "threat" is used to identify the dangers that can occur. We 
define risk to be the product of the value of an outcome times its probability of occurrence. This 
outcome could be either positive (gain) or negative (loss). This abstraction permits one to 
address not only the classical risk management issue, but also to discover opportunities leading 
to competitive advantage. 
We address the issue of risk assessment by estimating the probability distribution for the 
possible outcomes of a project, based on observed values of metrics that can be measured early 
in the process. The metrics were chosen based on a causal analysis to identify the most 
important threats and a statistical analysis to choose the shape of the probability distribution and 
relate its parameters to readily measurable metrics. 
3. Related Work 
There are three main groups of research related to risk: 
Assessing Software Risk by Measuring Reliability. This group follows a probabilistic 
approach and has successfully assessed the reliability of the product [Lyu 1995, 
Schneidewind 1975, Musa 19981. However, this approach addresses the reliability of the 
product, not the risk of failing to complete the project within budget and schedule 
constraints. These approaches could be used to assess risks related to failures of software 
projects, which are outside the scope of the current paper. A concern with these approaches 
is that the resulting assessments arrive too late to economically correct possible faults, 
because the software product is mostly complete and development resources are mostly 
gone at the time when reliability of the product can be assessed by testing. 
Heuristic approaches: Other researchers assess the risk from the beginning, in parallel 
with the development process. However, these approaches are less rigorous, typically 
subjective and weakly structured. Basically these approaches use lists of practices and 
checklists [SEI, 1996, Hall 1997, Charette 1997, Jones 19941 or scoring techniques [Karolak 
19961. Paradoxically, SEI defines software technical risk as a measure of the probability and 
severity of adverse effects in developing software that does not meet its intended functions 
and performance requirements [SEI, 19961. However, the term "probability" is misleading 
in this case because the probability distribution is unknown. 
Macro Model Approaches: A third group of researchers uses well known estimation 
models to assess how risky a project could be. The widely used methods COCOMO 
[Boehm 19811, and SLIM [Putnam, 19801 both assume that the requirements will remain 
unchanged, and require an estimation of the size of the final product as input for the models 
[Londeix 19871. This size cannot be actually measured until late in the project. 
The standard tools used to control all types of projects, including PERT, CPM, and Gantt, 
do not consider coordination and communication overhead. Such models represent sequential 
interdependencies through explicit representation of precedence relationships between activities. 
This simplified vision of a project cannot address the dynamics created by reciprocal 
requirements of information in concurrent activities, exception management, and the impact of 
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actor interactions. Since the missing factors increase time requirements, the estimates resulting 
from these generic project estimation models are overly optimistic. 
These issues are addressed by Vit Project [Levitt 1999, Thomsen et al. 19991. Vit Project is 
applicable to projects in which a) all activities in the project can be predefined; b) the 
organization is static, and all activities are pre-assigned to actors in the static organization; c) the 
exceptions to activities result in extra work volume for the predefined activities and are camed 
out by the pre-assigned actors; and d) actors are assumed to have congruent goals. The model is 
well suited for simulating organizations that deal with great amounts of information processing 
and coordination. Such characteristics are extremely relevant in software processes [Boehm, 
19811. However, this approach requires a fixed work breakdown structure, and therefore does 
not apply at the early stages when requirements are changing and the set of tasks comprising the 
project are still uncertain. 
By using informal risk assessment models, using estimation models based on optimistic 
assumptions that require parameters difficult to provide until late, and using optimistic project 
control tools, project managers condemn themselves to overrun schedules and cost. 
4. The Proposed Project Risk Model 
Our approach is based on metrics automatically collectable from the engineering database 
from near the beginning of the development. The indicators used are Requirements Volatility 
(RV), Complexity (CX), and Efficiency (EF). 
Requirement Volatility (RV): RV is a measure of three characteristics of the requirements: a) the 
Birth-Rate (BR), that is the percentage of new requirements incorporated in each cycle of the 
evolution process; b) the Death-Rate (DR), that is the percentage of requirements dropped in 
each cycle; and c) the Change-Rate (CR) defined as the percentage of requirements changed 
from the previous version. A change in one requirement is modeled as a birth of a new 
requirement and the death of another, so that CR is included in the measured values of BR and 
DR. RV is calculated as follows: RV = BR + DR. 
CompZexity (Cg; Complexity of the requirements is measured from a formal specification. A 
requirements representation that supports computer-aided prototyping, such as PSDL [Luqi 
19961, is useful in the context of evolutionary prototyping. We define a complexity metric 
called Large Granularity Complexity (LGC) that is calculated as follows: LGC = 0 + D + T, 
where for PSDL 0 is the number of atomic operators (functions or state machines), D is the 
number of atomic data streams (data connections between operators), and T is the number of 
abstract data types required for the system. Operators and data streams are the components of a 
dataflow graph. This is a measure of the complexity of the prototype architecture, similar in 
spirit to function points but more suitable for modeling embedded and real-time systems. The 
measure can also be applied to other modeling notations that represent modules, data 
connections, and abstract data types or classes. We found a strong correlation between the 
complexity measured in LGC and the size of PSDL specifications (correlation coefficient R = 
0.996). Most important, we also found a strong correlation (R = 0.898) between the complexity 
measured in LGC and the size of the final product expressed in non-comment lines of Ada code, 
including both the code automatically created by the generator and the code manually 
introduced by the programmers. 
EfJiciency (EF): The efficiency of the organization is measured using a direct observation of the 
use of time. EF is calculated as a ratio between the time dedicated to direct labor and the idle 
time: EF = Direct Labor Time / Idle Time. We found that this easily measurable quantity was a 
good discriminator between high team productivity and low team productivity in a set of 
simulated software projects pogueira 20001. 
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We validated and calibrated our model with a series of simulated software projects using 
Vit Project. This tool was chosen because of the inclusion of communications and exceptions in 
its project dynamics model, and because it has been extensively validated for many types of 
engineering projects, including software engineering projects. The input parameters for the 
simulated scenarios were RV, EF and CX, and the observed output was the development time. 
Given that the proposed model uses parameters collected during the early phases and given that 
Vit Project requires a complete breakdown structure of the project, which can be done only in 
the late phases, there was a considerable time gap between the two measurements. This time gap 
is less than for a post-mortem analysis, but it is sufficient for model calibration and validation 
purposes. 
The simulation results were analyzed statistically, with the finding that the Weibull 
probability distribution was the best fit for all the samples. A random variable x is said to have a 
Weibull distribution with parameters a, p and y (with a > 0, p > 0) if the probability distribution 
function (pdf) and cumulative distribution function (cdf) of x are respectively: 
r 0, X<Y 
(CrJP") (x exp(-((x - r>/P>">7 X l y  
pdf f(x; a, p, y) = { 
The random variable under study, x, can be interpreted as development time in our context. 
The shape parameter a controls the skew of the pdf, which is not symmetric. We found that this 
is mostly related to the efficiency of the organization (EF). The scale parameter /3 stretches or 
compresses the graph in the x direction. We found that this parameter is related to the efficiency 
(EF), requirements volatility (RV), and complexity (CX) measured in LGC. The shifting 
parameter y is shifts the origin of the curves to the right. We found that it is mostly related to the 
complexity measured in LGC. 
Based on best fit to our simulation results, the model parameters can be derived from the 
project metrics using the following algorithm: 
If (EF > 2.0) then a = 1.95; 
y = 22 * 0.32*(13*ln(LGC)-82); 
p = y /(5.71+(RV-20)*0.046); 
else a = 2.5; 
y = 22 * 0.85* (13*ln(LGC)-82) ; 
/3 = y /(5.47- (RV-20)*0.114); 
end if; 
The model estimates the following cumulative probability distribution for project completion on 
or before time x: 
P ( x )  = 1 - exp(- ( (  (x - y)//3)") / /  where x is time in days 
This equation can be inverted to obtain the schedule length needed to have a probability P of 
completing within schedule, with the following result. 
x = y + p(-ln(l-P))l'a 
The probability P can be interpreted as a degree of confidence in the ability of the project to 
successfully complete within a schedule of length x. Applying the above equation to estimate 
the development time needed for a 95% chance of completion within schedule for 16 different 1 4 9 
scenarios simulated using Vit Project, we observed a standard error of 22 days. The worst case 
was an error of 60 days for a project of 520 days (12%). The comparison of estimated time and 
simulated time is shown below. 
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5. Integrating Risk Assessment into Prototyping 
The model presented in the previous section is designed to support an iterative prototyping 
and software development process. In this process, an initial problem statement, a prototype 
demo or problem reports from a deployed software product trigger an issue analysis, followed 
by formulation of proposed requirements changes, and specification of a proposed adjustment to 
the software requirements, which can be initially empty. At this point in each cycle, the project 
manager should perform a risk assessment step. The results of the risk assessment step guide the 
degree of detail to which requirements enhancements are demonstrated, and the set of 
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The first measurement-based risk assessment step can be performed after specification of 
the first version of the prototype architecture, based on the requirements volatility, LGC and 
efficiency measurements from the steps just performed. 
The model is perfectly suited for any evolutionary software process because it follows the 
same philosophy. The risk assessment and estimation steps are conducted at each evolutionary 
In cases where risk assessments are required even earlier, before any prototyping has been 
done, estimates of team efficiency and requirements volatility can be based on measurements of 
similar past projects, and initial complexity estimates can be based on subjective guesswork of 
the kind currently used in the macro model approaches. This kind of estimate may be less 
reliable than those based solely on measurements, but it can provide a principled and reasonably 
accurate basis for deciding whether or not to start a prototyping process to determine the 
requirements for a proposed development project. Thus parts of our approach can be used truly 
at the very beginning of the process. 
If a prototyping effort is approved, early measurements of the process could be used to 
refine the initial estimates of the model parameters using Bayesian methods, thus providing a 
balanced and systematic transition from subjective guesswork, coded as an a priori distribution, 
to assessments increasingly based on systematic measurement. Such an approach also supports 
incorporation and systematic refinement of measurements from previous cycles of the iterative 
prototyping process. 
The results of risk assessment can provide guidance on the degree to which the project can 
afford to explore requirements enhancements requested by the customers. It can also help 
customers or marketing departments to decide how much they really want possible 
improvements, in the context of the resulting time and cost estimates. Systematic costhenefit 
analysis becomes possible only with the availability of reasonably accurate estimates. 
The risk assessment step can thus provide a balancing force to stabilize the requirements 
formulation process. In the absence of information on how much potential enhancements will 
cost, stakeholders are prone to unrealistic requirements amplification - of course they would 
always like to have a better system, no matter how good the existing one is, if you do not ask 
them to pay for the improvements. The proposed risk assessment steps can provide a realistic 
basis for incorporating time and cost constraints and costhenefit tradeoffs early in the process, 
when the situation is fluid and many options are open. 
This process refinement provides some additional insight into the dynamics of iterative 
prototyping: the iterative process should stop when the customers have determined what 
requirements they can afford to realize, and which of many possible improvements they will be 
willing to pay for, if any. It is not necessarily the case that the set of criticisms elicited by the 
final round of prototype demonstrations is empty - that is true only in an idealized world with 
adequate budgets and patient customers. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper introduces a formal risk assessment model for software projects based on 
probabilities and metrics automatically collectable from the project baseline. The approach 
enables a project manager to evaluate the probability of success of the project very early in the 
life cycle, during an iterative requirements formulation process, based on well-defined 
measurements rather than just guesswork or subjective judgments. 
For more than twenty years, estimation standards have been characterized by a common 
limitation: the requirements should be frozen in order to make estimates. This model presented 
in this paper removes this important limitation, facing the reality that requirements are 
inherently variable. 
improvement in the evolutionary software process, introducing a risk assessment step that can 
be automated, and that can help shape the planning of the project in the early stages when there 
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Abstract 
AFT (Automated Prototyping Tool-Kit) 
is an integrated set of software tools that 
generate source programs directly from 
real-time requirements. The APT system 
uses a fifth-gencration prototyping 
language to model the communication 
structure, timing constraints, VO control, 
and data buffering that comprise the 
requirements for an embedded software 
system. The language supports the 
specification of hard real-time systems 
with reusable components from domain 
specific component libraries. APT has 
been used successfully as a research tool 
in prototyping large war-fighter control 
systems (e.g. the command-and-control 
station, cruise missile flight control 
system, patriot missile defense systems) 
and demonstrated its capability to 
support the development of large 
complex embedded software. 
Keywords: APT, Automated 
Prototyping, Real-Time Systems, 
Command and Control, Formal Methods, 
Evolution, Reuse, Architecture, 
Components, PSDL 
1 INTRODUCTIOS 
Sofbare  project managers are 
often faced with the problem of inability 
to accurately and completely specify 
requirements for real-time software 
systems, resulting in poor productivity, 
schedule overruns, unmaintainable and 
unreliable software. APT is designed to 
assist program managers to rapidly 
evaluate requirements for military real- 
time control software using executable 
prototypes, and to test and integrate 
completed subsystems through 
evolutionary prototyping. APT provides 
a capability to quickly develop 
hnctional prototypes to verify feasibility 
of system requirements early in the 
software development process. It 
supports an evolutionary development 
process that spans the complete life- 
cycle of real-time software. 
2 THE AUTOMATED 
PROTOTYPIKG TOOL-KIT (APT) 
The value of computer aided prototyping 
in software development is clearly 
recognized. It is a very effective u-ay to 
gain understanding of the requirements, 
reduce the complexity of the problem 
and provide an early validation of the 
system design. Bernstein estimated that 
for every dollar invested in prototyping, 
one can expect a $1.40 return within the 
life cycle of the system development [ 11. 
To be effective, prototypes must be 
constructed and modified rapidly, 
accurately, and cheaply [8]. Computer 
aid for rapidly and inexpensively 
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constructing and modifying prototypes 
makes it feasible [lo]. The Automated 
Prototyping Tool-kit (APT), a research 
tool developed at the Naval Postgraduate 
School, is an integrated set of software 
tools that generate source programs 
directly from high level requirements 
specifications [7] (Figure 1). 
It provides the following kinds of 
support to the prototype designer: 
(1) timing feasibility checking via 
(2) consistency checking and 
the scheduler, 
automated assistance for project 
management, scheduling, 
designer task assignment, and 
project completion date 
estimation via the Evolution 
Control System, 
(3) computer-aided design 
completion via the editors, 
(4) computer-aided software reuse 
via the software base, and 
(5) automatic generation of wrapper 
and glue code. 
The efficacy of APT has been 
demonstrated in many research projects 
at the Naval Postgraduate School and 
planning, configuration other facilities. 
I 
Figure 1. The APT Rapid Prototyping Environment 
2.1 Overview of the APTMetJtod 
* Software Design 
Database I Database 1 
I 
Figure 2. Iterative Prototyping Process in APT 
There are four major stages in the APT 
rapid prototyping process: software 
system design, construction, execution, 
and requirements evaluation and/or 
modification (Figure 2). 
The initial prototype design starts with 
an analysis of the problem and a 
decision about which parts of the 
proposed system are to be prototyped. 
Requirements for the prototype are then 
generated, either informally (e.g. 
English) or in some formal notation. 
These requirements may be refined by 
asking users to verify their completeness 
and correctness. 
After some requirements analysis, the 
designer uses the APT PSDL editor to 
draw dataflow diagrams annotated with 
nonprocedural control constraints as part 
of the specification of a hierarchically 
structured prototype, resulting in a 
preliminary, top-level design free from 
programming level details. The user may 
continue to decompose any software 
module until its components can bc 
realized via reusable components drawn 
from the software base or new atomic 
components. 
This prototype is then translated into the 
target programming language for 
execution and evaluation. Debugging 
and modification utilize a design 
database that assists the designers in 
managing the design history and 
coordinating change, as well as other 
tools shown in Figure 3. 
2.2 APT as a Requirements 
Eitgiiteeriitg Tool 
The requirements for a software system 
are expressed at different levels of 
abstraction and with different degrees of 
formality. The highest level 
requirements are usually informal and 
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imprecise, but they are understood best 
by the customers. The lower levels are 
more technical, precise, and better suited 
for the needs of the system analysts and 
designers, but they are further removed 
from the user's experiences and less well 
understood by the customers. Because of 
the differences in the kinds of 
descriptions needed by the customers 
and developers, it is not likely that any 
single representation for requirements 
can be the "best" one for supporting the 
entire software development process. 
APT provides the necessary means to 
bridge the communication gap between 
the customers and developers. The APT 
tools are based on the Prototype System 
Description Language (PSDL), which is 
designed specifically for specifying hard 
real-time systems [ 5 ,  61. It has a rich set 
of timing specification features and 
offers a common baseline from which 
users and softns.are engineers describe 
requirements. The PSDL descriptions of 
the prototype produccd by the PSDL 
editor are )-cry formal, precise and 
unambiguous, meeting the needs of the 
system analysts and designers. The 
demonstrated behavior of the executable 
prototype, on the other hand, provides 
concrete information for the customer to 
assess the validity of the high level 
requirements and to refine them if 
necessary. 
2.3 APT as a System Testing and 
Integration Tool 
Unlike throwaway prototypes, the 
process supported by APT provides 
requirements and designs in a form that 
can be used in construction of the 
operational system. The prototype 
provides an executable representation of 
system requirements that can be used for 
comparison during system testing. The 
existence of a flexible prototype can 
significantly ease system testing and 
integration. When final implementations 
of subsystems are delivered, integration 
and testing can begin before all of the 
subsystems are complete by combining 
the final versions of the completed 
subsystems with prototype versions of 
the parts that are still being developed. 
2.4 APT as an Acquisition Tool 
Decisions about awarding contracts for 
building hard real-time systems are risky 
because there is little objective basis for 
determining whether a proposed contract 
will benefit the sponsor at the time when 
those decisions must be made. It is also 
very difficult to determine whether a 
delivered system meets its requirements. 
APT, besides being a usefd tool to the 
hard real-time system developers, is also 
very useful to the customers. Acquisition 
managers can use APT to ensure that 
acquisition efforts stay on track and that 
contractors deliver what they promise. 
APT enables validation of requirements 
via prototyping demonstration, greatly 
reducing the risk of contracting for real- 
time systems. 
2.5 A Plarfornr Independent User 
Interface 
The current APT systeni provides t\vo 
interfaces for users to invoke different 
AFT tools and to enter the prototype 
specification. The main interface (Figure 
3) was developed using the TAE+ 
Workbench [l  13. The Ada source code 
generated automatically from the graphic 
layout uses libraries that only work on 
SUNOS 4.1.X operating systems. The 
PSDL editor (Figure 4), which allows 
users to specify the prototype via 
augmented dataflow diagram, n a s  
implemented in C+t and can only be build PSDL prototypes on different 
executed under SUNOS 4.1.X platforms. We choose to overcome these 
environments. A portable limitations by reimplementing the main 
implementation of the APT main interface (Figure 5) and the PSDL editor 
interface and the PSDL editor was (Figure 6) using the Java programing 
needed to allow users to use APT to language [2]. 
Computer-&ded Prototyping System 
Figure 5. Main Interface of the new APT Figure 3. Main Interface of APT Release 2.0 
Figure 4. PSDL Editor of APT Release 2.0 Figure 6. PSDL Editor of the new APT 
The new graphical user interface, called of the PSDL components can be seen in 
the Heterogeneous Systems Integrator a hierarchy. The user can navigate 
(HSI), is similar to the previous APT. through the prototype by clicking on the 
Users of previous APT versions will names of the components on the tree 
easily adapt to the new interface. There panel. Thus, it  is possible to jump to any 
are some new features in this level in the hierarchy, which was not implementation, which do not affect the possible earlier. 
fbnctionality of the program, but provide 
a friendlier interface and easier use. The 3 A SIRIPLE EXAhlPLE: 
major improvement is the addition of the PROTOTYPIXG A C31 
tree panel on the left side of the editor. WORKSTATION 
The tree panel provides a better view of 









To create a first version of a new of the new prototype (say “~3i-systern~~) 
prototype, users can select “New” from and the APT PSDL editor will be 
the “Prototype” pull-down menu of the automatically invoked with a single 
APT main interface (Figure 7). The user initial root operator (with a name same 
will then be asked to provide the name as that of the prototype). 






AFT allows the user to specify the 
requirements of prototypes as augmented 
dataflow graphs. Using the drawing tools 
provided by the PSDL editor, the user 
can create the top-lcvel dataflow 
diagram of the c3i-system prototype as 
shown in Figure 8, \\.here the c3i-system 
prototype is modeled by nine modules, 
communicating with cach other via data 
streams. To model the dynamic behavior 
of these modules, the dataflow diagram 
is augmented with control and timing 
constraints. For example, the user may 
want to specify that the 
weapons-interface module has a 
maximum response time of 3 seconds to 
handle the event triggered by the arrival 
of new data in the weapon-status-data 
stream, and it only writes output to the 
weapon-emrep stream if the status of the 
weapon-status-data is damage, 
service-required, or out-of-ammunition. 
APT allow the user to specify these 
timing and control constraints using the 
pop-up operator property menu (Figure 
9), resulting in a top-level PSDL 
program shown in Figure 10. 
To complete the specification of the 
c3i-system prototype, the user must 
spccify how cach module Lvill be 
iniplementcd by choosing the 
implementation language for the module 
via the operator property incnu. The 
implementation of a module can be in 
either the target programming language 
or PSDL. A module with an 
implcrnentation in the target 
programming language is called an 
atomic operator. A module that is 
decomposed into a PSDL 
implementation is called a composite 
operator. Module decomposition can be 
done by selecting the corresponding 
operator in the tree-panel on the left side 
of the PSDL editor. 
APT supports an incremental 
prototyping process. The user may 
choose to implement all nine modules as 
atomic operators (using dummy 
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components) in the first version, so as to detailed subsystems and implement the 
check out the global effects of the timing sub-modules with reusable components, 
and control constraints. Then, he/she while leaving the others as atomic 
may choose to decompose the operators in the second version of the 
comms-interface module into more prototype, and so on. 
Figure 8. Top-level Dataflow Diagram of the c3i-system. 
Figure 9. Pop-up Operator Property Menus 
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Figure 10. Top-level Specification of the c3i-system 
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To facilitate the testing of the 
prototypes, APT provides the user with 
an execution support system that 
consists of a translator, a scheduler and a 
compiler. Once the user finishes 
specifying the prototlpe, he/she can 
invoke the translator and the scheduler 
from the APT main interface to analyze 
the timing constraints for feasibility and 
to generate a supervisor module for each 
subsystem of the prototype in the target 
programming language. Each supervisor 
module consists of a set of driver 
procedures that realize all the control 
constraints, a high priority task (the 
static schedule) that executes the time- 
critical operators in a timely fashion, and 
a low priority dynamic schedule task that 
executes the non-time-critical operators 
when there is time available. The 
supemisor module also contains 
information that enables the compiler to 
incorporatc all the software components 
required to implement thc atomic 
operators and generate the binary code 
automaticaIly. The translator/scheduler 
also generates the glue code needed for 
timely delivery of information between 
subsystems across the target nehvork. 
For prototypes which require 
sophisticated graphic user interfaces, the 
APT main interface provides an 
interface editor to interactively sculpt the 
interface. In the c3i-system prototype, 
we choose to decompose the 
corns-interface, the 
track-database-manager and the 
user-interface modules into subsystems, 
resulting in hierarchical design 
consisting of 8 composite operators and 
hventy-six atomic operators. The user 
interface of the prototype has a total of 
14 panels, four of which are shown in 
Figure 11. The corresponding Ada 
program has a total of 10.5K lines of 
source code. Among the 10.5K lines of 
code, 3.5K lines comes from supervisor 
module that was generated automatically 
by the translator/scheduler and 1.7K 
lines that were automatically generated 
by the interface editor [9]. 
4 CONCLUSION 
APT has been used successfully as a 
research tool in prototyping large war- 
fighter control systems (e.g. the 
command-and-control station, cruise 
missile flight control system, missile 
defense systems) and demonstrated its 
capability to support the development of 
large complex embedded sofhvare. 
Specific payoffs include: 
(1) Formulate/validate requirements 
via prototype demonstration and 
user feedback 
(2) Assess feasibility of real-time 
system designs 
(3) Enable early testing and 
integration of completed 
subsystems 
(4) Support evolutionary system 
development, integration and 
testing 
( 5 )  Reduce maintenance costs 
through systematic code 
generation 
( 6 )  Produce high quality, reliable 
and flexible software 
(7) Avoid schedule overruns 
In order to evaluate the benefits derived 
from the practice of computer-aided 
prototyping nithin the sofhvare 
acquisition process, we conducted a case 
study in which we compared the cost (in 
dollar amounts) required to perform 
requirements analysis and feasibility 
study for the c3i system using the 2 167A 
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process, in which the software is coded 
manually, and the rapid prototyping 
process, where part of the code is 
automatically generated via APT [3]. We 
found that, even under very conservative 
assumptions, using the APT method 
resulted in a cost reduction of $56,300, a 
27% cost saving. Taking !he results of 
this comparison, then projecting to a 
mission control software system, the 
command and control segment (CCS), 
we estimated that there would be a cost 
saving of 12 million dollars. Applying 
this concept to an engineering change to 
a typical component of the CCS software 
showed a fbrther cost savings of 
S25,OOO. 
NETWORK SETCP 
READ Y S A C E  
Figure I 1. User Interface of the c3i-system 
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Complex Information System 
Abstract: This paper introduces a graph-oriented model for conceptual level design of large, complex 
information systems. This has been shown to be highly effective to the system designer from the 
perspectives of maintainability and iipgradability. Basically due to the flat structure and the lack of 
holding multidimensional data, the relational model does not provide a structural approach to the 
system designer. The other alternative object oriented model offer the structured approach but also not 
able to describe various intemzodular relationships spread over same or different levels within a data 
model. The graph data model also allows dynamic regrouping of related entities at tlie designers’ level. 
We have proposed the appropriate data structure and the corresponding DDL has also been developed. 
Test runs on simulated environment fLlrther establish its computational eficiency. 
Keywords: Graph oriented data model, Semantic view, Functional abstraction, Encapsulation of data 
and relationships. 
1. Introduction 
The environments in which database management systems are being used have changed rapidly in 
the last several years. Although the relational model has made prominent contribution in !:he research of 
DBMS, recent database applications are outgrowing this model. The table based relationlil model is not 
the best approach to express complex and diverse databases. In this model, relationships among records 
are not structurally specified and due to this flat structure of the relational model, this is not useful to a 
user attempting to comprehend the logical structure actually existing in a schema. The alternative idea 
provide the concept of a class which can encapsulate homogeneous objects but there are no direct means 
to describe the mutual relationships amongst the objects within a class or to express the intermodular 
relationships spread over same or different levels. So our goal is to design a data model providing a 
structural approach which retains the desirable properties of the relational and object oriented model and 
simultaneously overcome the bottleneck of these schemes through the incorporation of some new 
features. In this effort, a graph based data model at conceptual level having the concept of functional 
abstraction has been developed. The significant improvement is expected corresponding tograph model 
in the context of maintainability, adaptability and transparency from the view of a system designer. 
Here we discuss related work done in the areas of graph-based data models, object oriented 
approach in graph data models, semi-structured data and view update. Abiteboul in [2] uses semi- 
structured data that is neither raw data (file systems) nor strictly typed (table-oriented or object 
oriented). Even if semi-structured data may have a structure, this structure is often implicit, and not as 
rigid or regular as that found in standard database systems. In [3] an OQL like query language extended 
with information retrieval tools is proposed to query SGML and HTML documents. Buneman in [5] 
defines semi-structured data as that for which the information normally associated with a schema is 
. 
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contained within the data itself. An attempt has been made to represent semi-structured data as graph 
like or tree like structure, where edges are labeled representing data types and leaves stand for raw data. 
In [63 a query language (UnQL) is adapted, which solves some of the limitations of SQL like languages 
for semi-structured data. Related work is also being conducted in both the area of semi-structured data 
access and querying. The graph data model presented here uses similar structure as in the ER data 
model [7], representing atomic entities by nodes and relations among them by links. However the 
database schema represented by the ER data model is not accessible by the DBMS, whereas in the graph 
data model the structure of the database is represented as part of the graph database itself. In [8] a graph 
model is proposed as underlying unified data model to access different databases expressed in standard 
data models. The query language is formally defined in terms of graphical primitives (atomic queries). A 
global information management system was developed providing a global framework where data on the 
web is accessed through conceptual views. GOOD [9,10,11] started as a database interface, then evolved 
as a graph object oriented database system. Actually, it is a graph representation of an object oriented 
database, where nodes represent objects and links represent relationships between objects. The GRAS 
data model [ 121 relies on attributed graphs. In this model, objects are represented by typed nodes, which 
may carry attributes. Relations between objects are modeled by bi-directional edges. In our model, we 
are trying to focus more on the concept of semantic groups providing the concept of functional 
abstraction for querying and updating data model but all the previous works are focused on defining a 
new approach to represent the graph data model itself. 
Our goal is to provide a tool to the system designer level for describing and maintaining a complex 
semi-structured information system in a better way. So we have proposed a methodology to develop a 
directed graph model in the logical level as (V,E) where a node V represents a basic data object or a 
functionally abstracted module and an edge implies the binary relationships between the entities present 
in the graph data model. In the graph model we can encapsulate the nodes of lower level under a 
functional abstraction node from a specific semantic view. There is no restriction on the existence of 
relationships among the nodes in a graph. Based on the graph based data model framework, we have 
developed a data description language (DDL) for easy description and modification of the entity and 
their relationships within a complex information system. A quite user-friendly script is provided to the 
system designer for easy description of the conceptual level. In DDL, we have generated a friendly 
script for the system designer; a mathematical script has been generated also for each statement (e.g. 
relation, encapsulation) of the designer script and according to the operation described in the 
mathematical script the software will be executed generating the data structure as a output. These entire 
concepts have been crystallized in the form of a software tool, which has also been subsequently 
implemented. 
2. The proposed data model and corresponding data structure 
The conceptual level of a semi-structured information system is represented by the graph model 
depicted in fig. 1. Here the basic instances of entity (lowest level vertices) or the functionally abstracted 
module is indicated by the vertex and the relationship among them by directed edges. In this graph data 
model the vertices indicated by triangle, square and circle indicate the node in the lowest level, 
intermediate level and the top most level respectively. The concept of encapsulation is implemented 
within the graph with respect to a functional abstraction node from a specific scientific view e.g. the 
nodes 4,5,6,7 and 8 are encapsulated in a same class under the functional abstraction node 2 reflecting a 
specific semantic view. The parallel edge between the nodes 4 and 5 indicate the existence of two 
different relation declared from two different semantic, declared with respect to abstraction node 1 and 
2. It has been suggested a suitable data structure to declare the conceptual level of the data model 
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depicted in fig.1. A pointer array maintains the growth of this graph - with each element of the array 
representing a vertex in the graph. Each element of array points to a doubly linked list, right link 
maintains the set of vertices encapsulated by it and the left link points to the set of vertices within each 
of which it exists as a vertex of the encapsulated subgraph. 
(Figure 1 : The Data Model) 
Each element of the linked list is a structure of three elements -the vertex no., type of relation (i.e. 
encapsulation is represented by tag L and direct edge is denoted by tag E) and the functional abstraction 
node on which the relation is based on. The assumption has been made for creation of the data structure 
that the highest level vertices 1,2,3 are encapsulated within the vertex 0, which is treated as the top most 
level node. This is indicated by a high value in the left link of the vertex indicated by 0. The right link 
of node 1 indicates that an encapsulation class has been formed with the member 3,4 and 5 under the 
functional abstraction node 1 and there is a direct edge from 1 to 2 defined with respect to abstraction 
node 0. Similarly the left link indicates that the functional abstraction node 1 itself is encapsulated as a 
member under the node 0 and there is a direct edge from 9 to the node 1.Also from the linked lists 
corresponding the node 4, we can say that the node 4 is encapsulated as a member in the two 
encapsulation class generated under the node 1 as well as 2 and there is a parallel edge between 4 and 5 
defined with respect to higher level node 1 and 2 respectively. 
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(Table 1: Data structure for figure 1 Data model) 
3. Data Description Language 
A data description language is also introduced in this paper by which the system designer will be 
able to easily describe the graph based data model and also can modify according to the need of the 
application. A user-friendly script is provided to designer for easy description of the data model. The 
equivalent mathematical script (relations) is being generated and executed through the procedures 
provided in the software producing the data structure i.e., the data model as an output. 
3.1. Creation of the graph model 
The DDL provided here have a two-fold job; one is to create the graph model depending upon the 
information available to system designer initially and modify it according to the requirement of the 
application. In this section we have described that how the data model depicted in fig1 will be created 
as per this DDL. 




Creation of nodes, as an element of an array. 
Encapsulation of nodes belonging to a semantic class with respect to a higher level 
functional abstraction node. 
Declaration of direct relationship amongst nodes within the graph. 
The syntax of the user-friendly script for the operations referred above as a to c is given below. 
CREATE GRAPH [GRAPHNAME] [NO OF NODES]; 
ENCAP [CLASSNAME] [MEMBER OF CLASS] UNDER [FUNCTIONAL ABSTRACTION NODE]; 
CREATE REL [RELATION NAME] WITH [CLASSNAME] FOR [NODES INVOLVED IN 
RELATION]; So to declare the data model of fig.1 the designer have to declare the data and their 
relations according to the syntax already given. 
1 6 8  
CREATE GRAPH G1 17; * Initially we want to create a graph model named G1 of 17 nodes. 
ENCAP EO [ 1,2,9] UNDER 0; * The nodes 1,2 and 9 will be encapsulated under the node 0 and it will 
be identified by relation EO. 
CREATE REL R1 WITH EO FOR [1,2]; 
CREATE REL R2 WITH EO FOR [9,l]; 
CREATE REL R3 WITH EO FOR [9,2]; * This statement indicates that the relation named R1 reflects 
an edge between 1 and 2 defined with respect to the functional abstraction node mentioned in relation 
EO i.e. 0. Instead of the above three statements, we can write CREATE REL RlYR2,R3 WITH EO FOR 
ENCAPEl [3,4,5]UNDER 1; 
CREATE REL R4 WITH E l  FOR [4,5]; 
ENCAPE2 [4,5,6,7,8]UNDER2; 
CREATE REL R5 WITH E2 FOR [4,5]; 
CREATE REL R6 WITH E2 FOR [7,8]; 
In the above manner we have to express all the relations amongst nodes within the graph. Then the 
equivalent internal form will be generated after compilation and the corresponding script is described 
here. 
ty G1 [O-161; * The symbols y~ and Q are used for creation and encapsulation respectively. 
EO = Q [ 1,2,9]0; 
R1 = 
node present in relation EO. 
R2 = [9,1]/ EO; 
R3 = [9,2]/ EO; 
E l  = Q [3,4,5]’; 
R4 = [4,5]/E1; 
E2 = 4 [4,5,6,7,8]’; 
R5 = [4,5]/E2; 
R6 = [7,8]/E2; 
software (also provided in DDL) and the corresponding data structure is generated as output. 
[ 121 ,[9¶ 11 ,[9¶21. 
[ 1,211 EO; * Direct relation between 1 & 2 is defined with respect to the functional abstraction 
Now these mathematical expressions, as declared by the designer, are treated as an input of the 
The complexity of the algorithm for development of data structure from a graph of n vertices, as 
specified by the system designer, is O(n’). This has been tested in a simulated environment. A random 
graph with degree varying from 4 to a maximum number of 10 has been considered as input to the 
algorithm and the corresponding data structure has been generated. The execution time has been plotted 
against the number of vatices as shown below. 
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3.2. Modification of the graph model 
In context to the modification of a graph model the basic operations are: 
a. Insertion of node(s) in the graph model. 
b. Deletion of an existing node. 
c. Modification of an encapsulation class from a different semantic view. 
d. Modification of an already existing edge. 
The syntax of the user-friendly script of the operations referred here as a to d is given below. 
OPEN GRAPH [GRAPH MODEL NAME]: * Initially the designer have to open the graph model G1 
for modification. 
INSERT NODE [NO. OF NODES]; 
DELETE NODE [NODES]; 
Generally the designer can delete only the lowest level nodes. The nodes selected for deletion 
including the relations involving these nodes will be deleted as a result of this operation. But if this 
attempt has been made for any functional abstraction node, all the nodes encapsulated within it will also 
be deleted including the specified node after getting an assurance for this operation from the system 
designer. 
The operation referred above as c can be implemented by insertion of a node into an encapsulation 
class from another class or by substitution of a group of nodes by the members of a different class. In 
this case, all the relations involving the nodes take place in the operation are deleted. Again the designer 
have to define the new relationship from a different semantic aspect. 
INSERT NODE(S) [NODES] OF CLASS [CLASSNAME] WITHIN CLASS [CLASSNAME]; 
MODIFY NODE(S) [NODES] OF CLASS [CLASSNAME] BY [NODES] OF CLASS 
[CLASSNAME 3; 
There are two cases regarding the operation d, either we want to delete an existing relation or to 
insert a new relation between a pair of node with respect to an abstraction node. 
DELETE REL [NODE1 ,NODE2,ABSTRACTION CLASS]; 
170 
INSERT REL [NODE 1 ,NODE2,ABSTRACTION CLASS]; 
CLOSE GRAPH [GRAPH MODEL NAME]. 
The specified graph model must be closed after the completion of the modification. 
Let us describe the modification of the graph model with an example. We assume the system 
1. Insert two new nodes in the graph model. 
2. Enter these two nodes in the encapsulation class headed by functional abstraction node 2. 
3. Replace the node 3 of encapsulation class headed by node 1 by the node 7 of the class under 
node 2. 
4. Create an edge from node 7 to 5 with respect to node 1. 
5. Delete the edge between 4 and 5 defined with respect to node 2. 
designer want to perform the following modifications on the graph model of fig. 1. 
To perform the modifications mentioned above, the designer script will be: 
OPEN GRAPH G1; 
INSERT NODES [2]; 
INSERT NODES [17,18] OF CLASS EO WITHIN CLASS E2; 
MODIFY NODE [3] OF CLASS El  BY [7] OF CLASS E2; 
INSERT REL [7,5,E1]; 
DELETE REL [7,8,E2]; 
CLOSE GRAPH G 1. 
OPEN G1; 
I+J [ 17-18]; * Create two new nodes in the graph model G1. 
EO = $[ 1,2,9,17,18]0; * By default , these two nodes are encapsulated within EO. 
E2 = $[4,5,6,7,8,17,18]'; *The modified class relation E2. 
EO = $[ 1,2,9] O; 
El  = $[4,5,7]'; 
E2 = $[3,4,5,6,17,18] 2; 
DEL REL R6; * Delete the previous relation involving node 7,named R6, as the previous relation may 
not exist from the new semantic view. If required, re-describe the relation. 
R6 = [7,5]/E1; * A new relation named R6 is generated. 
DEL REL R5; * The relation between 7 & 8 with respect to node 2 (named R5) will be deleted. 
CLOSE GI. 
and the data structure of the conceptual data model will be modified accordingly. 
4. Graph Data Model in Distributed Computing Environment 
The equivalent mathematical script involving the new modified relations will be: 
The mathematical script written above for the modification is also executed through the software 
In recent years, almost all of the software should be compatible to distributed environment due to the 
increasing trend towards the distribution of computer systems over multiple sites that are interconnected 
via a communication network. So the distributed database concept with respect to our data model 
implies that the graph designed by system designer must be spread over the sites of a computer network. 
The fragmentation amount of the graph totally depends on the nature of specific application e.g. What 
type of queries will be processed at a specific site; What are the necessary information related to these 
queries, etc. Still in this section we propose some general fragmentation methodologies of the graph 
model to achieve the improved performance.Depending upon the nature of the queries and the related 
necessary information to process these queries, the relevant portion of the graph, i.e. the semantic groups 
must be distributed amongst the sites. We termed this method as Graph fragmentation. It may be the 
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case that one can keep the necessary information (occurrences) within a group instead of storing all 
members of that group. This is decided dynamically through generation of certain constraints. In that 
case the entire copy of the semantic group must be kept in another site to avoid the loss of information. 
In some cases, we have to keep more than one copy of the same semantic group in different sites. 
In spite of the chances of generating inconsistency during updation, the replication is to be allowed to 
increase the availability and to reduce the communication cost for accessing data from different sites. In 
our data model, described in section 2, we have allowed to declare the relationship between the meber of 
different groups spread over different levels. After fragmentation, the mutual relationship within the 
group must belong to the subgraph present in the local site. A table, named Link table, has been 
maintained to keep track of information regarding relationship of any node in the local site with another 
node in some other site. This has been illustrated with an example in the next paragraph. 
Suppose there are three sites S 1, S2 and S 3  with respect to abstract data model as depicted in fig. 





Semantic groups encapsulated under functional abstraction node 1 and 2. 
Semantic groups encapsulated under functional abstraction node 2 and 8. 
Semantic groups encapsulated under functional abstraction node 9 and 1 1. 
According to the fragmentation scheme described above, the data structure depicted in Table 1 will 
also be decomposed amongst the sites. The figure 2 implies the subgraph belongs to site 1 and the Table 
2 indicates the corresponding data structure. Here the dotted lines and vertices indicate that th- ,se are not 
belonging within the site 1 but for query processing these vertices or links may be required. 
9 
. .  . .  . .  
(Figure 2 : Fragmented Graph model for site 1) 
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(Table 2: Data structure for Site 1) 
Now if the queries to be processed in site 1 are generally based on retrieval, then the nodes 13, 
15 and 9 should be replicated into site 1. Otherwise, a link table for site 1 is maintained using which 
information can be fetched from different sites to process the queries. 
2 6 13 
3 
(Table 3 : Link Table for site 1) 
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The task for creating site 1 can be accomplished by the following set of commands provided in 
the proposed data model. 
3 
Open graph G1; 
Fragment group 1,2 into sitel; 
9 2 
In a similar way, the other sites can be created and be joined back to regenerate the data model in 
figure 1 by the graph join operation provided in our data model. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, an attempt has been made to present an alternative approach for storage and 
maintenance of semi-structured data based information system. A better performance may be obtained 
from our data model due to the point mentioned below. 
Maintainability: The relational model is not providing a structured approach of the entities present in a 
large information system. So to find out the actual relations among entities scattered through different 
tables or the relations between tables, the designer has to derive the relations via common attributes 
searching through the tables. In a complicated large system, it will be a cumbersome process. But due to 
the provision of the structured approach in our proposed model, the designer can easily find out the 
relationships between some attributes (lowest level node) or some functional abstraction node directly 
via the option provided in our DDL. 
Adaptability: It will be an ideal condition to the system designer, if all information regarding the 
application is clearly known at the right of the beginning. Unfortunately, in practical, we have to initiate 
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the design process with only limited knowledge and the system is going to be gradually enriched with 
the inclusion of new information. So the data model should provide the feature of easy inclusion of new 
information on the existing data model. The proposed model is flexible one to offer the designer to 
easily incorporate new information as node in the graph and to describe the relations of the new nodes 
with the existing nodes through edges. It also provides the facility to redefine the relationships from a 
different semantic view and accordingly the designer can also maintain the different semantic view of 
the same data model as per the requirement. So this model is a really adaptable one providing more than 
one view of same data model with respect to separate semantic to the system designer level. (This view 
is totally different from the view provided to the end user level) 
Context sensitivity of the relations: The concept of functional abstraction is introduced to increase the 
effectiveness of the model. The designer will be able to formulate the behavioral aspects of the entities 
by forming an encapsulation class with respect to a functional abstraction node and can declare the 
mutual relationships among the members of the class. All these relations are context sensitive i.e. 
declared from a specific semantic which is incorporated within functional abstraction node e.g. the 
parallel edge within node 4 and 5 in fig.1 is context sensitive; one is defined with respect to abstraction 
node 1 and the other with respect node 2. So the significant improvement has been expected for this 
graph based data model in the context of the points mentioned in this section. The present work may 
further be consolidated by treating a Table as node in lieu of occurances of the attributes to maintain the 
user-friendlyness at the end user level. 
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Measuring and Evaluating 
Maintenance Process Using 
Reliability, Risk, and Test Metrics 
Norman F. Schneidewind, Fekw,  I € € €  
Abs act-In analyzing the stability of a maintenance process, it is important that i t  not be treated in isolation f r m  the reliability and 
risk of dfploying the softwan that result from applying tho process. Furthermore, we need io consider the efficiency of the test effort 
that is a part of the process and a determinate of reliability and risk of deployment. The relationship between product qualify and 
prccess capability and maturity has been recognized as a major issue in software engineering Oassd on the premise that 
irnprovemants in process w3 lead to higher quality products. To this end, we have been investiga:ing an important facat of procoss 
c3pabili!y-stability-as de"c3d and evaluated by trend, change, and shape rnetrics, across releases and within a roloase. Our 
integratior, of product and pmcess measurement serves the dual purpose of using metrics ts assess 2nd predict rofiability and risk and 
13 evaluate process stability. We use the NASA Space Shuttle flight software to illustrate our approach. 
Index Terms-Maintenance process stability, product and process integration, reliability risk. 
+ 
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E.ASURLYC and evaluating the stability of maintenance MP rocesses is important because of the recognized 
relationship between prccess quality and product quality 
171. fVe focus on the importent quality factor rdinhility. A 
maintenance process can quickly become unstable because 
the very act oi installing softw-ere changes thi. environment: 
pressures operate to modify tk.e environment, the problem, 
and tk.e technological solu:ioi~s. Changes generated by 
users a d  the environment and the consequent need for 
adapting the software to the changes is unpredictable and 
cannut be accommodated without iteration. Programs must 
be adaptable to change and the resultant change process 
must be ylenned and controlled. According to Lehman, 
large programs are never completed, they just continue to 
evolve [Ill.  In other words, with software, we are dealing 
with a moving target. Maintenance is performed continu- 
ously and the stability of the maintenance process has an 
effect on product reliability. Therefore, when we analyzed 
the stability of the NASA Space Shuttle software main- 
tenance process, it was important to consider the reliability 
of the software that the process prodxes. Furthermore, we 
needed to consider the efficiency of the test effort that is a 
part of the process and a. determinate of reliability. 
Therefore, we integrated these factors into a unified model, 
which a!lowed us to measure :he influence of maintenance 
actions and test effort on the reliability of the software. Our 
hypohesis was that these metrics would exhibit trends and 
other characteristics over time that would be indicative of 
the stability of the process. Our results indicate that this is 
the case. 
We conducted research on the SASA Space Shuttle flight 
software to investigate a hypothesis of measuring and 
evaluating maintenance stability. We used several metrics 
and applied them across releases of the software and within 
releases. The trends and shapes of metric functions over 
time provide evidence of Fvhether the software maintenance 
,process is stable. We view stability as the condition of a 
process that results in increasing reliability, decreasing risk 
of deployment, and increasing test effectiveness. In addi- 
tion, ouu focus is on process stability, not code stability. We 
explain o w  criteria for stability; describe metrics, trends, 
and shapes for judging stability; document the data that 
was collected; and sliotv how to apply our approach. 
Building on our previous work of defining maintenance 
stability criteria and developing and applying trend metrics 
for stability evaluation [El, in this paper we review related 
research projects, introduce shape metrics for stability 
evaluation, apply our change metric for multiple release 
stability evaluation, consider the functionality of the soft- 
ware product in stability evaluation, and interpret the 
metic resxlts in terns of process improvements. 
Our emphasis in this paper is to propose a unified product 
and process measurement model for product evaluation r x l  
process stability analysis. The reader should focus on the 
model prir.ciples and nct on the results obtained for the 
Shuttle. These are used only to illustrate the model concepts. 
In general, different numerical resclts would be obtained for 
other applications that use this model. 
Section 2 reviews related research. In Section 3, the 
concept of stability is explained and trend and shape 
metrics are defined. Section 4 defines the data and the 
NASA Space Shuttle application environment. Section 5 
gives an Znalysis of relztionships among maintenance, 
reliability, test effort, and risk, -.x.hile Section 6 discusses 
OC90.550399iSlOM C 1939 IEEE 
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both long term (i.e., 2CfOSS releases) and short term (i,e., 
within a release), as applied to the XASA Space Shuttle. 
Section 7 discusses our attempt to relate product metrics to 
process improvements and to the functionality and com- 
plexity of the software. Conclusions are drawn in Section 8. 
2 RELATED RESEARCH AND PROJECTS 
A number of useful related maintenance measurement and 
process projects have been reported in the literature. Rriand 
et al. developed a process to characterize software main- 
tenance projects [3]. They present a qualitative and 
inductive methodology for performing objective project 
charac:erizations to identify maintenance problems and 
needs. This niethodology aids in dctermining causal links 
between maintenance problems and flaws in the main- 
tenance organization and process. Although the authors' 
have related ineffective maintenance practices to orgnniza- 
tional and process problems, they have not made a linkage 
to product reliability and process stability. 
Gefen and Schneberger developed the hypothesis that 
maintenmce proceeds in three distinct serial phases: 
corrective modification, similar to testing; improvement in 
function within the original specifications; and the addition 
of new applications that go beyond the original specifica- 
tions [5] .  Their results from a single large information 
system, which they shidied in great depth, suggested that 
software maintenance is a multiperiod process. In the 
NASA Space Shuttle maintenance process, in contrast, all 
three types of maintenance activities are performed con- 
currently and are accompanied by continuous testing. 
Henry et al .  found a strong correlation between errors 
corrected per module and the impact of the software 
upgrade [6].  This information can be used to rank modules 
by their upgrade impact during code inspection in order to 
find and correct these errors before the software enters the 
expensive test phase. The authors treat the impact of change 
but do r.ot relate this impact to process stability. 
Khoshgoftarr et al. used discriminant analysis in each 
itcration of their project to predict fault prone modules in 
the next itcration [lo]. This approach provided an advance 
indication of reliability and the risk of implementing the 
nest iteration. This study deals with product reliability but 
docs not address the issue of process stability. 
Pearse and Oman applied a maintenance metrics index 
to measure the maintainability of C source code before and 
after maintenance activities [13]. This technique allowed the 
project engineers to track the "health" of the code as it was 
being maintained. Maintainability was assessed but not in 
terms of process stability. 
Pigoski and Kelson collccted and analyzed metrics on size, 
trouble reports, change proposals, staffing, and trouble report 
and change proposal completion times [l?]. A major benefit 
ofthis project was theuseof trends toidentify therelationship 
between the productivity of the maintenance organization 
and staffing levels. Although productivity was addressed, 
product reliability and process stability were not considered. 
Sneed recngineered a client maintenance process to 
conform to the ANSI/IEEE Standard 1291, Standard for 
Software Maintenance [19]. This project is a good example 
of how a star,dard can provide a basic framework for a 
process and c m  be tailored to the characteristics of th? 
project environment. Although applying 2 stzndard is 2n 
appropriate element of a good process, prodnct reliability 
and process stability were not addressed. 
Stark collected and analyzed metrics in the categories of 
customer satisfaction, cost, and schedule with the objectiv? 
of focusing management's attention on improvement xeas  
and tracking inipovements over time [20]. This approach 
aided management in deciding whether to include changes 
in the current release, with possible schedule slippage, or 
include the changes in the next release. However, the 
authors did not relate these metrics to process stability. 
Although there were similarities between these projects 
and our research, our work differed in that we integrated: 
1) maintenance actions, 2) reliabiliiy, 3) test effort, and 4) 
risk to the safety of mission md crew of deploying the 
software after maintenance actions, for the purpose 01' 
analyzing and evaluating the stability of t3e nzintenance 
process. 
3 CONCEPT OF STABILITY 
3.1 Trend Metrics 
TO gain insight into the interzction of tke maintenance 
process with pioduct nietrics like ieliability, h%ro types of 
metrics were analyzed: trend and shape. Both types are 
used to assess and predict maintenance process stability 
across (long term) and within (short term) :eleases after the 
software is released and maintained. Shape metrics are 
described in Section 3.2. By chronologically ordering metric 
values by release date, we obtain discrete fmcrions in t h e  
that can be analyzed for trends across releases. Similarly, by 
observing the sequence of metric values as contir.uouc 
functions of increasing test time, we can anz!yze trends 
within releases. These metrics are defined as empirical and 
predicted functions tl-.at are assigned values based on 
release date (long term) or test time (short term). When 
analyzing trends, we note whether an increasing or 
decreasing trend is favorable [ E l .  For example, an increas- 
iftg trend in Time to Next Failure and a dccrensing trend in 
Failures per KLOC would be favorable. Conversely, a 
decreasing trend in 'rime to Next Failure and an incvensing 
trend in Failures per KLOC would be unfavorable. A 
favorable trend is indicative of maintenance stability if the 
functionality of the software has increased with time across 
releases and within releases. Increasing fur,ctionality is the 
norm in software projects due to the enhancement that 
users demand over time. We impose this condition because 
if favorable trends are observed, they could be the result of 
decreasing functionality rather than ha\?ing achieved main- 
tenance stability. When trends in these metrics over time are 
favorable (e.g., increasing reliability), we conclude that the 
maintenance process is stable with respect to the software 
metric (reliability). Conversely, when the trends are 
unfavorable (e.g , decreasing reliability), we conclude that 
process is unstnb!c. Our research investigated whether there 
were relationshi?s among the following fzctors: 1) main- 
tenance actions, 2) reliability, and 3) test efiort iVe use the 
following types of trenc! metrics: 
1 7 6  
SCHNEIDEWIND: MEASURING AN0 EVALUATING MANENANCE PROCESS USING RELIABILITY, RISK, AND TEST METRICS 
1. Mninterznizce actbls: KLOC Change to the Code (i.e., 
amount of code changed necesszry to add given 
functionality); 
Reliability Various reliability nzetrics (e.g., MTTF, 
Total Failures, Remaining Failures, and Time to Next 
Failure); and 
Test cjort: Total Test Time. 
2. 
3. 
3.1. I Change Metric 
Although looking for a trend metric on a graph is useful, it 
is not a precise way of measuring stability, particularly if 
the graph has peaks and valleys and the measurements are 
made a t  discrete points in time. Therefore, we developed a 
Change Metric (CM), which is computed as follows: 
1. 
2. 
Kote the change in a metric from 0r.e release to the 
next (i.e., release j to release j + 1). 
I i  the change is in the desirable direction (e.g., 
Faiiures/KLOC decrease), treat the change in I as 
positive. If the change is in the undesirable direction 
(e.g., Failures/KLOC increase), trez: the change in 1 
as negative. 
If the change in 1 is an increase, divide it by the 
value of the metric in release j + 1. I i  the change in 1 
is a decrease, divide it by the value of the metric in 
release j. 
Compute the average of the values obtained in 3, 
taking into account sign. This is the char,ge metric 
(CM). The CM is a qucantity in the range -1,l. h 
positive value indicates stability; i! negative value 
indicates instability. Thc numeric valuc of Cbl 
indicates the degree of stability or instability. For 
example, 0.1 would indicate marginal stability and 
0.9 would indicate high stability. Similarly, -0.1 
would indicate marginal instability and -0.9 would 
indicate high instability. The standard deviation of 
these values can also be computed. Note that CIvl 
only pertains to stability or instabi!ity iuitk rt'jpect to 
fhe pnrticiilar metric thnt hus bee2 cvalunted (e.g., 
Failures/KLOC). The evaluation of stability should 
be made with respect to a sct of metrics and not a 
single metric. The average of the CM for a set of 




3.2 Shape Metrics 
h addition to trends in metrics, the shapes of metric functions 
provide indicators of maintenance stability. We use shape 
mctrics to analyze the stability of an individual release and 
the trend of these metrics across releases to analyze long-term 
stability. The rationale of these metrics is that it is better to 
reach iniportant points in the growth of product reliability 
sooner than later. If we reach these points late in testing, it is 
indicative of a process that is late in achieving stability. We 
use the following types of shape metrics: 
1. Direction and magnitude of the dope of a metric 
fimction (e.g., failure rate decreases asymptotically 
with total test time). Using faiIure rate as an example 





decrease toward zero with increasing total test time 
and that it have small values. 
Percent of total test time at whish a metric function 
changes frorn unstable (e.g., increasing failure rate) 
to stable (e.g., decreasing failure rate) and remains 
stable. Across releases, it is desirable that the tatal 
test time at which a metric function becomes stable 
gets progressively smaller. 
Percent of total test time at which a metric function 
increases at a niavimum rate in a favorable direcEon 
(e.g., failure rate has maximum negative rate of 
change). 'ising failure rate as an example, i; is 
desirable for it to achieve maximum rate of decrsase 
as soon as possible, as a function of total test time. 
Test time at which a metric function reaches its 
maximum value (e.g., test time at which failure rzte 
reaches its maximxni value). Using failure rate a j  an 
example, it is desirable for it to reach its maxim-Jm 
value (i.e., trmsition from. unstable to stable) as man 
as possible, as a function of total test time. 
Risk: Probability of not meeting reliability and safety 
goals (e.g., time to next failure should exceed 
iizission duration], using various shape metrics zs 
indicators of risk. Risk would be low if the 
conditions in 1-4 2boi.e obtain. 
3.3 Metrics for tong-Term Analysis 
'We use certain inetrits only for long-term analysis. As an 
example, we compute the following trend metrics over a 
sequence of releases: 




5 .  Time to Next Failure. 
Mean Time to Failure (MTTF). 
Total Failures norx-.zlized by KLOC Change to the 
Code. 
Total Test Time normalized by KLOC Change to the 
Code. 
Remaining Failures normalized by KLOC Change to 
the Code. 
3.4 Metrics for Long- and Short-Term Analysis 
We use other metrics for both long-term and short-term 
analysis. As an exaniple, we compute the following trend 
(1) and shape (2, 3, 4, and 3) metrics over a sequence of 





Percent of Total Test Time required for Remaining 
Failures to reach a specified value. 
Degree to which Failure Rate asymptotically zp- 
proaches zero with increasing Total Test Time. 
Percent of Total Te;t Time required for Failure Rate 
to become stable and remain stable. 
Percent of Total Test Time required for Failure Rate 
to reach maximum decreasing rate of change (i.e., 
slope of the failure rate curve). 
Maximum Failure Rate and Total Test Time where 
Failure Rate is maximum. 
5. 
4 DATA AND EXAMPLE AFPLICAT~ON 
We use the NASA Space Shuttle application to il!ustrate the 
concepts. This large maintenance project has been evolvkg 
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TABLE 1 
Characteristics of Maintained Software Across NASA Space Shuftle Releases (Part 1) 
with increasing functionality since 1953 121. We use data 
collected from tlie developer of tlie flight software of the 
NASA Space Shuttle, as shol.c.n in TnSle 1, Part 1, and 
TaSle 2, Part 2. These tables show Operational Increments 
(01;) of the KASA Space Shuttle: OIA ... OIQ, covering the 
period 1963-1997. We define an 01 as follows: i? software 
system comprised of modules and configured from a series 
of builds to meet NAS-4 Space Shuttle mission functional 
requirements [16]. In Part 1, for each of the OIs, ice show the 
Release Date (the date of release by the contractor to 
NASA), Total Post Delivery Failures, and Failure Severity 
(decreasing in severit?: from "1" to ''4"). In Part 2, we show 
the maintenance change to the code i n  KLOC (source 
language changes and additions) and the total test time of 
the 01. In addition, for those 01s with at least two failures, 
we show the compu:ation of MTTF, Failures/KLOC, and 
Total Test Time/KLOC. KLOC is an indicator of main- 
tenance actions, not f.inctionality [8]. Increased function- 
ality, as measured by the incredse in the size of principal 
functions lozded into mass memory, has averaged about 
2 percent over the last 10 01s. Therefore, if a stable process 
were observed, it could no: be attributed to decreasing 
functionality. Also t3 be noted is that the software 
developer is a ch/~h.f Level 5 organization that has 
continually improved its process. 
Because the flight software is run continuously, around 
the clock, in sirnulation, test, or flight, Total Test Time refers 
to continuous execution time from the time of release. For 
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TABLE 2 
Characteristics of Maintained Software Across NASA Space Shuttk Releases (Pari 2) 
01s where there was a sufficient sample size (i.e., Total Post 
Delivery Failures)-OIA, OIB, OIC, OID, OIE, OIJ, and 
OIO-we predicted software reliability. For these OIs, we 
show Launch Date, Mission Duration, and Reliability 
Prediction date (i.e., the date when we made a Prediction). 
Fortunately, for the safety of the crew and mission, there 
have been few postdelivery failures. Unfortunately, from 
the standpoint of prediction, there is a sparse set of 
observed failures from which to estimate reliability model 
parameters, particularly for recent 01s. Nevertheless, we 
predict reiiabi!ity prior to launch date for 01s with as few as 
five failures spanning many months of maintenance and 
testing. In the case of OIE, we predict reliability after launch 
because no failures had occurred prior to launch to use in 
the prediction model. Because of the scarcity of failure data, 
we made predictions using all severity levels of failure data. 
This turns out to be beneficial when making reliability risk 
assessments using number of Remaining Failures. For 
example, rather than specifying that the numher of 
predicted Remaining Failures must not exceed one severiy 
"1," the criterion could specify that the prediction not 
exceed orie failure of any type-a more conservative 
criterion [16]. 
As would be expected, the number of predeliwq 
failures is much greater than the number of postdelivery 
failures because the software is not as mature from a 
reliability standpoint. Thus, a way around the insufficient 
sample size of recent 01s for reliability prediction is to 
predelivery failures for model fit and then use the fitted 
model to predict postdelivery failures. However, we are not 
sure that this approach is appropriate because the multiple 
builds in which failures can occur and the test strategies 
used to attempt to crash various pieces of code during the  
predelivery process contrast sharply with the postdelivery 
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I environment of testing an integrated 01 with operational scenarios. Nevertheless, we are experimenting with this - 
approach in order to evaluate the prediction accuracy. The 
results will be reported in a future paper. 
5 RELATlONSHlP BETWEEN MAINTENANCE, 
5.1 Filetrics for Long-Term Analysis 
We want our maintenance effort to result in increasing 
reliability of software over a sequence of releases. A graph 
of this relationship over calendar time and the accompany- 
ing CM calculations indicate whether the long-term main- 
tenance effort has been successful as it relates to reliability. 
In order to measure whether this is the case, we use both 
predicted and actual values of metrics. We predict 
reliability in advance of deploying the software. If the 
predictions are favorable, we hare confidence that the risk 
is acceptable to deploy the software. If the predictions are 
unfavorable, we may decidt to delay deployment and 
perform additional inspection arid testing. Another reason 
for making predictions is to assess whether the maintenance 
process is effective in improving reliability and to do it 
sufficiently early during maintenance to improve the 
maintenance process. In addition to making predictions, 
we collected and analyzed historicel reliability data. These 
data show in retrospect whether nxintenance actions were 
sliccessfui in increasing reliability. In addition, the test 
effort should not be disproportionate to the an:ount of code 
that is changed and to the reliabi1i:y that is achieved as a 
result of maintznance actions. 
RELIABILITY, RISK, AND TEST EFFORT 
5.7.1 Mean Time to Faii‘ure 
We want Mean Time to Failure (MTTF), as computed bj7 (l), 
to sliow an increasing trend across releases, indicating 
increasing reliability. 
&:in ‘Time to  Failure = Tota! Tc>t l’ime/Total 
S:amt)er of Failures During (1) 
T W  
2 I  
Fig. 1. Mean time to failure across re!eases. 
5.1.2 Total Faiiures 
Similarly, we want Total Failures (and faults), normalized 
by KLOC Change in Code, as computed by (2), to show a 
decreasing trend across releases, inciicatiiig that reliability 
is increasing with respect to code changes. 
Total Failiirca/’IiLOC: = Total Kuniber of Failurcs 
DurIng Tc%t/Kf,OC! C‘limgc (2j 
iu CcitLe 0:) rhe 01 
We plot (I) a n d  (2) in Fig. 1 a x 1  Fig. 2, respectively, 
against Release Time of 01. This is the nuz-her of months 
since the release of the 01, using “0” as thc release time of 
01.4. We identify the 01s at the bottom of the plots. Both of 
these plots use actual ralues (i.e., historica! data). The CM 
value for (1) is -0.060 indicating sinall instability with 
respect to MTTF and 0.087 for (2 j  indicating small stability 
with respect to normalized Total Failures. The correspond- 
ing standard deviations are 0.5:ll and U.:-i2. Large varia- 
bility in CM is the case in this application due to the large 
variabiIity in functionality- across releases. Fnrthermore, it is 
not our objective to judge the process that is used in thi; 
example. Rather, our purpose in showing these and 
subsequent values of Cbf is to i[iustmk our model. tVe 
use these plots and the Ck[ to assess the long-term stability 
0 3 4  T . 2 7  1 3 . 1 7  1 7 . 5  8 i . a  I45 j 
Mc,lt .s  S ~ n c s  F la lease  ~ I F i r s l O t  
31 A R c I) F. J 0 
Fig. 2. Total failures per KLOG a w s s  releilses 
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of the maintenance process. We show example computa- 
tions of CM for (1) and (2) in Table 3. 
5.1.3 Total Test Time 
We want Total Test Time, normalized by KLOC Change in 
Code, as computed by (3), to show a decreasing trend 
acrms releases, indicating that test effort is decreasing with 
respect to code changes. 
Total Test Time/KLOC = Total Test TimejKLOC 
(3) Cha:ige in Code on the Oi. 
We plot (3) in Fig. 3 against Release Time of 01, using 
actua1 values. The CM value for this plot is 0.116, with a 
standard deviation of 0.626, indicating stability with respect 
to efficiency of test effort. We use this plot and the CM to 
assess whether testing is efficient with respect to the 
amount of code that has been changed. 
5.2 Reliability Predictions 
5.2.7 Total Failures 
L+ to this point, we have used only actual data in the 
analysis. Now we expand the analysis to use both 
predictions and actual data but only for the seven 01s 
i\.herc we could make predictions. Using the Schneidewind 
hlodel [l], [9 ] ,  [16], f171, [18] and the SMERFS software 
rdiability tool 141, we show prediction equations, using 
30 day time intervals, aild make predictions for OIA, Om, 
OiC, OID, OIE, OIJ, and 010. This model or any other 
applicable model may be used [ll, [4]. 
To predict Total Failures in the range (1. m! (i.e., failures 
over the life of the software), we use (4): 
(4) FyX.) = a/? + -Y,-1 
where the terms are defined as follows: 
s: starting time interval for using failures counts for 
computing parameters n and /3, 
a: initial failure rate, 
p: rate of change of fzi!ure rate, and 
Xs-:: observed failure count in the range [I, s - lj 
Now, we predict Total Failures normalized by KLOC 
Change in Code. We want predicted normalized Total 
Failures to show a decreasing trend across releases. We 
computed a C M  value for this data of 0.115, with a 
standard deviation of 0.271, indicatinz stability with respect 
to predictec! normalized Total Failures. 
5.2.2 Remaining Failures 
To predict Remaining Failures ~ ( t )  at time t, we use (5) [l], 
191, [171: 
T { t )  = F ( m )  - x, (5 j 
FiG. 3. Tctal test time per KLOC across releases. 
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Actual Predicttld 
0 3.4 9.27 13.17 175 81.6 C 3.4 9.27 3 17 17.5 81.6 'CS.6 
RlcnRs Since Relcse of First 01 hlnlmSxeRdmeof Firsf 01 -- 01 P. B C O E J O  
Mean Time To Failure 
Total Test Time per KLOC 
Fig. 4. Fieliability of maintained software--:emaining failures normalized 01 A B C D  E J 
by changa to code. 
Fig. 6. Reliability of maintained ssfhvare-time to next failure 
1 
-0.060 
This is the predicted Total Failures over the life of the 
software minus the observed failure count at time t. 
We predict Remaining Failures, normillize them by 
KLOC Change in Code, and compare them with normalized 
achizl Remaining Failures for seven 01s in Fig. 4. We 
approximate Actual Remaining Failures at time t by 
subtracting the observed failure count at time t from the 
observed Tot21 Failure count at time 'I,, where T >> t .  The 
rcasop. for this approach is that w e  are approximating the 
failure count over the life 'ty 120f the software by using the 
failure count at time T. We want (5) and actual Remaining 
Failures, normalized by KLOC Change in Code, to show R 
decreasing trendover a sequence of releases. The C M  values 
for these plots are 0.107 and 0.277, respectively, indicating 
stabilify with respect to Remaining Failures. The corre- 
sponding standard deviaticjns are 0.617 and 715. 
5.2.3 Time to Next Failure 
To predict the Timc for the Ncxt fi  Failures to occur, when 
the current time is t, we use ( G )  [l], [ lh] ,  [17]. 
TF(I)  = [(lGgicl/(a - /3(Ss,, + F , ) ) ]  j//3] - ( t  - .S - 1) 
The terms in Tr(t) have the following definitions: 
(6) 
t : Current time interval; 
X,,t: Observed failure count in the range [s: t];  and 
Ft: Given number of failures to occur after interval t 
(c.g., one failure). 
Rcmaining Failurcs per KLOC j 0.277 
We want (6) to show 2.n increasing trend over a sequence 
of releases. Predicted 2nd actual values are plotted for six 
01s (010 has no failures) in Fig. 5. Thc CM values for these 
plots are -0.152 and -0.065, respectively, indicating slight 
instability tvith respect to time to next failure. The 
corresponding standi?rd deviations are 0.693 and 0.630. 
We predicted valtics of Total Failures, Remaining Fdl- 
urcs, axid Time to Sexk Failure as indicators of the risk of 
operating software in the future: Is the predicted future 
reliability of software an acceptable risk? The risk to the 
mission may or may be not be acceptable. If the latter, we 
take action to improve the maintained product or the 
maintenance p x e s s .  We use actual valces to measure the 
reliability of software ar.d the risk of deploying it resulting 
from maintenance actiocs. 
0.107 
5.3 Summary 
We summarize change metric values in Table 4. Overall 
(i.e., average Chf), the values indicate marginal stability. If 
the majority of the results and the average CM were 
negative, this rvould be an alert to investigate the cause. The 
results could be causcd by: 1) greater functionality and 
complexity in the software over 2 sequence of releases, 2) a 
maintenance process that needs to be improwd, or 3) a 
combination of these causes. 
Average 
TABLE 4 
Change Metric Summary 
0.071 
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Fig. 6. Total test time to achieve remaining failures. 
6 METRlCS FOR LONG-TERM AND SHORT-TERM 
ANALYSIS 
In addition to the long-term maintenance criteria, i t  is 
desirable that the maintenance effort results in increasing 
reliability within each release or 01. One way to evaluate 
how well we achieve this goal i s  to predict and observe the 
amount of test time that is required to rexh a specified 
number of Remaining Failures. In adc3ion, we want tlie test 
effort to be efficient in finding residual faults for a given Oi. 
Furthermore, number of Remaining Failures serves as an 
indicator of the risk involved in using the maintained 
software (i.e., a high value of Remaining Failures portends a 
significant number of residual faults in the code). In the 
analysis that follows we use predictions and ackal data for 
a selected 01 to illustrate the process: OID. 
6.1 Total Test Time Requited for Specified 
Remaining Failures 
We predict the Total Test Timethat is required to achieve a 
spccificd number of Remaining Failures, r(t,), at time t i ,  by 
(7) [11, [171: 
tl = [log [a/(B [+)])\I  /5 (s - 1) (7) 
We plot predicted and actual Total Test Time for OID in 
Fig. 6 against given number of Reinainjng Failures. The two 
plots have similar shapes and show the typical asymptotic 
characteristic of reliability (e.g., Remaining Failures) vs. 
Total Test Time. These plots indicate the possibility of big 
gains in reliability in the early part of testing; eventudly the 
gains become marginal as testing continues. The figure also 
shows how risk is reduced with a decrease in Remaining 
Failures that is acconiplished with increased testing. 
Predicted values are used to gauge how much maintenance 
test effort would be required to achieve desired reliability 
goals and whether tlie predicted amount of Total Test Time 
is technically and economically feasible. We use actual 
values to judge whether the maintenance test effort has 
been efficient in relation to the achieved reliability. 
Decreasing Risk - ::I , , . , , , , , . , , , 
0.D.M 
5.9 8.a 7.41 a . ~  11.7 10.w zzm =Q wn 78.77 wim TOO 
Percent of Total Test Time 
Fig. 7. OiD failure rate. 
0 co . 
Stable When Nagative . 9 (i' 
6 1; 20 17 34 4 1  41 5s 62 69 76 83 90 97 
Percent of Total Teat Time 
Fig. 8. OID rate of change of failure rate. 
! - - , . I . ' . ' '  " ' . ~ ' ~ ' ~ ' " ~ " ' ~ ~ ' ' " ~  ' 
0.8 7 
0.2 r 
r r> _ I  ,....... 
Fic. 3. OID failure rate predicted vs. actual. 
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6.2 Failure Rate 
h the short term (i.e., within a release), we want the Failure 
Rate (l/MTTF) of an 01 to decrease over an 01's Total Test 
Time, indicating increasing reliability. Practically, we 
would look for a decreasing trend, after an initial period 
of instability (i.e., increasing rate as personnel learn how to 
maintain new software). In addition, we use various shape 
metrics, as defined previously, to see how quickly we can 
achieve reliability growth with respect to test time 
exyended. Furthermore, Failure Rate is an indicator of the 
risk involved in using the maintained software (i.e., an 
increasing failure rate indicates an increasing probability of 
failure with increasing use of the software). 
-- la1 2/83 I I .4 Payload Re-kiiaiufest Capabililies. -- 
_- .--- 66/M 5.9 Crcw Fhhtincemenrs. 
l(YS/84 12.2 Expcrimcntcll OiMr Autopilot. Fnhcnccd Gi.ound Chcckout. 
21 S/85 6.8 'Vi'cstctn Tcst Rangc. Fnhancc Pvorallant h m p s .  
- .  
(8) 
Failure Rate = Total Kumber of Failures 
During Tst/Total Test Time 
We plot (8) for OID in Fig. 7 against Total Test Time 
since the release of OID. Fig. 7 dues show that short-term 
stability is achieved (i.e., failure rate asymptotically 
approaches zero with increasing Total Test Time). In 
addition, this curve shows when the failure rate transitions 
from unstable (positive Failure Rate) to stable (negative 
Failure Rate). The figure also shows how risk is reduced 
with decreasing Failure Rate as the maintenance process 
stabilizes. Furthermore, in Fig. 8 we plot the rate of change 
(i.e., slope) of the Failure Rate of Fig. 7. This curve shows 
the percent of Total Test Time when the rate of change of 
Failure Rate reaches its maxinium negative value. We use 
these plots to assess whether we have achieved short-term 
TABLE 5 
Percent of Total Test Time Required to Achieve Reliability Goals and Change Metrics (CM) 
TABLE 6 
Shuttle Operational Increment Functonality 
Systeiii Lnprovemenrs. I 
Abort Enhanccmcnu. 
Extcndcd landing Sitcs. Tians-Atlantic Abort Cocc Co- 
Residency. 
Redesigned Abort Srqxnczr.  One Engine Auto Contingency Ahons. 
Hardware Chances I j r  &bikr. 
711 SJ93 
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Chronology of Process fmprovements 
Pro totyping 
Inspection Improvzments 
t'ornial Requirements Inspecrions 
Process Applied to Siippon Soliwxe 
Reconfiguration Certification 
Kcliability LModcling and Prcdiciion 
Yeor in which Process 









Formal Software Inspections 
I 
Formal Insuection Moderators 
Formalized Confi mration Control I 
Inspection Immovemenrs I 
Configuration Managcmenr Database I 
I 
I983 I Oversigh1 Analyses 
1984 i Formalized Reauinments Analvsis 
-- - - .
; Build AuroInation I 
i ! -  1990 1 Formdizcd Training 
stability in the maintenance process (i.e., whether Failure 
Rate decreases asymptotically with increasing Total Test 
Time), If we obtain contrary results, this would be an alert 
to investigate whether this is caused by: 1) greater 
fimctionalih and complexity of the 01  as it is being 
maintained, 2) a maintenarxe process that needs to be 
improved, or 3) a combination of these causes. 
Another way of looking at failure rate with respect to 
stability and risk is the annotated Failure Rate of OD 
shown in Fig. 9, where we show both the actual and 
predicted Failure Rates. W'e use (8) and (9) [l] to coapute 
the actual and predicted Failme Rates, respectively, where i 
is a vector of time intervals for i 2 s in (9). 
f ( i )  = a(~]CP(-9[r: - s i 1j; j (91 
A 30-day intervd has been found to be convenient as a 
unit of NAS.4 Space Shuttle test time because testing can 
last for many months or even years. Thus, this is the unit 
used in Fig. 9, where we show the following events in 
intervals, where the predictions were made at 12.73 
intervals: 
Release time: 0 interval, 
Launch time: 13.90 intervals, 
Predicted time of maximum Failure Rate: 6.0 intervals, 
Actual time of maximum Failure Rate: 7.43 intervals, 
Predicted maximum Failure Rate: 0.5735 failures 
per interval, and 
Actual maximum Failure Rate: 0.3351 failures per interval. 
In Fig. 9, stability is achieved after the maximum failure 
rate occurs. This is at i = s (i.e. i = 6 intervals) for 
predictions because (9) assumes a monotonically decreasing 
failure rate, whereas the actual failure rate increases, 
reaches a maximum at 7.43 intervals, and then decreases. 
Once stability is achieved, risk decreases. 
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6.3 Summary 
In addition to analyzing short-term stability with these 
metrics, we  use them to analyze long-term stability across 
releases. We show the results in Table 5 where the percent 
of Total Test Time to achieve reliability growth goals is 
tabulated for a set of OIs, using actual failure data, and the 
Change Metrics are computed. Overall, the values of CM 
indicate marginal instability. Interestingly, except for OID, 
the maximum negative rate of change of failure rate occurs 
when Failure Rate becomes stable, suggesting that max- 
imum reliability growth occurs when the maintenance 
process stzbilizes. 
7 SPACE SHUTTLE OPERATIONAL INC REMENT 
FUNCTIONALITY AND PROCESS IMPROVEMENT 
Table 6 shows the major functions of each 0 1  [12] along 
ttith the Release Date and KLOC Change ;epeated from 
Table 1 and Table 2. There is a not a me-for-one relation- 
ship between KLOC Change and the functionality of the 
change because, as stated earlier, KLOC is a.n indicator of 
maintenance actions, not functionality. However, the soft- 
ware developer statcs that there has been increasing 
software functionality and complexity with each 01, in 
some cases with less raflier than more KLOC [8 ] .  The focus 
of the early 01s was on launch, orbit, and landing. Later 
Oh, as indicated in Table 6, built u p o ~ .  this baseline 
fmctionality to add greater functionality in the form of MIR 
docking and the Global Positioning System (GPS), for 
example. Table 7 shows the process improvements that 
have been made over time on this 'project, indicating 
continuous process improvement across releases. 
The stability analysis that was performed yielded mixed 
results: About half are favorable and half are unfavorable. 
Somc variability in the results may be duc to gaps in thc data 
caused by 0 1 s  that have experienced insufficient failures to 
p s m i t  statistical analysis. Also,we note that thevalues of CII 
are marginal for both the favorable and unfavorable cases. 
Although there is not pronounced stability neither is there 
pronounced instability. If there were consistent and large 
negative values of CM, it would be cause for alarm and would 
suggest theneed to perform a thorough review of the process. 
This is not the case for the NASA Space Shuttlc. We suspect, 
but cannot prove, that in the absence of the process 
improvements of Table 7 the CM values would look much 
worse. It is very difficult to zssociate a specific product 
improvement with a specific process improvement. .4 
controlled experiment would be necessary to hold all process 
'fxtors constant and observe the one fnctor of interest and its 
influence on product quality. Tnis is infeasible to do in 
industrial organizations. However, we suggest that in the 
n g p p l e  a series of process improvements is beneficial for 
product quality and that a set of CM values can s~\rve to 
highlight possib!e process problems. 
8 Conclusions 
AS stated in the Introduction, tlne authors' emphasis in this 
paper was to propose a unified product and process 
ncasurernent model for both product evaluation and 
process stabilit\.. analysis. We wcrc less interested in the 
results of the NASA Space Shuttlc stability analysis, which 
was used to illtistrate the model concepts. The authors 
concluded, bassd on both predictive and retrospective use 
of reliability, risk, and test me:rics, that i t  is feasible to 
measure and asjess both product qua!ity and the stability of 
a maintenance process. The model is not domain specific. 
Different organizations may obtain different numerical 
results and trends t han  the ones w e  obtained for the SASA 
Space Shuttle. 
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Cost as the Universal COTS Metric 
We focus on factors that the user should consider 
when deciding whether to use COTS software. We take 
the approach of using the common dcnominator cusc. 
This is done for two rcasons: First, cost is obviously of 
interest in making such decisions and second a single 
mctric - cost in dollars - can bc used for evaluating the 
pros and cons of using COTS. The reason is that various 
software system attributes, like acquisition cost and 
availability (i.e.. thc percentage of scheduled operating 
time that the system is available for use), are non- 
commensurate quantitics. That is, we cannot relate 
quantitatively "a low acquisition cost" with "high 
availability". These uniis are neither additive nor 
multiplicative. However. i f  i t  were poss~ble t o  translaic 
availability into either a cost gain or loss for COTS 
software, we could operate on these metrics 
mathematically. Naturally, in addition to cost. the user 
application is key in rnakinz the decision. Thus one 
could dcvclop a matrix wherc one dimension is 
npplicntion and the other dimension is the various c05r 
efernenrs. We show how cost elements can be identified 
and how cost comparisons can be made over the rife of 
the software. Obviously, identifying the costs would not 
be casy. Thc uscr would havc to do a lot of work to set 
up the dccision matrix but oncc it was constructed, it  
would be a significant tool in the evaluation of COTS. 
Furthermore, even if all the required data cannot be 
collected, having a framework that defines software 
system attributes would serve as a user guide for factors 
to consider when making the decision about whether to 
use COTS software or in-house developed software. 
Certainly, different applications would havc varying 
degrees of retationships with the cost elements. For 
example, flight control software would have a stronger 
relationship with the cost of unavailability than a 
spreadsheet application. Conversely, the latter would 
have a stronger relationship with the cost of inadequacy 
of tool features than the former. Due to the difficulty of 
identifying specific COTS-related costs, our initial 
approach is to identify cost elements on the ordinal scale, 
Thus, the first version of the decision matrix would 
involve ordinal scale metrics (i.e., the cost of 
unreliability is more important for flight control software 
than for sprcadsheet applications). As the field of COTS 
analysis matures and as additional data is collected about 
the cost of using COTS, we will be able to refine our 
metrics to the ratio scale (e.p., thc cost of unreliability in  
COTS systems is two times that in  custom systems). 
The cost elements for comparing COTS software 
with in-house software are identified below. This list is 
not exhaustive; its purpose is to illustrate the approach. 
Thesc elements apply whether we are cornparing a 
system comprised of ail COTS components with all in- 
house components or comparing only a subset of COTS 
components with corresponding in-house components. 
Explanatory comments are made where necessary. Mean 
values are used for some quantities in the initial 
framework. This is the case because it will be a challenge 
to collcct any data for some applications. Thcrcforc. the 
initial framework should not be overly complex. 
Variance and statistical distribution information could bc 
included as enhancements if  the initial framework proves 
successful. 
Cost Elements 
C,(j) = Cost of acquiring COTS software in ycar j. 
CiQ) = Cost of developing in-house software in yearj. 
UcQ) = Cost of upgrading COTS software i n  year j. 
UiQ) = Cost of upgrading in-house software in  ycar j. 
P(i) = Cost of personnel who use the software system in 
year j. This quantity represents the value to the customer 
of using the software system. 
MJj) = Cost per unit time of repairing a fault in COTS 
softwarc i n  year j. This is the cost of customer time 
involved in resolving a problem with the vendor. 
MiG) = Cost per unit time of rcpairing a fault in in-house 
software in year j. 
U.S. Government Work Not Protected by U.S. Copyright 
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&(j) = Mean time of repairing a fault that causes a 
failure in  COTS software i n  year j. This is the average 
time that the user spends in resolving a problem with the 
vendor. 
Ri(j) = Mean time of repairing a fault that causes a 
failure in in-house software in  year j. 
TO) = Scheduled operating time for the software system 
in ycar j. 
A,(J = Availability of software system that uses 'COTS 
software in year j. 
Ai(j) = Availability of software system that uses software 
devcloped in-house in  yearj. 
These quantities are the fractions of T(j) that the software 
system is available for use. 
F,(j) = Failure rate of COTS software in year j 
.Fi(j) = Failure rate of COTS softwarc in  year j. 
These quantities are the number of failures per year that 
.causc loss of productivity and availability of the software 
.system: 
In some applications. some or all of the above 
quantities may be known or assumed to be constant over 
.the life of the software system. Using the above cost 
,elements, wc derive the equations for the annual costs of 
the two systems and the difference in thesc costs. In the 
.cost difference calculations that follow, a positive 
,quantity is favorable to in-house development and a 
*negative quantity is favorable to COTS. 
Cost of Acquiring Software 
Difference in annual cost = CcQ) - CiQ) 
.Cost of Upgrading Software 
(1) 
Difference in annual cost = Uc(j) - Ui(j) (2) 
Cost of Software being Unavailable for Use 
Annual cmt of COTS software being unavailable for use 
= ( I - M i ) )  * PW. 
Annual cost of the in-house software being unavailable 
for use 
= ( 1  -Ai(j)) * PG). 
Differcnce in  annual cost = PO.) * (A,G) - Ac(j)) 
Cost of Repairing Software 
(3) 
Average annual cost of repairing failed COTS software = 
FJj) * T(i) * R,(j) * Mc(j). 
Average annual cost of repairing failed in-house software 
= Fi(j) * T(j) * Ri(j) * MiCj). 
Difference in  annual cost = 
TG) * ((Fdj) * Rc(j) * MJj))  - ((FiG) * R,(j) * MiQ)) 
Then, TCj, total difference in cost in  year j, is the sum of 
( I ) ,  (2), (3). and (4). Because there is the opportunity to 
invest funds in  alternate projects, costs in  different years 
are not equivalent (i.e., funds available today have more 
value than an equal amount in  the future because they 
could be invested today and earn a future rcturn). 
Therefore, a stream of costs over the life of thc software 
for n years must be discounted by k, the ratc of return on 
alternate use of funds. Thus thc total discounted cost 
differential between COTS software and in-house 
software is: 
(4) 
Z:TC,/(I + k)' 
In this initial formulation, we have not included 
possible differences in functionality between the two 
approaches. However, a reasonable assumption is that 
COTS software would not be considered unless it could 
provide minimum functionality to satisfy user 
requirements. Thus, a typical decision for the user is 
whether it is worth the additional life cycle costs to 
develop an in-house software system with all the 
desirable attributes. 
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Abstract 
We develop a new metric, Relative Critical Value De- 
viation (RCVD), for classifiing and predicting sof iare 
quality. The RCVD is based on the concept that the extent 
to which a metric's value deviates from its critical value, 
normalized by the scale of the metric, indicates the degree 
to which the item being measured does not conform to a 
specified norm. For example, the deviation in body tem- 
perature above 98.6 Fahrenheit degrees is a surrogate for 
fever. Similar&, the RCVD is a surrogate for the extent to 
which the quality of software deviates from acceptable 
norms (eg., zero discrepancy reports). Early in develop- 
ment, surrogate metrics are needed to make predictions of 
quality before quality data are available. The RCVD can 
be computed for a single metric or multiple metrics. Its 
application is in assessing newly developed modules by 
their quality in the absence of quality data. The RCVD is a 
part of the larger framework of our measurement models 
that include the use of Boolean Discriminant Functions 
for cIassi3ing software quality. We demonstrate our con- 
cepts using Space Shuttle flight software data. 
Keywords: Quality classifkation and prediction, relative 
critical value deviation metrics. 
1. Introduction 
Our goal is to provide models and processes to assist 
software managers in answering the following questions: 
How can I control the quality of my software? 
How can I predict the quality of my software? 
How shall I prioritize my effort to achieve my quality 
goals? 
How can I determine whether my quality goals are 
being met? 
How much will it cost to achieve my quality goals? 
We develop quality control and prediction models that are 
used to identify modules requiring priority attention dur- 
ing development and maintenance. This is accomplished 
in two activities: validation and application. During vali- 
dation, we use a build of the software that has been devel- 
oped as the source of data to compute Boolean Discrimi- 
nant Functions (BDFs), Relative Critical Value Deviation 
(RCVD) metrics, and regression equations that we use to 
retrospectively classify and predict quality with specified 
accuracy, by build and module. Using these functions and 
equations during application, we classify and predict the 
quality of new software that is being developed. This is 
the quality we expect to achieve during maintenance. 
During validation, both quality factor (e.g., discrepancy 
reports of deviations between requirements and imple- 
mentation) and software metrics (e.g., size, structural) data 
are available; during application, only the latter are avail- 
able. During validation, we construct Boolean discrimi- 
nant functions (BDFs) comprised of a set of metrics and 
their critical values (i.e., thresholds) [1, 21. We select the 
best BDF based on its ability to achieve the maximum 
relative incremental qualitylcost ratio. During application, 
if at least one of the module's metrics has a value that ex- 
ceeds its critical value, the module is identified as "high 
priority" (i.e., low quality); otherwise, it is identified as 
"low priority" (i.e., high quality). Our objective is to iden- 
tify and correct quality problems during development, as 
opposed to waiting until maintenance when the cost of 
correction would be high. This process addresses the 
question: "How can I control the quality of my software?" 
Because BDFs only provide an acceptlreject decision on 
module quality, during validation, we also construct 
RCVDs that are used to prioritize the effort applied to 
rejected modules. In other words, an RCVD measures the 
degree to which quality is low. This process addresses the 
question: "How shall I prioritize my effort to achieve my 
quality goals? 
A RCVD is a derived metric, based on the normalized 
deviation between a metric's value and its critical value. It 
may be based on a single or multiple metrics. In our proc- 
ess, we: 1) identify the critical values of the metrics and 2) 
find the optimal BDF and RCVD based on their ability to 
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satisfy both statistical and application criteria. Statistical 
criteria refer to the ability to correctly classify the software 
(i.e., classify high quality software as high quality and low 
quality software as low quality). Application criteria refer 
to the ability to achieve a high qualitylcost ratio. This pro- 
cess addresses the questions: "HOW can I determine 
whether my quality goals are being met?" and "How much 
will it cost to achieve my quality goals?" 
RCVD values that exceeded the .80 percentile value 
were able to account for two-thirds of the discrepancy 
reports. To round out our approach, we use regression 
equations to predict quality limits. This is desirable be- 
cause, although BDFs and RCVDs control and predict 
quality based on expected values, they are not capable of 
predicting the range of quality values. 
We show that it is important to perform a marginal 
analysis (i.e., identification of the incremental contribution 
of each metric to improving quality) when making a deci- 
sion about how many metrics to include in the BDFs and 
RCVDs. If many metrics are added to the set at once, the 
contribution of individual metrics is obscured. Also, the 
marginal analysis provides an effective rule for deciding 
when to stop adding metrics. 
The contributions of this research are the following: 1) 
the Relative Critical Value Deviation (RCVD) is a new 
metric for classifying and predicting software quality; 2) 
the RCVDs in combination with the BDFs we previously 
developed, allow the software manager to both control 
quality and prioritize the effort required to achieve quality 
goals; 3) BDFs, RCVDs, and regression equations are 
integrated into a process to assist the software manager in 
answering the questions posed in the introduction; and 4) 
the data and most of the calculations are implemented in a 
spreadsheet for easy transfer to practitioners. 
1.1 Related Research 
Our models are in the class of models concerned with 
the classification, control, and prediction of quality. Other 
researchers have had similar objectives but different ap- 
proaches. Porter and Selby used classification trees to par- 
tition multiple metric value space so that a sequence of 
metrics and their critical values could be identified that 
were associated with either high quality or low quality 
software [3]. This technique is closely related to our ap- 
proach of identifying a set of metrics and their critical 
values that will satisfy quality and cost criteria. However, 
we use statistical analysis to make the identification. 
Briand et al. used logistic regression to classify mod- 
ules as fault-prone or not fault-prone as a function of vari- 
ous object oriented metrics [4]. In another example of 
logistic regression, Khoshgoftaar and Allen used it to clas- 
sify modules as fault-prone or not fault-prone as a function 
of faults, requirements, performance, and documentation 
software trouble report metrics [5]. While one of our ob- 
jectives is similar -- classify modules as either high quality 
or low quality -- we derive from this binaly classification 
several predictive continuous quality and cost metrics, 
including the RCVDs. These metrics are used to predict 
the quality of software that will be delivered by develop- 
ment to maintenance and the cost of achieving it. 
Khoshgoftaar et al. used nonparametric discriminant 
analysis in each iteration of a military system project to 
predict fault-prone modules in the next iteration [6] .  This 
approach provided early indication of reliability and the 
risk of implementing the next iteration. They conducted a 
similar study involving a telecommunications application, 
again using nonparametric discriminant analysis, to clas- 
sify modules as either fault-prone or not fault-prone [7]. 
Our approach has the same objective but we produce 
BDFs and RCVDs in terms of the original metrics as op- 
posed to using density functions as discriminators. 
Khoshgoftaar and Allen have also developed models 
for ranking modules for reliability improvement according 
to their degree of fault-proneness as opposed to whether 
they are fault-prone or not [8]. They used Alberg Dia- 
grams [9] that predict percentage of faults as a function of 
percentage of modules by ordering modules in decreasing 
order of faults and noting the cumulative number of faults 
corresponding to various percentages of modules. Our 
approach is similar but we accomplish the same objective 
by sorting the modules by RCVD and finding its percen- 
tile distribution and the corresponding drcount percentile 
distribution, as we explain later. 
2. Discriminative Power Model 
2.1. Discriminative Power Validation 
Using our metrics validation methodology [lo, 111, 
and the Space Shuttle flight software metrics and discrep- 
ancy reports (DRs), we validate metrics with respect to the 
quality factor drcount. This is the number of discrepancy 
reports written against a module. In brief, this involves 
conducting statistical tests to determine whether there is a 
high degree of association between drcount and candidate 
metrics. As shown in Figure 1, we validate metrics on 
Build 1 (1397 modules) and apply them to Build 2 (846 
modules) of the Space Shurtle flight software. Nikora and 
Munson argue for the need of a measurement baseline 
against which evolving systems may be compared [12]. 
Our baseline is Build 1 in Figure 1. The measurement re- 
sults from Build 1 provide the data source for controlling 
and predicting the quality delivered to maintenance and 
for comparing predicted with actual quality, once the latter 
is known. Next, we define Discriminative Power. 
2.1.1. Discriminative Power 
Given the elements Mij of a matrix of n modules and 
m metrics (ie., nm metric values), the elements MCj of a 
vector of m metric critical values, the elements Fi of a 
vector of n quality factor values, and scalar FC of quality 
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factor critical value, M,, must be able to discriminate with 
respect to F,, for a specified FC, as shown below: 
M ,  > M ,  tf F, > FC andM, S M ,  cf F, I FC (1) 
for i=1,2, ...,XI, and j=1,2, ..., m with specified a, where a is 
the significance level of various statistical tests that are 
used for estimating the degree to which a set of metrics 
can correctly classify software quality. In other words, do 
the indicated metric relations imply corresponding quality 
factor relations in (l)? This criterion assesses whether MC, 
has sufficient Discriminative Power to be capable of dis- 
tinguishing a set of high quality modules from a set of low 
quality modules. If so, we use the critical values in Quality 
Control and Prediction described below. The validation 
process is illustrated in Figure 1, where the critical values 
MC, are produced during the Test phase of Build 1 by us- 
ing the metrics M,, from the Design phase and the quality 
factor F, ( e g ,  drcount) available in the Test phase. (Dis- 
crepancy Reports are written against the software 
throughout development but they are not significantly 
complete until the end of the Test phase during which 
failures are observed). The desired quality level is set by 
the choice of FC. The lower its value, the higher the 
quality requirement; conversely, the higher its value, the 
lower the requirement. A value of zero is appropriate for 
safety-critical systems like the Space Shuttle. 
2.2. Relative Critical Value Deviation (RCVD) 
Metric 
The RCVD is based on the concept that the extent to 
which a metrick value deviates from its critical value, 
normalized by the scale of the metric, is an indicator of the 
degree to which the entity being measured does not con- 
form to a specified norm. For example, the extent to which 
body temperature exceeds 98.6 degrees Fahrenheit is an 
indicator of the deviation from an established norm of 
human health. Measurement involves using surrogates: the 
deviation in temperature above 98.6 degrees is a surrogate 
for fever. Similarly, the RCVD is a surrogate for the ex- 
tent that software quality deviates from acceptable norms 
(e.g., zero discrepancy reports). The concept of the RCVD 
is shown in Figure 2, where the metric and quality scales 
are shown, defined by the maximum (MX,, and minimum 
(MNJ) metric boundaries and the maximum (FX) and 
minimum (FN) quality boundaries, respectively. The the- 
ory of the RCVD is given by the following relation: 
( M y  - MC , ) / (MX, - MN ,) ( F ,  - FC )/(FX - FN ) (2) 
This means that the deviation of a metric from its 
critical value, normalized by metric length, is related to 
the degree of quality, as represented by the normalized 
deviation of a quality factor (e.g., drcount) from its criti- 
cal values: increasing positive deviations are related to 
decreasing quality and increasing negative deviations are 
related to increasing quality. It should not be inferred that 
RCVD 'I = 
the relationship is linear or proportional; in fact, it is non- 
linear. In the idealized diagram in Figure 2, the worst 
quality corresponds to MX, and FX, the best quality to MN, 
and FN, and acceptable quality to MC, and FC. Also, Fig- 
ure 2 does not indicate the mathematical form of F,. If FN 
is equal to zero and F, is set equal to zero, which is fre- 
quently the case, F, and FX can be replaced by the sum of 
the quality factor across a set of modules and the total 
quality factor, respectively. This quantity is the proportion 
of drcount computed across a set of modules. An RCVD 
can also be comprised of multiple metrics by computing 
their mean. Note that although it would not be valid to 
compute the mean of metrics, the mean of RCVDs is an- 
other story since these are normalized dimensionless 
quantities. We experimented with both single and multiple 
metric RCVDs, as we explain later. 
2.3. Quality Control and Prediction 
Quality control is the evaluation of modules with re- 
spect to predetermined critical values of metrics. The pur- 
pose of quality control is identify software that does not 
meet quality requirements early in the development proc- 
ess so corrective action can be taken when the cost is low. 
Quality control is applied during the Design phase of 
Build 2 in Figure 1 to flag software for detailed inspection 
that is below quality limits. The validated BDFs, com- 
prised of the metrics M,, and their critical values MC, that 
are obtained from Build 1,  are used to either accept or 
reject the modules of Build 2 [ 1, 21. At this point during 
the development of Build 2, only the metric data M,J and 
MC, are available. The validated RCVDs are used to pri- 
oritize the attention and effort devoted to modules that are 
rejected by the BDFs. Details are given later. 
Quality predictions are used by the developer to antici- 
pate rather than react to quality problems. Figure 1 shows 
the metrics controlling and predicting the quality of soft- 
ware that will be delivered to maintenance ear& in the 
development of Build 2. Accompanied by rigorous in- 
spection and test, this process will result in improved 
quality of Build 2 and the software that is released to 
maintenance. Once all of the quality factor data Ft (e.g., 
drcount) have been collected for Build 2, at the end of the 
Test phase as shown in Figure 1, the quality of Build 2 
would be known. This, then, becomes the actual quality of 
Build 2 in the maintained software. Regression equations 
F,=f(M,,) are developed during the Test phase of Build 1 
and applied to predicting quality limits during the Design 
Phase of Build 2, as shown in Figure 1. This process ad- 
dresses the question: "How can I predict the quality of my 
software?" 
3. Validation Methodology 
We use a five stage process to select metrics and met- 
ric functions for quality control and prediction: 1) com- 
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pute critical values of the candidate metrics; 2) for the set 
of candidate metrics and critical values, find the optimal 
BDF based on statistical and application criteria; 3) apply 
a stopping rule for adding metrics; 4) identify the best 
RCVD for prioritizing quality assurance effort; and 5) 
develop a regression equation that will accurately predict 
quality limits (e.g., limits of drcount). Table 1 provides a 
functional description of each stage. The five stages take 
place during the Test Phase of Build 1 of Figure 1, once 
all the quality factor data Fi (e.g., drcount) are available. 
The next sections describe the analysis for each stage. 
3.1. Stage 1: Compute Critical Values 
Critical values MCl are computed based on the Kol- 
mogorov-Smimov (K-S) test [ l ,  21. Table 1 shows the 
metric definitions, critical values MC,, and K-S distances 
for six metrics of Build 1. These metrics were selected 
based on their relatively high K-S distance compared to 
other metrics that had been collected on the Space Shuttle. 
The test statistic is the maximum vertical difference be- 
tween the CDFs of two complementary sets of data (e.g., 
the CDFs of Mo for drcountsFC and drcount>FC). If the 
difference is significant (i.e., a<.005), the value of M,, 
corresponding to maximum CDF difference is used for 
MC,. This relationship is expressed in equation (3). Met- 
r i c ~  are added to the BDF in order of their K-S Distance. 
(3) 
K -S  (MC,)= 
max{cDF (M, / (F ,  I FC ))I- [CDF (M, / (F ,  > FC ))I) 
3.2. Stage 2: Form a Set of Boolean Discriminate 
Functions (BDFs) 
For each BDF identified in Stage 1 we use Table 2 to 
further evaluate the ability of the functions to discriminate 
high quality from low quality, from both statistical (e.g., 
misclassification rates) and application (e.g., ability of the 
metric set to correctly classify low quality modules) 
standpoints. In Table 2, MC, and FC classify modules into 
one of four categories. The left column contains modules 
where none of the metrics exceeds its critical value; this 
condition is expressed with a Boolean AND function of 
the metrics. This is the ACCEPT column, meaning that 
according to the classification decision made by the met- 
r i c~ ,  these modules have acceptable quality. The right col- 
umn contains modules where at least one metric exceeds 
its critical value; this condition is expressed by a Boolean 
OR function of the metrics. This is the REJECT column, 
meaning that according to the classification decision made 
by the metrics, these modules have unacceptable quality. 
The top row contains modules that are high quality; these 
modules have a quality factor that does not exceed its 
critical value (e.g., drcount=O). The bottom row contains 
modules that are low quality; these modules have a quality 
factor that exceeds its critical value (e.g., drcount>O). 
Equation (4) gives the algorithms for making the cell 
counts, using the BDFs of F, and M,, that are calculated 
over the n modules for m metrics. This equation is an im- 
plementation of the relation given in (1). 
C , t = C ? y T  FOR ((F,5FC)h(MII<MCi) ...h(M,,5MC,)...h(M,5MCrn)) 
czZ=co* FOR ((F,>Fc)~((M, ,>MG) ...v (M~,>MC,) ...v (M, >MC,))) 
for j=l, ..., m, and where COUNT(i)=COUNT(i-1)+1 FOR 
Boolean expression true and COUNT(i)=COUNT(i- l), 
otherwise; COUNT(O)=O. The counts (C,,, CI2, C,,, and 
Ct,) correspond to the cells of Table 2, where row and 
column totals are also shown: n, n,, nt, N,, and N,. 
In addition to counting modules in Table 2, we must 
also count the quality factor (e.g., drcount) that is incor- 
rectly classified. This is shown as Remaining Factor, RF, 
in the ACCEPT column. This is the quality factor count on 
modules that should have been rejected. Also shown is 
Total Factor, TF, the total quality factor count on all the 
modules in the build. Table 2 and subsequent equations 
show an example validation, where the combination of 
metrics from Table 1 and their critical values for Build 1 is 
prologue size (P) with a critical value of 63, statements 
(S) with a critical value of 27, and eta2 (E2) with a critical 
value of 45. This is the optimal BDF. Later we will ex- 
plain how we arrived at this particular combination of 
metrics as the optimal set. The results of the following 
calculations for the optimal BDF are shown in Table 3. 
3.2.1. Statistical Criteria 
We validate a BDF statistically by demonstrating that 
it partitions Table 2 so that C,, and C,, are large relative to 
C,, and Cz,. If this is the case, a large number of high 
quality modules (e.g., modules with drcounz=O) would 
have M~SMC, and would be correctly classified as high 
quality. Similarly, a large number of low quality modules 
(e.g., modules with drcount>O) would have Mij>MCj and 
would be correctly classified as low quality. We evaluate 
partitioning ability using the misclassification rates. 
3.2.2. Misclassification 
We compute the degree of misclassification in Table 
2 by noting that ideally C,,=n,=N,, C,,=O, C,,=O, 
C,,=n,=N,. The extent to which this is not the case is esti- 
mated by Type I misclassifications (i.e., the module has 
Low Quality and the metrics %ay” it has High Quality) 
and Type 2 misclassifications (i.e., the module has High 
Quality and the metrics %ay” it has Low Quality). Thus, 
we define the following measures of misclassification: 
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Proportion of Type 1 : PI = c,,/n 
For the example, p ,  = (35/1397)*100 = 2.51% (5) 
(6) 
Proportion of Type 2 : p2  = C12/n 
For the example, p ,  = (344/1397)* 100 = 24.62% 
3.2.3. Application Criteria 
Because it is the performance of the metrics in the ap- 
plication context that counts, we also validate metrics with 
respect to the application criteria QuaIity and Inspection, 
which are related to quality achieved and the cost to 
achieve it, respectively [l, 21. During the Design phase of 
Build 2 in Figure 1, we predict that the quality computed 
by equations (7)--(9) will be delivered to maintenance, 
assuming that the modules rejected by the quality control 
process are inspected and tested and that the problems that 
are found are corrected. Furthermore, we predict that the 
degree of inspection computed by equation (1 0) will be 
required to achieve this quality. In addition to controlling 
and predicting quality, equations (7)--(9) can be used to 
address the question: "How can I determine whether my 
quality goals are being met?" For example, if a quality 
goal is ~ 3 %  residual defects, the achievement of this goal 
can be measured by RFP -- equation (9). Also, the degree 
of rigorous inspection -- equation (1 0) can be used to ad- 
dress the question: "How much will it cost to achieve my 
quality goals?" 
3.2.4. Quality 
First, we estimate the metrics' ability to correctly 
classify quality, given that the quality is known to be low: 
LQC :proportion of low quality (e.g., drcount > 0) 
For the example, LQC=(541/576)* 100=93.92%. 
Second, we estimate the metrics' ability to correctly 
classify quality, given that the BDF has classified modules 
as ACCEPT. This is done by summing quality factor in the 
ACCEPT column in Table 2 to produce Remaining Factor, 
RF (e.g., remaining drcount), given by equation (8). 
RF = XF, FOR ((F, > FC) A (M,I 5 MC I) ... A 
(M, 5 MC,) ...A (M, 5 MC,)) 
software correctly classified= CJn2  (7) 
7 (8) !"I 
forj=l, ..., m. This is the sum of F, (e.g., drcount) on mod- 
ules incorrectly classified as high quality because, for 
these modules, (F~>FC)A(M;~SMC,). 
We estimate the proportion of RF by equation (9), 
where TF is the total F, for the build. 
For the example, from Table 2 there are 56 DRs on 35 
modules that are incorrectly classified (i.e., RF=56). The 
total number of DRs for the 1397 modules is 2579. There- 
fore, RFP=(56/2579)*100=2.17%. 
(9) RFP = RF/TF 
3.2.5. Inspection 
Inspection is one of the costs of high quality. We are 
interested in weighing inspection requirements (i.e., per- 
cent of modules rejected and subjected to detailed inspec- 
tion) against the quality that is achieved, for various 
BDFs. We estimate inspection requirements by noting that 
all modules in the REJECT column of Table 2 must be 
inspected; this is the count C,,+C,. Thus, the proportion of 
modules that must be inspected is given by: 
(10) I = ( G 2  + c*2)/n 
For the example, 1=((344+541)/1397)*100=63.35% and 
the percentage accepted is 1-1 = 36.65%. 
3.2.6. Summary of Validation Results 
Table 3 summarizes the results of the validation ex- 
ample. The properties of dominance and concordance are 
evident in these validation results and in other data we 
have analyzed from the Space Shuttle. That is, a point is 
reached in adding metrics where Discriminative Power is 
not increased because: 1) the contribution of the dominant 
metrics in correctly classifying quality has already taken 
effect and 2) additional metrics essentially replicate the 
classification results of the dominant metrics -- the con- 
cordance effect. This result is due to the property of the 
BDF used as an OR function, causing a module to be re- 
jected if only one of its metrics exceeds its critical value. 
3.3. Stage 3: Apply a Stopping Rule for Adding 
Metrics 
It is important to strike a balance between quality and 
cost (i.e., between FWP and I). Thus we add metrics until 
the ratio of the relative change in RFP to the relative 
change in I is maximum, as given by the Qua& Inspec- 
tion Ratio in equation (1 l), where i refers to the previous 
RFP and I: 
For the example, QIR(P,S-P,S, E2)= (( I .2.17- 
2.95 I )/2.95)/((63.35-60.13)/60.13)=4.91. Therefore, we 
stop adding metrics after eta2 (E2) has been added. 
3.3.1. Comparison of BDF Validation with Applica- 
tion Results 
In order to compare validation with application re- 
sults, we first show how BDF Table looks in the Design 
phase of Build 2 in Figure 1, when only the metrics M, 
and their critical values MCi are available. This is shown 
in Table 4, where the 'I?" indicates that the quality factor 
data F, are not available when the validated metrics are 
used in the quality control function of Build 2. During the 
Design phase of Build 2, modules are classified according 
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to the criteria that have been described. Whereas 36.65% 
(512/1397) and 63.35% (885/1397) modules were ac- 
cepted and rejected, respectively, during Build 1 (see Ta- 
ble 2), 26.95% (228/846) and 73.05 % (618/846) modules 
were accepted and rejected, respectively, during Build 2 
(see Table 4). The rejected modules would be given prior- 
ity attention (i.e., subjected to rigorous inspection). 
A comparison of the Validation (Build 1) with the Ap- 
plication (Build 2) with respect to statistical and applica- 
tion criteria are shown in Table 5. To have a basis for 
comparison with the validation results, we computed the 
values shown in Table 5 retrospectively (i.e., after Build 2 
was far enough along to be able to collect all of the quality 
factor data at the conclusion of the Test phase). The values 
for Build 2 are the actual quality delivered to maintenance, 
as shown during the Test phase of Figure 1. The results of 
the two builds are comparable. Note that the same critical 
values computed during Build 1 were used on Build 2. 
This procedure is necessary because the quality factor data 
that is used in the K-S test in Stage 1 is not available dur- 
ing the Design Phase of Build 2 in Figure 1. This transfer- 
ability of model parameters is key to our process because 
the point of validation is to apply its results to other but 
similar software when the quality factor data is not avail- 
able for the latter. Also, we have found that to apply this 
approach, Build 2 does not have to be a direct descendant 
of Build 1. Builds 1 and 2 do not have this relationship. 
3.4. Stage 4: Form a Set of Relative Critical 
Value Metrics (RCVD) 
Granularity of data is an issue that does not seem to 
have been discussed much in the literature but one that we 
have found to be of great importance in metrics analysis. 
By granularity we refer to the level of data (e.g., module, 
module sets, build) that will yield useful results when the 
data are used in a model. This was an issue in our research 
to develop an RCVD suitable for use as a second level 
discriminant in controlling and predicting quality. By sec- 
ond level we mean that the RCVD comes into play after 
the optimal BDF has done its job of either accepting or 
rejecting a module. Although the BDF is very useful, it 
does not indicate the degree of quality (e.g., number of 
DRs) on a rejected module or set of rejected modules. Our 
original objective was to provide discrimination at the 
module level (i.e., rank the drcount in modules by 
RCVD). Due to the large number of modules with zero 
DRs (58.77% and 50.59% for Build 1 and Build 2, re- 
spectively) and the large variability of the data, this did 
not prove feasible. However, by sorting the modules by 
RCVD and finding its percentile distribution and the cor- 
responding drcount percentile distribution, we were able 
to identify key points in the plots of these distributions. 
We call these points breakpoints. These are points in the 
percentile distributions where the slope of the percentile 
curve starts to increase sharply. An example is shown in 
Figure 3, where percentile drcount is plotted against per- 
centile prologue size. A break point occurs at 30 percen- 
tile (80%) on the X-axis. This corresponds to RCVD 
(prologue size)=O.517. This value corresponds to a Y-axis 
value of .35 (35%). Thus for values of RCVD greater than 
.0517, we estimate that the RCVD would identify 65% of 
the drcount. Thus we see that a difference of only .20 per- 
centile (1.00-30) of the RCVD accounts for a difference 
in .65 percentile (1 .OO-.35) of the drcount. In order to im- 
plement this process, we validate function (12) for sets of 
metrics during the Test Phase of Build 2, in Figure 1, 
when the quality factor data F, are available. Then we ap- 
ply function (12) during the Design Phase of Build 2, 
when no quality factor date is available for Build 2. 
This means that in addition to rejecting modules -- the 
function performed by the BDF -- there is further classifi- 
cation performed by the RCVD. Any modules that evalu- 
ate to true in (12), would receive special attention because 
the likelihood is that they would contain multiple DRs. 
This is illustrated in Table 6 where 65.37% of the drcount 
is identified by RCVD (prolo,oue size) in combination 
with the BDF on Build 1, corresponding to a drcount den- 
sity of 6.08. This is in contrast with a density of .80 on 
modules where (12) does not evaluate to true and 2.85 
when the BDF alone is used. Similar results are observed 
for Build 2 in Table 6. These results indicate the quality 
that would be delivered to maintenance unless action is 
taken in inspection and test to correct the defects. 
We experimented with using all six metrics of Table 1 
in the RCVD. We used all six in order to have sufficient 
data to make the computation feasible. RCVD was worse 
than RCVD (prologue size), as can be seen in Table 6, in 
terms of both percentage of drcount classified and drcount 
density. Since RCVD (prologue size) is much easier to 
compute, it was the preferred RCVD to apply to Build 2, 
as shown in Table 6. This result is due to the dominance 
and concordance properties of metrics mentioned earlier. 
In addition, the result is due to the fact that prologue size 
contains a thorough change history comprised of the fol- 
lowing notations in the program listing: module; purpose 
of the module; specification reference; change request; 
discrepancy report; release; release date; revision level; 
programmer; description of change; listing of statements 
affected by the change; indication of whether a statement 
is added, deleted, or changed; and program comments. We 
use prologue size as a predictor of drcount in the aggre- 
gate (i.e., the cumulative quantity of entries in the pro- 
gram), not on a one-for-one basis of a change possibly 
resulting in a DR. 
A seemingly trivial but yet important aspect of this 
stage of the analysis was demonstrating the usefulness of 
sorting data to examine their distributions and the flexibil- 
ity for doing this provided by a spreadsheet program. 
V (M,, MC,)A RCVD, (12) 
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3.5. Stage 5: Identify Quality Limit Predictors 4. Summary and Conclusions 
The final stage of the analysis involves identifying 
regression equations for predicting the average and limits 
of quality (e.g., drcount) of module sets, F,=f(M,, ), during 
the Test Phase of Build 1, as shown in Figure 1. This pro- 
cess is desirable because BDFs and RCVDs are not capa- 
ble of predicting quality limits. During the Test phase of 
Build 1, regression coefficients are estimated and the re- 
sultant equation is applied, during the Design Phase of 
Build 2 ,  to predict the quality limits that would be deliv- 
ered to maintenance unless action is taken to correct the 
defects. As in the case of forming the RCVDs, granularity 
of data was an issue. Again, because of the large number 
of modules with zero drcount and the large variability of 
the data, prediction at the individual module level was not 
feasible. However, applying OUT earlier regression work 
for the Space Shuttle [13], where we found that if we di- 
vided the data into the appropriate number of frequency 
classes (i.e., modules sets), according to Sturges’ rule [ 141, 
usable regression equations could be developed based on 
the averages computed for the classes. In that work, we 
only predicted average values. We now extend the ap- 
proach to include predicting quality limits. We experi- 
mented with various sets of predictor variables. The model 
results are shown in Table 7. The equation we selected is 
the exponential function using average statements (ave S): 
(13) 
This equation was selected for application to Build 2 for 
the following reasons: 1) lowest Mean Square Error 
(MSE) in Table 7; 2) fair accuracy in predicting Build 1 
drcount; 3) theoretical consideration that the rate of 
change of drcount with module size would vary with 
module size (property of exponential distribution); and the 
relative ease of collecting size data. Although the F-ratio 
and R2 are impressive for the linear function using nodes, 
this equation has a relatively high MSE and the collection 
of nodes requires the use of a metrics analyzer. 
Prediction results are shown in Figures 4 -- 7. The 
figures show the following for average drcount for sets of 
100 modules (1 -- 100, 101 -- 200, etc.): Figure 4, actual 
and predicted values for Build 1; Figure 5, actual and pre- 
dicted limits for Build 1; Figure 6, actual and predicted 
values for Build 2;  and Figure 7, actual and predicted 
limits for Build 2 .  Figure 7 shows that the prediction lim- 
its bracket the actual values for Build 2. This is another 
example of retrospective analysis: once the quality factor 
data F, are available during the Test Phase of Build 2, Fig- 
ure 1, the actual drcount can be compared with the predic- 
tions. In the application of the prediction equation, the 
software manager would compute the average size of sets 
of modules and predict the drcount and the limits of 
drcount for each module set, as shown in Figures 6 and 7, 
respectively. 
avedrcount = exp(0.1137 + 0.0056697 * aveS) 
We developed a new metric, Relative Critical Value 
Deviation (RCVD), for classifying and predicting software 
quality. When the granularity of data was considered, the 
RCVD proved to be a useful indicator of the degree to 
which software quality deviates from a specified norm. 
We discovered that the major application of the RCVD 
was to prioritize the effort required to achieve quality 
goals. At the outset we posed several questions that the 
software manager wants answered concerning software 
quality. We provided an integrated set of models based on 
Boolean discriminant functions, RCVDs, and regression 
equations to address these questions. We made a thorough 
evaluation of two builds - one was used for validation and 
the other for application -- using a five-stage analysis ap- 
proach. In the three areas of our modeling effort, the pre- 
dictions for the application build were close to the actual 
values. Based on these preliminary results and the fact that 
we have done analysis on additional Space Shuttle data, 
we feel that the models, not the specific numerical results, 
are transferable to other organizations, if the models are 
applied within and not across application domains. How- 
ever, to increase our confidence in the results, in future 
research we will examine several additional builds of the 
Space ShuttZe flight software, Finally, we found that mun- 
dane aspects of the analysis like data sorting to discover 
information about distributions of data and the use of 
spreadsheet calculations significantly aided the analysis. 
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Table 5: Comparison of Validation (Build 1, n=1397 modules) with Application (Build 2, n=846 modules) 
Critical Values Statistical Criteria Application Criteria 
Metric Set l P l  s j  E2 I P, Yo PtYo I LQC O/o 1 RFP Yo I QIR 1 I Yo 
Validation P, S, E2 I 63 I 27 1 45 I 2.51 24.62 1 93.92 1 2.17 I 4.91 I 63.35 
Application P, S, E2 I 63 I 27 I 45 I 3.07 26.71 I 93.78 I 2.69 1 9.11 I 73.05 
P: prologue size, S :  statements, E2: eta2 ~ ~~~ I 
I Table 6: Comparison of Relative Critical Value Deviation (RCVD) Discriminative Power 
Build 1 (Validation) Build 2 (Application) 
RCVD (prologue size) I RCVD @rologue size) RCVD (six mmics\ 
I - 
.80 Percentile RCVD I 
Value (Break Point) I 
BDF A RCVD 1 ((P>63)V(S>27)V(E2>45)) I ((P>63)V(S>27)V(E2>45)) ((P>63)V( S>27)V(E2>45)) 
A(RCVD>. 1026) A(RCVD>.OS 17) A(RCVD>.0777) 
drcount identified 1400 1686 1002 
(percent) (54.28) (65.37) (62.74) 
modules with drcount 263 280 173 
identified (percent) (18.83) (20.04) (20.45) 
drcount density 5.32 6.02 5.79 
(drcoun tlmodule) 
modules 
drcount density for other 1.04 .80 .88 
BDF ((€‘>63)V(S>27)V(E2>45)) 
drcount density 2.85 I 2.5 1 
1. RCVD (six metrics): mean of RCVDs of six metrics in Table 1 
2. drcount identified: count of DRs on modules rejected by BDF A RCVD; percent of total DRs 
3. modules with drcount identified: count of modules rejected by BDF A RCVD; percent of total modules 
4. drcount density: drcountlmodule count 
5. drcount densiw for other modules: modules other than those rejected by BDF A RCVD 
Build 2: Application 
aveS I Exponential 1 56.94 I .851 1 0.437 I 1637 I 1597 
S: statements, N: nodes, MSE: mean square error computed between predicted and actualdrcount 
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Investigation of the Risk to Software Reliability of Requirements Changes 
Th 1999 NASA Workshop on Risk Management, Morgantown, West Virginia. October 28-29, 
1999, 13 pages. 
Norman F. Schneidenind 
BACKGROUND 
While software design and code metrics have enjoyed some success as predictors of software 
quality attributes such as reliability [KH0961 , KH0962, LAN95, MUN96. OHL961, the 
measurement field is stuck at this level of achievement. If measurement is to advance to a higher 
level, we must shift our attention to the front-end of the development process. because it is 
during system conceptualization that errors in specifying requirements are inserted into the 
process. A requirements change may induce ambiguity and uncertainty in the development 
process that cause errors in implementing the changes. Subsequently, these errors propagate 
through later phases of development and maintenance. These errors may result in significant 
risks associated with implementing the requirements. For example, reliability risk (i.e., risk of 
faults and failures induced by changes in requirements) may be incurred by deficiencies in the 
process (e.g., lack of precision in requirements). Although requirements may be specified 
correctly in terms of meeting user expectations, thzre could be significant risks associated with 
their implementation. For example, correctly implementing user requirements could lead to 
excessive system size and complexity with adverse effects on reliability or there could be a 
demand for project resources that exceeds the available funds, time, and personnel skills. 
Interestingly, there has been considerable discussion of project risk (e.g., the consequences of 
cost overrun and schedule slippage) in the literature [BOH9 1 ] but not a corresponding attention 
to reliability risk. 
Risk in the Webster's New Universal Unabridged Dictionary is defined as: "the chance of 
injury; damage, or loss" [WEB79]. Some authors have extended the dictionary definition as 
follows: "Risk Exposure=Probability of an Unsatisfactory Outcome*Loss if the Outcome is 
Unsatisfactory" [BOH91]. Such a definition is frequently applied to the risks in managing 
software projects such as budget and schedule slippage. In contrast, our application of the 
dictionary definition pertains to the risk of executing the software of a system where there is the 
chance of injury (e.g., crew injury or fatality), damaie (e.g., destruction of the vehicle), or loss 
(e.g., loss of the mission) if a serious software failure occurs during a mission. We use risk 
factors to indicate the degree of risk associated with such an occurrence. 
The generation of requirements is not a one-time activity. Indeed, changes to requirements 
can occur during maintenance. When new software is developed or existing software is changed 
in response to new and changed requirements, respectively, there is the potential to incur 
reliability risks. Therefore, in assessing the effects of requirements on reliability, we should deal 
with changes in requirements throughout the life cycle. 
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In addition to the relationship between requirements and reliability. there are the 
intermediate relationships between requirements and complexity and between complexity and 
reliability. These relationships may interact to put the reliability of the software at risk because 
the requirements changes may result in increases in the size and complexity of the software that 
may adversely affect reliability. 
OBJECTIVES AND EXPECTED SIGNIFICANCE 
Objectives 
Given the lack of emphasis in metrics research on the critical role that requirements play in 
determining reliability, combined with our experience and interest in metrics and reliability, we 
are motivated to investigate the following issues: 
- What is the relationship between requirements attributes and reliability? That is, are there 
requirements attributes that are strongly related to the occurrence of defects and failures in the 
software? 
- What is the relationship between requirements attributes and software attributes like complexity 
and size? That is, are there requirements attributes that are strongly related to the complexity and 
size of software? 
- Is it feasible to use requirements attributes as predictors of reliability? That is, can static 
requirements change attributes like the size of the change be used to predict reliability in 
execution (e.g., time to next failure, number of failures)? 
- Are there requirements attributes that can discriminate between high and low reliability, thus 
qualifying these attributes as predictors of reliability? 
- Which requirements attributes pose the greatest risk to reliability? 
An additional objective is to develop a framework that other researchers could use for the 
following: 1 ) analyze the relationships between requirements changes, complexity, and 
reliability, and 2) assess and predict reliability risk as a function of requirements changes. 
Significance 
This research is significant because the field of software engineering lacks the capability to 
quantitatively assess and predict the effect of a requirements change on the reliability of the 
software. Much of the research and literature in software metrics concerns the measurement of 
code characteristics WIK981. This is satisfactory for evaluating product quality and process 
effectiveness once the code is written. However, if organizations use measurement plans that are 
limited to measuring code, they will be deficient in the following ways: incomplete, lack 
coverage (e.g., no requirements analysis and design), and start too late in the process. For a 
measurement plan to be effective, it must start with requirements and continue through to 
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operation and maintenance. Since requirements characteristics directly affect code 
characteristics and hence reliability, it is important to assess their impact on reliability when 
requirements are specified. 
RESEARCH PLAN 
Our research is aimed at conducting experiments to see whether it is feasible to develop a 
mapping between changes in requirements to changes in software complexity and reliability. In 
other words, we will investigate whether the following implications hold, where R represents 
requirements, C represents complexity, and F represents failure occurrence (i.e., reliability): 
AR=ACaAF. We include changes in size and documentation in changes in complexity. 
By retrospectively analyzing the relationship between requirements and reliability, we will be 
able to construct models that can predict reliability as a function of requirements changes. In 
order to quantify the effect of a requirements change, we use various risk factors that are defined 
as the attribute of a requirement change that can induce reliability or project risk. Various 
examples of risk factors are shown in the section Risk Factors. We propose to statistically 
analyze specified risk factors to see in what way, if any, they are associated with reliability. In 
particular, we want to identify those factors that have an adverse effect on reliability. In addition 
to risk factors, we can also use the number of requirements change requests on modules (see 
Table 4, Data Sources section). The number and rate of occurrence of these requests will be 
considered as additional potential risk factors. 
Experiments 
Several experiments will be conducted to see whether ARsACaAF is confirmed for 
specified data sets. These include discriminant analysis, trend analysis, and reliability prediction. 
Examples of the data that would be used are shown in the Data Sozirces section. 
Discriminant Analysis 
Using the null hypothesis, H,: A given set of risk factors is not a discriminator of reliability 
versus the alternate hypothesis H,: A given set of risk factors is a discriminator of reliability, we 
will use categorical data analysis and discriminant analysis to test the hypothesis. A similar 
hypothesis will be used to assess whether factors can serve as discriminators of complexity. We 
will use the rich set of requirements, requirements risk factors, reliability, and metrics data we 
have from the Space Shuttle to test our hypotheses. We will develop a discriminate function 
comprised of a linear or Boolean function of the risk factors. We will evaluate this function to 
see whether it can accurately discriminate between those requirements changes that caused a one 
or more failures and those that did not. We will draw on our experience in applying categorical 
data analysis and discriminant analysis for classifying the quality of software based on using 
Boolean discriminant functions that are comprised of both a set of metrics and corresponding 
critical values [SCH971]. 
2 0 3  
To minimize the effects of a large number of variables that interact in some cases, a 
statistical categorical data analysis will be performed incrementally. We will use onl>- one 
category of risk factor at a time to see the effect of adding an additional discriminator on the 
ability to correctly classify modules that have discrepancy reports (ie., a report that documents 
deviations between specified and observed software behavior) and those that do not. 
Trend Analysis 
In our work on analyzing the relationship between product reliability and process stability, 
we developed a generalized relative Change Metric (CM) that represents trend information (e.g., 
changes in reliability across releases) in a single metric [SCH98]. CM is independent of the 
scales of the measured quantities. Although looking for a trend on a graph is useful, it is not a 
precise way of measuring and comparing trends, particularly if the graph has peaks and valleys 
and the measurements are made at discrete points in time. We will use this metric to measure 
changes in risk factors, complexity, and reliability across releases or builds of the software and 
compare them to see whether trends are as expected (i.e., increases in risk factors are 
accompanied by increases in complexity and decreases in reliability). The following is an 
example of computing CM for the reliability metric faiZzaes/KLOC: 
1. Note the change in a metric from one release to the next (i.e., release j to release j+l). 
2.a. If the change is in the desirable direction (e.g., FailuredKLOC decrease), treat the change in 
1 as positive. 
b. If the change is in the undesirable direction (e.g., Failures/KLOC increase), treat the change 
in 1 as negative. 
3. a. If the change in 1 is an increase, divide it by the value of the metric in release j+l 
b. If the change in 1 is a decrease, divide it by the value of the metric in release j. 
4. Compute the average of the values obtained in 3, taking into account sign. This is the change 
metric (CM). The CM is a quantity in the range -1, 1. A positive value indicates a favorable 
trend; a negative value indicates an unfavorable trend. The numeric value of CM indicates the 
degree of stability or instability. The standard deviation of these values can also be computed. 
The average of the CM for a set of metrics can be computed to obtain an overall change metric. 
An example of calculating CM for MTTF and Failures/KLOC is shown in Table 1 for various 
Operational Increments (releases) of Shuttle software, where an Operational Increment (01) is a 
software system comprised of modules and configured from a series of builds to meet Shuttle 
mission functional requirements. Figure 1 shows the corresponding plot of Failures/KLOC 
across the releases. 
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Reliability Prediction 
If the discriminant analysis and trend analysis prove successful with respect to discriminating 
reliability as a function of risk factors, we will use the results as scale factors on reliability 
predictions. An example of this approach is shown in Figure 2, which is a plot of failure rate 
versus test time for one of the Shuttle 01s. This plot shows a decreasing trend, after an initial 
period of instability (i.e., increasing rate as personnel learn how to maintain new software). 
Figure 2 shows that stability is achieved (i.e., failure rate asymptotically approaches zero with 
increasing test time).There are two types of risks indicated on the diagram. One is the reduction 
in risk with increased testing. We have done research work on this type of risk [KEL95]. The 
other risk - a subject of this proposal - is represented by a family of failure rate curves (two 
shown). The concept is that the lower curve (lower failure rate) would be associated with 
requirements changes that have lower reliability risk than the upper curve. Thus. we would 
predict on an ordinal scale that for a given amount of test time. requirements changes that have 
lower risk would result in higher reliability (lower failure rate). Alternatively. for a given failure 
rate, we would predict that requirements that have lower reliability risk would require less test 
time to achieve the specified reliability goal. 
RISK FACTORS 
One of the software maintenance problems of the NASA Space Shuttle Flight Software 
organization is to evaluate the risk of implementing requirements changes. These changes can 
affect the reliability and maintainability of the software. To assess the risk of change, the 
software development contractor uses a number of risk factors. which are described below. The 
risk factors were identified by agreement between NASA and the development contractor based 
on assumptions about the risk involved in making changes to the software. This formal process is 
called a risk assessment. No requirements change is approved by the change control board 
without an accompanying risk assessment. During risk assessment, the development contractor 
will attempt to answer such questions as: “Is this change highly complex relative to other 
software changes that have been made on the Shuttle?’ If this n-ere the case. a high-risk value 
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would be assigned for the complexity criterion. To date this qualitative risk assessment has 
proven useful for identifying possible risky requirements changes or, conversely, providing 
assurance that there are no unacceptable risks in making a change. However, there has been no 
qzrantitntive evaluation to determine whether, for example. high risk factor softn-are was really 
less reliable and maintainable than low risk factor softw-are. In addition, there is no model for 
predicting the reliability and maintainability of the software, if the change is implemented. Our 
research will address both of these issues. 
We had considered using requirements attributes like completeness, consistency, correctness, 
etc as risk factors [DAV90]. While these are useful generic concepts. they are difficult to 
quantify. Although some of the following risk factors also have qualitative values assigned, there 
are a number of quantitative factors, and many of the factors deal with the execution behavior of 
the software (i.e., reliability), which is our research interest. 
The following are the definitions of the risk factors, where we have placed the factors into 
categories and have provided our interpretation of the question the factor is designed to answer. 
In addition, we added the risk factor requirements specijiccrtions techniques because we feel that 
this one could represent the highest reliability risk of all the factors if a technique leads to 
misunderstanding of the intent of the requirements. 
Shuttle Flight Software Requirements Change Risk Factors 
If the answer to a yesho question is "yes", it means this is a high-risk change with respect to the 
given factor. If the answer to a question that requires an estimate is an anomalous value, it means 
this is a high-risk change with respect to the given factor. 
Complexity Factors 
o Qualitative assessment of complexity of change (e.g., very complex) 
- Is this change highly complex relative to other software changes that have been made on the 
Shuttle? 
o Number of modifications or iterations on the proposed change 
- How many times must the change be modified or presented to the Change Control Board 
(CCB) before it is approved? 
Size Factors 
o Number of lines of code affected by the change 
- How many lines of code must be changed to implement the change? 
o Size of data and code areas affected by the change 
- How many bytes of existing data and code are affected by the change? 
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Criticality of Change Factors 
o Whether the software change is on a nominal or off-nominal program path (i.e., exception 
condition) 
- Will a change to an off-nominal program path affect the reliability of the software? 
o Operational phases affected (e.g., ascent. orbit, and landing) 
- Will a change to a critic21 phase of the mission (e.g., ascent and landing) affect the 
reliability of the software? 
Locality of Change Factors 
o The area of the program affected (i.e., critical area such as code for a mission abort sequence) 
- Will the change affect an area of the code that is critical to mission success? 
o Recent changes to the code in the area affected by the requirements change 
- Will successive changes to the code in one area lead to non-maintainable code? 
o New or existing code that is affected 
- Will a change to new code (i.e.. a change on top of a change) lead to non-maintainable 
code? 
o Number of system or hardware failures that would have to occur before the code that 
implements the requirement would be executed 
- Will the change be on a path where only a small number of system or hardware failures 
would have to occur before the changed code is executed ? 
Requirements Issues and Function Factors 
o Number and types of other requirements affected by the given requirement change 
(requirements issues) 
- Are there other requirements that are going to be affected by this change? If so, these 
requirements will have to be resolved before implementing the given requirement. 
o Possible conflicts among requirements changes (requirements issues) 
- Will this change conflict with other requirements changes (e.g., lead to conflicting 
operational scenarios) 
o Number of principal software functions affected by the change 
- How many major software functions will have to be changed to make the given change? 
Performance Factors 
o Amount of memory required to implement the change 
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- Will the change use memory to the extent that other functions will be not have sufficient 
memory to operate effectively? 
. o Effect on CPU performance 
- Will the change use CPU cycles to the extent that other functions will not have sufficient 
CPU capacity to operate effectively? 
Personnel Resources Factors 
o Number of inspections required to approve the change. 
o Manpower requirements required to implement the change 
- Will the manpower required to implement the software change be significant? 
o Manpower required to verify and validate the correctness of the change 
- Will the manpower required to verify and validate the software change be significant? 
Tools Factors 
o Any software tools creation or modification required to implement the change 
- Will the implementation of the change require the development and testing of new tools? 
o Requirements specifications techniques (e.g., flow diagram, state chart, pseudo code, control 
diagram). 
- Will the requirements specification method be difficult to understand and translate into 
code? 
DATA SOURCES 
We have access to several sets of data from the Space Shuttle of the following types: 
- Pre-release and post release failure data from the Space Shuttle from 1983 to the present. An 
example of post-release failure data is shown in Table 2 (data provided by US Alliance, Houston, 
Texas). 
Table 2 
Failure Found On Days from Release Discrepancy Severity Failure Date Release Module in 
Operational Increment When Failure Occurred Report ff Date Error 
Q 75 I 10402 2 05-19-97 03-05-97 10 
- Risk factors for the Shuttle Three Engine Out Auto Contingency and Single Global Positioning 
System software. This software was released to NASA by the developer on 10/18/95 and 3/5/97, 
respectively. An example of a partial set of risk factor data is shown in Table 3 (data provided 
by US Alliance, Houston, Texas). 
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Table 3 
Change SLOC Complexity Criticality Number of Number of Number of Number of Manpower 
Request Changed Rating of of Change Principal Modifications Requirements Inspections Required to 
Number Change Functions Of Change Issues Required Make 
Affected Request Change 
107734 1933 4 3 27  7 23 8 12 209.3 MW 
Module 
10 
- Metrics data for 1400 Shuttle modules. each with 26 metrics. An example of a partial set of 
metric data is shown in Table 4 (data provided by Prof. John Munson, University of Idaho). 
Operator Operand Statement Path Cycle Discrepancy Change Request 
Count Count Count Count Count Report Count Count 
3895 1957 606 998 4 14 16 
We will use the Shuttle data to test our hypothesis about the ability of risk factors to 
discriminate between levels of reliability and complexity and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory X- 
2000 system - the latest planetary vehicle. This project provides a rare opportunity to work with 
the software development team and testers to establish a measurement plan form the inception of 
a project as opposed to the usual situation of having to intervene in an on-going project. We plan 
to instrument the software system for obtaining measurements throughout the development and 
maintenance process. 
LONG-TERM GOALS 
This research is another in the series of our software measurement projects that has included 
software reliability modeling and prediction, metrics analysis, risk analysis, and maintenance 
stability analysis [SCH98]. We have been involved in the development and application of 
software reliability models for many years [SCH93, SCH921. Our models, as is the case in 
general in software reliability, use failure data as the driver. This approach has the advantage of 
using a metric that represents the dynamic behavior of the software. However, this data is not 
available until the test phase. Predictions at this phase are useful but it would be much more 
useful to predict at an earlier phase - preferably during requirements analysis-when the cost of 
error correction is relatively low. Thus, there is great interest in the software reliability and 
metrics field in using static attributes of software in reliability modeling and prediction. 
Integrating Risk Analysis with Reliability Prediction 
In the past, we have coupled reliability prediction with risk analysis. but the risk metrics we 
developed pertained to the risk of the softcvare not meeting remaining failures and time to next 
failure goals [SCH973]. For example. we have used the Schneidetvind software reliability model 
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for integrating reliability and reliability risk predictions for the Space Shuttle. This integration 
is described below. 
Assume that software reliability goals have been specified for a project in terms of remaining 
failures r(tt) and time to next failure TF(tt ) to be achieved once the software is deployed. Then 
the criteria for achieving these goals, for a given test time tt,, execution or elapsed time, are as 
follows: 
1) predicted remaining failures r(tt)<rc,where rc is a specified critical 1-alue , and 
2) predicted time to next failure TF(tt)>tm, where t, is mission duration. 
Remaining Failures Risk Metric 
Then we can formulate the normalized remaining failwes risk metric as follows: 
(r(tt)-rc)/rc=( r( t t)/rc)- 1 (1) 
Equation (1) divides the risk space into three regions, as a function of test time: positive, zero, 
and negative values corresponding to r(tt)>rc, r(tt)=rc, and r(tt)<rc, respectively. In terms of risk, 
these regions correspond to critical, neutral, and desirable, respectively 
Time to Next Failure Risk Metric 
Similarly, we can formulate the time to next failure risk metric as follows: 
Equation (2) divides the risk space into three regions, as a function of test time: positive. zero, 
and negutive values corresponding to TF(tt)<t,, TF(tt)=tm, and TF(tt)>tm. respectively. In terms of 
risk, these regions correspond to critical, neutral, and desircible, respectively. 
Based on the premise that no one model suffices for all prediction applications, one of our 
long-range research goal is to develop an integrated suite of models for various applications. One 
type of model and predictions were just described. Other members of the suite are our quality 
metrics and process stability models [SCH971, SCH72, SCH981. Now we want to change our 
research emphasis to the prediction of reliability at the earliest possible time in the development 
process -- to the requirements analysis phase -- that heretofore has been unattainable. We would 
also like to determine whether there exists a “standard” set of risk factors that could be applied in 
a variety of applications to reliability prediction. As the X-2000 project matures, and reliability 
and complexity data become available, we will be able to observe whether the risk factors that 
we validate on the Shuttle are applicable to the X-2000 for identifying and predicting reliability 
risk. Also, we may discover additional risk factors on the X-2000 project. Lastly, we will be able 
to determine whether the numerical results of reliability classification and prediction obtained on 
the Shuttle scale to the X-2000. 
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Summary and Conclusions 
We show how software reliability predictions can increase confidence in the reliability of 
safety critical software such as the NASA Space Shuttle Prima9 Avionics Software Svstenz 
(Shuttle flight software). This objective was achieved using a novel approach to integrate 
software safety criteria, risk analysis, reliability prediction, and stopping rules for testing. 
This approach is applicable to other safety critical software. We only cover the safety of the 
software in a safety critical system. The hardware and human operator components of such, 
systems are not explicitly modeled nor are the hardware and operator induced software 
failures. Our concern is with reducing the risk of all failures attributed to software. Thus, our 
use of the word safety refers to software safety and not to system safety. By improving the 
reliability of the software, where the reliability measurements and predictions are directf'y 
related to mission and crew safety, we contribute to system safety. 
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Remaining failures, maxirnzrm failures, total test time required to attain a given fraction of 
remaining failures, and time to next failure are shown to be useful reliability measurements 
and predictions for: 1) providing confidence that the software has achieved safety goals; 2) 
rationalizing how long to test a piece of software; and 3) analyzing the risk of not achieving 
remaining failure and time to next failure goals. Having predictions of the extent that the 
software is not fault free (remaining failures) and whether it is likely to survive a mission 
(time to next failure) provide criteria for assessing the risk of deploying the software. 
Furthermore, fraction of remaining failures can be used as both an operational quality goal in 
predicting total test time requirements and, conversely, as an indicator of operational quality 
as a function of total test time expended. 
Software reliability models provide one of several tools that software managers of the 
Shuttle flight software are using to provide confidence that the software meets required safety 
goals. Other tools are inspections, software reviews, testing, change control boards, and 
perhaps most important -- experience and judgement. 
1. Introduction 
We propose that two categories of software reliability measurements (i.e., observed failure 
data used for model parameter estimation) and predictions (i.e., forecasts of future reliability 
using the parameterized model) be used in combination to assist in assuring the safety of the 
software in safety critical systems like the Shuttle flight software. The two categories are: 1) 
measurements and predictions that are associated with residual software faults and failures, 
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and 2) measurements and predictions that are associated with the ability of the software to 
survive a mission without experiencing a serious failure. In the first category are: remaining 
failures, maximum failures, fraction of remaining failures, and total test time required to 
attain a given number orfraction of remaining failures. In the second category are: time to 
next failure and total test time required to attain a given time to next failure. In addition, we 
define the risk associated with not attaining the required r-emaining failures and time to next 
failure. Lastly, we derive a quantity from the fraction of remainivag failures that we call 
operational qimlity. 
The benefits of predicting these quantities are: 1) they provide confidence that the 
software has achieved safety goals, and 2) they provide a means of rationalizing how long to 
test a piece of software (stopping rule). Having predictions of the extent that the software is 
not fault free (renzainingfidures) and its ability to survive a mission (time to nextfailure) are 
meaningful for assessing the risk of deploying safety critical software. In addition, with this 
type of information a software manager can determine whether more testing is warranted or 
whether the software is sufficiently tested to allow its release or unrestricted use. These 
predictions, in combination with other methods of assurance, such as inspections, defect 
prevention, project control boards, process assessment, and fault tracking, provide a 
quantitative basis for achieving safety and reliability goals [3]. 
Risk in the Webster'i New Universal Unabridged Dictionary is defined as: "the chance of 
injury; damage, or loss" [19]. Some authors have extended the dictionary definition as 
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follows: "Risk Exposure=Probability of an Unsatisfactory Outcome*Loss if the Outcome is 
Unsatisfactory" [2]. Such a definition is frequently applied to the risks in managing software 
projects such as budget and schedule slippage. In contrast, our application of the dictionary 
definition pertains to the risk of executing the software of a safety critical system where there 
is the chance of injury (e.g., astronaut injury or fatality), damage (e.g., destruction of the 
Shuttle), or loss (e.g., loss of the mission) if a serious software failure occurs during a 
mission. We have developed risk criterion metrics to quantify the degree of risk associated 
with such an occurrence. 
Lockheed-Martin, the primary contractor on the Shuttle flight software project, is 
experimenting with a promising algorithm which involves the use of the Schneidewind 
Softwave Reliability Model to compute a parameter: fi-action of remaining failures as a 
function of the archived failure history during test and operation [lo]. Our prediction 
methodology uses this parameter and other reliability quantities to provide bounds on total 
test time, remaining failures, operational quality, and time to next failure that are necessary to 
meet Shuttle safety requirements. We also show that there is a pronounced asymptotic 
characteristic to the total test time and operational qualitl, curves that indicate the possibility 
of big gains in reliability as testing continues; eventually the gains become marginal as testing 
continues. We conclude that the prediction methodology is feasible for the Shuttle and other 
safety critical systems. 
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We only cover the safety of the software in a safety critical system. The hardware and 
human operator components of such systems are not explicitly modeled nor are the hardware 
and operator induced software failures. However, in practice, these hardware-software 
interface and human operator-software interface failures may be very difficult to identify as 
such; these failures may be recorded as software failures. Our concern is with reducing the 
risk of all failures attributed to software. Thus, our use of the word safety refers to sofhvare 
safety and not to system safety. 
Although remaining failures has been discussed in general as a type of software reliability 
prediction [ 131, and various stopping rules for testing have been proposed, based on costs of 
testing and releasing software [4, 5 ,  8, 171, failzrre intensiq [12], and testability [18], our 
approach is novel because we integrate software safety criteria, risk analysis, reliability 
prediction, and a stopping rule for testing. For a system like the Shuttle, where human lives 
are at risk, we cannot use economic or time-to-market criteria to determine when to deploy 
the software. Although failure intensity has proven useful for allocating test effort and 
determining when to stop testing in commercial systems [ 121, this criterion is not directly 
related to software safety. In a safety critical system, the prediction of remaining failures and 
identification of the faults which cause them is more relevant to ensuring safety than the trend 
of failure intensity over time. The latent faults must be found and removed through additional 
testing, inspection, or other means, if the safety of the mission is not to be jeopardized. 
Furthermore, as we will show, remaining failures, along with time to nextfailzrre, can be used 
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as risk criteria. It is not clear how failure intensity could be a meaningful safety criterion. 
Because testability attempts to quantify the probability of failure, if the code is faulty [ 181, 
this criterion has a relationship with reliability if we know that the code is faulty. However in 
the Shuttle and other safety critical software, our purpose is to predict whether the code is 
faulty. For safety critical software, we must use reliability measurements and predictions to 
assess whether safety and mission goals are likely to be achieved. 
We first define two criteria for software safety. Then we apply these criteria to risk 
analysis of safety critical software, using the Shuttle flight software as an example. Next, we 
define and provide brief derivations for a variety of prediction equations that are used in 
reliability prediction and risk analysis; included is the relationship between time to next 
failure and reduction in remaining failures. This is followed by an explanation of the 
principal of optimal selection offailwe data that involves selecting only the most relevant set 
of failure data for reliability prediction, with the result of producing more accurate 
predictions than would be the case if the entire set of data were used. Then we show how the 
prediction equations can be used to integrate testing with reliability and quality. An example 
is shown of how the risk analysis and reliability predictions can be used to make decisions 
about whether the software is safe to deploy. Lastly we show validation results for a variety 
of predictions. 
Acronyms 
OIA : Shuttle operational increment A 
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OIB: Shuttle operational increment B 
OIC: Shuttle operational increment C 
OID: Shuttle operational increment D 
Assumptions [ 1 ] : 
1. Faults that cause failures are removed. 
2. As more failures occur and more faults are corrected, remaining fnilztres will be reduced. 
3. The remaining failures are "zero" for those 01's that were executed for extremely long 
times (years) with no additional failure reports; correspondingly, for these OI's, maximum 
failures equals total observed failures. 
4. The number of failures detected in one interval is independent of the failure count in 
another. 
5. Only "new" failures are counted (i.e., failures that are repeated as a consequence of not 
correcting a fault are not counted). 
orrecting a fault are not counted). 
Definitions 
o Interval: an integer time unit t of constant length defined by t- 1 <t<t+ 1, where t>O; failures 
are counted in intervals (e.g., one failure occurred in interval 4) [ 1 , 71. 
o Number of Intervals: the number of contiguous integer time units t of constant length 
represented by a positive real number (e.g., the predicted time to next failure is 3.87 
intervals). 
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o Operational Increment (01): a software system comprised of modules and configured from 
a series of builds to meet Shuttle mission functional requirements. 
o Time: Continuous CPU execution time over an interval range. 
Severity Codes: 
1 .  Severe Vehicle or Crew Performance Implications. 
2. Affects Ability to Complete Mission (Not a safety issue). 
3. Workaround Available, Minimal Effect on Procedures. 
4. Insignificant (Paperwork, etc.). 
5.  Not Visible to User. 
Nonz en clatii re 
o Predicted at time t: a prediction made in the interval t. 




failure rate at the beginning of interval s 
negative of derivative of failure rate divided by failure rate (i.e., relative failure 
rate) 
predicted failure count in the range [ 1 ,i]; used in computing MSE, 




F(t) predicted failure count in the range [ 1, t] 
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given number of failures to occur after interval t; used in predicting TF(t) 
predicted failure count in the range [tl,t2] 
predicted failure count in the range [ 1 ,..I; maximum failures over the life of the 
software 
current interval 
next interval j>i where Fij>O 
maximum j ~t where Fij>O. 
mean square' error criterion for selecting s for failure count predictions 
mean square error criterion for selecting s for remaining failure predictions 
mean square error criterion for selecting s for time to next failure predictions 
fraction of remaining failures predicted at time t 
operational quality predicted at time t; the complement of p(t); the degree to 
which software is free of remaining faults (failures) 
critical value of remaining failures; used in computing RCM r(t,) 
remaining failures predicted at time t 
remaining failures predicted at total test time tt 
reduction in remaining failures that would be achieved if the software were 
executed for a time TF, predicted at time t 
RCM r(tJ risk criterion metric for remaining failures at total test time tt 
RCM TF(tt) risk criterion metric for time to next failure at total test time tt 
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starting interval for using observed failure data in parameter estimation 
optimal starting interval for using observed failure data, as determined by MSE 
criterion 
cumulative time in the range [ 1 ,t]; last interval of observed failure data; current 
interval 
mission duration (end time-start time); used 
total test time (observed or predicted) 
time to next failure(s) predicted at time t 
n computing RCM TF(tt) 
time to next failure predicted at total test time tt 
time to next N failures that would be achieved if remaining failures were 
reduced by Ar, predicted at time t 
time since interval i to observe number of failures Fij during interval j; used in 
computing MSE; 
observed failure count in the range [ 1 ,i] 
observed failure count in the range [ 1 ,s- 11 
observed failure count in the range [s,t] 
observed failure count in the range [s,tl] 
observed failure count in the range [ 1 ,t] 
observed failure count in the range [ 1 ,tl] 
2. Criteria for Safetv 
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If we define our safety goal as the reduction of failures that would cause loss of life, loss 
of mission, or abort of mission to an acceptable level of risk [l 11, then for software to be 
ready to deploy, after having been tested for total time t,, we must satisfy the following 
criteria: 
1) predicted remaining failures r(tt)<rc, 
where rc is a specified critical value , and 
2) predicted time to next failure TF(tt)>tm, 
where t, is mission duration. 
For systems that are tested and operated continuously like the Shuttle, tt, TF(tt), and t, are 
measured in execution time. Note that, as with any methodology for assuring software safety, 
we cannot guarantee safety. Rather, with these criteria, we seek to reduce the risk of 
deploying the software to an acceptable level. 
2.1 Remaining Failures Criterion 
I 
Using assumption I that the faults that cause failures are removed (this is the case for the 
Shuttle), criterion I specifies that the residual failures and faults must be reduced to a level 
where the risk of operating the software is acceptable. As a practical matter, we suggest rc=l. 
That is, the goal would be to reduce the expected remaining failtires to less than one before 
deploying the software. The reason for this choice is that one or more remaining failtires 
would constitute unacceptable risk for safety critical systems. This is the threshold used by 
the Shztttle software managers. One way to specify rc is by failure severity level (e.g., sever@ 
2 2 4  
ZeveZ I for life threatening failures). Another way, which imposes a more demanding safety 
requirement, is to specify that rc represents all severity levels. For example, r(t,)<l would 
mean that r(tJ must be less than one failure, independent of severity level. 
If we predict r(tt)>rc, we would continue to test for a total time t,'>t, that is predicted to 
achieve r(t;)<rc, using assumption 2 that we will experience more failures and correct more 
faults so that the remaining failzrres will be reduced by the quantity r(t,)-r(t,'). If the developer 
does not have the resources to satisfy the criterion or is unable to satisfy the criterion through 
additional testing, the risk of deploying the software premahirely should be assessed (see the 
next section). We know from Dijkstra's dictum that we cannot demonstrate the absence of 
faults [6]; however we can reduce the risk of failures occurring to an acceptable level, as 
represented by r,. This scenario is shown in Figure 1. In case A we predict r(tt)<rc and the 
mission begins at tt. In case B we predict r(tt)2rC and postpone the mission until we test for 
total time t; and predict r(t()<r. In both cases criterion 2) must also be satisfied for the 
mission to begin. 
2.2 Time to Next Failure Criterion 
Criterion 2 specifies that the software must survive for a time greater than the duration of 
the mission. If we predict TF(tt)<tm, we would continue to test for a total time ttt'>tt that is 
predicted to achieve TF(tt")>tm, using asszimption 2 that we will experience more failures and 
correct more faults so that the time to next failure will be increased by the quantity TF(tt")- 
TF(tt). Again, if it is infeasible for the developer to satisfy the criterion for lack of resources Gr 
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failure to achieve test objectives, the risk of deploying the software prematurely should be 
assessed (see the next section). This scenario is shown in Figure 2. In case A we predict 
TF(tt)>tm and the mission begins at tt. In case B we predict TF(tt)< t, and postpone the mission 
until we test for total time tt" and predict TF(tt")>tm. In both cases criterion I )  must also be 
satisfied for the mission to begin. If neither criterion is satisfied, we test for a time which is 
the greater of tt' or tt". 
3. Risk Assessment 
The amount of total test time t, can be considered a measure of the degree to which 
software reliability goals have been achieved. This is particularly the case for systems like the 
Shuttle where the software is subjected to continuous and rigorous testing for several years in 
multiple facilities, using a variety of operational and training scenarios (e.g., by Lockheed- 
Martin in Houston, by NASA in Houston for astronaut training, and by NASA at Cape 
Kennedy). If we view tr as an input to a risk reduction process, and r(t,) and TF(tt) as the 
outputs, we can portray the process as shown in Figure 3, where rc and tm are shown as "risk 
criteria levels" of safety that control the process. While we recognize that total test time is not 
the only consideration in developing test strategies and that there are other important factors, 
like the consequences for reliability and cost, in selecting test cases [20], nevertheless, for the 
foregoing reasons, total test time has been found to be strongly positively correlated with 
reliability growth for the Shuttle [ 151. 
3.1 Remaining. Failures 
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We can formulate the mean value of the risk criterion metric (RCM) for criterion I as 
follows: 
RCM r(t,)= (r(tt)-rc)/rc=(r(t,)/rc)- 1 (3) 
We plot equation (3) in Figure 4 as a function of tt for rc=l, where positive, zero, and 
negative values correspond to r(tt)>rc, r(tt)=rc, and r(tt)<rc, respectively. In Figure 4, these 
values correspond to the following regions: UNSAFE (i.e., above the X-axis predicted 
remaining failures are greater than the "safe" value); NEUTRAL (i.e., on the X-axis predicted 
remaining failures equal to the "safe" value); and SAFE (i.e., below the X-axis predicted 
remaining failures are less than the "safetr value). 
This graph is for the ShzittZe operational increment O D .  In this example we see that at 
approximately t,=57 the risk transitions from the UNSAFE region to the SAFE region. 
3.2 Time to Next Failure 
Similarly, we can'formulate the mean value of the risk criterion metric (RCM) for 
criterion 2 as follows: 
RCM TF(tt)=(tm-TF( tt))/tm=I -( TF(tt))/tm (4) 
We plot equation (4) in Figure 5 as a function of tt for tm=8 days (a typical mission duration 
time for this 01), where positive, zero, and negative risk corresponds to TF(tt)<tm, TF(tt)=tm, 
and TF(tt)>tm, respectively. In Figure 5 ,  these values correspond to the following regions: 
UNSAFE (i.e., above the X-axis predicted time to next failure is less than the "safe" value); 
NEUTRAL (i-e., on the X-axis predicted time to next failtrre is equal to the "safe" value); and 
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SAFE (i.e., below the X-axis predicted time to next failirre is greater than the "safe" value). 
This graph is for the Shuttle operational increment OIC, In this example we see that at 
all values of tt 
the RCM is in 
the SAFE 
region. 
4. Approach to Prediction 
In order to support our safety goal and to assess the risk of deploying the software, we 
make various reliability and quality predictions. In addition, we use these predictions to 
perform tradeoff analysis between reliability and total test time. Thus, our approach is to use a 
software reliability model to predict the following: 1) maximzm failures, remaining failures, 
and operational quality (as defined in the next section); 2) time to next failzrre (beyond the 
last observed failure); 3) total test time necessary to achieve required levels of remaining 
failures (fault) level, operational quality, and time to next failure; and 4)  tradeoffs between 
increases in levels of reliability and quality with increases in testing. 
5. Prediction Equations 
The following prediction equations are based on the Schneidewind Software Reliabiliiy 
Model [ 1, 14, 15, 161, one of the four models recommended in the AIAA Recommended 
Practice for Sof iare  Reliability [ l].These equations use asszrmptions 4- 7 in the Introdirction. 
2 2 8  
We derive these equations in the next section. . We apply them to analyze the reliability of the 
Shuttle flight software. All predictions are mean values. 
Because the flight software is run continuously, around the clock, in simulation, test, or 
flight, "time" refers to continuous execution time and total test time refers to execution time 
that is used for testing. Failure count intervals are equal to 30 days of continuous execution 
time. This interval is long because the Shuttle software is tested for several years; a 30 day 
interval length is a convenient for recording failures for software that is tested this long. 
In the following equations, the parameter a is the failure rate at the beginning of interval 
s; the parameter p is the negative of derivative of failure rate divided by failure rate (i-e., 
relative failure rate); t is the last interval of observed failure data; s is the starting interval for 
using observed failure data in parameter estimation that will result in the best estimates of a 
and p and the most accurate predictions [ 141; X,-1 is the observed failure count in the range 
[l,s-11; X,, is the observed failure count in the range [s,t]; and X,=X,-I+X,.,. These failure 
count interval relationships are shown in Figure 6; also shown is total test time tt. Failures are 
counted against operational increments (01s). Data from four Shuttle O h ,  designated OIA, 
OIB, OIC, and OID are used in this analysis. 
5.1 Cumulative Failures 
When maximum likelihood estimates are obtained for the parameters a and p, with s as the 
starting interval for using observed failure data, we obtain the predictedfailzrve cozrnt in the 
range [s, t]: 
2 2 9  
Fs,t=(49 [ 1 -exp(-N(t-s+ 1 >)>I ( 5 )  
Furthermore, if we add X+,, the observed failure count in the range [l,s-l], we obtain 
predicted failure count in the range [Z, t/: 
5.3 Maximum Failures 
If we let t-m in equation (6 ), we obtain the predicted -failure cotint in the range [I,..] 
(i.e., rnaximtirn failtires over the life of the software): 
(8) F( m)=dP+X,- 1 
5.4 Remaining Failures 
To obtain predicted remaining failtires r(t) at time t, we subtract Xt=X,-I+X,,t from 
equation (8): 
r(t)=(cdp)-X,,t=F(m)-Xt (9) 
r(t) can also be expressed as a function of total test time tt by substituting equation ( 5 )  into 
equation (9) and setting t=tt: 
r(tt)=(a/p)(exP-p[t*-(s- 1 )I) 
5.5 Fraction of Remaining: Failures: 
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If we divide equation (9) by equation (8), we obtain fraction of remaining failures 
predicted at time t: 
P ( t ) = W W  (1 1) 
5.6 Operational Qualitv 
The operational quality of software is the complement of p(t). It is the degree to which 
software is free of remaining faults (failures), using assmytion 1 that the faults that cause 
failures are removed. It is predicted at time t as follows: 
Q(t>=l -p(t> 
5.7 Total Test Time to Achieve Specified Remaining; Failures 
The predicted total test time required to achieve a specified number of remaining failures 
tt = ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ P ~ ~ ~ t l > 1 > l l ~ P + ~ ~ ~ >  
at t,, r(t,), is obtained from equation (10) by solving for t,: 
5.8 Time to Next Failure 
By substituting t2=t+TF(t) in equation (7), setting t l  = t, defining F,=F(t,t+TF),and solving 
for TF(t), we obtain the predicted time for the next Ft failures to occur, when the current time 
The terns in TF(t) have the following definitions: 2 3 1  
t: Current interval; 
Xs,t: 
F,: 
Observed failure count in the range [s,t]; and 
Given number of failures to occur after interval t. 
We consider equations (5)-( 1 1) and (14) to be predictors of reliability that are related to 
safety; equation ( I  3) represents the predicted total test time required to achieve stated safety 
goals. If a quality requirement is stated in terms of fraction of remaining failures, the 
definition of Q as Operational Qirality, equation (12), is consistent with the IEEE definition 
of quality: the degree to which a system, component, or process meets specified requirements 
[9]. For example, if a reliability specification requires that software is to have no more that 
5% remaining failures (i.e., p=.05, Q=.95) after testing for a total of tt intervals, then a 
predicted Q of .90 would indicate the degree to which the software meets specified 
requirements. 
5.9 Relating Time to Next N Failures and Remaining Failures Predictions 
Although we have shown the risk analysis and prediction equations for remaining failures 
and time to next failzire separately, it would be useful to combine these quantities in one 
equation so that we can predict the effect on one quantity for a given change in the other. In 
particular we want to predict, at time t, the time to the next N failtires, TF(Ar,t), that would be 
achieved if remaining failures were reduced by AT. We use assumption I that N=ar; that is, 
faults that cause failures are removed. When N=l, we have the familiar time to next failure. 
When N>1, TF(hr,t) is interpreted as cumulative execution time for the N failures to occur. 
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Conversely, we want to predict, at time t, the reduction in remaining failures, Ar(TF,t), that 
would be achieved if the software were executed for a time TF. This relationship is derived by 
using equation (10) and setting Ar=r(tI)-r(t,), t,=tl+at, and t l  =t, and solving for At=TF(Ar,t): 
TF(Ar,f)=(- 1 /p) [log [ 1 -((PA,/,) (exp( p(t-s+l ))))]I (15) 
for (( pAr/a)( exp( P(t-s+ 1 ))))< 1 . 
Equation (15 ) is analogous to equation (14). Also, Ar in equation (1 5 ) is analogous to F, in 
equation (14), if we use assumption I that the faults that cause the F, failures are removed, 
with a corresponding reduction in remainingfailures. The two equations produce the same 
result for the same parameter values. Equation (15 ) has the advantage of being a simpler 
computation because it does not require the observed data vector XS,t, which is used in 
equation (1 4). Also, equation ( 15 ) is convenient to use for trading off time to next Nfnilures 
against reduction in remaining failures, and the effort and the total test time implicit in 
making the reductions. 
We can invert equation (1 5 ) to solve for the reduction in remaining failures that would be 
achieved by executing the software for a time TF. 
Ar(TF,f)=( dp) [exp (-P(t-s+ 1 )) 1 [ 1 -exp (- p (TF) ) ] (16) 
6. Criterion for Optimallv Selecting Failure Data 
The first step in identifying the optimal value of s (s*) is to estimate the parameters a and p 
for each value of s in the range [ 1 ,t] where convergence can be obtained [ 1,14,16]. Then the 
Mean Square Error (MSE) criterion is used to select s*, the failure count interval that 
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corresponds to the minimum MSE between predicted and actual failure counts (MSEF), time 
to nest failzrre (MSET), or remaining failures (MSE,), depending on the type of prediction. 
The first two were reported in [ 141. In this paper we develop MSE,. MSE, is also the criterion 
for niaximzrm failures (F(w)) and total test time (tJ because the two are functionally related to 
remaining failzrres (r(t)); see equations 9 and 13. We also show MSET because it is used in 
predictions that involve time to next failure: TF(t), TF(nr,t), and Ar(TF,t). Once a, p, and s are 
estimated from observed counts of failures, the foregoing predictions can be made. The 
reason MSE is used to evaluate which triple (a, p, s) is best in the range [ 1 ,t] is that research 
has shown that because the product and process change over the life of the software, old 
failure data (i.e., s=l) are not as representative of the current state of the product and process 
as the more recent failure data (i-e., s>l) [ 141. The optimal values of s (s*) that were used in 
the risk analysis and prediction examples are shown in Tables 1-4. 
The Statistical Modeling and Estimation ofReliability Fiinctions for Softwnre (SMERFS) 
[7] is used for all predictions except tt, TF(Ar,t), and Ar(TF,t), which are not implemented in 
SMERFS. 
6.1 Mean Square Error Criterion for Remaining Failures 
Although we can never know whether additional failures may occur, neverthelzss we can 
form the difference between two equations for r(t): (9), Lyhich is a function of predicted 
maximum failures and the observed failures, and (lo), which is a function of total test time, 
and apply the MSE criterion. This yields the following Mean Square Error (MSE,) criterion 
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for number of rem a in ing fa ilzi res : 
where F(i) is the predictedfailzrre count in the range fI,i] and Xi is the observed failure count 
in the range [ 1 ,i] 
6.2 Mean Square Error Criterion for Time to Next Failure(s) 
The Mean Square Error (MSET) criterion for time to next failtire(s), which was derived in 
for (a 1 PI ' (Xs.i i- Fij) 
[ 141 , is given by equation ( 1 8): 
The terms in MSET have the following definitions: 
i: Current interval; 
j: Next interval j>i where Fij>O; 
X,.i:Observed failure count in the range [s,i]; 
Fij: Observed failure count during interval j since interval i; 
Tij: Time since i to observe number of failures Fij during j (i.e., Tijzj-i) 
t: The last interval of observed failure data; and 
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J: Maximum j i t  where Fij>O. 
7. Relating: Testing to Reliability and Quality 
7.1 Predicting Total Test Time and Remaining Failures 
We use equation (8) to predict nzaximtm failures (F(m)=ll.76) for Shuttle OIA. Using 
given values o f p  and equation (1 1) and setting t=tt,, we predict r(tJ for each value ofp.  The 
values of r(tJ are the predictions of remaining failzrres after the 01 has been executed for total 
test time tt. Then we use the values of r(tJ and equation (1 3) to predict corresponding values 
of tt. The results are shown in Figure 7, where r(t,) and tt are plotted againsty for OIA. Note 
that required total test time tt rises very rapidly at small values ofp and r(t,). Also note that the 
maximum value o f p  on the plot corresponds to tt= 18 and that smaller values correspond to 
ftrture values of tt (i.e., tt>18). 
7.2 Predicting Operational Oualitv 
Equation (12) is a useful measure of the operational qrrality of software because it 
measures the degree to which faults have been removed from the software (using assumption 
I that the faults that cause failures are removed), relative to predicted nzaximtrm failures. We 
call this type of quality operational (i.e., based on executing the software) to distinguish it 
from static quality (e.g., based on the complexity of the software). 
Using given values ofp  and equations (1 1) and (12)and setting tztt, we compute r(tJ and 
Q, respectively. The values of r(tt) are then used in equation (13) to compute tt. The 
corresponding values of Q and tt are plotted in Figure 8 as Oper.ntiona1 Qzinliv and Total Test 
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Time, respectively for OIA. We again observe the asymptotic nature of the testing relationship 
in the great amount of testing required to achieve high levels of quality. 
7.3 Predicting; Time to Next Failure 
First, we show the actual time to next failure in Figure 9 for OIA on the solid curve that 
has occurred in the execution time range t=[ 1,181, where one failure occurred at t=4, 14, and 
18, and two failures occurred at t=8 and 10. All failures were Severity Level 3 : "Workaround 
available; minimal effect on procedures". The way to read the graph is as follows: If we take a 
given failure, Failtire I ,  for example, it occurs at t=4; therefore, at t=l the time to next 
failure=3 (4-1); at t=2 the time to next failzire=2 (4-2); at t=4 Failure I occurs, so the time to 
next failure=4 (8-4) now refers to Failtire 2, etc. Next, using equation (14), we predict the 
time to next failtrre TF(18) to be 4 (3.87 rounded) on the dashed curve. Based on the 
foregoing, this prediction indicates we should continue testing if TF( l8)=3.87<tm (mission 
duration). 
7.4 Predicting Tradeoffs of Time to Next N Failures with Reduced Remaining; Failures 
By using equation (1 5 ), we can predict time to next N failures, TF(Ar,t), as a function of 
reduction in remaining failures, Ar. This is shown in Figure 10 for OIA , where, for example, 
with A F ~ ,  we predict TF( 1,18)=3.87 (i.e., a reduction in remaining failzires of 1 corresponds 
to achieving a time to next failtire of 3.87 intervals from the current interval 18). Conversely, 
by using equation (1 6 ), we predict redirction in remcrining failures, hr(TF,t), as a fbnction of 
time to next failtire, TF. This is shown in Figure 11 for OIA, where, for example, with 
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TF=3.87, we predict ~r(3.87,18)=1 (Le., executing OIA for a time to next failure of 3.87 
intervals from the current interval 18 corresponds to achieving a rediction in remaining 
failures of 1). We provide further elaboration of these graphs in the next section. 
8. Making Safetv Decisions 
In making the decision about how long to test, tl, we apply our safety criteria and risk 
assessment approach. We use Table 1 to illustrate the process. For tt=l 8 (when the last failure 
occurred on OIA), r,=l, and t,=8 days (.267 intervals), we show remaining failures, RCM for 
remaining failures, time to next failure, RCM for time to next failure, and operational quality. 
These results indicate that safety criterion 2 is satisfied but not criterion I (i.e., UNSAFE with 
respect to remaining failures); also operational qualit?/. is low. 
By looking at Figure 10 and Table 1, we see that if we reduce remaining failures r( 18) by 
1 from 4.76 to 3.76 (non-integer values are possible because the predictions are mean values), 
the predicted time to next failure that would be achieved is TF( 18)=3.87 intervals. These 
predictions satisfy criterion 2 (i.e., TF( 18)=3.87~,=.267) but not criterion I (i.e., 
r( 1 8)=4.76>rC=1). Note also in Figure 10 and Table 1 that fraction of remaining failures p=l- 
Q=.40 at r( 18)=4.76. Now, if we continue testing for a total time t,=52 intervals, as shown in 
Figure 10 and Table 1, and reduce remaining failures from 4.76 to .60, the predicted time to 
next 4.26 failures that would be achieved is 33.94 (34, rounded) intervals. This corresponds to 
t,=l8+34=52 intervals. That is, if we test for an additional 34 intervals, starting at interval 18, 
we would expect to experience 4.16 failures. These predictions now satisfy criterion I 
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because r(52)=.60<rC=1. Note also in Figure 10 and Table 1 that fraction of remaining 
failures p=l-Q=.OS at r(52)=.60. Using the converse of the relationship in Figure 10, provides 
another perspective, as shown in Figure 11, where we see that if we continue to test-for an 
additional TF=34 intervals, starting at interval 18, the predicted reduction in remaining 
failtires that would be achieved is 4.16 or r(52)=.60. 
Lastly, Figure 12 shows the Launch Decision, relevant to the Shuttle, (or, generically, the 
Deployment Decision), where remaining failures are plotted against total test time for OIA. 
With these results in hand, the software manager can decide whether to deploy the software 
depending on factors such as predicted remaining failures, as shown in Figure 12, along with 
considering other factors such as the trend in reported faults over time, inspection results, etc.. 
If testing were to continue until t,=52, the predictions in Figure 12 and Table 1 would be 
obtained. These results show that criterion I is now satisfied (i.e., SAFE) and operational 
quality is high. We also see from Figure 12 that at this value of tt, further increases in tt 
would not result in a significant increase in reliability and safety. Also note that at tt=52 it is 
not feasible to make a prediction of T~(52) because the predicted remaining failures is less 
than one. 
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Table 1 










* Cannot predict because predicted Remaining Failures is less than one. 
9. Summarv of Predictions and Validation 
9.1 Predictions 
Table 2 shows a summary of remaining and maximum failure predictions compared with 
actual failure data, where available, for OIA, OIB, OIC, and O D .  Because we do not know 
the actual remaining and maximum failures, we use asstiruption 3: remaining failures are 
"zero" for those 01's (B,  C, and 0) that were executed for extremely long times (years) with 
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maximum failures equals total observed failures. 
.05 1 
30 day Total Test Time Intervals 
Time of last recorded failure: 
r(tJ I Actual r 
0-95 I lB  
F(m) I ActualF 
I 7A 11.76 
12.95 I 13B 
I 13c 12.87 
17.36 I 14D 
A. No additional failures have been reported after 17.17 intervals. 
B. The last recorded failure occurred at 63.67 intervals. 
C. The last recorded failure occurred at 43.80 intervals. 
D. The last recorded failure occurred at 65.03 intervals. 
Table 3 shows a summary of total test time and time to next failzive predictions compared 
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Table 3 
Predicted Total Test Time and Time to Next Failure versus Actuals 
s* t,(r=l) Actual tt t s* T,(t) Actual TF 
OIA 9 43.59 ? 18 9 3.9 ? 
OIB 1 3; 63.67 20 * * 
OIC 7 24.98 27.07 20 5 4.2 7.63 
43.67 
OID 6 56.84 58.27 18 5 6.4 6.2 
30 day Total Test Time and Time to Next Failure Intervals. 
* Cannot predict because predicted Remaining Failures is less than one. 
Additional Predictions for OID: 
The following are additional predictions of total test time for OID that are not listed 
in Table 3: t,(r-2)=43.35, Actual=45.17; t,(r=3)=35.47, Actual=23.70. 
Table 4 shows a summary of the predictions of time to rzext#iilure for a given reduction in 
remaining failures of 1 and the predictions of reduction in remaining failures for given time 
to next failure compared with actual execution time and failure data, where available, for OIA, 
OIB, OIC, and OID. 
Table 4 
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30 day Total Test Time and Time to Next Failure Intervals. 
* Cannot predict because predicted Remaining Failures is less than one. 
9.2 Validation 
A total of 18 predictions were made across Tables 2,3, and 4, where there was an actual 
value to compare: three r(t), four F(a), four tt, two TF(t), two TF( q t ) ,  and three nr(T,,t). The 
mean relative error (mean of (achial-predicted)/actual) of prediction is 22.92% and the 
standard deviation is 27.6 1 %. In making these predictions we note both the sparsity of post- 
delivery failures and the extremely long test times for Shuttle flight software, as summarized 
in Table 5. See the Appendix for a listing of the failure data. Despite the fact that the 
Schneidewind Software Reliabiliy Model uses optimal selection of failure data, and thus less 
than the full set of data, there must be a minimum number of failures to start theparameter 
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estimation process, understanding that the model will then select the optimal value of s(s*). 
Thus, given the sparsity of the data, all failures in Table 5 were used in parameter estimation, 
regardless of their severity. Furthermore, as described earlier, a more conservative risk 
assessment is produced if all categories of failures are included in the analysis. 
Table 5 




































30 day Total Test Time Intervals. 
* Unknown Severity for two failures 
There are no post-delivery Severity 1 or 5 failures in the above Operational Increments. 
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APPENDIX 
Observed Failure Counts 
(Interval i = 30 days execution time) 
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Software quality control and prediction model for 
maintenance 
Norman F. Schneidewind 
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E-mail: nschneid@n:s.navy.mil 
b'e develop a quality control and prediction moi-! for improving the quality of sofnvare 
delivered by development to maintenance. This mo2el identifies modules that require priority 
attention during development and maintenance by using Boolean discriminant functions. The 
model also predicts during development thc quality ihat will be delivered to maintenance by 
using both point and confidence interval estimates of quality. We show that it is important 
to perform a marginal analysis when making a desision about how many metrics to include 
in a discriminant function. If many metrics are adit: at once. the contribution of individual 
metrics is obscured. Also, the marginal analysis pro1:ides an effective rule for dxiding when 
to stop adding metrics. We also show t h x  certair! rietrics are dominant in their effects on 
ch.ssifyin,a quality and that additional mctrics are r a t  needed to increase the accuracy of 
classification. Related to this property of doriiirzaucc is  the property of coricordmce. which is 
the degree to which a set of metrics produces the s z . c  result in classifying software quality. 
A high value of coricordarice implies that additicn.1 metrics will not make a significant 
contribution to accurately classifying quality; hencc. these metrics are redundant. Data from 
the Space Slirittle flight software are used to illusrrxe the model process. 
1. Introduction 
A key problem in maintenance is to identify problems in the software during 
development before it reaches maintenance. To this end. we develop a quality control 
and prediction model that is used to identify modules that require priority attention dur- 
ing development and maintenance. This is accomplished in t\vo activities: wzlidorion 
and application. Both activities occur during software development. Validarioiz is an 
activity that is required in order to identify metrics that can identify low quality soft- 
ware that requires corrective action. Application is an activity during which validated 
metrics are applied to control and predict softn.are quality. During \didatioiz, M'e use 
a build of the software that has been developed as the source of data to compute a 
discriminant function (i.e., a statistical method that is used to classify software quality) 
that we use to retrospectively classify and przdict quality with specified accuracy. by 
build and module. Usins this discriminant function during application. \ve classify and 
predict the quality of new softlyare that is beins developed. %'e make both point and 
C J.C. Baltzer AG, Science Publishers 
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confidence interval estimates of quality. This is the quality tve expect to experience 
during maintenance. 
During vnlidation, both quality factor (e.g., discrepanc! reports of deviations 
between requirements and implementation) and software mztrics (e.g.. size. structural) 
data are available: during application. only the latter are available. Durins \dicirrioiz, 
we construct Boolean discriminant functions (BDFs) comprised of a set of metrics 
and their critical values (i.e., thresholds). A BDF is a Boolean function consisting of 
A N D  and OR operators, module metric values, and metric critical values that is used 
to classify the quality of software. .A metric critical value is a value in the range of 
the metric, estimated by using the inverse of the Kofriiogol.o~.-Sr7zir-ii~~i ci stance (to 
be explained) that provides a threshold between two levels (e.g., high  and lolr-) of 
the quality of the software. We select the best BDF based on its ability to achieve 
the maximum relative incremental quality/cost ratio. During applicarion. if at least 
one of the module’s metrics has a i d u e  that exceeds its critical value, the module 
is identified as “high priority” (i.e., low quality); otherLvise, it is identified as “low 
priority” (i.e., high quality). Our objective is to identify and correct quality problems 
during development so that a high quality product can be delivered to maintenance, as 
opposed to waiting until maintenance Lvhen the cost of correction would be high. 
We use nonparametric statistical methods to: (1) identify the critical values of 
the metrics and (2) find the optimal BDF based on its ability to satisfy both srarisricnl 
and applicatiotz criteria. Statistical criteria refer to the ability to correctly classify the 
software (i.e., classify high quality software as high quality and low quality software 
as low quality). Application criteria refer to the ability to achieve a high quality/cost 
ratio. A BDF compares a module’s metric value with the metric’s critical value, 
for a set of metrics, in classifying thz quality of the software. The BDFs provide 
good accuracy (i.e., <3% error) for classifying quality factors. These functions make 
fewer mistakes in classifying software that is low quality than is the case when linear 
vectors of metrics are used because thz critical values provide additional information 
for discriminating quality. In addition. we develop an effective stopping rule for adding 
metrics to the BDF that is based on quality/cost considerations. 
We show that it is important to perform a marginal analysis (i.e., identification 
of the incremental contribution of each metric to improving quality) when making a 
decision about how many metrics to include in the discriminant function. If many 
metrics are added to the set at once, the contribution of individual metrics is obscured. 
Also, the marginal analysis provides an effective rule for deciding when to stop adding 
metrics. We also show that certain metrics are dominant in their effects on classifying 
quality for Space Shuttle software ( i t . ,  dominant metrics make feLver mistakes in 
classifying metrics than non-dominant ones) and that additional metrics are not needed 
to accurately classify quality. Related to the property of domiiznrrce is the property of 
concordance, which is the degree to v, hich a set of metrics produces the same result 
in classifying softivare quality. A hizh value of concordarice implies that additional 
metrics will not make a significant contribution to accurately classifying quality; hence, 
these metrics are redundant. 
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The contributions of this research are the following: 
(1) both statistical and application criteria should be used to determine which metrics 
(2) a marsinal analysis should be performed on each metric to determine whether its 
(3) the Boolean discriminant function (BDF) is a new type of discriminant for classi- 
(4) our application of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) distance is a new way to de- 
(5) we have developed a new stopping rule for adding metrics: the ratio of the relative 
and how many metrics should be used to classify maintenance quality; 
addition will increase the quality/cost ratio; 
fying maintenance quality; 
termine a metric’s critical value; and 
improvement in quality to the relative increase in cost. 
1. I .  Related research 
Our model is one of a class of models concerned with the classification of quality, 
sometimes referred to as the identification of fault-prone modules. Porter and Selby 
[I9901 used classification trees to partition multiple metric value space so that a se- 
quence of metrics and their critical values could be identified that were associated with 
either high quality or low quality software. This technique is closely related to our 
approach of identifying r? set of metrics and their critical values that will satisfy quality 
and cost criteria. However, we use statistical analysis to make the identification. 
Briand et al. [1998] used logistic regression to classify modules as fault-prone 
or not fault-prone as a function of various object oriented metrics. In another example 
of logistic regression. Khoshgoftaar and Allen [1997] used it to classify modules as 
fault-prone or not fault-prone as a function of faults, requirements, performance, and 
documentation so f tuxe  trouble report metrics. While one of our objectives is similar 
- classify modules as either high quality or low quality - we derive from this birzniy 
classification several predictive corrtiiziroirs quality and cost metrics. These metrics 
are used to predict the quality of software that will be delivered by development to 
maintenance and the cost of achieving it. 
Khoshgoftaar er rrl. [ 1996al used nonparametric discriminant analysis in each 
iteration of their military system project to predict fault-prone modules in the next 
iteration. This approach provided an advance indication of reliability and the risk 
of implementing the nest iteration. They also conducted a similar study involving a 
telecommunications application, again using nonparametric discriminant analysis, to 
classify modules as either fault-prone or not fault-prone [Khoshgoftaar et nl. 1996bl. 
Our approach has the same objective but we produce BDFs in terms of the original 
metrics as opposed to using density functions as discriminators. 
Khoshsoftaar and Allen [ 19981 have also developed models for ranking modules 
for reliability improvement according to their degree of fault-pronenzss as opposed 
to whether they are fault-prone or not. They used Alberg Diagrams [Ohlsson and 
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Alberg 19961 that predict pzrcentage of faults as a function of percentage of modules 
by ordering modules in decreasing order of faults and noting the cumulative number 
of faults corresponding to various percentages of modules. The imperative in safety 
critical systems like the Space Shittle is to investigate all suspect modules because 
cven the module with the lowest a priori reliability risk could pose a safety hazard 
in operation. Our previous research showed a very hizh association betn,een module 
failures and metric values that exceeded the critical values [Schneidewind 19951, as 
r\.e will show later. 
The following topics are covered: Discriniinative Porver model, approach to vali- 
dation. and quality control and prediction applications of the model, section 2; detailed 
description of validation methodology, section 3; comparison of validation with appli- 
xition results for quality control and prediction, section 4; quality point and confidence 
interval estimates. section 5: comparison of BDF and linear discriminant function qual- 
ity classification results, section 6: development metric characteristics of modules that 
failed during maintenance. section 7; and conclusions about the contributions of the 
model to quality control and prediction and the results obtained to date in applying it 
LO the Space Shiirtle, section 8 .  
2. Discriminative power model 
Using our metrics validation methodology [IEEE 1998; Schneidewind 19921, and 
;hz Spnce Shiitrle flight software metrics and discrepancy reports (DRs). n.e validate 
inetrics with respect to the quality factor drcount. This is the number of discrepancy 
:?ports written against a module. In brief, this involves conducting statistical tests to 
determine whether there is a high degree of association between drcoiint and candidate 
metrics. As shown in figure 1, n'e validate metrics on one random sample (validation 
sample) of 100 modules from Build 1 and apply the validated metrics to three random 
samples (application samples) of 100 modules each from Build 2 that are both disjoint 
zmong themselves and from the validation sample, drawn from a population of 1397 
modules of Space Shuttle flight software. Nikora and Munson argue for the need of a 
measurement baseline against which evolving systems may be compared [Nikora and 
llunson 19983. Our baseline is Build I in figure 1. The measurement results from 
Build 1 provide the data source for controlling and predicting the quality delivered to 
maintenance and for comparing predicted with actual quality, once the latter is known. 
Yext, lye define Discriminative Po!r.er. 
2. I .  I .  Discr-iniiimtive Poirer 
Given the elements if,, of a matrix of 71 modules and m metrics (i.e.. nnz metric 
~alues).  the elements MC, of a vector of m metric critical values, the elements F, of 
a vector of n quality factor values, and scalar FC of quality factor critical value, JIii 
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Fi: Known Quality + 
Mij : Metric j on Module i 
MCj: Metric j Critical Value 
Fi : Quality Factor on Module i 
Figure 1. Measurement process. 
must be able to discriminate with respect to Fi, for a specified FC. as shown in the 
following relation: 
for i = 1,2 , .  . . , n, and j = 1,2,. . . ,m with specified a, where Q is the significance 
level of various statistical tests that are used for estimating the degree to which a set of 
metrics can correctly classify software quality. In other words, do the indicated metric 
relations imply corresponding quality factor relations in ( I )?  This criterion assesses 
whether MCj has sufficient Discriminative Po\r.er to be capable of distinguishing a set 
of high quality modules from a set of low quality modules. If this is the case, we use 
the critical values in Quality Control and Prediction described below. The validation 
process is illustrated in figure 1, where the critical values MCj are produced in the Test 
phase of Build 1 by using the metrics Afij from the Design phase and the quality factor 
Fi (e.g., drcotmt) that is available in the Test phase. Discrepancy reports are written 
against the software throughout development but they are not significantly complete 
until the end of the Test phase for a build during which failures are observed. The 
counts of discrepancy reports and metrics that are associated with a module were col- 
lected at the completion of a build by a metrics analyzer, usins the source code as input. 
If a discrepancy report involves multiple modules, it is counted against every module 
affected. The desired quality level is set by the choice of FC. The lower its value, the 
higher the quality requirement; conversely, the higher its value,. the lower the require- 
ment. A value of zero is appropriate for safety-critical systems like the Space Slzurtle. 
It is important to recognize that validation is performed retrospectively. That is, 
with both metrics hfij and quality factor Fi in hand for Build 1, we can evaluate how 
well the metrics would have performed if they had been applied to Build 1. If the 
2 5 1  
1V.E Schneidewind / Sofnc,are qilalin control and prdiciiori model 
metrics perform well, we say they are validated and it  is our expectation that they 
will perform adequately when applied to Build 2. (i.e., not as well as when applied to 
Build 1 because of possible differences in module characteristics between Build 1 and 
Build 2 but better than using unvalidated metrics). Next, M'e describe the application 
of the model to quality control and prediction. 
2.1.2. Qrrality coirtrol arid prediction 
Quality control is the evaluation of modules with respect to predetermined critical 
values of metrics. The purpose of quality control is to allow software managers to 
identify software that does not meet quality requirements early in the development 
process so corrective action can be taken when the cost is low. Quality control is 
applied during the Design phasc of Build 2 in figure 1 to flag modules below quality 
limits for detailed inspection. Th? validated BDFs, comprised of the metrics M,, and 
their critical values MC, that are obtained from Build 1, are used to eithzr accept or 
reject the modules of Build 2 [Schneideivind 1997a,b]. At this point in the development 
of Build 2, only the metric data -Ull and MC, are available. 
Quality predictions are used by the developer and maintainer to anticipate rather 
than react to quality problems. The predictions provide indications of the quality of 
the software that would be delivered to maintenance. Figure 1 shows the metrics 
controlling and predicting the quality of software that will be delivered to maintenance 
early in the development of Build 2. Accompanied by rigorous inspection and test, 
this process will result in improved quality of Build 2 and the software that is released 
to maintenance. of which Build 2 is a part. Once all of the quality factor data F, 
(e.g., drcount) have been collected for Build 2. at the end of the Test phase as shown 
in figure 1, the quality of Build 2 kvould be known. This, then, becomes the actual 
quality of Build 2 in the maintained software. 
3. Validation methodology 
The basis of this model is a methodology for validating BDFs and their critical 
values that have the ability to discriminate high quality from low quality. We use a 
three-stage process for selectin: metrics for quality control and prediction: 
( I )  compute critical values of the candidate metrics; 
( 3 )  for the set of candidate metrics and critical values, find the optimal combination 
based on statistical and application criteria; and 
( 3 )  apply a stopping mle for adding metrics. 
Table 1 provides a functional description of each stage. The three stages take 
place during the Test phase of Build 1 of figure 1, once all the quality factor data 
F, (e.g., drcorirrr) are available. The sections that follow provide the details of the 
statistical analysis for each stase. 
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Stage I Kolmogorov- 
Smirnov 
( K-S ) 
table ana!ysis 
Stage 2 Contingency 
Stage 3 Stopping rule 
for adding 
metrics 
Compute the critical valucj of the 
candidate metrics. 
Use the critical values obtained from 
stage 1 to form a set of BDFs. Use 
the BDFs to estimate quality and cost 
of inspection for each set of metrics, 
starting nith one metric, and 
increasing by one until the stopping 
rule is satisfied. 
Add metrics to stage 2 until  the ratio 
of relative incremental quality to 
relative incremental inspection cost 
reaches a maximum. 
- 
hletrics ranked by K-S test 
results for input to stage 1. 
hletric sets with increasing 
numbers of metrics, each set 
with estimated quality and 
cost of inspection. 
Validxed BDFs and their 
critical values that provide 
the highest estimated quality 
relative to the estimated cost 
of inspection. 
Table 2 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov distance for drcormt = 0 vs. drcomr > 0. Validation sample I ( 7 1  = 100 modules). 
Metric (symbol) Definition (counts per module) Critical value Distmce n Rank 
Prologue size ( P )  Change history line count in 38 0.5S5 0.005 1 
module listing 
Statements (S )  Executable statement count 26 0.551 0.005 1 
Eta1 ( E l )  Unique operator count 10 0.192 0.005 3 
Kodes (:\-) Sode count (in control graph) 11 0.487 0.005 4 
~~~ 
3. I .  Stage I: comprrte critical values 
Critical values MC, are computed, using a new method lve have developed, 
which is based on the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test [Conover 19711. This test was 
investigated for application to software metrics because of its ability to indicate the 
value of a metric (i.e., critical value) where maximurn discrimination occurs between 
two samples of modules - one of high quality and the other of low quality. The 
method has consistently yielded good results for controlling the quality of Space ShirttZe 
software as our results n.ill show. The K-S test is exact for continuous distributions 
and conservative (Le., the true alpha is less than the specified value) for discrete metrics 
data [Conover 19711. In addition, the large range (e.g., 0-2316 for profoglie size) and 
fine granularity (e.g., units of one for proZogire size) of the metrics data approximate 
continuous distributions. Thus, the K-S test is appropriate for analyzing metrics data. 
Table 2 shmvs the metric definitions, critical values MCj, and K-S distances 
for four metrics of the validation sample. These rnetrics were selected for analysis 
based on their relatively high K-S distance compared to other metrics that had been 
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Figure 2. K-S test: Prologue size CDF (sample 1, n = 100 modules). 
collected on the Space Shuttle. The K-S method tests whether the sample cumulative 
distribution functions (CDF) are from the same or different populations. The test 
statistic is the maximum vertical difference between the CDFs of two samples (e.g., 
the CDFs of Mi, for drcoririr < FC and drcoirizt > FC). If the difference is significant 
(i.e., Q < 0.005), th? value of A l i j  corresponding to maximum CDF difference is used 
for MCj. This relationship is expressed in equation (2). This concept is illustrated in 
figure 2, for the critical value of prologue size, where we show the CDFs for clrcount 
= 0 and drcoiint > 0. In this example, the critical value is 38. This is the value 
of prologue size where there is the maximum difference between the CDFs. This is 
the value of prologue size where there is the maximum discrimination between high 
quality (drcount = 0 curve) and low quality (clrcount > 0 curve). Metrics are added 
to the BDF in the order of their decreasing K-S distance: 
K-S(MCj) = max{ [CDF(ilfij I Fi < FC)] - [CDF(:Ifij 1 Fi > FC)]}. (2) 
The history of changes (e.g., requirements, design, and code) and other activities 
(e.g., inspections, tests, and failure and fault observations) are recorded at the beginning 
of a module's listing (i.e., prologue). The number of lines in this section is called 
the prologrie size. Because this metric records the volatility of the software, it is 
a very good quality discriminator, as our results will demonstrate. A stnfement is an 
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executable statement in the Hal/S programming language that is used to code the Space 
Shuttle flight software. 
3.2. Stage 2: pe$orttt contiiigenc? table analysis 
3.2. I .  Validation contingency table 
For each BDF identified in stage 1 we use the contingeticy table (see table 3) 
and its accompanying x’ statistic [Conover 19711 to further evaluate the ability of 
the functions to discriminate high quality from low quality, from both statistical (e.g., 
values of x’ and a )  and application (e.g., ability of the metric set to correctly clas- 
sify low quality modules) standpoints. In table 3, MC, and FC classify modules into 
one of four categories. The left column contains modules where none of the metrics 
exceeds its critical value; this condition is expressed with a Boolean AND function 
of the metrics. This is the ACCEPT column, meaning that according to the classi- 
fication decision made by the metrics, these modules have acceptable quality. The 
right column contains modules where at least one metric exceeds its critical value; this 
condition is expressed by a Boolean OR function of the metrics. This is the REJECT 
column, meaning that according to the classification decision made by the metrics, 
these modules have unacceptable quality. The top row contains modules that are high 
quality; these modules have a quality factor that does not exceed its critical value (e.g., 
drcowit = 0). The bottom row contains modules that are low quality; these modules 
have a quality factor that exceeds its critical value ( e g ,  drcoutzt > 0). 
Equation (3) gives the algorithms for making the cell counts of modules, using 
the BDFs of F, and i11, that are computed over the n modules for m metrics. This 
equation is an implementation of the relation given in (1). 
cI = C O ~ T  FOR((F, ,< FC) A ( J I ~ ~  ,< M C ~ )  A . . A (JI~,,~ ,< MC,)), 
z= 1 
n 




C22 = COUNT FOR((F2 > FC) A (J1z~ > MCI) V . . * v (JIzrn > M C m ) ) ,  
for j = I , .  . . , m, and where 
COUNT(i - 1) + 1 FOR Boolean expression true. { COUNT(i - 1) otherwise; COUNT( i) = 
COUNT(0) = 0. 
The counts correspond to the cells of the conririgericy rubfe (C11, Clz, C.1. and 
Cz:), as shown in table 3, where row and cclumn totals are also shown: n, n 1 ,  712, SI, 
and The analysis could be generalized to include multiple quality factors, if 
necessary; in this case, the contingency table would have more than two rows. 
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Table 3 
Validation contingency table. 
Hish quality CII = 3 0  C,? = 27 nl = 57 
dt.colinr = 0 
Low quality C?, = 1 c2: = 42 n2 = 13 
drcoiirir > 0 
F, 6 FC type 2 
F, > FC type 1 
n = 100 
T F =  191 
n.1 = 31 .Y: = 69 
RF= 1, RFhI = I 
ACCEPT REJECT 
In addition to counting modules in table 3, tve must also coun: the quality factor 
(e.g., drcoitnt) that is incorrectly classified. This is shown as Remaining Factor, RF, 
in the ACCEPT column. This is the quality factor count on modules that should 
have been rejected. Also shown is Total Factor. TF, the total quality factor count 
on all the modules in the sample (i.e., the sum of drcoiuzt). Lastly we show RFiM 
(Remaining Factor Modules) that is the count of modules with quality factor count >O 
(i.e., modules with Remaining Factor, RF). 
Table 3 and subsequent equations show an example validation, where the optimal 
combination of metrics from table 2 and their critical values for a random sample of 
100 modules (sample I ) ,  from the population of 1397, is prologue size ( P )  with a 
critical value of 38 and statenzeizts ( S )  with a critical value of 26. This low value of 
stateirients is understandable because the median value in the builds analyzed is 23. 
There are many small modules that call a subroutine, compute a value. and transfer 
control to another module. Later we will explain how we amved at this particular 
combination of metrics as the optimal set, 
3.2.2. Statistical criteria 
We validate a BDF statistically by demonstrating that it partitions table 3 in 
such a way that C11 and Czz are large relative to C,? and GI.  If this is the case, a 
large number of high quality modules (e.g., modules with drcount = 0) would have 
AIlj  6 MCj and would be correctly classified as high quality. Similarly, a large number 
of low quality modules (e.g., modules with drcoum > 0) would have Al,, > MCj and 
would be correctly classified as low quality. One measure of the degree to which this 
is the case is estimated by the chi-square (s') statistic [Conover 19711. If computed 
sf > x: (chi-square at specified a,) and if computed aC < as, then these .results 
suggest that a given BDF can discriminate between high and low quality. However, 
because the x' test may not produce consistent results [Eman 19981. we use it only as 
one of several indicators of Discriminarive Poir.er. Other criteria are misclassification 
rates and, most important, application criteria (see below). We note that the use of 
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chi-square and alpha as statistical criteria is independent of the application (i.e., these 
criteria could be used whether the application is metrics or personnel management). 
Application criteria, on the other hand, such as qirahy and iuspectiori (see below) are 
meaningful in the corztext of the metrics application. 
3.2.2.1. Misclass~cntiori 
We compute the degree of misclassification in table 3 by noting that ideally 
CII  = 721 = :YI, clz = 0, C2l = 0, C22 = n2 = -1-2. The estent that this is not the 
case is estimated by h p e  I misclassifications (ix., the module has low qrralip and the 
metrics “say” it has high quality) and type 2 misclassifications (i.e., the module has 
high pa f i ry  and the metrics “say” it has fo\r, qriafin). Thus, tve define the follouing 




For the example. PI = (1/100). 100 = 172, P2 = (27/100). 100 = 2772, PI. = 
c2 I PI = -. 
n 
CI 2 P2 = -. 
n 
c21 f c12 
PI? = 
Proportion of modules of type 1: 
Proportion of modules of type 2: 
Proportion of modules of type 1 f type 2: 
n 
( ( I  - 27)/100) x 100 = 28%. 
3.2.3. Applicatioti criteria 
It is insufficient to validate only with respect to statistical criteria. In the final 
analysis. it is the performance of the metrics in the application context that counts. 
Thenfore. we validate metrics with respect to the application criteria: qruzfiQ a d  
itispection, which are related to the quality achieved and the cost to achieve it, respec- 
tively [Schneidenind 1997a,b]. At the Design phase of Build 2 in figure 1, we predict 
that the quality computed by equations (7)-(12) u.ill be delivered to maintenance, as- 
suming that the modules that are rejected by the quality control process are inspected 
and tested and that the problems that are found are corrected. Furthermore, we predict 
that the degree of inspection computed by equation (13) will be required to achieve 
this quality. 
3.2.3.1. Quality 
First, we estimate the ability of the metrics to correctly classify quality, given 
that the quality is known to be low: proportion of low quality (e.g., drcornzt > 0)  
modules correctly classified 
(7) c22 
For the example, LQC = (42/43). 100 = 97.7%. 
Second, we estimate the ability of the metrics to correctly classify quality, given 
that the BDF has classified modules as ACCEPT. This is done by summing the quality 
LQC = -. 
n2 
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factor in the ACCEPT column in table 3 to produce Remaining Factor, RF (e.g., 
remaining drcowzt), given by equation (8): 
This is the sum of quality factor F, (e.g., drcouitt) on modules incorrectly classi- 
fied as high quality because (Fi > FC) A (Alrij < MCj) for these modules. We assume 
that the elements of Fi are additive and that the lower its value, the higher the quality 
of the module. This ivould be the case for any quality factor of interest in this analysis: 
discrepancy report count, error count, fault count, and failure count. 
We estimate the proportion of RF by equation (9), where TF is the total quality 
factor F, for the validation sample: 
RF 
RFP = -. 
TF (9) 
For the example. from table 3 there is a one DR on one module that is incorrectly 
classified (i.e.. RF = 1). The total number of DRs for the 100 modules is 192. 
Therefore, RFP = ( 1  192) 100 = 0.52%. 




RFD = -. 
For the example, RFD = 1 / 100 = 0.01 drcorozr/module. 
In addition, we estimate the count of modules that Lvere incorrectly classified 
because they have DRs written against them (i.e., have Fl > FC). The proportion 
remaining RMP is given by equation (1  1). Note that RMP = Pi (proportion of rype I 
misclassifications) ivhm FC = 0 (i.e., the only modules with F, > 0 will be in the 
GI  cell); see table 3. 
RFM RMP= -, 
71 
where RFM is given by 
RFM= COCST FOR((F, > 0) A (JIil < MCl) A . . . A (.iUtj < MC,) 
z =  I 
A 1 . .  A ( A f t m  < MC,)), for j = 1, .  . . ,m. (12) 
For the example, there is one accepted module with one DR, so RMP = (1/100).100 = 
1 %. 
3.2.3.2. tnspectiori 
Inspection is one of the costs of high quality. We are interested in weighing 
inspection requirements (i.e.. percent of modules rejected and subjected to detailed 
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Discriminative Power validity evaluation (sample 1, n = 100 modules). 
Critical values Statistical criteria Application criteria 
Metric set p S El S P! P: 1; crC for xf LQC RFP RXlP I 
5 % -  5 sr 5 %  
P 38 1 21 33.1 8.4 x lo-' 95.3 1.56 2 62 
P, s 38 26 1 27 26.7 2.4 x lo-' 97.7 0.52 1 69 
P. s, El 38 26 10 1 30 21.5 2.1 x 97.7 0.52 1 72 
K-S distance 0.585 0.557 0.492 0.487 
P: prologue size, S: statements. El: eral. A': nodes 
inspection) against the quality that is achieved, for various BDFs. We estimate inspec- 
tion requirements by noting that all modules in the REJECT column of table 3 must 
be inspected; this is the count Clz + C22. Thus. the proportion of modules that must 
be inspected is given by 
I =  c,. - c.1 
n 
For the example. I = ((27 + 42)/100) . 100 = 69% and the percentage accepted is 
1 - I = 3 1 % .  
3.2.4. Siiniiiiary of validation resrrlrs 
The results of the validation example are summarized in table 4. The properties of 
doiiiiitarrce and concordmice are evident in these validation results and in other samples 
we have analyzed from this data. That is. a point is reached in adding metrics where 
Discrintiiintive Pou.er is not increased because: (1) the contribution of the dominant 
metrics in correctly classifying quality has already taken effect, and (2) additional 
metrics essentially replicate the classification results of the dominant metrics - the 
concordmice effect. This result is due to the property of the BDF used as an OR 
function, which will cause a module to be rejected if only one of the module's metrics 
exceeds its critical value. These effects can only be observed if a marginal analysis is 
performed, where metrics are added to the set one-by-one and the calculations shotvn 
in table 4 are made after each metric is added. For each added metric, its effect is 
evaluated \vith respect to both statistical and application criteria. In addition, a suitable 
stopping mle must be used to know when to stop adding metrics (see the next section). 
3.3. Stnge 3: Appl? n stopping rule for adding rnetrics 
One rule for stopping the addition of metrics to a BDF is to quit when RFP no 
longer decreases as metrics are added. This is the r?ia.rimiun quali& rule. This rule is 
illustrated in table 3. When a third metric, etal (El). is added, there is no decrease 
in RFP and RMP nor is there an increase in LQC. If i t  is important to strike a balance 
between quality and cost (i.e., between RFP and I ) .  n e  add metrics until the ratio of 
the relative change in RFP to the relative change in I is maximum, as given by the 
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Table 5 
Application contingency table. 
Hish qusl i ry  Type 3- 
? ? ? ? 
,? ? *> 1 
Lou quality TYPt 1 
-Y, = 40 :Y: = 60 n =  100 
ACCEPT REJECT 
Qiralify Iiispecrioti Rario (QIR) in equation (14), where i refers to the previous RFP 
and I :  
For the examplz, 
iO.52 - 1.561/1.56 
QIR(P - P ,  S) = = 5.90. 
(69 - 62)/62 
This is the valuc of QIR in going from one metric prologlie size ( P )  to two metrics 
( P ,  S), adding srmet?zetirs (S). 
Also, QIR(P. S - P, S ,  E l )  = 0. This is the value of QIR in going from two 
metrics ( P , S )  to three metrics ( P , S , E l ) ,  adding era1 (El). 
Therefore. we stop adding metrics after srureineitrs has been added. In this par- 
ticular case, equation (1 4) produces the same metric set as the i~~nrintiun quality rule. 
4. Comparison of validation with application results 
In order to compare validation ivith application results, we first show how the 
Contingency table looks at the Design phase of Build 2 in figure 1, when only the 
metrics A1,j and their critical values MC, are available. This is shown in table 5 ,  where 
the "?" indicates that the quality factor data Fi are not available when the validated 
metrics are used in the quality control function of Build 2. During the Design phase 
of Build 2, modules are classified according to the criteria that have been described. 
A second disjoint random sample of 100 modules (sample 2) was used to illustrate 
the process. Whereas 31 and 69 modules were accepted and rejected, respectively, 
during Build 1. 40 and 60 modules were accepted and rejected, respectively, during 
Build 2. The rejected modules would be given priority attention (i.e., subjected to 
rigorous inspection). 
A comparison of the validation sample (Build 1) with the application samples 
(Build 2) with respect to statistical criteria is shown in table 6. A comparison of the 
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Table 6 
Ststistical criteria PI and P2 for metric set: P, S. Validation (sample 1)  vs. application (samples 2 4 ) .  
n = 100 modules. 
PI: percentage type 1 misclassification P2: percentage type 7 misclassification 
Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 1 Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4 
1 .o i .O 4.0 3.0 21.0 24.0 18.0 '7.0 
Table 7 
Application criteria LQC and RFP for metric set: P.S. Validation (sample 1) vs. spplication isamples 
2 3 ) .  R = 100 modules. 
LQC: percentage of low quality modules (drcoioir 
> 0) correctly classified 
RFP: percentage of quality facior (drcolttirj insor- 
rectly classified 
Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4 Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4 
97.7 91.3 91.1 93.2 0.52 0.61. 3.01 1.50 
Table 8 
Application criteria RFD and I for metric set: P, S. Validation (sample 1) vs. application (samples 2 4 ) .  
n = 100 modules. 
~ ~~ 
RFD: density of quality factor (drcoittir/module) 
incorrectly classified 
I :  percentage of modules inspected 
Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample -i Sample 1 Sample 1 Sample 3 Sample 1 
0.01 0.0 I 0.05 0.03 69 60 59 . . 63 
validation sample with the application samples ivith respect to application criteria is 
shown in tables 7 and 8. As we have mentioned, only metrics data is available when the 
validated metrics are applied during the Design phase of Build 2 in figure 1. However, 
to have a basis for comparison with the validation results, we computed the values 
shown in tables 6- S retrospectively (i.e., after Build 2 was far enough along to be able 
to collect all of the quality factor data at the conclusion of the Test phase). The values 
for samples 2-4 in tables 7 and 8 are the actiral quality delivered to maintenance, as 
shown during the Test phase of figure 1. The reader should compare the rssults of 
samples 2-4 with those of sample 1 in the tables. As the accuracy of classification 
of low quality software increases, the accuracy of classifying high quality software 
decreases and inspection cost increases. However, the more important consideration 
is to prevent low quality software from being delivered to maintenance, particularly in 
safety critical systems like the Space Shirttfe. 
5. Quality point and confidence interval estimates 
In addition to the quantities in tables 3 4 ,  there are other quantities of interest, 
such as the proportion of modules with zero and non-zero drcoiuzt and their confidence 
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intervals. For these quantities, software developers and maintainers are provided with 
both point estimates and interval estimates of the range in which the actual quality 
values are likely to fall. Thus, they are able to anticipate rather than react to quality 
problems. For example, estimates obtained from Build 1 in figure 1 are used to predict 
the quality of software that would be delivered to maintenance if correctiL,e action were 
not taken. This action is the quality control step of the Design phase of Build 2 where 
modules are rejected and subjected to detailed inspection and test if their metrics values 
exceed the critical values. In addition. the estimates provide indications of resource 
levels that are needed to achieve quality goals. For example, if the predicted quality 
of the software were lower than the specified quality. the diffcrence ivould be an 
indication of increased usage of personnel and computer time during inspection and 
testing, respectively. 
A benefit of using confidence limits is that they provide protection against pre- 
diction error. A prediction error could arise because the very act of measuring and 
predicting may affect the predictions - the Heiseizberg Principle. For example, pro- 
l o p e  size, the record of change history, has proven to be a good predictor of quality. 
However, if the software is changed in response to problems observed durin: the qual- 
ity control function, thereby adding to the change history and prologue size, this effect 
would tend to make the original predictions optimistic. Another protection against 
prediction error is to periodically repeat the predictions as the software evolves over 
the life cycle. 
The normal approximation to the binomial distribution is used to estimate the 
confidence limits of the proportions. This distribution is used because \be are interested 
in estimating the proportions of modules and drcowzt that fall into one of tivo categories 
(i.e., a module is either accepted or rejected or DRs are either present or not present 
on a module). The normal approximation gives the mean proportion p of modules or 
DRs that fall into one of two categories and the confidence limits are a function of p .  
The point and confidence limit estimates for module and quality factor counts 
use terms that are defined beloLv. Where it is necessary to distinguish validation from 
application quantities in the computations. we usz primed notation for the latter. 
n: number of modules in the validation and application samples (see tables 3 and 5 ,  
respectively). 
-1-1 : number of modules accepted in the validation sample of Build 1. 
-Yl: number of modules rejected in the validation sample of Build 1. 
:I-:: number of modules accepted in the application samples of Build 2 
-Y<: number of modules rejected in the application samples of Build 2 
5.1. hrlod11le colrllfs 
Module count estimates are made using the validation sample in the Test phase 
of Build I .  These estimates are applied to the application samples in the Design phase 
of Build 2 and compared with actual values in table 9. 
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The proportion of all modules with quality factor Fi > 0 (e.g., clrcorirzr > 0 on 
module i) in the entire validation sample is given by equation (15): 
COUNT:=, FOR Fi > 0 
71 
Pn = 9 
where 
COUNT(i - 1) -+ 1 
COUNT(i - 1). otherwise; 
FOR expression rrzie, COUNT( i) = 
COUNT(0) = 0. 
We use this equation to estimate pk  in the application samples. U'e obtain the two-sided 
confidence interval of p, ,  from expression (16). We use this expression to estimate the 
lower and upper limits of p; in the application samples: 
As shown in table 9, we lvould expect the proportion of all modules uith drcoirizr > 0 
in maintenance to be between 33.3-52.7% unless corrective action is taken to make 
these limits lower. If corrective action is taken, this estimate provides bounds on the 
resources - personnel and computer time - that would be required to inspect, correct, 
and test defective modules. 
The proportion of nccepred modules with quality factor F, > 0 (e.g., clrcoiiizr 
> 0 on module I )  in the validation sample is given by equation (17), ivhere RFhl is 
obtained from equation (1 2): 
We use this equation to estimate pNf in the application samples. We obtain the one- 
sided upper confidence limit of p X 1  from expression (1 8). We use this expression to 
estimate the upper limit of in the application samples: 
As shown in table 9, we would expect the proportion of accepted modules with drcoriizr 
> 0 in maintenance to be 6 8.45% as the result of the quality control effort in the 
Design phase of Build 2. 
The proportion of rejecred modules with quality factor Fi > 0 (e.g.. clrcorirzt > 0 
on module i) in the validation sample is given by equation (19): 
This is equal to: (afl modules with quality factor Fi > 0) minus (accepred modules 
with quality factor Fj > 0), divided by the number of rejected modules. We use this 
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equation to estimate pi\-; in the application samples. We obtain the one-sided 1oLver 
confidence limit of p iv ,  &om expression (20). We use this expression to estimate the 
lower limit of in the application samples: 
As shown in table 9, we would expect the proportion of rejected modules with d r c o m  
> 0 in maintenance to be 2 51.254% as the result of the quality control effort in the 
Design phase of Build 2. 
5.2. Qira fity factor counts 
Quality factor proporriorz count estimates in (21)-(34) are made using the val- 
idation sample in the Test phase of Build 1. Quality factor torn1 count estimates in 
(25) and (26) use data from the validation sample and data that is available in the 
application samples in the Design phase of Build 2: number of modules accepted, -I-{ 
and number of modules rejected, :I-;. These estimates are applied to the application 
samples in the Design phase of Build 2 and compared with actual values in tables 9 
and 10. 
The proportion of quality factor Fi > 0 (e.g., drcomt > 0) that occurs on accepted 
modules in the validation sample is given by equation (21): 
RF 
dl = - 
TF ’ (21 1 
where RF is obtained from equation (8) and TF is the total quality factor Fi for the 
validation sample. We use this equation to estimate d’, in the application samples. We 
obtain the one-sided upper confidence limit of dl from expression (23). We use this 
expression to estimate the upper limit of di in the application samples: 
(23) 
As shown in table 9, we would expect the proportion of drcoimt > 0 on accepted 
modules in maintenance to be < 1.38% as the result of the quality control effort in 
the Design phase of Build 2. 
The proportion of quality factor Fi > 0 (e.g., drcorrnr > 0) that occurs on rejected 
modules in the validation sample is given by equation (23): 
d2= 1 -d1.  (23) 
We use this equation to estimate d: in the application samples. We obtain the one-sided 
IoLver confidence limit of d l  from-expression (24). We use this expression to estimate 
the lower limit of d: in the application samples: 
(24) 
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Table 9 
Validation predictions (sample 1) vs. application actual values (samples 2-4). 
Point estimates 9 5 9  Confidence limits Actual values 
(sample 1) (sample 1) Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4 
~ ~ ~~~ ~~~~ 
p h :  proportion of all 43.0% 33.3-53.79 37.05 45.0% 44.05 
modules with 
drcolulf > 0 
accepted modules 
with drcoitrir > 0 
rejected modules 
\iith drcoririr > 0 
drcormt > 0 on 
accepted modules 
drcoiint > 0 on 
rcjrcted modules 
p S ; :  proportion of 3.22% LE S.159 2.50cr 9.765 8.1 1% 
p s i :  proportion of 60 9% GE 5 1.29 6005- 69.59 65.15 
dl :  proportion of 0.52% LE 1 3 %  0.625 3.015 1 .so5 
di .  proportion of 99.59 GE 98.69 99.45 97.0% 9S.55 
As shown in table 9, we would expect the proportion of dxount  > 0 on rejected 
modules in maintenance to be 2 9S.67~ as the result of the quality control effort in 
the Desisn phase of Build 2. 
The total quality factor Fi > 0 (e.g., drcoiuzt > 0) that occurs on nccepted 
modules in the validation sample is given by equation (25): 
N;. RF 
A', 
D , = - .  (25)  
We use this equation as a predictor of 0; in the application samples. As shown in 
table 10, we would expect the toral drcorrnt on accepted modules in maintenance to be 
1.29, 1.32, and 1.19 for application samples 2, 3, and 4, respzctively. The reason for 
the three estimates of sample 1 is that each sample has a different number of accepted 
modules LY; in equation (25). 
The total quality factor of Fi > 0 (e.g., drcotint > 0) that occurs on rejecred 
modules in the validation sample is given by equation (26): 
We use this equation as a predictor of 0: in the application samples. As shown in 
table 10, we would expect the ford drco&t on rejected modules in maintenance to 
be 166.1, 163.3, and 174.4 for application samples 2, 3, and 4, respectively. The 
reason for the three estimates of sample 1 is that each sample has a different number 
of rejected modules A-4 in equation (26). 
Ten of the actual L'alues out of the fifteen cases in table 9 fall within the confidence 
limits. The averase relative error across six comparisons between sample 1 versus 
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Tahle 10 
Validation actual values and predictions (sample 1) vs. application actual values (samples 2-4). 
Actual Estimate Actual Estimatc Actual Estimate Actual 
sample 1 sample I sample 1 sample 1 sample 3 sample I sample 4 
0;: rota1 drcoiirtt 1 1.29 I 1.32 5 1.19 3 
on accepred modules 
on rejected modules 
0;: total drcoruir 191 166.1 160 163.3 161 174.4 197 
Table 1 1  
Comparison of Boolean Discriminant Function (BDF) with Linear Discriminnnt Function (LDF). Validity 
evaluation (sample I ,  R = 100 modules). 
Statistical criteria Application criteria 
Function Metric set PI W j  Pz (9) xf Q~ f o r x t  L Q C ( % )  I ( % )  
BDF P. s 1 .o 27.0 76.7 2 . 1  x lo-’ 97.7 69.0 
LDF 9 metrics 9.0 9.0 37.5 =ZO 79.1 43.0 
LDF metric ST[ (counts per module): Halstead eral. eta’, 71. and 72: lines of code. prologue size, nodes, 
paths, and maximum path. 
samples 2-4 in table 10 is 28.9% with a standard deviation of 30.79. Variation in 
results niny be caused by sampling error (i.e., in order to obtain disjoint samples, it 
was necessary to sample without replacement). 
6.  Comparison of Boolean and linear discriminant functions 
We compared the quality classifying ability during validation of the Boolean dis- 
criminant function (BDF) with an alternate method: the linear discriminant function 
(LDF) consisting of the summation across metrics of the product of standardized met- 
rics variables and standardized classification coefficients [Jobson 19921. For the BDF, 
tve used thc optimal metrics set - prologire size and stcltemerirs - and results obtained 
from table 4. For the LDF. we used the set of nine metrics listed in table 11 and a 
marginal analysis that yielded the highest Discrimirznrive Po\r.er- as measured by the 
eigenvalue and x’. The comparison is shown in table 11. In thz comparison, we used 
both statistical and application criteria. In the application category, we did not compute 
RFP and RMP for the LDF as we did in table 4. Unlike the BDF where equations 
(8) and (9 )  count quality factor and (11) and (12) count modules that are misclassi- 
fied into the ACCEPT categor). there is no algorithm for making these computations 
for the LDF. It would have been necessary to compare the metrics and drcorirzt for 
each module with the LDF to determine how the metrics classified the modules and 
drcozint. However, a good comparison is obtained by using LQC. In this example, 
table 10 shows that the BDF does a better job of classifying the low quality modules 
(e.g., loner value of PI and higher value of LQC) and that LDF does a better job of 
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Table 12 
Metric characteristics of failed modules. 
Failure Severity XIodule Prologue Statements Eta1 Xodes d r c o m  
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Critical valuc 38 26 10 11 0 
Failed modules mean 253.7 201.9 23.6 110.3 6.7 
Build 2. mc3n 134.6 70.2 16.7 28.4 1.8 
classifying the high quality modules (e.g.. lower values of P2 and I ) .  As stated in 
section 1, the reason for this result is that BDFs make fewer mistakes in classifying 
software that is low quality than is the case when linear vectors of metrics are used 
because the critical values provide additional information for discriminating quality. 
The implications for applying the validated metrics durinz the quality control function 
of the Design phase of Build 2 is that the BDF would yield higher quality and the 
LDF would yield lower cost. Our preference is the BDF in a safety critical system 
like the Space Shuttle. \vhere high quality sofnvare is the paramount objective. 
7. Metric characteristics of failed modules 
Further evidence of the model’s ability to identify low quality during development 
is shown in table 12. This table shows the 15 modules that failed during maintenance 
of the 1397 modules of Build 2 in figure 1, where the severity of the 10 failures 
decreases from 2 to 4. In the case of failure $7, six modules caused this failure. The 
table also shows the module metrics and validated critical values that were obtained 
during Build 1. For all failed modules, one or more of their metric values exceed the 
critical value. Metric \.slues in irdics would fail to reject these modules during quality 
control of the Design phase of Build 2. Hotvever, this would be compensated for by 
the metric prologire six that Lvould have correctly rejected all of these modules. To 
illustrate the difference in metric characteristics of the failed modules versus all the 
modules of Build 2, the means of each Mere computed. The difference in means is 
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significant at ci < 0.05. As this example illustrates, although a metrics program can 
alert the developer to the possibility of unreliable software. i t  cannot prevent failures 
from occumng. In this example, the inspection and test process failed to find and 
correct the problems before Build 2 entered maintenance. 
8. Conclusions 
A model was developed for controlling and predicting the quality of software that 
is delivered by development to maintenance. The model provides software developers 
and maintainers with both point estimates and interval estimates of the range in which 
the actual quality values are likely to fall. Thus, they are alerted to the need to take 
corrective action. 
It is important Lvhen validating and applyin,o metrics to consider both statistical 
and application criteria and to measure thz marginal contribution of each metric in 
satisfying these criteria. When this approach is used, ~ ' e  observe that a point is reached 
where adding metrics makes no contribution to improvin? quality and the cost of 
using additional metrics increases. This phenomenon is due to the metric classification 
properties of dornirznizce and coizcordance. Using our approach, we achieved an error 
of 6 3% in classifying quality factors for the samples used in the study. The ratio of 
the relative improvement in quality to the relative increase in inspection cost is a new 
and effective stopping rule for adding metrics. 
Our Boolean discriminant function (BDF) is a new type of discriminant for clas- 
sifying software quality to support an integrated approach to control and prediction in 
one model, and our application of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov distance is a new way 
to determine a metric's critical value. On this application. the BDF, using two met- 
rics, was superior to a linear discriminant function, using nine metrics, in classifying 
low quality software: however, when used for quality control. the BDF requires more 
inspection. 
Finally, with a very limited sample of modules that caused failures we found that 
the validated metrics. if they had been applied to the modules that eventually failed, 
would have acted as early indicators of these failures. 
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We expose some of the truths about 
COTS, discounting some exaggerated claims 
about the applicability of COTS, particularly with 
regard to using COTS in safety critical systems. 
Although we agree that COTS has great potential 
for reduced development and maintenance time 
and cost, we feel that the advocates of COTS have 
not adequately addressed some critical issues 
concerning reliability, maintainability, 
availability, requirements risk analysis, and cost. 
Thus we illuminate these issues, suggesting 
solutions in cases where solutions are feasible and 
leaving some questions unanswered because it 
appears that the questions cannot be answered due 
to the inherent limitations of COTS. These 
limitations are present because there is inadequate 
visibility and documentation of COTS 
components. 
Introduction 
In this paper we analyze three important 
aspects of COTS software: 1) reliability, 
maintainability, and availability; 2) requirements 
risk assessment, using risk factors from the Space 
Shuttle and modifying them for more general use; 
and 3) cost framework. We are motivated to 
address these issues because we feel that the 
COTS community has not adequately addressed 
some very important questions concerning the 
applicability of COTS when used i n  a host 
system. We define a host system as follows: it 
contains both COTS and non-COTS software; the 
latter is specific to the operational mission of the 
organization; and the mission cannot be satisfied 
entirely by COTS components. Our concerns are 
reinforced by Kohl: “The most significant 
challenges of V&V of COTS products has to do 
with knowledge of the functionality, performance 
and quality of these products. Because these 
products tend to be developed for large, 
commercial markets as opposed to being 
developed to a specification for a single customer, 
they tend to provide a variety of useful and 
desirable features for the market that they are 
targeted for, at the expense of the specific system 
needs in which such products may be used. 
Further. quality and reliability are sometimes not 
considered critical when time-to-market is a 
driving requirement. Thus, it is sometimes the 
case that these COTS products contain features 
and functionality that may not be fully known, 
even to the vendor.” [KOH99]. 
Many vendors produce products that are 
not domain specific (e.g., network server) or have 
limited functionality (e.g., mobile phone). In 
contrast, many customers of COTS develop 
systems that are domain specific (e.g., target 
tracking system) and have great variability in 
functionality (e.g., corporate information system). 
This discussion takes the viewpoint of how the 
customer can ensure the quality of COTS 
components. I n  addition to direct quality 
evaluation, we also consider requirements risk 
analysis in a later section, which indirectly affects 
quality. We must distinguish between using a non- 
mission critical application like a spreadsheet 
program to produce a budget and a mission 
critical application like military strategic and 
tactical operations. Whereas customers will 
tolerate an occasional bug in the former, zero 
tolerance is the rule in the latter. We emphasize 
the latter because this is the arena where there are 
major unresolved problems in the application of 
COTS. Furthermore, COTS components may be 
embedded in host systems. These components 
must be reliable. maintainable, and available, and 
must interoperate with the host system in order for 
the customer to benefit from the advertised 
advantages of lower development and 
maintenance costs. Interestingly, when the claims 
of COTS advantages are closely examined, one 
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finds that to a great extent these COTS 
components consist of hardware and office 
products, not mission critical software [CLE97]. 
Obviously, COTS components are different 
from host components with respect to one or more 
of the following attributes: source, development 
paradigm, safety, reliability, maintainability, 
availability, security, and other attributes. 
However, the important question is whether they 
should be treated differently when deciding to 
deploy them for operational use; we suggest the 
ansn.er is no. We use reliability as an example to 
justify our answer. In order to demonstrate its 
reliability, a COTS component must pass tlie same 
reliability evaluations as the host components, 
othenvise the COTS components will be the 
weakest link in the chain of components and will 
be tlie determinant of software system reliability. 
The challenge is that there will be less information 
available for evaluating COTS components than 
for host components but this does not mean we 
should despair and do nothing. Actually, there is a 
lot we can do even in the absence of 
docurnentation on COTS components because the 
customer will have information about how COTS 
components are to be used in  tlie host system. To 
illustrate our approach, we will consider tlie 
re1 iabil i ty, main tainabi 1 i ty, and avai lability 
(RMA) of COTS components as used in host 
systems. 
In addition, COTS suppliers should consider 
increasing visibility into their products to assist 
customers in determining the components' fitness 
for use i n  a particular application. We offer ideas 
about information that would be useful to 
customers and what vendors might do to provide 
it. 
This paper is organized as follows: reliability, 
maintainability, availability, requirements risk 
analysis, improved visibility into COTS, cost as 
the universal COTS metric, and conclusions. 
Reliability 
There are some intriguing questions 
concerning how to evaluate the reliability of 
COTS components that we will attempt to answer 
[SCH991]. Among these are the following: How 
do we estimate the reliability of COTS when there 
is no data available from the vendor? How do we 
estimate the reliability of COTS when it is 
embedded in a host system? How do we revise 
our reliability estimates once COTS has been 
upgraded? A fundamental problem arises in 
assessing the reliability of a software component: 
a software component will exhibit different 
reliability performance in different applications 
and environments. A COTS component may have 
a favorable reliability rating when operated in 
isolation but a poor one \\.hen integrated in a host 
system. What is needed is the operational profile 
of COTS components as integrated into the host 
system in order to provide some clues as to how to 
test COTS components. We will assume tlie 
worst-case situation that documentation and 
source code are not available. Thus, inspection 
would not be feasible and we would have to rely 
exclusively on testing and reliability calculations 
derived from test data to assess reliability. 
The operational profile identifies the 
criticality of components and their duration and 
frequency of use. Establishing the operational 
profile leads to a strategy of what to test, with 
what intensity, and for what duration. We must 
recognize that a COTS component must be tested 
with respect to both its operational profile and the 
operational profile of the host system of which it 
is a part. The COTS component would be treated 
like a black box for testing purposes similar to a 
host component being delivered by design to 
testing but without the documentation. Testing the 
COTS components according to these operational 
profiles will produce failure data that can be used 
for two purposes: 1) make an empirical reliability 
assessment of COTS components in the 
environment of the host system and 2) provide 
data for estimating the parameters of a reliability 
model for predicting future reliability [SCH97]. 
A comprehensive software reliability 
engineering process is described in [ANS93]. As 
pointed out by Voas, black box and operational 
testing alone may be inadequate [VOA98]. In 
addition, he advocates using fault injection to 
corrupt one component (e.,o., COTS component) 
to see how well other components (e.g., tlie host 
system) can tolerate the failed component. While 
this approach can identify problems in the 
software, it cannot fix them without 
documentation. Thus there must be a contract lvitli 
the vendor that allows tlie customer to report 
problems to tlie vendor for their resolution. 
Unfortunately. from the customer's standpoint, 
vendors are unlikely to agree to such an 
arrangement unless tlie customer has significant 
leverage such as the Federal Government. In the 
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case where documentation is available, it would 
be subjected to a formal inspection of its 
understandability and usability. If the 
documentation satisfies these criteria, it would be 
used as an aid to inspecting any source code that 
might be available. Next we consider COTS 
maintainability issues. 
Maintainability 
In the case of maintainability, there are more 
intriguing issues. Suppose a problem occurs in a 
host system. Is the problem in COTS or in the 
host software? Suppose it is caused by an 
interaction of the two. The customer knows the 
problem has occurred, but does not know how to 
fix it if there is no documentation. The vendor, not 
being on site, does not know the problem has 
occurred. Even the vendor may not know how to 
fix the problem if the source of the problem is the 
host software or an interaction between it and 
COTS components. In addition, suppose the 
customer needs to upgrade the host software and 
this upgrade is incompatible with the COTS 
components. Or, conversely, the vendor upgrades 
COTS components and they are no longer 
compatible with the host sofhvare. Lastly, suppose 
there are no incompatibilities, but the customer 
may be forced to install the latest COTS 
components upgrade in order to continue to 
receive support from the vendor. None of these 
situations can be resolved without either the 
customer having documentation to aid in fixing 
the problem, or a contract with the vendor of the 
type mentioned above. As in the case of 
reliability, when neither of these remedies is 
available, problems can only be identified but they 
cannot be fixed. Thus the software cannot be 
maintained. An additional factor that impacts both 
reliability and maintainability is that the vendor is 
unlikely to continue to support the software if the 
customer modifies it. Thus the situation 
degenerates to one in  which the customer is totally 
dependent on vendor support to achieve reliability 
and maintainability objectives. This may be 
satisfactory for office product applications but it is 
unsatisfactory for mission critical applications. 
Next we consider the COTS availability issues. 
Availability 
High availability is crucial to the success of a 
mission critical system. What will be system 
availability using COTS? To attempt to answer 
this question, it is useful to consider hardware as a 
frame of reference. The ultimate COTS is 
hardware; it has interchangeable and replacement 
components. Maintenance costs are kept low and 
availability is kept high by replacing failed 
components with identical components. Unlike 
hardware, availabilit). cannot be kept high by 
'treplacing'l the softn.are. A failed component 
cannot be replaced because the replacement 
component would have the same fault as the failed 
component. Fault tolerant software is a possibility 
but it has had limited success. We see that 
availability is a function of reliability and 
maintainability as related by the formula: 
Availability = MTTF/(MMTTF+MTTR) = 
1 / 1 +( MTTIUMTTF), 
where MTTF is mean time to failure and MTTR is 
mean time to repair. b1TTF is related to reliability 
and MTTR is related to maintainability. For high 
availability, we want to drive time tu failure to 
infinity and repair rime to zero. However, we 
have seen from the discussion of reliability and 
maintainability that achieving these objectives is 
problematic. Thus to achieve high availability, 
either the COTS softkvare must be of high intrinsic 
reliability - probably a naive assumption - or 
there must be in place a strong vendor 
maintenance program (this assumption may be 
equally naive). Next n.e consider COTS visibility 
issues. 
Improved Visibility into COTS 
Major drawbacks of including COTS in a 
software system are the lack of visibility into how 
the COTS components were developed and an 
incomplete understanding of the components' 
behavioral properties [SCH991]. Without this 
information, it is difficult to assess COTS 
components to determine their fitness for a 
particular application. As suggested by McDermid 
in [TAL98]. a partial solution might be for COTS 
vendors to identify a set of behavioral properties 
that should be satisfied by the software, and then 
certifying that those properties are satisfied. For 
instance, an operating system supplier might 
certify that a lower-priority task does not interrupt 
a higher priority task as long as the higher priority 
task holds the resources required to continue 
processing. COTS vendors might also include the 
specifications of those components as well as 
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details of verification activities in which those 
specifications had been used to show that specific 
behavioral properties of the software were 
satisfied. For instance, an effort in progress at the 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory [JPL98] involves 
developing libraries of reusable specifications for 
spacecraft software components using the PVS 
specification language [SRI98]. The developers of 
the libraries work cooperatively with anticipated 
customers to develop the specifications and 
identify those properties that the components 
should satisfy. As they develop the libraries, the 
component developers use the PVS theorem 
proverb to show that the behavioral properties are 
satisfied by the specification. These proofs are 
intended to be distributed with the libraries. When 
customers modify the libraries, perhaps to 
customize them for a new mission, they will be 
able to use the accompanying proofs as a basis for 
showing that the modified specification exhibits 
the desired behavioral properties. Similarly, 
commercial vendors could work with existing and 
potential customers through user groups to 
discover those behavioral properties in which 
users are the most interested, and then work to 
certify that their components satisfy those 
properties. Next we present a methodology for 
analyzing requirements risk when COTS is 
embedded in a host system. 
Requirements Risk Analysis 
In  this section we first describe the Shuttle 
risk management process. Then we consider how 
it could be modified to accommodate the use of 
COTS. In providing this analysis, it sl~ould not be 
inferred that we necessarily advocate the use of 
COTS on the Shuttle or on any other safety 
critical system. Whether COTS sl~ould be 
employed would depend upon many 
environmental and application factors. Rather, our 
goal is to investigate whether the Shuttle risk 
analysis process is adaptable to the use of COTS. 
Shuttle Risk Management Process 
One of the software development and 
maintenance problems of the NASA Space Shuttle 
Flight Software organization is to evaluate the risk 
of implementing requirements changes. These 
changes can affect the reliability, availability and 
maintainability of the software. To assess the risk 
of change, a number of risk factors are used. The 
risk factors were identified by agreement between 
NASA and the development contractor based on 
assumptions about the risk involved in making 
changes to the software. This formal process is 
called a risk assessment. No requirements change 
is approved by the change control board without 
an accompanying risk assessment. During risk 
assessment. the development contractor will 
attempt to answer such questions as: "Is this 
change highly complex relative to other sofhvare 
changes that have been made on the Shuttle?" If 
this were the case, a higli-risk value would be 
assigned for the complexity criterion. To date this 
qualitative risk assessment has proven useful for 
identifying possible risky requirements changes 
or, conversely, providing assurance that there are 
no unacceptable risks in making a change. 
The following are the definitions of the risk 
factors, where we have placed the factors into 
categories and have provided our interpretation of 
the question the factor is designed to answer. In 
addition, Lye added the risk factor requirements 
specificatioris techniques because we feel that this 
one could represent the highest reliability risk of 
all the factors if a technique leads to 
misunderstanding of the intent of the 
requirements. For each of the risk factors, we 
anal~ze its appropriateness for COTS. As you will 
see, this analysis not only determines the 
adaptability of the process to COTS, but also 
exposes some serious issues in the employment of 
COTS i n  my system. For example, the Shuttle 
risk process is all about assessing the risk of 
requirements changes. In COTS, we would not 
want to attempt changes because we don't have 
the necessary source code and other 
documentation. Furthermore. if we did make a 
change, it could invalidate our software license. 
This situation illuminates a serious deficiency in 
using COTS. Therefore, our only recourse, if 
feasible, is to change the host software to reflect 
the change. In other words, COTS has to be used 
"as is" in  our system. Thus, in what follows, the 
risk factors are a function of the change in the 
host software and how the change relates to and 
can be integrated with COTS. 
In order to modify the Shuttle risk process to 
make it applicable to the use of COTS, we must 
change the software change metric from lines of 
code to components. In addition, we must change 
our view of the software from a set of individual 
instructions to a set of interconnected 
components. Otherwise, it would make no sense 
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to talk about number of lines of code to be 
changed in the host sofhvare when we only have 
visibility of COTS at the component level. We 
will also assume an object oriented development 
and maintenance paradigm. 
Requirements Change Risk Factors 
The following are the definitions of the 
Shuttle risk factors modified to accommodate the 
use of COTS, where, as mentioned previously, 
only host sofflvare components can be changed, 
but in making the changes, the relationship with 
COTS components must be considered. If the 
answer to a yes/no question is "yes". it means this 
is a high-risk change with respect to the given 
factor. If the answer to a question that requires an 
estimate is an anomalous value, it means this is a 
high-risk change with respect to the given factor. 
When a change to a component is mentioned 
below, it will be understood to be a change to host 
software. 
Complexity Factors 
o Qualitative assessment of complexity of 
change (e.s., very complex) 
- Is this change highly complex relative to 
other software changes that ha\.e been made 
on the system? What are the interfaces 
between the host components and COTS 
components that are affected b!. the change? 
Is the change more complex for the host 
system than for the host software alone? 
o Number of modifications or iterations on the 
proposed change 
- How many times must the change be 
modified or presented to the Change Control 
Board (CCB) before it is approved? 
Size Factors 
o Number and types of components affected by 
the change 
- How many components and types of 
components must be changed to implement 
the requirements change? 
o Size of software components that are affected 
by the change 
- How many component objects are affected 
by the change? 
Criticality of Change Factors 
o Whether the software change is on a nominal or 
off-nominal component path (i.e., exception 
cond it i on) 
- Will a change to an off-nominal component 
path affect the reliability of the software? 
o Operational phases affected by the changed 
component path (e.g., ascent, orbit, and 
landing) 
- Will a change to a critical phase of the 
mission ( e g ,  ascent and landing) affect the 
reliability of the software? 
Locality of Change Factors 
The area of the affected change (i.e., critical 
area such as a component path for a mission 
abort sequence) 
- Will the change affect objects of 
components that are critical to mission 
success? 
Recent changes to components 
affected by the requirements change 
in the area 
- Will successive changes to the components 
in a given area lead to non-maintainable code? 
New or existing components that are affected 
- Will a change to new components (i.e., a 
change on top of a change) lead to non- 
maintainable software? 
Number of system or hardware failures that 
would have to occur before the components 
that implement the requirement are executed 
- Will the change be on a component path 
where only a small. number of system or 
hardware failures would have to occur before 
the changed components are executed ? 
Requirements Issues and Function Factors 
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o Number and types of other requirements 
affected by the given requirement change 
(requirements issues) 
- Are there other requirements that are going 
to be affected by this change? If so, these 
requirements will have to be resolved before 
implementing the given requirement. 
o Possible conflicts among requirements 
changes (requirements issues) 
- Will this change conflict with other 
requirements changes (e.g., lead to conflicting 
operational scenarios) 
o Number of principal software functions and 
components affected by the change 
- How many major software functions and 
components will have to be changed to make 
the given change? 
Performance Factors 
o Amount of memory required to implement the 
change 
- Will tlie change use memory to the extent 
that other functions and components will not 
have sufficient memory to operate 
effectively? 
o Effect on CPU performance 
- Will the change use CPU cycles to the extent 
that other functions and components will not 
have sufficient CPU capacity to operate 
effectively? 
Personnel Resources Factors 
o 
objects required to approve the change 
Number of inspections of components and 
- Will the number and duration .of inspections 
be significant? 
o Manpower required to implement the change 
- Will the manpower required to implement 
the software change be significant? 
o Manpower required to verify and validate the 
correctness of the change 
- Will the manpower required to verify and 
validate the software change be significant? 
Tools Factor 
o Software tools creation or modification 
required to implement the change 
- Will the implementation of the change 
require the development and testing of new 
tools - for example the development of 
component and object testing tools? 
o Requirements specifications techniques (e.g., 
flow diagram, state chart, pseudo code, control 
diagram). 
- Will the requirements specification method 
be difficult to understand and translate into 
components and objects? 
As an example, Table 1 shows a partial list of the 
risk factors compiled for the for the Shuttle Three 
Engine Out Auto Contingency and Single Global 
Positioning System requirements changes. 
Table 1 
Change SLOC Complexit Criticality Number of Number of Number of Number of Manpower 
Request Changed y of Change Principal Modifications Requirements Inspections Required 
Number Rating of Functions Of Change Issues Required to Make 
Change Affected Request Change 
107734 1933 4 3 27 - 7  23 8 12 209.3MW 
Discussion requirements risk analysis to a component 
oiiented one, it is not clear that the resultant risk 
model would be entirely usable because no matter 
reasonable translation from a code oriented how we define the software entities of interest, we 
still do not have equal visibility of the host 
Although we belie~.e we have made a 
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software and COTS. We suggest this is a 
fundamental problem that has not been solved by 
COTS advocates, particularly for safety critical 
systems. Next we present a framework for 
identifying and analyzing the cost of COTS. 
Cost as the Universal COTS Metric 
We focus on factors that the user should 
consider when deciding whether to use COTS 
software [SCH992]. We take the approach of 
using the common denominator cost. This is done 
for two reasons: first, cost is obviously of interest 
in making such decisions and second a single 
metric - cost i n  dollars - can be used for 
evaluating the pros and cons of using COTS. The 
reason is that various software system attributes, 
like acquisition cost and availability (i.e., the 
percentage of scheduled operating time that the 
system is available for use), are non- 
commensurate quantities. That is, we cannot relate 
quantitatively "a low acquisition cost" with "high 
availability". These units are neither additive nor 
multiplicative. However, if it were possible to 
translate availability into either a cost gainor loss 
for COTS software, we could operate on these 
rnetrics mathematically. Naturally, i n  addition to 
cost, the user application is key i n  making the 
decision. Thus one could develop a matrix where 
one dimension is application and the other 
dimension is the various cost elements. We show 
how cost elements can be identified and how cost 
comparisons can be made over the life of the 
sof'hvare. Obviously, identifying the costs would 
not be easy. The user would have to do a lot of 
work to set up the decision matrix but once it was 
constructed. it would be a significant tool in the 
evaluation of COTS. Furthermore, even if all the 
required data cannot be collected, having a 
framework that defines software system attributes 
would serve as a user guide for factors to consider 
when making the decision about whether to use 
COTS softLvare or in-house developed software. 
Note that host software could be developed either 
in-house or under contract. If the former, the in- 
house cost element below apply to host software. 
Certainly, different applications would have 
varying degrees of relationships with the cost 
elements. For example, flight control software 
\vould have a stronger relationship with the cost of 
unavailability than a spreadsheet application. 
Conversely, the latter would have a stronger 
relationship with the cost of inadequacy of tool 
features than the former. Due to the difficulty of 
identifying specific COTS-related costs, our initial 
approach is to identify cost elements on the 
ordinal scale. Thus, the first version of the 
decision matrix \vould involve ordinal scale 
metrics (i-e., the cost of unreliability is more 
important for flight control software than for 
spreadsheet applications). As the field of COTS 
analysis matures and as additional data is 
collected about the cost of using COTS, we will 
be able to refine our metrics to the ratio scale 
(e.g., the cost of unreliability in a host system is 
two times that i n  a commercial COTS system). 
The cost elements for comparing COTS 
software with in-house software are identified 
below. This list is not exhaustive; its purpose is to 
illustrate the approach. These elements apply 
whether we are comparing a system comprised of 
all COTS components with all in-house 
components or comparing only a subset of COTS 
components with corresponding in-house 
components. Explanatory comments are made 
where necessary. Mean values are used for some 
quantities i n  the initial framework. This is the case 
because it will be a challenge to collect ar7y data 
for some applications. Therefore, the initial 
framework should not be overly complex. 
Variance and statistical distribution information 
could be included as enhancements if the initial 
framework proves successful. 
Cost Elements 
Cc@ = Cost of acquiring COTS software in year j. 
CiQ) = Cost of developing in-house software in 
year j . 
U,U) = Cost of upgrading COTS software in year 
J. 
UiQ) = Cost of upgrading in-house software in 
year j. 
PG) = Cost of personnel who use the software 
system in year j .  This quantity represents the 
value to the customer of using the software 
system. 
McCj) = Cost per unit time of repairing a fault i n  
COTS software i n  year j. This is the cost of 
customer time involved in resolving a problem 
with the vendor. 
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Mi(j) = Cost per unit time of repairing a fault in 
in-house software in year j. 
Rc(j) = Mean time of repairing a fault that causes a 
failure in COTS software in year j. This is the 
average time that the user spends in resolving a 
problem with the vendor. 
Ri(j) = Mean time of repairing a fault that causes a 
failure in in-house software in year j.  
T(j) = Scheduled operating time for the software 
system in year j .  
A,(j) = Availability of software system that uses 
COTS software in yearj. 
Ai(j) = Availability of software system that uses 
software developed in-house in year j. 
These quantities are the fractions of T(j) that the 
software system is available for use. 
F,(j) = Failure rate of COTS software in year j .  
FiG) = Failure rate of in-house software in year j .  
These quantities are the number of failures per 
year that cause loss of productivity and 
availability of the software system. 
In some applications, some or all of the 
above quantities may be known or assumed to be 
constant over the life of the software system. 
Using the above cost elements, we derive the 
equations for the annual costs of the two systems 
and the difference in these costs. In the cost 
difference calculations that follow, a positive 
quantity is favorable to in-house development and 
a negative quantity is favorable to COTS. 
Cost of Acquiring Software 
Difference in annual cost = C,(j) - Ci(j) (1)  
Cost of Upgrading Software 
Difference in annual cost = U,Q) - U;(j) (2) 
Cost of Software being Unavailable for Use 
Annual cost of COTS software being unavailable 
for use = ( I-A,(j)) * P(j). 
Annual cost of the in-house software being 
unavailable for use = (1  -Ai(j)) * P(j). 
Difference in annual cost = 
P(j> * (AiCj) - (3 1 
Cost of Repairing Software 
Average annual cost of repairing failed COTS 
software = F,(j) * T(j) * R,(j) * M,(j). 
Average annual cost of repairing failed in-house 
software = F;(j) * T(j) * Ri(j) * Mi(j). 
Difference in annual cost = 
Then, TC,. total difference in cost in year j, is the 
sum of (1). (2), (3), and (4). Because there is the 
opportunity to invest funds i n  alternate projects, 
costs in different years are not equivalent (i.e., 
funds available today have more value than an 
equal amount i n  the future because they could be 
invested today and earn a future return). 
Therefore. a stream of costs over the life of the 
software for t i  years must be discounted by k, the 
rate of return on alternate use of funds. Thus the 
total discounted cost differential between COTS 
software and in-house software is: 
C;' TCj /(1+ k)' 
I n  this initial formulation, we have not 
included possible differences in functionality 
between the two approaches. However, a 
reasonable assumptioh is that COTS software 
would not be considered unless it could provide 
minimum functionality to satisfy user 
requirements. Thus, a typical decision for the user 
is whether it is worth the additional life cycle 
costs to develop an in-house software system with 
all the desirable attributes. 
Conclusions 
The decision to employ COTS on mission 
critical systems should not be based on 
development cost alone. Rather, costs should be 
evaluated on a total life cycle basis and RMA 
should be evaluated in a system context (i.e., 
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COTS components embedded in a host system). 
COTS suppliers should also consider making 
available more detailed information regarding the 
behavior of their systems, and certifying that their 
components satisfy a specified set of behavioral 
properties. In addition, a formal risk assessment of 
requirements should be performed taking into 
account the characteristics of host system 
environments. 
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Knowledge -Based 
>YSTEMS;-- 
E L S E V I E R  
Approximate declarative semantics for rule base anomalies 
DLI Zhanp".". Luqi' 
Abstract 
Despite the fact that there ha5 been a surge of publications in  verification and validation of knowledge-based systems and expert systems in 
the past decade. there are still gaps i n  the study of verification and validxion (Vk\ . )  of expert systems. not the least of ui ich is the lack of 
oppropriate semmics for expert systeni programming languages. LVithout a semantics. i t  is hard to formally detine and axlyze knouledgz 
base anornalies such a( inionsijtency and redundancy. and it  is haid to 3iiess the effectiveness of V&V tools. method; 3nd techniques thdt 
have been developed or p r o p o d .  I n  t!ik paper. lye, develop an approu;rxate declarative semantics for rule-based knoirledge bases and 
provide ;L formal definition and analysii of knowledge base inconsistency. redundancy. circularity and incompletcntss in t e r m  of theories in 
the first order predicate logic. In  the papcr. we offer classifications of coninionly found cases of inconsistency. redundancy. circularity and 
incompleteness. Finally. generid guidelints 011 hou. to remedy knowlcdgc. btiie anomalies are given. C I999 Elsevier Sciencc B.V. A!] rights 
reserved. 
K<~iroi-d<: Knowlzdge bake ~iioni.iIie~: Ini'lln Acrlcy: Redundancy: Circularit!: i:i~~1npletene+: Knou.ledSe haze veriticatism 
1. Introduction 
The last decade has tvitnessed a surge of publications in 
veritication and validation ( V B V )  of expert systems and 
knoLvltdpe-based s):s?en.is ivhich resulted in several books 
[ 1.21. and special issues of several journals [3-6]. Major A1 
conferences have had Lvorkshops and special sessions that 
lvere devoted to the issue. .A sample of additiona! publicn- 
lions can be found in Refs. 17-40]. hlany VBV methods. 
techniques and tools have been proposed, developed or 
implemented for expert system applications. On the other 
hand. advances in knoivledge engineering have resulted in 
better methodologies and practice that aim at reducing 
errors and faults durinp system development and maintr- 
nance [41 -441. Despite all these activities. there are still 
gaps in the study of VBV of expert systems. not the least 
of which is the lack of appropriate semantics for expert 
system programming languages. LVithout a semantics. it is 
hard to formally define and analyze knowledge base (KB) 
anomalies such as inconsistency and redundancy. and i t  is 
hard to assess the effectiveness of VBV tools. methods and 
techniques that have been developed or proposed. 
VBV of expert systems in general and VBV of KB in 
pmiculur need to be based on a sound thmretical founda- 
tion. Holyever. the reality is that "the construction of either 
dtclarative or Hoare-style semantics for current rule-based 
Iringurtges is a hopeless task" [31]. In the long run. concern 
for verifiability and reliability should lead to the develop- 
ment of programming languages with tractable semantics 
for expert system applications. In the meantime. some 
approximate semantics (declarative or imperative) is needed 
to enable a formal analysis of properties of expert system 
components (such as a KB). For example. sketches of an 
approximate declarative semantics. which is based on a 
logical interpretation of a rule base. and an approximate 
imperative semantics, which is based on axiomatic logic 
and invariants, for the current rule-based programming 
languages lvere proposed in Ref. [3 11. 
Adopting a declarative semantics for a rule-based 
Iringuage has some potential difficulties: ( a )  It is hard to 
provide a purely declarative interpretation of rules. because 
they often behave in an imperative manner Xvith the intended 
side effects of updatins a working memory. Simply treating 
;i tule base as a logical theory may result i n  an escessivelq' 
conservative semantics. (b) Due to the fact that consistency 
in  the first order logic is semi-decidable, th=.re does not exist 
a n  algorithm that can find all inconsistenci=.s and rzdundan- 
si:s in an arbitrary first order KB. thus. making it difficult to 
dt\.elop practical VBrV tools. 
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T;lble I 
Typesetting conventions 
2.  Preliminaries 
Symbol hleaning 
D 
Boldface capital letter 
Ordinar). capital letter 
Louw-casc ordinary letter 
Lonx-case  itdic letteris) 
r 
i 
LHS (r , )  
L 
RHS ( r )  
A nonempty domain of elements 
An interpretation 
Set o f ~ t Y ( l i t c r d ~ l .  or set of rules 





Set of literal., in the left-hand 
side of r, 
Set of literals in the right-hand 
side of r, 
Logical value> 
Variable 
There have been several efforts toLvard providing a 
precise characterization of the logical nature of a rule- 
based KJ3 [ 1 1.3 1.351. An algorithm to detect all inconsis- 
tencies and redundancies in "a certain ivell-defined. 
reasonably expresive. subset of all quasi-first-order-logic 
KB" is presented in [ 1 I].' The results in [35] indicate that a 
rule-based languase is still amenable to logical analysis. 
The purposes of this paper are to (a) Provide an approx- 
imate declarative semantics for rule-based KB so that 
various KB anomalies can be formally defined and correctly 
understood. if'e go beyond the results of [ I 1.3 I .35] by deal- 
ing with not only KB inconsistencies and redundancies. but 
also KB circularity and incompleteness. (b)  Establish KB 
anomaly analysis procedures using theories in the first order 
predicate logic (such as the iirodel rheoty, sorisfribility, and 
der i vab i l i~  of certain tautologous well-formed formulas 
[45-47]). This may serve as the theoretical underpinnings 
of practical VBrV tools. (c)  Offer classifications for cases of 
inconsistency. redundancy. circularity and incompleteness 
commonly found in rule-based Kl3. (d) Propose guidelines 
on how to remedy the anomalies once they are identified. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follous: Section 2 
briefly reviews the terms and concepts to be used throughout 
the paper. Definitions, classifications and analyses of KB 
inconsistency, redundancy, circularity and incompleteness 
are provided in Sections 3-6, respectively. Some possible 
remedial measures for KB anomalies are discussed in 
Section 7. Section 8 concludes bvith remarks about future 
uork. 
~~ ~~~~ 
' The key step in the algorithm is the subsumption tests which must be 
decidable for a given KB in  order for the KB to be completely analyzed for 
inconsistency and redundancy. The subsumption tests ivill  be decidable 
only when the expressions to be tested satisfy the yitro~rifirr tircwuplrtl 
iq-decouplcd) property [ I  I ] .  In gcneml. one does not knon  in advance i f  
u given KB u.ill generate m y  nun q-decoupled expressions because there 
ddes not exist a syntactic test for determining the q-decoupleubility of the 
KB. 
We assume that the reader is familiar lvith the ba: 
concepts and terminology in the first order predicatc lo; 
[45-47]. \Ye use iifi 10 denote the ~~.el17for.riircl~~r71:rllas 
the predicate logic. A n  nromicfoniirilo (or t 7 m i i )  refers to 
ii-place predicate symbol and its I I  terms. .4 groirrid atom 
one not containing any variables. .A lirercil is an atom or 
negation. To avoid confusion. ~ v e  adopt the typesetti 
conventions as given in Table I .  
Definition 1. An inrerpretnriori of n kvff consists of a no 
empty domain D. and an assignment of "values" to ea 
constant. function symbol and predicate symbol appeari 
in the ivff according to the folloning: ( a )  assigning 
element of D to each constant: tb)  assigning a mappi 
from D" to D to each ii-ary function symbol: and ( c )  assig 
ing a mapping from D" to (rriie.fillse} to each n-ary prec 
cate symbol. 
Definition 2 .  X a f f  H (or a set C of wft] is s~7ri 
(consisrenr) if and only if there exists an interpret: 
such that H (or e v e q  wff in  C) is evaluated to rriic' 
variable assignments' under c. uhich is dtnoted =: 
C). l is said to be a iiiodel of H ( C )  and { strrisfies H 
(C) is iiicorisisre!ir if and only if there exists no mode 
(C). H is said to be lalid (rortrologoris) if and only i 
possible interpretation satisfies H. H is a logical 
qiteiice of C if and only if every model of C is 
model of H. This is denoted as C = H. 
Theorem 1. 
C != H if and only if P A ... A Q - H is valid. Given a set of wff C = {P, . . ., Q} and a 
Definition 3. Let C and C' be sets of wff. C = C' ( 
that C is satisfiable if and only if C' is satisfiable [1 
This paper focuses on rule-based knoLvledge bt 
rule-based KB can be divided into a set of frcrs u 
stored in a n.ol-kir7g menzoi? (Wl l )  and a set of rule: 
in a rule base (RB). Rules represent general kno 
about an application domain. They are entered inti 
durinz initial knowledge acquisition or subseque 
updates. Facts in a \VM provide specific info] 
about the problems at hand and may be elicited eithe 
mically from the user during each problem-solving ! 
or statically from the domain expert during knc 
acquisition process, or derived through rule deducti 
' A variable assisnment is a mapping trsm \ xinllblei in a wff to 
in D. 
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Equi\.alent Sariit,.: denoted as L I  = L:'. L! and L: are syntacticall> 
identical fsamc predicate symbol. sanie arity. and same 
terms at comsponding positions) 
Ci,r,;plrtftr/itrrn: dtnotcd L!#L:. L: and L: are an atom 
and its negation 
Syror:?n!oui: denoted L: = L:'. L ,  and L: are 
syntactic all^^ different. but logically cquivdent 
Contiict' .Muri& e . ~ c l i ~ . ~ i i ~ :  denored L; e L:. L: and L: are 
syntactically different anJ semantically have opposite 
truth va!ues 
1/iwi!;~:rilh: denoted L: x L:. L ,  and L: are 
complementary pair of synonymous literali 
"Given two rules r and r.. ifLHSlr,)  = {PI. .... Pfii and LHSir, = {PI ' .  .... PN';.. then LHStr ) = LHS:r;)iffVi E [l.filPi = Pi'. 
" G i v t n t w o r u l e a r , a n d r  ,. i i L H S i r , l = I P l  ..... P r i } a n d L H S ( r , , = ~ P l '  ..... Ri':.. thenLHSi: ) %  L H S . r ; ) i f f V i E  [ I . I I ]  P;= Pi'. 
. L. and L: are conflict litcralc. denoted L ,  TL L:. it'tL.wL,i v t i  fL:ivrL.==L:r 
Definition 1. Rules in a KB have the format: P, A ... A 
P, - R. kvhere P,'s are the conditions (collectivel\,. the left- 
h i i d  side. LHS. of a rule). R is the conclusion (or righr- 
h i i d  side. RHS. of a rule). and the symbol '. - '' is under- 
stood as the logical implication. The P,'s and R are 1iteml.c. 
If the conditions of a r u l e  instance are satisfied b! facts in 
LVhl. then its conclusion is deposited into LVhI. 
Definition 5. A fact is represented as a ground atom. It 
hpecifies an instance of a relationship anion: particular 
objects in the problem domain. Li34 contains a collection 
of po.7irit.e ground atoms. which are deposited through 
either assertion (initial or dynamic). or rule deduction. 
Definition 6. A negated condition -,$.v) in the LHS of a 
ruk is satisfied if p ( s )  is not in LVM for any .r. A negated 
ground atom -p(a) in the LHS of a nile is satisfied ifpca) is 
nut in L V M  A negated conclusion -R in the RHS of a rule 
results in the removal of R from LVM. when the LHS of the 
rule is satisfied:' Rule instances and negated literals can he 
utilized by the inference system. but are never deposited 
into LVM [ 113. 
Definition 7. Given tu'o sets of literals L and L'. L' is said 
t o  be a specia1i:cirion of L. denoted L' 4 L. if there exists a 
nonempty set of srrhsrirritiom 8. such that L' = (L)O. In 
particular. a literal P' is a specialization of P. denoted as 
P' 4 P if there exists a nonempty set of substitution 0 such 
that P' = (PJB. 
Definition 8. Given a set L of ii literals. p(L) represents 
the Set of all literai permutations in L. 
' There \{oulLf be no ctkcr  on \ \31 i f R  is not in LYX! lvhcn -R is deri\e.i. 
Definition 9. If r is a rule and P is a literal. the espression 
r - P is used to indizate arbitrary lensth derivation of P from 
r in terms of some inference methods.' 
Csing Irlgictil eqriit~ileiice. H'C can always convert a logi- 
cal implication into a disjunction of literals. \Ye further 
simplify the notation by dropping the logical connective 
.. V '. from such a disjunction. For instance. thr. set of uff 
{P A Q - R. UA -1' - LV) has the folloLving logically 
equivalent short representation: {-P -QR. -VYW) where 
e x h  element in the set is a disjunction of literals. 
Definition 10. The concepts of the snine. syroiryiioris, 
c.oiiiplciiieiiri71?. /iilirllnl e.diisii,e. iircoinpnriDle. and 
cmcflicr literals are defined in Table 2 in terms of syntax 
and semantics considerations. 



















In this paper. \ve do not consider the situatio:i in ivhich 
riiles are augmented with c.rr.rlri/iV ,firc.ton. B e c ~ i ~ i s e  of the 
\vay they are defined. rule.; and facts ;ire subsets of w3. 
Therefore. the terms "rule" and "fact" can he freely replriceci 
by the term *.\vfYf' throughout the rest of the paper. 
3. KiB inconsistency 
bur its manifestation is through \\.XI. For instance. the 
incnnsistcncy of a RB containins a pair of rules {pl.v) - 
q . ~ ) .  p(.v)--q(.v)] is not apparent until a fact pra) i:, 
a.;certecl into \Y>l. In  general. a!though the rules in il RB 
n'a!. be consistent on their nwn (because there exists :I 
model for thern). the! can form iin inconsistent theory 
i:hen combined \vith certain t'licrs in \\.\I. In order for  ;I 
KB to be consistent. there weds  to he a niodel for both RB 
und \V\l. 
On the other hand. facts in \\.\I are chiinsing over time clue 
t o  d!.iiuniic asserrion; and retractions. If  11-e uqe submiprs  t o  
dci>l-,te >tarts of \\-Yl ur differerlt times. R B  may be conbiv 
ten: \\it11 \i'Y:. but insonsis::nt n.ith \'i31 xvhere i = j .  
Th:is. relying on a partictila: \VM state i n  verif! in; the 
con.;isteiic!. of R B  m i y  not produce a n  accurate result. 
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so thnt effective detection algorithms can be developed: (b) 
the completeness of the V&V tools can bc. measured. 
The exhaustive nature of the classification can be consid- 
ered by enumerating all cases that result in an unsatisfiable 
RB (Definition 13). The clue is the derivation of conflict 
literals by a RB or a derived literal being in conflict n i th  a 
fact in WM. Due to space limit. we nil1 skip a forms1 proof. 
3.3. Anaiysis 
Gi1.m a RB and a R'M containing a set of rulej and a set 
of facts. respectively. ~ v e  can show that the Kls is consistent 
by trying to find a model for it. The way lve t? to find a 
model for the Kl3 is through considering an arbitrary inter- 
pretation c. If i satisfies the KJ3 (i.e. satisfies RB and 
WM). then [ is a model for it: otherwise. there is no 
model for the KJ3. If a model is found. then the KB is 
consistent: otherlvise. it is inconsistent. Live sholv the analy- 
sis through some examples. 
Esaniple 2. Given a KB consisting of a 
RB = {rl.r2.r;.rJ.r3] and a WM = {f l . f2 . f3}  shovn belo~v 
r ,  : P A Q - A  f ,  : P 
r , : R A Q - - B  f : :Q  
r 3 : . L \ ~ B - L \ -  f : : R  
r, : X - D 
r, : B --t -D 
~ v e  can show that there is n o  model for the KB. thus, it is 
inconsistent. 
Proof. We convert the KB into the set below 
f ? l  = (-P-QA.-R -QB.-A -BCV. 
--AD.-B 1D.P.Q.R)  
Let i be any interpretation for 0,. 
If 
According to the first two elements in  R, .  there ;nust be 
kc .A and kc B: 
Since kL A and ki B, there must be I=; D and =; -D in 
order for -AD and -B -D to be rrw.  Bur this is 
impossible. As a result. one of the rules of -.AD and 
-B -D must befrrlsr under c. 
Since [ cannot satisfy all rules in R,. it is not a mode1 for 
0:. Because c is an arbitrary interpretation. there is no 
model for GI .  Thus. the given I;B is inconsistent. 
is a model for RI. then IF( P. k: Q. and =- R: 
c7 
The inconsistency in Example 2 is of type 1- 13 because r4 
and ri have different biit consistent LHS and result in 
conflicting conclusions D and -D. The proof procedure 
can be automated using the i ~ . . s o l i / r i o i i  principle lvhere the 
derivation of an enipty c1;1iw amounts to the failure of 
finding a niodel [or the presence of inconsistency in the 
KB). In practice. u'e can use the srructure of the derivation 
generated bj. the resolution principle to extract a set of 
inconsistent rules. 
The above esample demonstrates iin inconsistency in the 
current state of a KB. Thcre is. hontver. another scenario in 
which the proof procedure yields a model for a KB. but there 
exists the potential of inconsistency in  a posible future state 
of the KB. Consider the sirurition \vhcre fact f,: is a legitimate 
input but is not present in the \Yhl at the time of chtcking. 
the proof procedure u i l l  find a model for (KB - f;) and 
conclude that i t  is consistent. (This coincides u.ith the intui- 
tive explanation that the conflicting conclusion -D is not 
deducible because the LHS of r: cannot be satisfied-). 
HoLvever. inconsistency arises \\.hen fact f,: is asserted into 
WM. This phenomenon confirms our earl? arguments that: 
The cause of inconsistency StemS from rules. but facts 
\\ill help expose the insn!isistensy. Thus the inconsis- 
tency checking should involve both RB and \ Y l l .  
KB conjistency can he either temporary or persistent. For 
instance. KB - f? is tei11poi,iiril!. consistent until f j  is 
asserted. Sdch a transienr consiztmcy is not a reliable 
indicator. "'hat is ne&J is an ultimate coniistenc!. 
that guarantees that  a F;B \ \ i l l  be consistent for a11 possi- 
ble states. 
The set of a11 legitimate f x t s  in an applicntion domain 
L I S L I : ~ ! ~ ~  chunges with time. Given ;I time period. it is 
irnportant to identify the set of all legitimate facts durinf 
the period in order to conclude u.hether a E;B Lvill be 
pcr<isrently consistent during the period. 
Operational!y. when a pair of conflictin2 conclusions is 
derived. it ainounts to a fact retraction in WM. i n  a rule- 
based programming language. there itre t u a  types of fact 
retraction: csplicir one through ii language construct such as 
retract and iiqdicir one through derivation of a negated fact 
and negation a i  absence rule for FYM. The implicit fact 
retraction would be an indicator for RB inconsistency. but 
i t  is not a necessary condition for RB inconsistency. The 
reason is that in general. a rule-based system may not have 
the Clziit~I~-Ros.rer p operty.' therefwe the derived facts by 
RB for the same initial facts in CVM may not be unique. For 
instance. tvhen both r2 and r; are enabled. depending on the 
conflict resoliltion strategy used by the control component 
of the system. rl and ri can be fired in different order. As a 




r , : P h Q - R  f ,  : P  
Given a KB contciining the following rules 
r2 : R - U' f 2  : Q 
r3 : W - A 
rl : A --P 
\ve can show that there is no model for the KB. thus. the KB 
is inconsistent. 
Proof. Lye convert the KB into the jet 
(2, = { -P-QR.-RiV.-WA.-X-P.P,Qj 
be an!' interpretation for (1:. Let 
If i is a model for R2. then ic P and k: Q: 
There must be :-.A. 
Hoa.ei.er. there must be 
L-LV and t C-R. respectivel!.. in  
order for -A -P. -\\..A: and -R&:.'to be tmc under (: 
F; R according to the first 
element in fl:. R and -R cannot be both rrire under i .  
As a result. one of the clausej of -P -QR and -RL\- 
must be fdsc  under <. 
cannot surisfy all rules in 0,. i t  is not a model for 
R2. Because is :in arbitrary interpretation. there is no 
model for c!:. Thti5. the given KB is inconsistent. 
Since 
Z 
The inconsistency in Example 3 is of type 11-1 becaux r ;  
has a condition P and results in the derivation of -P. Type 11 
inconsistency not only introduces the logical contradiction 
into the inference process. i t  also has other pragmatic 
ramifications: 
In Example 3. the inconsistency involves a pair of 
complementary literals. \\,-hen r: is fired. it caiises P to 
be removed from UXI. thus either preventing those rules 
that rely on P as input from being enabled or deactivatin? 
those rules that are enabled as a result of P. 
A list of synonymous literals and :I list of mutual esclu- 
sive literals must be declared and maintained as a KB is 
being built and modified. In addition to Definition 6. the 
folloLving should be used to maintain the validity of \Y!vl: 
I f ( P S  Q) A ( Q  E KM). then KB /- P Lvould result in 
If (P 1 Q )  h ( Q  E LV31). then IS3 b- P u.ould result in 
(R'SI - { Q } )  U (P}.  
(LySf - {Q},. 
Computationall!.. when -P i.; a derived fact. the infer- 
ence engine udl check not only for the presence of P in 
LV-M. but also the presence of some literal synonymous to 
P.') Alternatively. before a derived fact P gets deposited 
into LYS.1. the inference system also need to check for the 
presence of Q in \\'M that is mutually exclusive to P. 
Though the use of synonymous and niutultl exclusive 
literals may aid the espressive ponw of the language. 
their potential complications in system correctness should 
never be underestimated and their computntionul cost 
should not be ignored. Therefore. the use of [hose literals. 
especially synonymous literals. should be judicious. 
4. KB redundancy 
Though redundan:y may not cause logical problems (i.e. 
bvith no effect on the set of deducible literals). i t  may lead to 
follon.ing situations \{.here potential problems may arise: 
During E;B niuintenance or e\.olution. if one of the rtdun- 
dunt rules is modified and the others remain unchanged. 
then the updateci E(B will not correspond to the intended 
change. and inconsiscencies cun be introduced as n-ell: 
For a Id3 tvhere no certainty factors are utilized. redun- 
dant d e s  may be enabled under a given state. thus 
resulting in performance slov. donn because all the 
enabled redundant rules may be fired. even thoush the 
firinss of those redundant rules ivill yield the smie j e t  of 
literals (conclusions): 
For a €33 containing ceitainty factors. redundancy nil1 
become a serious problem. the reason being that each 
redundant rule ma! be fired. resulting in multiple count- 
ings of the same information. lvhich. in turn. erroneously 
increases the level of confidence assigned to the derived 
literals (conclusions). This ni;iy ultimately impact the set 
of deducible literals. 
If redundancy is introduced b!. design to speed up some 
classes of frequent deductions. then it is usually contined to 
a subset of the cases (2.2. types 1-2. 1-3. 1-5 in Table 4). We 
can al\vays isolate tho5e "useful" redundant rules. and need 
out redundancy from the KB lvhere there is supposed to be 
none. 
Definition 11. For a set S of rules. lve define a function t)
\vhich returns the number of distinct literals in S. If both 
L and -L are in S .  they will be counted a s  two different 
literals. 
Definition 15. 
set S' of rules such that S = S' and 
( a )  either S' = S - 1. n.here 2, = 
(b) or S '  = & S ) .  ivhere d is a transformation on S such 
that IS'/ = is/ and ,!AS') < $(S) :  then there i j  redundancy 
in S. 
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Given a set S of rules. if we can construct a 
and 1 C s: 
Table 4 
Types of redundancy 












Rules havin,o the same conclusion but different 
permutations of the same set of conditions 
.A rule r. which can be deduced from a set of rules 
.A rule r u.hich is a specialization of another rule r: 
.A rule r. u.hich is subsumed by another rule 
Generalized subsumed rule Ir. is subiumed by r, and r,) 
Rules with same conditionls, and synonymous 
conclusions 
Rules with synonymous conditions and same 
conclusion 
Rules u ith synonymous conditions and synonymous 
conclusim 
Two rultj tvhich have the same or synonymous 
conclusion but contain pairtsi of conflict literals in 
their conditions 
.A rule Lvith redundant conditionlsi 
TKO rule. sharin; the same conclusisrn. and one rule 
having a singleton condition that is in contlict u i t h  a 
condition of another rule 
fRHS(r,) = RHSIr. 1 1  A (LHSIr:, E p(L)) A (LHSlr.1 E p(L)). 
\vhere L is a set of literals 
( r  .._.. r }  ~r , . \vhere fRHSIr , )=LHSI  ... ) , A  ... A ~ R H S (  ...) =  
LHSir,)) A fLHSir I = LHSlr,)) A (RHSfr,) = RHSfr , ) )  
rLHStr \ C LHSrr. 1 1  A tRH3r.J S RHS(r.)i. where LHS(r,) and 
RHSirJ are specializations based on the same set of subjritutions 
(LHSir,) C LHSfr. I I  A (RHSlr,) = RHSfr,)) 
IRHSir.) C LHS(r 1 1  A (RHSir.) = RHSfr,))r,  (LHSir,) = 
(LHSfr;i U LHS(r.1 - RHSir,)ii 
(RHSlr,) = RHSiC. 1 1  A I L H S ~ ~ , )  = LHSlr,)) 
If either of the conditions in Definition 15 holds for a 
given RB. then the RB is said to contain redundancy. 
Thus. in essence. d l  types of redundancy are captured by 
Definition 15. Hotvever. in practice. thzre are sets of 
commonly found types of redundancy. \Vhat are included 
in Table 4 are the frequently encountered types of redun- 
dancy. Type I redundancy in Table 4 in1,olves redundant 
rule(< ) and Type I1 involves redundant (or unnecessary) 
literal(s). Each type encompasses a set of specific cases. 
GiLen a set S of rules. S F C indicates the set C of 
conclusions derivable from S .  If n e  can construct a set S ‘  
of rules from S such that Property (a )  in Definition 15 is 
satisfied. \ye further divide C into C‘ and C” where S’ I- C’ 
and A I- C”. \Ye can prove that if S’ = S .  then S’ I= A. 
According to Theorem 1. for every rule P E A. S‘ - P is 
valid. thus C” C C’ and C = C’. Thereforz. rules in A are 
redundant. During the analysis process ~ v e  can select a 
model i for S‘ with regard to the enabling facts and obtain 
C’ from S’.  and then obtain C” from A to show C” C C‘. 
When S’  is constructed with Property (b) of Definition 15. 
the number of literals in S’ is reduced. even though the 
number of d e s  remain the same. Similar analysis can be 
carried out to prow that C = C’. Since S ’  either contains 
fewer rules or has fcLver literals. \ye can use S’ to replace S .  
Examples 4 and 5 are used to demonstrate the analysib 
proce j s .  
Example 4. Given the followin,o set S of rules 





P A Q - R  
A A B - U  
u A V - \ U ’  
R A I\* - D 
P A  Q A A A B  A \ ’ -  D 




We first convert S and S’ into the abbreviated 
S ’  = (-P -QR. -.A -BU. -U -WV, -R -WD} 
Let i be an interpretation. Two situations need to be 
considered: 
1. If bi S .  then k=; S ’  is obvious. This is a trivial case. 
2 .  If I=[ S ’ .  we need to show that kc S also holds. This boils 
dolvn to pro\.ing that I=< ri. Since =; r4 in S’ .  we must 
have ki D or +: -R or I=; 4\’ 
Case 1: If k; D. then bc r5: 
Cnse 2 :  If =; -R. then I=; -P or Fc -Q because 
ti r,.  Hence. t,. rs: 
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Ctrsr 3: If k; -U-. then k; -U or k,. -V because 
F; r:. 
if bL -V, then i.I ri. 
if k( -U. then either kL -A or k; -B because kc r , .  
Thus. I= r5. 
Therefore. if S‘ is satisfied under i .  so is S. S’ = S. 
If we choose a model 5,) for S’ in Lvhich kc,, (P. Q, A. B. 
V}. j , ,  is also a model for ri. The set of derivable facts from 
S’ and rs are C ‘ =  {R.U.W.D} and C” = {D}. respec- 
tively. Obviously. C” C C’. therefore ri is redundant. C 
S is of redundancy type of 1-5. Removing rj  will eliminate 
the redundancy. 
Example 5. 
ri  : 
Given the follou.ing set S of rules 
P A Q A \V -t R 
rz: - Q - R  
Let rb be a transformation that results in a rule r l ’  bl. 
eliminating the literal Q from r l ,  and let S ’  = {rl  ‘.r2}. We 
can show that S’ = S and the literal Q is redundant (or 
unnecessary ). 
Proof. We first convert S and S’ into the format beloLv: 
S = { -P -Q -WR. QRJ. S’ = { -P -WR. QR) 
Let < be an interpretation. Two cases need to be con- 
sidered: 
1. If ki S’, then I=< S is trivial. 
1. If I=< S. we need to show that t=< S‘ also holds. This boils 
down to proving that uhenever S is satisfied by <. bc r,’. 
Since Fc r2 in S. we must have kc Q or k: R 
Case 1: If k; R. then t=< r,’: 
Case 1: If ki Q and R,‘” then I=: -P or ti -W 
must be rnie because I=; r l .  Hence. I=; rl’. 
Therefore. S’ = S. the literal Q in rl is redundant. 0 
S is of redundancy type of 11-3. Correcting Type I1 redun- 
dancy involves removing the literal(s) in question. For 
instance. for Type 11-3. uhen RB contains a rule set S 
matching the pattern. it can be replaced by the 
I ”  K; R indicates that R evaluates to false under < 
corresponding rule set S’ as shown belou.: 
S :  r i : P l ~ . . . ~ P k ~ Q + R  X.2 I 
r2: -Q - R 
S’ : r’,: P1 A ... A Pk -* R 
r2: -Q --. R 
5. KB circularit3 
3.1. De$iiirion of circulnrip 
Circularity in a KB has been informally defined as a set of 
rules forming a cycle [7,21.30]. What exactly a circularity 
entails semantically is not that clear in the literature. In this 
section. we provide a definition of the KB circularity in 
terms of the derivation of tautologous rules and argue that 
the phenomenon reflects an anomalous situation in a €3 and 
has both operational and semantic ramifications. 
Definition 16. A rule E is ro~trologoits. denoted as E, if it 
contuins a complementary or an incompatible pair of 
literals. 
Example 6. 
P A Q - P, where -P and P are a complementar! pair 
( in  -P  V -Q V P) 
Irighjiriced(s) A spncioifs(s) - e.Ypemii.e(.v), u here - highgriced(.~) and e s p e n s i ~ ~ ( . r )  a e an incompatible 
pair ( in  -highgri-iced(s) v -spncioirs(s) v e . ~ p e n s i i ~ f s ) ) .  
Follouing are two tautologous rules: 
Definition 17. 
can deduce a tautologous rule from S .  
A nonempty set S of rules is circular if we 
Definition 18. A nonempty set S of rules is ntinin7a!/y 
circular. denoted as s, if S is circular and no proper subset 
of S is circular. 
Given 5. rules in s are said to be forming a cycle. The 
deduction of a tautologous rule is trivial if 5 is a singleton 
set satisfying the aforementioned condition. In a given S, 
there may be more than one tautologous rule deducible from 
it that involves different pairs of (complementary or incom- 
patible) literals. 
Operationally speaking circular rules may result in 
infinite loops (if an exiting condition is not properly defined) 
during inference. thus hampering the problem solving 
process. Semantically speaking. the fact that a tautologous 
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wff is derivable indicates that the circular rule set encom- 
passes knowledge that is always true regardless of any 
problem specific information. In general. tautologous wffs 
are those that are true by virtue of their logical form and thus 
provide no useful information about the domain being 
described [47]. Therefore. circular rules prove to be less 
useful in the problem solving process. \%'hat is needed. as 
evidenced in many real KB systems. are consistent rules that 
are triggered by problem specific information (facts) rather 
than tautologous rules that are true regardless of the problem 
to be solved. 
5.2. Types of circularin 
Circularity primarily stems from the definitions of rules in 
RB. However. control strategies deployed (in places such as 
the mechanisms of agendas. rule salience or priority level 
definitions and module selections) in the inference system 
may also be cause for the infinite looping of certain rules. In 
this paper. ~ v e  focus on the types of circularity that are 
confined in the RB. 
Definition 19. 
define t\vo sets of literds 5, and 5, as follom s: 
SL = {L L E LHS(r) A r E S )  
Given a minimally circular rule set 5. we 
S ,  = {LiL E RHS(r) A r E 3). 
The types of circularity in a rule base. as summarized 
in Table 5. are classified based on enumerating possible 
relationships between 5,. and 3, and the nature of the 
tautology. Type I circularity indicates cycles in which 
SL = S , .  Type I1 describes cycles with additional condi- 
tions involved in the ruler. therefore. 5, is a proper 
subset of 5,. If Cs is a cycle formed out of a minimally 
circular rule set 5. the girth p of Cs can be defined as 
gtCs) = 'Si. Cycles in these types can have a girth 
ranging from one to some integer MAX where MAX 
is bounded by the cardinality of the rule base /RBI of a 
given KB. 
5.3. Analysis 
The analysis of KI3 circularity amounts to deriving 
from a given rule base a tautologous rule r that satisfies 
the conditions in Definition 16. using some inference 
method. 
Esample 7. Below is a rule base S containing five rules 
r,: \V + u 
r.: P A A - R  
rl: Q A c - I\' 
r:: R A B - Q  
r5 : U A D A E A G - P  
C'sing the resoluriori method. we can derive a tautologous 
rule from S .  Since S is the smallest set that yields such a 
tautologous rule. it is thus minimally circular. 
Proof. 
S = { -lVL.-P -AR.-Q -Cb'.-R -BQ. 
LVe convert S into the following format 
-U -D -E -GP). 
It is not difficult to see that the following rule is derivable 
from S by using the resolution method 
-LV -D -E -G -A -B -CiV. 
Since -LV and IV are a pair of complementary literals. the 
derived rule is tautologous. Therefore. S is minimally 
circular. L - 
Incidentally. there are four other tautologous rules 
involving -P and P. - Q  and Q. -R and R. and -U 
and U. respectively. This example exhibits Type 11-1 circu- 
larity. 
Once a circularity is detected. the circular rule set needs 
t~ be synti1ctically redefined to break up the circularity. 
Semuntically. information about a problem domain needs 
to be reorganized so that i t  tvill contribute to the problem 
solving process. Some of the possible remedial measures for 
circularity can bz found in Section 7. 
6. KB incompleteness 
Informally speaking. a KI3 is incomplete when it does not 
have dl the necessary information to answer a question of 
interest in an intended application [ 16.311. Thus. complete- 
iiess represents a queq-centric measure for the quality of a 
KB. Id3 incompltteness is a real issue to be reckoned with 
for at least the folloLving reasons: (a) In many applications. 
the KB is built in an incremental and piecemeal fashion and 
it undergoes a continual evolution. The information 
acquired at each stage of the evolution may be vague or 
indefinite in nature. ( b )  The deployment of a KB system 
cannot just Lvait for the KB to be stabilized in some final 
and complete form since this may never happen. 
Despite the fact that a practical KB can never 
completely capture all aspects of a real problem 
domain. i t  is still possible for a KB to be complete 
for a specific area in the domain. The boundaries of 
this specific area may be defined in terms of all re lewzr  
p e r i c s  to be asked during problem solving process. If a 
KB h3s all the information to answer those relevant 
queries defiiiite!\. then the KB is complete with regard 
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Table 5 
Type' of circularity in a NIC b ~ ; c  
to those queries. In what follows. we base our introduce a set of predicate symbols %(p) on \vhich p 
discus5ions of completeness on the concepts of relevant directly or indirectly depends. % ( p )  can bc obt:iincd using 
querie5 and the abilitj. of a KB to answer those queries. the follonins procedure. 
6.1. Dqfiiiirioii of' qirct?-based iircoinplereiiess ISPUT: p E F 
OUTPUT: %(y)  
Definition 20. 
of all prcdicate symbols and rrsknblc predicate symbols in while 31- E I;s [ p  € RHS(r)] do %(I>) := %(p)U 
LHS(r): 
that can appziir in a query. Csually it is the case that nlzile 3 r  E KJ3 3q E ? ~ b  [q E RHStri A q E 
?KE 3 ? , , . I '  X query 0 contnining predicate symbols % ( I > )  A LHS(r) 0 % ( p ) ]  do % ( p )  := 3i (p)  U LHSlr); 
p,. ._.. 17: E s?., is denoted as 
If a littral containing a predicate symbol p cannot be 
satisfied by either a given fact or a deri\.ed fact. then it is 
denotcd as H p .  Three types of incompletmess arc defined 
i n  Table 6. Types I and I1 reveal KB incompleteness from 
the pzrspective of relevant queries. i.e., lack of nccessac. 
information to ansu:er queries. and Type 111 indicares the 
potential incompleteness of the relevant query set 2 from 
Given a KB. ive define ?=;;3 and ? A  as Sct j  
the KB. respectively. A n  askable predicate symbol is one 
%fp)  := rz: 
- 
0 Q I J ?  ,..... />,) 'I 
Definition 21. 
115 fol lo\ . \~  
A set CJ of d t ~ ~ ~ - u r r  qwries is now defined 
Q = {O  Q appears in some query session A 
0 -  e ( p ,  ...,. p , ) h p ,  ..... p ,  € ? \ } .  
- 
Definition 22. Given a query Q E Q. the ans\i.er to Q. 
denoted ils d Q ) .  can be either dcfiiiite or iurkmm.~~.  n(Q) 
is definite if either KB + Q or KB i- -0: C Y ( ~ )  is unknown if 
neither KB I- Q nor KB I- -0. 
Definition 23. 
query set Q if VQ E C2 [do) is definite]. 
A KB is coniplert. \vith regard to a relevant 
6.2. T ~ p c s  of iiicoiiiplereiies.r 
Let 3 = PKE U PA. For a predicate symbol p E ?. we 
I' LVhcn there i s  incomplereness in  3 KB. this may not be true. a\ 
I' Lye 3.\)ume that the query 0 i.i a conjunction of the literals containing 
evidenced in Table 6. 
prcdicat: s! tnbols P,. . . _. P,, 
the perspective of knoLvn information (rules/facts). 
Though the classification in Table 6 is exhaustive with 
regard to Definition 23. there are pragmatic and application 
specific considerations that Ivill help determine the i.;llidity 
of incompleteness cases. 
The analysis of KB incompleteness depends critically on 
the availability of information regarding the relevant query 
set in a problem domain. Prototypinz often serves as a 
means to ascertain the releimt query set. If the relevant 
query set is available. the analysis amounts to findinp out 
if  all queries can be answered definitely. Checking for the 
prcsence or absence of the aforementioned syntactic symp- 
toms is an integrai 'and necessary part of the analysis 
process. Hou,ever. there are other considerdtionc in the 
analysis process that are semantic. pragmatic. or problem 
specific. The analysis process is really an iterati\.< one. 
because a 3  KB continually evolves. so will the relevant 
query set. 
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Table 6 
Types of incomplereness 
Type Descriptions i7.21.371 Pattern 
I Dangling conditions. 311 E P 3 p  E '+[q E '3;tp) A 
unreachable conclusions Fi q]' 
I1 blissing initial facts. 3 p  E P.4 ['fi(pJ = a A 
missing rules P E PKSl 
111 Cseless conclusions. 3y E PhB vp E [q E %(PI] 
unused initial facts. 
isolated rules 
Bes;luse the criterion for the completeness issue is domain-specific. i t  is 
possiblc t h i t  q in [q E % ( p ) A  Fi q] may be useless structure in the KB. 
Ultimately. the domain expert or knowledge engineer has to determine 
the nature of the anomaly. 
Since p: E PA and [\R@,) = 0 A p 2  @ iPKB]. there 
exists Type I1 incompleteness. No rules and facts could be 
used to answer queries involving p:. In addition. h E % ( p ,  )
and If h. So Type I incompleteness also exists. Finally. the 
presence of the rule r.: and the fact f i  may indicate that p ;  
should have been an askable predicate. In other \vords, F,4 is 
incomplete. and there is reason to believe that the relevant 
query set is incomplete also. C j  
7. Remedial measures 
Once KB anomalies are identified, the next issue is how 
to correct the situations in which the quality of a KB has 
been compromised. Though it is of pivotal importance. the 
issue has not been adequately addressed in the literature. To 
a certain extent. this is due to the fact that the issue of how to 
mend a KB relies on a whole host of considerations, many of 
which are problem or application specific. In the rest of this 
section, we would like to address the issue in terms of some 
general principles and provide some example remedial 
measures for the cases dealt with in the previous four 
sections. 
For correcting inconsistency, we suggest the folloaing 
actions: 
Avoid usinp synonymous literals if possible. 
Delete one of the offending rules that derives the conflict 
conclusion. 
Xlodify the conditions (e.g. predicate symbols) of the 
rules involved such that they no longer have or share 
the same or synonymous conditions. 
hlodify the conclusions (e.g. predicate symbols) of the 
rules involved such that they are no longer in conflict. 
Move one of the offending rules to a different rule 
module such that the derivation of conflict conclusions 
cannot take place in the same problem-solving session or 
at the same time. 
Actions to eliminate redundancy may include: 
Delete redundant rule(s). 
Merge or collapse rules into one. 
For example. P A Q - R. -P A Q - R Q - R 
Delete condition(s) of certain rule(s). 
For example. P A Q - R. -Q - R * P + R, 
- Q- R  
Xlodify the conditions or conclusions of the redundant 
rules such that they no longer are the same or synony- 
mous. 
To resolve circularity. the following remedial measures 
may be taken: 
Remove a rule from a circular rule set. 
For example. P -  Q. Q-  R. R -  P *  P-  Q. 
Q - R  
Redefine a conclusion of a rule in the set such that it no 
longer serves as a condition of another rule in the set. 
For example. P- Q. Q-R.  R - + P * P - Q ,  
Q - R', R - P where R' and R are no longer unifiable. 
Redefine a condition of a rule in the set such that it no 
l o n p  matches a conclusion of another rule in the set. 
To plug holes in an incomplete KB, we could 
Add new rules and/or facts to make all relevant queries 
definite. 
For example, new rules and facts can be added to make 
h(s .  j) satisfiable in Example 8. 
Modify the initial facts to patch up holes. 
Modify the conditions andor conclusions of rules 
involved in an incompleteness case so that they will 
be "connected" with the rest of RB. 
Though i t  is beyond the scope of this paper, we would like 
to point out that in a KE? Lvhere certainty factors (CF) are 
used. there are additional actions to be considered. For 
instance. add or modify CF values for rules or facts. or 
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modify the threshold value(s) for the CF-value propagation 
during inference process. 
Xckno.rvledgements 
8. Concluding remarks 
As more and more expert systems and kno\vled= oe-based 
systems are deployed in settings where failures may result in 
loss of productivity. decision-making quality. property. 
business. services. investment. or even life. u.ays to detect 
and resolve potential anomalies in a KB become critical 
issues in de\.eloping correct. accurate and reliable systems. 
In order for the results LO be credible. V&V techniques milst 
be built on a solid theoretical foundation. 
It is difficult to assess many of the V&V tools. methods 
and techniques that have been developed or proposed 
because there is no accepted standard against tvhich to 
measure the reliability or coi-rectness of an expert system. 
Indeed there is lack of definite semantics for expert systems 
in general and KB in particular. This prevents any definite 
conclusions about reliability and hinders the use of expert 
systems in safety-critical applications. The field of V&V for 
expert systems is far from having tractable formal models 
that can cover all of the features of real expert systems. 
which often rely on imperative state changes and other 
non-logical features. Our simplified model. though a preli- 
minary one. does provide a basis for reachin, 0 definite 
conclusions about the reliabilit!. of those aspects in expert 
systenii that can be expressed in logical terms. It is our hope 
that the logical formulation presented in this paper makes a 
step in the right direction. 
Future uurk can continue in several directions. One is 
concerned with h o n  to establish an assessment standard. 
based on logical instrliments similar to those discussed in 
this paper. for the V&V tools and methodologies. For 
instance. given a KB and its semantics r. we use ,& to 
indicate the set of anomalies defined under r. For a V&V 
method M. we use Asl to denote the set of anomalies M is 
capable of discovering. M is soirncl if Vii E As, [a E &,I.]; M 
is coinpIetr if Vii E i .1.  [g E ,i\,]. 
Another direction is to study the KB anomalies in an 
object-oriented (00) paradigm. Recent developments in  
knouledge representation formalisms include: (a) estznding 
the 00 paradigm to include rules (i.e. rules can be consid- 
ered as a specific type of behavior for objects); (b)  bringing 
objects into the rule-based paradigm (i.e. rules are specified 
about objects); (c)  hybrid representation formalism that 
blends frames, objects. cases and rules together [ IS ] .  The 
next challenge to us is the issue of how to (re)define the 
concepts and meanings of E;B anomalies in the context of 
those formalisms. 
A KB should be developed based on its underlying ontol- 
ogy [49.50]. It is not clear Lvhat relationship there is betLveen 
the anonymous situations that arc manifested at a KB levzl 
and the root causes at its ontology. This is yet another direc- 
tion worth exploring. 
The authors lvould like to express their sincere apprecia- 
tion to Prof. V. Berzins. and the anonymous referees for 
their helpful comments and suggestions on the earlier drafts 
of the paper. 
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Abstract 
Machine learning deals with the issue of how to build programs that improve their 
performance at some task through experience. Machine learning algorithms have proven 
to be of great practical value in a variety of application domains. They are particularly 
useful for (a) poorly understood problem domains where little knowledge exists for the 
humans to develop effective algorithms; (b) domains where there are large databases 
containing valuable implicit regularities to be discovered; or (c) domains where programs 
must adapt to changing conditions. Not surprisingly, the field of software engineering 
turns out to be a fertile ground where many sofhvare development tasks could be 
formulated as learning problems and approached in terms of learning algorithms. In this 
paper, we Jirst take a look at the characteristics and applicability of some Ji-equently 
utilized machine learning algorithms. We then provide formulations of some software 
development tasks using learning algorithms. Finally, a brief summay is given of the 
existing work. 
Keywords: machine learning, software engineering, learning algorithms. 
1. The Challenge 
The challenge of modeling software system structures in a fastly moving scenario gives 
rise to a number of demanding situations. First situation is where software systems must 
dynamically adapt to changmg conditions. The second one is where the domains involved 
may be poorly understood. And the last but not the least is one where there may be no 
knowledge (though there may be raw data available) to develop effective algorithmic 
solutions. 
To answer the challenge, a number of approaches can be utilized [1,12]. One such 
approach is the transformational programming. Under the transformational programming, 
software is developed, modified, and maintained at specification level, and then 
automatically transformed into production-quality software through automatic program 
synthesis [5 ] .  This sokware development paradigm will enable software engineering to 
become the discipline of capturing and automating currently undocumented domain and 
design knowledge [lo]. Software engineers will deliver knowledge-based application 
generators rather than modif iable  application programs. 
In order to realize its full potential, there are tools and methodologies needed for the 
various tasks inherent to the transformational programming. In this paper, we take a look 
at how machine learning (ML) algorithms can be used to build tools for software 
development and maintenance tasks. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 
2 provides an overview of machine learning and frequently used learning algorithms. 
Some of the software development and maintenance tasks for which learning algorithms 
are applicable are given in Section 3. Formulations of those tasks in terms of the learning 
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algorithms are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 describes some of the existing work. 
Finally in Section 6,  we conclude the paper with remarks on future work. 
2. Machine Learning Algorithms 
Machine learning deals with the issue of how to build computer programs that improve 
their performance at some task through experience [ 1 11. Machine learning algorithms have 
been utilized in: (1) data mining problems where large databases may contain valuable 
implicit regularities that can be discovered automatically; (2) poorly understood domains 
where humans might not have the knowledge needed to develop effective algorithms; and 
(3) domains where programs must dynamically adapt to changing conditions [l 13. 
Learning a target function from training data involves many issues (function 
representation, how and when to generate the function, with what given input, how to 
evaluate the performance of generated function, and so forth). Figure 1 describes the 
dimensions of the target function learning. 
Major types of learning include: concept learning (CL), decision trees (DT), artificial 
neural networks (ANN), Bayesian belief networks (BBN), reinforcement learning (RL), 
genetic algorithms (GA) and genetic programming (GP), instance-based learning (IBL), 
inductive logic programming (ILP), and analytical learning (AL). Table 1 summarizes the 
main properties of different types of learning. 
Not surprisingly, machine learning methods can be (and some have already been) used in 
developing better tools or software products. Our preliminary study identifies the software 
development and maintenance tasks in the following areas to be appropriate for machine 
learning applications: requirement engineering (knowledge elicitation, prototyping); 
software reuse (application generators); testing and validation; maintenance (software 
understanding); project management (cost, effort, or defect prediction or estimation). 
3. Software Engineering Tasks 
Table 2 contains a list of software engineering tasks for which ML methods are applicable. 
Those tasks belong to different life-cycle processes of requirement specification, design, 
implementation, testing and maintenance. This list is by no means a complete one. It only 
serves as a harbinger of what may become a fertile ground for some exciting research on 
applying ML techniques in software development and maintenance. 
One of the attractive aspects of ML techniques is the fact that they offer an invaluable 
complement to the existing repertoire of tools so as to make it easier to rise to the 
challenge of the aforementioned demanding situations. 
4. Applying ML, Algorithms to SE Tasks 
In this section, we formulate the identified software development and maintenance tasks as 
learning problems and approach the tasks using machine learning algorithms. 
Component reuse 
Component retrieval from a software repository is an important issue in supporting 
software reuse. This task can be formulated into an instance-based learning problem as 
follows: 
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Table 2. SE tasks and applicable A4L methods. 
SE tasks 
Requirement engineering 
Rapid prototyping GP 
Applicable type(s) of learning 
AL, BBN, LL, DT, ILP 
Component reuse IBL (CBR4) 
Cost'effort prediction IBL (CBR), DT, BBN, ANN 
Defect prediction 1 BBN I/ 
Test oracle generation I AL (EBL') II 
Test data adequacy I CL 1 
Validation ll 
Reverse engineering 
Components in a software repository are represented as points in the n-dimensional 
Euclidean space (or cases in a case base). 
Information in a component can be divided into indexed and unindexed information 
(attributes). Indexed information is used for retrieval purpose and unindexed 
information is used for contextual purpose. Because of the curse of dimensionality 
problem [ 1 I], the choice of indexed attributes must be judicious. 
Queries to the repository for desirable components can be represented as constraints on 
indexable attributes. 
Similarity measures €or the nearest neighbors of the desirable component can be based 
on the standard Euclidean distance, distance-weighted measure, or symbolic measure. 
The possible retrieval methods include: K-Nearest Neighbor, inductive retrieval, 
Locally Weighted Regression. 
The adaptation of the retrieved component for the task at hand can be structural 
(applying adaptation rules directly to the retrieved component), or derivational 
(reusing adaptation rules that generated the original solution to produce a new 
solution). 
Rapid prototyping 
Rapid prototyping is an important tool for understanding and validating software 
requirements. In addition, software prototypes can be used for other purposes such as user 
training and system testing [ 181. Different prototyping techniques have been developed for 
evolutionaiy and throw-away prototypings. The existing techniques can be augmented by 
including a machine learning approach, i.e., the use of genetic programming. 
In GP, a computer program is often represented as a program tree where the internal nodes 
correspond to a set of functions used in the program and the external nodes (terminals) 
indicate variables and constants used as input to functions. For a given problem, GP starts 
with an initial population of randomly generated computer programs. The evolution 
process of generating a final computer program that solves the given problem hinges on 
some sort of fitness evaluation and probabilistically reproducing the next generation of the 
CBR stands for case-based reasoning. 
EBL refers to explanation-based learning. 5 
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program population through some genetic operations. Given a GP development 
environment such as the one in [8], the framework of a GP-based rapid prototyping 
process can be described as follows: 
1. Define sets of functions and terminals to be used in the developed (prototype) systems. 
2. Define a Jitness function to be used in evaluating the worthiness of a generated 
program. Test data (input values and expected output) may be needed in assisting the 
evaluation. 
3. Generate the initial program population. 
4. Determine selection strategies for programs in the current generation to be included in 
the next generation population. 
5. Decide how the genetic operations (crossover and mutation) are carried out during 
each generation and how often these operations are performed. 
6. Specify the terminating criteria for the evolution process and the way of checking for 
termination. 
7. Translate the returned program into a desired programming language format. 
Requirement engineering 
Requirement engineering refers to the process of establishing the services a system should 
provide and the constraints under which it must operate [18]. A requirement may be 
functional or non-functional. A functional requirement describes a system service or 
function, whereas a non-functional requirement represents a constraint imposed on the 
system. How to obtain functional requirements of a system is the focus here. The situation 
in which ML algorithms will be particularly useful is when there exist empirical data from 
the problem domain that describe how the system should react to certain inputs. Under this 
circumstance, functional requirements can be "learned" from the data through some 
learning algorithm. 
1. Let X and C be the domain and the co-domain of a system functionfto be learned. The 
data set D is defined as: D = { <Xiy cp1 X i  E X A c k  E C} . 
2. The target functionsfto be learned is such that VXi E X and ' d c k  E C , f ( X i )  = c k  . 
3. The learning methods applicable here have to be of supervised type. Depending on the 
nature of the data set D, different learning algorithms (in AL, BBN, CL, DT, ILP) can 
be utilized to capture (learn) a system's functional requirements. 
Reverse engineering 
Legacy systems are old systems that are critical to the operation of an organization which 
uses them and that must still be maintained. Most legacy systems were developed before 
software engineering techniques were widely used. Thus they may be poorly structured 
and their documentation may be either out-of-date or non-existent. In order to bring to 
bear the legacy system maintenance, the first task is to recover the design or specification 
of a legacy system from its source or executable code (hence, the term of reverse 
engineering, or program comprehension and understanding). Below we describe a 
framework for deriving functional specification of a legacy software system from its 
executable code. 
1. Given the executable code p and its input data set X, and output set C, the training data 
2. The process of deriving the functional specification f for p can be described as a 
learning problem in whichfis learned through some ML algorithm such that 
3. Many supervised learning methods can be used here (e.g., CL). 
set D is defrned as: D = { < X i ,  p(Xi )>I X i  E X Ap(Xi) E C }  .
VXi E X [ f(Xi) = p ( ~ i ) ] .  
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Validation 
Verification and validation are important checlung processes to make sure that 
implemented software system conforms to its specification. To check a software 
implementation against its specification, we assume the availability of both a specification 
and an executable code. This checking process can be performed as an analytic learning 
task as follows: 
1. Let X and C be the domain and co-domain of the implementation (executable code) p ,  
which is defined as: p :  X + C. 
2. The training set D is defined as: D = (<x,,p(x,)>l x, E X }. 
3. The specification for p is denoted as B, which corresponds to the domain theory in the 
analytic learning. 
4. The validation checlung is defined to be: p is valid if 
5. Explanation-based learning algorithms can be utilized to carry out the checlung 
Test oracle generation 
Functional testing involves executing a program under test and examining the output fiom 
the program. An oracle is needed in functional testing in order to determine if the output 
fiom a program is correct. The oracle can be a human or a software one [13]. The 
approach we propose here allows a test oracle to be learned as a h c t i o n  fiom the 
specification and a small set of training data. The learned test oracle can then be used for 
the hnctional testing purpose. 
1. Let X and C be the domain and co-domain of the programp to be tested. Let B be the 
specification for p .  
2. Define a small training set D as: D = { <xl, p(xl)>I x, E X' A X' c X A p(xJ E C }  .
3. Use the explanation-based learning (EBL) to generate a test oracle 0 (0: X + C) forp 
from B and D. 
4. Use 0 for the functional testing: 'dxt E X [output o fp  is correct if&,) = O(x,)]. 
Test adequacy criteria 
Software test data adequacy criteria are rules that determine if a software product has been 
adequately tested [21]. A test data adequacy criterion 6 is a function: 6:  P x S x T 3 {true, 
false) where P is a set of programs, S a set of specifications and T the class of test sets. 
c@, s, t) = true means that t is adequate for testing program p against specification s 
according to criterion 6 .  Since 6 is essentially a Boolean function, we can use a strategy 
such as CL to learn the test data adequacy criteria. 
1. Define the instance space X as: X = { <p,, s,, t p lp l  E P A s, E S A t k  E T). 
2. Define the training data set D as: D = {<x, &)>I x E X A c(x) E V], where V is 
defined as: V = {true, false}. 
3. Use the concept of version space and the candidate-elimination algorithm in CL to 
learn the definition of 6.  
Software defect prediction 
Software defect prediction is a very useful and important tool to gauge the likely delivered 
quality and maintenance effort before software systems are deployed [4]. Predicting 
defects requires a holistic model rather than a single-issue model that hinges on either size, 
or complexity, or testing metrics, or process quality data alone. It is argued in [4] that all 
'd<Xl ,  p(-%)> E D [B A x, I- p(x1)l. 
process. 
these factors must be taken into consideration in order for the defect prediction to be 
successful. 
Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN) prove to be a very useful approach to the software 
defect prediction problem. A BBN represents the joint probability distribution for a set of 
variables. This is accomplished by specifying (a) a directed acyclic graph (DAG) where 
nodes represent variables and arcs correspond to conditional independence assumptions 
(causal knowledge about the problem domain), and (b) a set of local conditional 
probability tables (one for each variable) [7, 111. A BBN can be used to infer the 
probability distribution for a target variable (e.g., “Defects Detected”), which specifies the 
probability that the variable will take on each of its possible values (e.g., “very low”, 
“low”, “medium”, “high”, or “very high” for the variable “Defects Detected”) given the 
observed values of the other variables. In general, a BBN can be used to compute the 
probability distribution for any subset of variables given the values or distributions for any 
subset of the remaining variables. When using a BBN for a decision support system such 
as software defect prediction, the steps below should be followed. 
1. Identify variables in the BBN. Variables can be: (a) hypothesis variables for which the 
user would like to find out their probability distributions (hypothesis variable are either 
unobservable or too costly to observe), (b) information variables that can be observed, 
or (c) mediating variables that are introduced for certain purpose (help reflect 
independence properties, facilitate acquisition of conditional probabilities, and so 
forth). Variables should be defined to reflect the life-cycle activities (specification, 
design, implementation, and testing) and capture the multi-facet nature of software 
defects (perspectives from size, testing metrics and process quality). Variables are 
denoted as nodes in the DAG. 
2. Define the proper causal relationships among variables. These relationships also 
should capture and reflect the causality exhibited in the software life-cycle processes. 
They will be represented as arcs in the corresponding DAG. 
3. Acquire a probability distribution for each variable in the BBN. Theoretically well- 
founded probabilities, or frequencies, or subjective estimates can all be used in the 
BBN. The result is a set of conditional probability tables one for each variable. The 
full joint probability distribution for all the defect-centric variables is embodied in the 
DAG structure and the set of conditional probability tables. 
Project effort (cost) prediction 
How to estimate the cost for a software project is a very important issue in the software 
project management. Most of the existing work is based on algorithmic models of effort 
[ 171. A viable alternative approach to the project effort prediction is instance-based 
learning. TBL yields very good performance for situations where an algorithmic model for 
the prediction is not possible. In the framework of IBL, the prediction process can be 
carried out as follows. 
1. Introduce a set of features or attributes (e.g., number of interfaces, size of functional 
requirements, development tools and methods, and so forth) to characterize projects. 
The decision on the number of features has to be judicious, as this may become the 
cause of the curse of dimensionality problem that will affect the prediction accuracy. 
2. Collect data on completed projects and store them as instances in the case base. 
3. Define similarity or distance between instances in the case base according to the 
symbolic representations of instances (e.g., Euclidean distance in an n-dimensional 
space where n is the number of features used). To overcome the potential curse of 
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dimensionality problem, features may be weighed differently when calculating the 
distance (or similarity) between two instances. 
4. Given a query for predicting the effort of, a new project, use an algorithm such as K- 
Nearest Neighbor, or, Locally Weighted Regession to retrieve similar projects and use 
them as the basis for returning the prediction result. 
5. Existing Work 
Several areas in software development have already witnessed the use of machne learning 
methods. In this section, we take a look at some reported results. The list is definitely not a 
complete one. It only serves as an indication that people realize the potential of ML 
techniques and begin to reap the benefits from applying them in software development and 
maintenance. 
Scenario-based requirement engineering 
The work reported in [9] describes a formal method for supporting the process of inferring 
specifications of system goals and requirements inductively from interaction scenarios 
provided by stakeholders. The method is based on a learning algorithm that takes 
scenarios as examples and counter-examples (positive and negative scenarios) and 
generates goal specifications as temporal rules. 
A related work in [6] presents a scenarios-based elicitation and validation assistant that 
helps requirements engineers acquire and maintain a specification consistent with 
scenarios provided. The system relies on explanation-based learning (EBL) to generalize 
scenarios to state and prove validation lemmas. 
Software project effort estimation 
Instance-based learning techniques are used in [17] for predicting the software project 
effort for new projects. The empirical results obtained (from nine different industrial data 
sets totaling 275 projects) indicate that cased-based reasoning offers a viable complement 
to the existing prediction and estimations techniques. A related CBR application in 
software effort estimation is given in [20]. 
Decision trees (DT) and artificial neural networks (ANN) are used in [ 191 to help predict 
software development effort. The results were competitive with conventional methods 
such as COCOMO and function points. The main advantage of DT and ANN based 
estimation systems is that they are adaptable and nonparametric. 
The result reported in [3] indicates that the improved predictive performance can be 
obtained through the use of Bayesian analysis. Additional research on ML based software 
effort estimation can be found in [2,14,15,16]. 
Software defect prediction 
Bayesian belief networks are used in [4] to predict software defects. Though the system 
reported is only a prototype, it shows the potential BBN has in incorporating multiple 
perspectives on defect prediction into a single, unified model. 
Variables in the prototype BBN system [4] are chosen to represent the life-cycle processes 
of specification, design and implementation, and testing (Problem-Complexity, Design- 
Effort, Design-Size, Defects-Introduced, Testing-Effort, Defects-Detected, Defects- 
Density-At-Testing, Residual-Defect-Count, and Residual-Defect-Density). The proper 
causal relationships among those software life-cycle processes are then captured and 
reflected as arcs connecting the variables. 
A tool is then used with regard to the BBN model in the following manner. For given facts 
about Design-Effort and Design-Size as input, the tool will use Bayesian inference to 
derive the probability distributions for Defects-Introduced, Defects-Detected and Defect- 
Density. 
6. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we show how ML algorithms can be used in tackling software engineering 
problems. ML algorithms not only can be used to build tools for software development 
and maintenance tasks, but also can be incorporated into software products to make them 
adaptive and self-configuring. A maturing software engineering discipline will definitely 
be able to benefit from the utility of ML techniques. 
What lies ahead is the issue of realizing the promise and potential ML techniques have to 
offer in the circumstances as discussed in Section 4. In addition, expanding the frontier of 
ML application in software engineering is another direction worth pursuing. 
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